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ABSTRACT
The widespread use of the statutory authority has long been 
seen as a major characteristic of Australian public 
administration. A major theme in the literature on statutory 
authorities in countries such as Australia whose core 
institutions of government are based on the Westminster model 
is the problem of accountability which these bodies are 
alleged to cause. This thesis addresses that problem in the 
context of Australian Commonwealth government.
The general aim of the thesis is to challenge the 
traditional view that the statutory authority is not a 
suitable administrative form upon which to build an 
accountable public administration. It begins by showing how 
the dominant conception of accountability associated with the 
Westminster 'syndrome' of ministerial control of 
administration and ministerial responsibility to parliament 
has shaped, and prejudiced, the understanding of 
accountability in Commonwealth statutory authorities. Next, 
it is argued that there is less difference between the 
accountability of Australian Commonwealth statutory 
authorities and that of ministerial departments than is often 
supposed. The thesis then questions the continuing 
application to statutory authorities of assumptions about 
accountability which have for some time been under serious
challenge in Australian public administration. It is argued 
that, considered in the light of an understanding of 
accountability informed by contemporary developments in 
Australia and elsewhere, Commonwealth statutory authorities 
demonstrate a reasonably healthy degree of accountability and, 
perhaps more importantly, reveal the potential to play an 
important role in the development of a more accountable public 
administration.
Central to the thesis is an attempt to develop an 
appropriate conceptual framework for understanding the public 
accountability of statutory authorities. To this end, the 
root idea of accountability is identified as the satisfaction 
of diverse expectations and concerns about the exercise of 
administrative discretion. It is then argued that three 
conceptions of, or perspectives on, accountability may be 
usefully distinguished. Alongside the traditional notion of 
'parliamentary control', 'managerialist' and 'constituency 
relations' conceptions are introduced. The differences 
between the three may be summarized as follows: parliamentary 
control relies heavily on essentially bureaucratic 
relationships of close supervision or control of the 
administrative agency; the managerialist conception employs 
quasi-contractual relations, emphasizing strategic control and 
periodic evaluation; and the constituency relations conception 
rests on an essentially political set of relationships, 
emphasizing the responsiveness through various mechanisms of 
the agency to a range of interested constituencies.
The three conceptions are presented as complementary 
rather than mutually exclusive ways of viewing accountability.
All have a role to play in contemporary public administration, 
and indeed all three may be utilized in different mixes to 
engineer a desired level and form of public accountability for 
particular statutory authorities. Accountability regimes, it 
is suggested, ought to be tailored to the nature and mission 
of the individual administrative organization.
It is also suggested, finally, that debate over the 
accountability of statutory authorities may be viewed as an 
aspect of a wider debate over the relative merits of competing 
models of democracy. Statutory authorities have a role to 
play in a system of government based on dispersal of power and 
widespread responsiveness. They allow administrative tasks to 
be located in a wide range of purpose-built administrative 
agencies with a wide range of purpose-related means of 
responding to the concerns and expectations of many relevant 
constituencies regarding the use of administrative discretion.
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INTRODUCTION
The widespread use of the statutory authority has long been 
seen as a major characteristic of Australian public 
administration. In the era of responsible government 
Australia was slower to abandon and earlier to readopt the 
statutory authority as a standard form of administrative 
agency than was Britain (Wettenhall, 1963). Powerful, 
substantially autonomous statutory authorities have been 
identified as a key component of a distinctively Australian 
pattern of public policy (Emy, 1974). While the latter has 
arguably been breaking down over recent years, statutory 
authorities continue to be created in large numbers. 
Moreover, at both the state and federal levels statutory 
authorities continue to be large consumers of governmental 
resources, human and financial, and to have an important 
economic impact. These facts have recently begun to be 
documented in detail (PBRC, 1981; SSCSAF, 1983) and have been 
widely publicised.
It is not surprising then that statutory authorities 
have over many years attracted the attention of Australian 
political scientists. A good deal of the resultant 
literature seeks to chart, survey developments within, and 
assess the importance of whole statutory authority 'sectors'
2in state or Commonwealth government1. Other studies explore 
'the politics of' particular high profile statutory 
authorities, such as the Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
(Harding, 1979; Inglis, 1983; Davis, 1988) or the publicly- 
owned airlines (Corbett, 1965; Brogden, 1968); and still 
others examine particular statutory authorities as part of 
inquiries into particular policy fields, such as industry 
policy (for example, Warhurst, 1982) or energy policy (for 
example, Rosenthal and Russ, 1988).
Analytical work on statutory authorities in Australia 
follows two broad paths of inquiry. One is concerned 
generally with the policy uses to which statutory authorities 
are put. Several distinct forms of this activity may be 
identified. That most closely associated with the survey 
literature noted above involves attempts to classify 
statutory authorities in accordance with the policy functions 
with which they are associated, or to differentiate the 
rationales for the creation of statutory authorities. Self-
1. For the states, examples such work can be found in Davis 
(1960), Wettenhall (1968a), Townsley (1976), Holmes (1976) and 
Parker (1978a). Victorian statutory authorities have attracted 
more attention than those in other states - in addition to the 
literature cited above see Mauldon (1935), Davis, Halligan, 
Foley, Russell, Clarke and Porter (1982), Holmes (1984), Halligan 
and 0'Grady (1985) and Wettenhall (1985). On Commonwealth 
statutory authorities see especially Wettenhall (1976a; 1977; 
1979; 1984; 1986; 1988). Other surveys of Australian statutory 
authorities include Sawer (1954) and Wiltshire (1978).
3consciously normative writing for or against the use of 
statutory authorities in general or for particular tasks 
(especially trading activities) is also represented in the 
Australian literature (Eggleston, 1932 is probably the best 
known example). A very small amount of attention has been 
devoted to various other matters, including the differing 
attitudes of political parties towards the creation of 
statutory authorities (Wettenhall, 1964 and 1976:329; Parker, 
1958) and patterns of growth and change in the use of 
statutory authorities (Wettenhall, 1976:328-9; Halligan, 
1982:15-18)2. Beyond issues related to the use of statutory 
authorities to involve government in substantive policy areas 
are questions about whether functions undertaken by statutory 
authorities, such as trading or ’business' activities, should 
be performed by government at all (compare Clarke and Porter, 
1982 and Evatt Research Centre, 1988).
This thesis is not about matters of the above sorts. 
It is squarely located within a second broad path of inquiry, 
concerned with issues of accountability in the design of 
administrative institutions. In the study of statutory 
authorities particular emphasis has been placed on an alleged 
'problem of accountability'. This is seen to arise as 
follows: in a democracy all public administration should 
arguably be authorised and guided by the democratic process, 
and yet statutory authorities are established because it is 
held that certain activities are not appropriately performed
2 I have compared the Australian literature in these areas 
with some international literature in an unpublished paper 
(Stone, 1985) .
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as an extension of the elected government.
The tension between the apparently incompatible 
institutional values, independence and control, has been a 
pervasive theme in the literature on statutory authorities. 
But it has excited widely differing degrees of concern 
depending on the legal and constitutional traditions of 
particular countries (see Hood, 1984). For instance, in the 
Scandinavian countries (especially Sweden) statutory 
authorities with some genuine autonomy have traditionally 
played a central role in government and yet comparatively 
little seems to have been heard of any lack of accountability 
among these bodies. Indeed, we are told that European 
public-law countries, as a group, have experienced less 
difficulty with statutory authorities than have common-law 
Anglo-Saxon countries (Johnson, 1979; Hood, 1984). Johnson 
(1979:393) has suggested one reason for this: the more
developed state structures of the former set of countries 
have given them less need to make use of appointed public 
agencies (statutory or non-statutory). But, anticipating 
later argument, it may be conjectured that the more 
pluralistic or multi-stranded approach to administrative 
accountability characteristic of these countries is also part 
of the explanation.
Even within the other group of countries there seem 
to be important differences in the degree of sensitivity to 
the accountability question. Thus Hood (1984:7) has 
suggested that: 'In a Washington-type separation of powers
system, public boards only present a problem insofar as they
5may be seen to cut across the doctrine of the separation of 
powers, particularly when it comes to the exercise of 
regulatory powers'. This claim would seem to be overstated. 
Considerable attention has been paid in the United States to 
the 'flexibility/accountability' balance in government 
corporations (see, for example, National Academy of Public 
Administration, 1981). Moreover, since the New Deal and 
especially since the early 1970s the regulatory agencies have 
been increasingly criticised for their excessive independence 
from the democratic process (Breyer, 1982:351). 
Nevertheless, Hood's claim highlights a basic consequence of 
the differing American and Westminster constitutional 
traditions: the accountability of administrative agencies
(of all types) raises less theoretical difficulties in the 
United States partly because the more fragmented state 
structure has meant that accountability itself is conceived 
in much less monistic terms than has been the case in the 
parliamentary democracies.
Where core institutions of government are based on the 
'Westminster model' the independence-control problem has 
assumed a unique, and especially acute, form. The overriding 
'problem of statutory authority accountability' in such 
countries has been identified as a fundamental 
incompatibility between quasi-autonomous public boards and 
the central doctrine of ministerial responsibility. In 
accordance with this doctrine three main principles determine 
that the 'normal' pattern of public administration is to be 
the ministerial department. The principles are, firstly,
6
that 'powers and duties are conferred by statute, or by 
virtue of the Royal prerogative, upon Ministers' and not upon 
officials or administrative agencies; secondly, that 
officials, in exercising such powers or performing such 
duties 'are merely exercising the powers of the Minister' and 
that departments of state can be viewed as 'merely the 
instruments of ministerial action'; and, thirdly, that it 
is therefore 'ministers and ministers alone, who can report, 
explain and defend in Parliament . . . what is done in the 
exercise of their powers and duties' (Parker, 1960, cited by 
Wettenhall, 1973:249). While Parker (1978b:350; 1976:182) 
has claimed that these principles were 'never intended to 
apply to the whole range of state institutions', there is 
little doubt that in Australia, as in other countries 
importantly influenced by the 'Westminster model', they have 
defined the orthodox view of administrative organization and
3administrative accountability .
Hence the impasse in which thinking about the 
relationship between statutory authorities and responsible 
government has remained in Britain, Canada and Australia 
through the twentieth century. The creation of 
administrative agencies outside the core structure of 
ministerial departments has been justified basically on the 
ground that certain sorts of governmental activity require
However, I agree with Parker's contention (1978b:335) 
that responsible government and public accountability in 
Australia have in practice meant more than ministerial 
responsibility. Like Parker, I wish to argue the importance for 
an understanding of contemporary public administration of 
recognizing the 'other forms of accountability' in existence.
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a significant measure of independence from ministers or 
parliament. If ministerial control is weakened, however, it 
surely follows that ministerial responsibility will be 
similarly affected, with the result that public 
accountability, understood as the answerability of ministers 
to parliament, must suffer. On the other hand, if 
ministerial and parliamentary control is maintained in the 
name of accountability, the independence of the agency (which 
was the reason for employing the statutory authority in the 
first place) is undermined.
Throughout the Australian literature one finds the 
'problem of accountability' stated in essentially the same 
terms. F.A. Bland (1937:41) was not telling his Australian 
readers anything they had not heard before when he argued, 
against Herbert Morrison, that 'the statutory government 
corporation is out of harmony . . . with the old theory of 
parliamentary government and ministerial responsibility' and 
that Australians had for 50 years been perversely 'trying to 
gain the advantages of two systems which are mutually 
opposed'. F.W. Eggleston (1932) had previously argued at 
length that the pressures for parliamentary control and 
ministerial interference had largely destroyed the promise 
which Victoria's range of 'independent' statutory 
corporations had originally shown. Eggleston's concern was 
with excessive control. A decade earlier, however, Bland 
(1923:128-9) had pointed to the opposite danger in the 
influential 'theory' of government by statutory corporation 
which, he suggested, threatened to 'reduce the Parliamentary
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representatives to administrative impotence'. But Bland saw
the same practical dilemma as Eggleston: 'impartiality,
efficiency and continuity in administration' often required
independence from ministers and parliament, whereas democracy
seemed to entail parliamentary control and ministerial
responsibility (1923:75). Nearly 50 years later the
conceptual universe of Australian public administration had
ostensibly changed so little that a textbook on
administrative law could conclude a discussion of
contemporary practice in almost identical fashion:
the use of the statutory authority in modern 
government presents something of a dilemma. If 
independence of action is required this can be 
achieved through the statutory authority - but at the 
cost of a loss of effective central control, with the 
consequent danger of lack of coordination and 
planning, and diminished ministerial responsibility 
and accountability to parliament. On the other hand, 
if central control is to be retained, and
responsibility and accountability are to be 
effective, there seems little justification in most 
cases for adopting the statutory authority concept 
rather than the ordinary government department 
(Hotop, 1985:70).
But the intellectual environment of public 
administration has changed in important respects. The ready 
equation of administrative accountability with 'central 
control' and 'the ordinary government department' which is 
made in the above quotation has been widely questioned in the 
1970s and 1980s. Traditional understandings of, and 
arrangements for, accountability have come under sustained 
criticism . In particular, it has been successfully argued 
that ministerial responsibility and the institutional
For an overview see Emy and Hughes (1988:308-18)
9
arrangements designed to give effect to this principle are 
overburdened or otherwise unsatisfactory in some respects in 
the circumstances of contemporary government. Resulting 
administrative reforms, based on revised assumptions about 
administrative accountability, have already produced very 
significant changes in public administration in Australia 
(Emy and Hughes, 1988:337-66; Thynne and Goldring, 1987)5.
The puzzle which stimulated this thesis was that these 
changes seem, surprisingly, to have had very little effect 
on the way statutory authority administration, and in 
particular the matter of accountability, is discussed in 
Australia.
Now that the relevant background has been sketched, 
the aims of the thesis may be stated. The general aim is to 
challenge the traditional view that the statutory authority 
is not a suitable administrative form upon which to build an 
accountable public administration. To this end it advances 
two lines of argument. Firstly, it argues that, even on 
traditional assumptions about accountability, Australian 
Commonwealth statutory authorities are more accountable than 
is often supposed. Secondly, it questions the
appropriateness of continuing to discuss the accountability 
of statutory authorities on assumptions which have for some 
time been under serious challenge in Australian public 
administration. It argues that, considered in the light of 
an understanding of accountability informed by contemporary
5. These matters are discussed at greater length in Chapter 
9 of this thesis.
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developments in Australia and elsewhere, Commonwealth 
statutory authorities demonstrate a reasonably healthy degree 
of accountability and, perhaps more importantly, reveal a 
potential to play an important role in the development of a 
more accountable public administration.
The thesis focuses fairly exclusively on the sphere 
of Australian Commonwealth government, as distinct from the 
state governments. Concentration on a single governmental 
jurisdiction provided a way of delimiting the study, a step 
which in turn was judged necessary for a reasonably detailed 
treatment. The Commonwealth was chosen for several reasons. 
One was that more intellectual interest has been shown in the 
statutory authorities of the Commonwealth than those of most 
states. Since the thesis is in part about the assumptions 
of previous thought and practice, the better record of these 
which exists for the Commonwealth made that jurisdiction more 
attractive. A second reason was that administrative reforms 
encompassing the changed views about accountability I wished 
to contrast with the ongoing treatment of statutory 
authorities have proceeded further in the Commonwealth public 
sector than in the states, with the possible exception of 
Victoria. Finally, and most decisively, Commonwealth 
statutory authorities have recently been the subject of a 
prominent reform movement which culminated in government 
'discussion' and 'policy' papers in 1986 and 1987. This 
campaign for statutory authority re-form, together with the 
debate engendered by the government's actions, has provided 
probably the best body of evidence concerning contemporary
11
Australian thinking about the position of statutory 
authorities in the framework of government.
The selection of the Commonwealth government as the 
main field of study may be justified, but it undoubtedly 
limits the value of the study. While important parts of the 
argument are clearly general in nature, it cannot be assumed 
that specific findings also apply to the state public 
sectors. Moreover, there can be no suggestion that the 
states are of lesser importance as a field for the study of 
statutory authorities. On the contrary, statutory 
authorities play a more important role in the states than 
they do in Commonwealth government.
The thesis has three parts. Examined first is the 
history of the ideas and institutional arrangements relevant 
to the accountability of statutory authorities. The main aim 
is to show the tenacious hold of assumptions about 
accountability derived from ministerial administration, 
despite various efforts at reconceptualization. These tasks 
occupy Chapters 1 and 2. Chapter 3 traces the influence of 
the historically dominant approach on the recent movement for 
the reform of Commonwealth statutory authorities. The 
conclusion reached is that this exercise was both 
intellectually limited and driven by particular institutional 
interests. Its deficiencies demonstrate the need for a 
reconsideration of both the problem and its solutions. Parts 
II and III undertake that exercise. In Part II the 
accountability of Commonwealth statutory authorities is 
examined in detail from the traditional perspective
12
associated with the idea of parliamentary control. Chapters 
4 to 6 treat in turn the three main aspects of the idea of 
parliamentary control - control of legislation, 
administrative scrutiny, and financial control. In Part III 
the analysis is broadened to encompass alternative 
perspectives on accountability, together with the 
relationship between those perspectives and trends in 
Commonwealth public administration generally. To this end 
Chapters 7 and 8 each elucidate a particular alternative 
perspective - 'managerialism' and 'constituency relations' - 
and explore in detail the application of each to Commonwealth 
statutory authorities. The final chapter justifies this 
exercise by showing that the general approach to 
accountability underpinning the present analysis is congruent 
with the pluralist approach to accountability which has 
become important in Commonwealth public administration at 
large.
A preliminary definition and discussion of the object 
of study is necessary. The term statutory authority is a 
familiar one in the language of Australian public 
administration. But as with that other seemingly 
straightforward concept, the department, conventional usage 
masks several definitional problems. When Australian 
students of public administration refer to statutory 
authorities they normally have in mind collegial 
administrative bodies (boards, commissions, councils and the 
like) created by statute and enjoying a significant measure 
of organizational separation and operational autonomy vis-a-
13
vis ministers and their departments. This usage is employed 
throughout the thesis, but it is worth observing that 
entities with a claim to statutory authority status may lack 
one or more of these characteristics. Where a body is 
created 'pursuant to' an Act, for instance, it is not always 
clear whether it should be described as a statutory or a non- 
statutory body (Wettenhall, 1976:376). Again, in a number 
of cases individual public servants, who remain in other 
respects ordinary members of a ministerial department, 
exercise powers associated with an office created by statute. 
Further, some Australian departments, including ministerial 
departments, have a statutory basis. This is more common in 
state government but is not unknown at the Commonwealth level 
(Wettenhall, 1976:314; Stone, 1986:5-6).
The class of statutory authorities is wider than that 
of statutory or public corporations, categories which were 
once more popular and are still widely used. My preference 
for the broader category has two justifications. Firstly, 
as Wettenhall (1984:105) has noted, at least since the Coombs 
Royal Commission of the mid-1970s scholarly recognition of 
and interest in what are sometimes called 'fringe' bodies has 
extended well beyond the 'public corporations running the 
Commonwealth's business enterprises' which had to that time 
tended to monopolise attention. Secondly, the category comes 
much closer to delineating a meaningful universe of 
phenomena. Webb (1954:101) has argued that 'to classify 
administrative bodies in accordance with whether or not they 
have corporate status is about as useful as classifying
14
animals in accordance with whether they have tails'. Webb's 
point was in part that the criterion of corporate status 
lacked value because it separated bodies with much in common 
while it grouped together very diverse entities.
But Webb (1955:162-3) also thought the 'statutory 
corporation' category was far too embracing and argued for 
the superior utility of a system of functional categories. 
His point is well taken: for many purposes sensible 
discussion requires a focus on particular functional 
groupings, such as trading bodies, regulatory bodies, quasi­
judicial bodies and so on - if not even more narrowly defined 
categories. Functional categories are referred to in this 
work where I have judged this to be helpful. But, for a 
study dealing with the broad themes of administrative 
independence and accountability, statutory authorities at 
large are a suitable universe of objects (note Wettenhall, 
1984:105)
There is a final point to be made about usage. It is 
common in referring to a statutory authority to include 
implicit reference to the organization which exists to serve 
the authority. Thus the Federal Airports Corporation is 
strictly only the seven member authority created by the 
Federal Airports Corporation Act 1986, but in practice a 
reference to that body may also be taken to include the large 
workforce employed by the Corporation. In this thesis 
references to statutory authorities are to be understood, 
according to the context, in either the broad or the narrow
sense.
PART I
THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY AS 
ACCOUNTABILITY PROBLEM
CHAPTER 1
COMMONWEALTH STATUTORY AUTHORITIES AND THE QUESTION OF
ACCOUNTABILITY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The problem of statutory authority accountability has taken 
on a certain timeless and objective quality in Australia, as 
in other countries with Westminster-style systems of 
government. In the terms in which it is identified in such 
countries, however, the 'problem' is better understood as due 
to the choice of a basic structure of government. The core 
institutions of Australian government embody particular 
assumptions about accountability which are closely linked to 
the idea of ministerial administration. Consequently, the 
modern statutory authority, while a prominent feature of 
Australian public administration, has lacked the virtually 
automatic legitimacy of the ministerial department. This, 
in turn, has affected the manner in which the statutory 
authority 'sectors' (if such unorganized collections of 
disparate bodies can be so dignified) of Australian 
governments have developed, as well as the arrangements made 
to secure the accountability of statutory authorities.
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The pre-eminence of the ministerial department in the 
landscape of public administration is, however, a phenomenon 
of no great antiquity. In Britain the relative status of the 
two types of agency was settled by the major changes in 
central government which occurred in the period between the 
two Reform Acts (1832 and 1867). When the majority of 
Australian colonies achieved self-government towards the end 
of this period they tended, more or less faithfully, to 
follow British developments. Colonial experience, in turn, 
contributed to the system of government that was put in place 
at the national level in 1901, and to the development of that 
system. By showing how an administrative setting was 
established in Australia in which the statutory authority was 
assigned a definite role but a subordinate status, nineteenth 
century administrative history can lay bare the structural 
basis of the traditional accountability problem. A necessary 
first step in this study, therefore, is to examine this 
history; but as the relevant developments have been traced 
in some detail in the existing literature, only the most 
salient aspects need be touched on here.
The Administrative Inheritance of Australian Commonwealth 
Government
In early nineteenth century Britain much administration was 
conducted by boards of appointed officials, as had long been 
the case not only in Britain but throughout Europe. As 
compared with ministers, boards had traditionally been 
attractive to the Crown because they seemed to offer greater
17
predictability, continuity and efficiency in performance; 
they were less likely to develop into 'overmighty subjects'; 
and, perhaps most importantly, they increased the amount of 
patronage and, thereby, the representation of the Court in 
the House of Commons (Parris, 1969). Given their link with 
the Crown, it is not surprising that their demise was 
preceded by a broad process of institutional change over the 
period 1780-1830, which, inter alia, saw the departure of 
the Crown from politics. In particular, the growing desire 
and capacity of parliament to hold governments responsible 
for administration, together with the movement towards a 
professional civil service, were instrumental in discrediting 
the board form of administration. These developments were 
accelerated by the first Reform Act (Parris, 1969).
The boards did not, however, simply fade away after 
1832. As Willson (1955) has shown in his careful study of 
administrative agencies in this period, the House of Commons 
was gradually converted to a preference for ministries over 
boards by its experience with boards over the period 1832-55. 
In these years there was, in fact, an upsurge in the use of 
boards as the old style of administration responded to new 
demands on government. In 1832 British central government 
was conducted by 12 ministries and 16 boards. During the 
next 23 years three new ministries were created to replace 
boards but 15 new boards were set up (of which two were 
converted into ministries in the period) (Parris, 1969:83-4). 
Boards established over the first half of this period 
operated in practice largely without parliamentary
18
participation, as they had traditionally done. But 
subsequently there was a notable change. Adverse reaction 
to the use of independent Commissioners to administer the 
Poor Law in the years 1843-47 is identified by Willson 
(1955:50-52) as the turning point: boards continued to be 
established with considerable frequency until 1855, but they 
now all contained an active parliamentary membership. By the 
early 1850s, however, a Parliament interested in control over 
administration, rather than merely in possessing channels 
of communication with administrators, had discovered that 'a 
board which was represented in Parliament by one of its 
members was not thereby made fully responsible to Parliament’ 
(p.52). It was at this stage that the concerns of the 
Commons were finally translated into a clear case for 
ministerial administration (Willson, 1955:52; Parris, 
1969:89-93) .
By the 1850s the managerial considerations which had 
favoured the use of boards in earlier times were also 
disappearing. In particular, the permanent civil service was 
proving able to provide continuity in administration, and its 
reform made it the natural vehicle for the late nineteenth 
century expansion of government. Indeed, the year of the 
establishment of a Civil Service Commission, designed to 
de-politicize the recruitment of public servants, marks the 
boundary identified by Willson (1955:53) between the period 
of experimentation with new boards and the 'Golden Age of 
ministerial administration’ (1855-1906).
By the time of the Second Reform Act (1867), not only
19
was the ministerial department triumphant in both theory and 
practice but a system of parliamentary control of 
administration had also been put in place in Britain which 
has dominated thinking about accountability in government, 
in Australia as well as Britain, down to the present day. 
The centre-piece of the system was the mechanism of 
ministerial responsibility, and its obverse the 'anonymity' 
of the civil servant. This brought together, in 'happy 
conjunction', a 'concentration of administrative power and 
therefore of responsibility in one person and the presence 
of that person in Parliament' (Willson, 1955:54). The 
consolidation of individual ministerial responsibility went 
hand in hand with the rise of the parliamentary question as 
the principal means of scrutinising public administration 
(Willson, 1955:54).
Of equal importance was the development in the years 
between the two Reform Acts of a comprehensive system of 
financial control. By the middle of the century it had 
become the established practice to channel all public revenue 
into the Consolidated Fund and to require that all public 
payments, statutory or annually appropriated, be made from 
that source (Mackenzie, 1963:152; Garrett, 1980:172). Close 
Treasury control over both expenditure proposals and the 
expenditure of parliamentary appropriations by departments, 
with the latter treated as 'units in an accounting system' 
rather than independent institutions, also dates from this 
period (Parris, 1969:247-57). So do other aspects of modern 
budgeting, such as the presentation to parliament of annual
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estimates and annual accounts of departmental expenditure 
(Mackenzie, 1963:157-61). A permanent parliamentary
Committee of Public Accounts was added in 1861. Finally, the 
'circle* of financial control was completed in 1866 by the 
Exchequer and Audit Act, which required detailed and complete 
systems of estimates and accounts to be presented in 
comparable form, and established the office of Comptroller 
and Auditor General to ensure that expenditures were in 
accordance with parliamentary appropriation and Treasury 
authorization (Normanton, 1980:176).
Nineteenth century Australian administrative history 
displays a less clear-cut pattern. Wettenhall (1963; 1973; 
1976) has shown that administrative change after the 
achievement of self-government by most of the colonies in the 
late 1850s did follow British trends, but with some delay and 
less zeal. Moreover, the revival of the statutory board 
began two decades earlier in Australia. As a result, while 
Britain experienced a period of half a century in which 
ministerial administration held virtually complete sway, 
there was almost no stage in late nineteenth century 
Australia when both types of agency were not actively 
supported.
Statutory boards of the familiar English kind were 
widely utilized for important functions in the colonies 
before self- government. Land boards, education boards, 
public works boards, trustee savings banks and professional 
registration boards for medical practitioners were among 
those established between the late 1820s and the early 1840s
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(Wettenhall, 1963:256-8). Wettenhall has shown that these 
were not directly affected by the coming of responsible 
government, which brought about a thorough- going 
' ministerialization' of the political executive but made 
considerably less impact on administrative structures 
(1963:242;1976). His explanation of the persistence in the 
colonies of administrative arrangements, including appointed 
statutory boards, which were aberrant from the perspective 
of the Westminster model of responsible government highlights 
three main factors. As the transition to responsible 
government in Australia occurred at a time when the 'British 
design' was not complete, there was no clear 'Westminster 
model' for Australian governments to follow. Secondly, the 
colonies possessed reasonably well-developed and effective 
administrative structures which, in the absence of a 
compelling case for change, simply continued as before. 
Finally, Westminster 'ideology' never became a powerful 
independent force in nineteenth century Australia; the 
ministerialization of administration which did occur was 
almost solely a response to political pressures and, 
therefore, 'more uneven' than in Britain (Wettenhall, 
1973:40,43).
These arguments are not completely convincing. The 
authorities on the transformation of government in mid­
nineteenth century England have emphasized that practical 
considerations, rather than philosophical argument, were the 
main stimuli for change in that country as well (Willson,
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1955:50-53; Parris, 1969:89-93)1. Further, there is no 
reason to believe that administrative inertia would not have 
been equally as strong in Britain as in Australia. A 
crucial difference between the two countries not discussed 
by Wettenhall would seem to have been the far greater 
institutional strength of the Westminster parliament compared 
with the fledgling parliaments of the Australian colonies. 
It was the desire of the parliament to exercise a real 
measure of control over administration which was the 
decisive factor in the ministerialization of British 
government. In Australia both the tradition of executive 
dominance in the years before responsible government and the 
rapid transition to democratic politics, with its tendency 
to define parliamentarians first and foremost as transmitters 
of public demands, probably inhibited the ability of 
parliaments to be powerful yet disinterested watchdogs over 
the administration.
Nevertheless, there was a clear trend towards 
ministerial administration; and Wettenhall's emphasis on 
the importance of political pressure in bringing this about 
is surely correct. It was specifically popular pressure, and 
the crude pork-barrel style of politics to which this has 
often led in the early phase of the life of a democratic 
political system, which seems to have had the greatest 
influence. Australian governments were more active than 
their British counterparts. As the Sydney Morning Herald
1. Such argument did exist, however. As Willson (1955:49) 
notes, Bentham had argued forcefully for 'single-seatedness' 
before 1832 (see also Schaffer, 1957).
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noted in 1879:
The colonies are governed after the paternal fashion; 
the United Kingdom is not. Here, the Government 
undertakes to do a hundred different things for the 
people which there the people are left to do for 
themselves. Here the Government has an enormous 
public estate to manage, and thousands of business 
transactions to carry on in connection with the 
leasing, sale or the improvement of it. There is 
nothing in England to impose a similar charge upon 
the government (Dickey, 1969:76).
The power which these circumstances gave to ministers, and 
the way in which they used this power, was recorded by 
Anthony Trollope in 1876:
A member of a colonial cabinet is not so great a man 
as a cabinet minister at home. . . but he holds very 
much more than proportionate powers, and exercises 
very much more than proportionate patronage. 
Everything is centralized.... When a member for some 
district becomes a cabinet minister, that district 
at once expects a railway. Should a Roman Catholic 
be Prime Minister, the Roman Catholics throughout 
the colony expect government places - and every 
porter at a railway holds a government place.... A 
supporter of the ministry considers himself entitled 
to buy good land cheap. . . . Tenders of contracts for 
the conveyance of mails are sent out in the name of 
the postmaster-general.... The same practice 
prevails through the cabinet, and produces a feeling 
that staunch support of the government maybe quite 
as influential in procuring the desired job as 
favourable terms (A. Trollope, Australia and New 
Zealand (1876), cited in Miller, J.D.B., 1959:122).
In this sort of political system there were powerful
practical incentives for bringing under the direct control
of ministers areas of administration which closely affected
the material interests, or life-chances, of members of the
public. The more significant and immediate the effect, the
greater the pressure for ministerial control (Wettenhall,
1963:258-9).
In addition, Wettenhall (1963:265-6) has argued that
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ai desire for more rational and effective forms of 
administrative organization to conduct the growing business 
of government contributed a separate stimulus to the 
movement towards ministerial administration. By the mid- 
IL880s, according to him, the ministerial department was 
olearly the preferred agency for the great bulk of 
administrative activity in the self-governing colonies: 'the 
:few boards that survived represented the small byways of 
administration only' (1963:267).
However, no sooner had direct ministerial 
administration achieved pre-eminence than a trend back 
towards the statutory authority began to manifest itself. 
Though labour boards were created in New South Wales and 
Victoria in the 1870s, the most important indication of the 
new mood in public administration was the establishment of 
railway commissions in place of departments in these states 
in 1883 (Victoria) and 1888 (NSW) . Despite the serious 
efforts being made at this time to create 'uniformly 
regulated and patronage-free public services', it was 
successfully argued that politically-induced inefficiency in 
railway administration could be prevented only by a move away 
from direct ministerial control (Wettenhall, 1960; 1961). 
The growing popularity of the quasi-autonomous statutory 
corporation in Australia, at a time when it was little used 
in Britain, would thus seem to have been a consequence of the 
more interventionist nature of Australian governments as well 
as their more democratic character. Experience had 
demonstrated that this mixture could be detrimental to sound
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administration. In these circumstances, the value of the 
statutory corporation to those who did not wish to 
contemplate either less interventionist or less democratic 
government was that it appeared to offer a purely technical 
solution which did not require any political sacrifices. 
Hence its appeal to the radical democrats of Australian 
politics, such as the Victorian Liberals of the 1890s and the 
early twentieth century. It allowed them to undertake 'a 
programme of active government participation in national 
development against the opposition of the older conservative 
parties whose chief propaganda weapon was that such policies 
led to corruption' (Sawer, 1954:13 )2. In line with this 
rationale, by the turn of the century the statutory 
corporation had been employed in the administration of 
various urban infrastructural services, banks and transport 
facilities such as railways and harbours. And the first few 
years of the twentieth century saw rural land development and 
water management added to the list (Eggleston, 1932:32-4).
Those responsible for designing and setting in 
operation the new Commonwealth government were thus subject 
to somewhat different influences from Britain and colonial 
Australia. In the latter case ministerial administration, 
while well entrenched, had stopped well short of displacing 
inconsistent administrative arrangements. Not only were 
growing numbers of statutory bodies springing to life to 
administer governmental trading operations and physical
2. A range of particular advantages were claimed for the 
statutory corporation by turn of the century Victorian Liberal 
politicians (see Sawer, 1954:12-13).
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infrastructure services, but departmental sectors also 
continued to manifest organizational features inherited from 
the period before responsible government. The British 
example was less ambiguous. By the 1890s the 'Westminster 
model', having achieved its final form at least two decades 
earlier, was at the height of its fame and constituted a 
strong influence in favour of a thorough-going
'ministerialization' of the new government.
Establishment of a Pattern of Statutory Authority Use 
While colonial experience with statutory authorities was to 
contribute to the evolving shape of Commonwealth 
administration, the latter represented a significant break 
with the past. Some existing administrative machinery (for 
example, posts and telegraphs) was taken over at Federation; 
but, compared with the colonies at the time they gained 
responsible government, the Commonwealth was largely 
unencumbered by the administrative traditions of the 
pre-responsible government era. Consequently, it was able 
to begin life with a much purer Westminster-style 
administrative system than the colonies had been able to 
develop. Commonwealth government administration in 1901 was 
almost fully ministerialized: statutory powers exercised by
departments were largely vested in ministers rather than 
officials, and a correspondence was established between the 
number and designation of ministers and the number and 
designation of departments. Additionally, the Public Service 
Act 1902 created a permanent commonwealth service with
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patronage-free recruitment procedures and uniform staffing 
arrangements, under the control of an independent (statutory) 
authority. Even when Commonwealth administration grew more 
complex and new authorities were created alongside 
ministries, the original strong Westminster structure 
remained the dominant force in the system. When departmental 
officials were given statutory powers in their own right it 
was normally specified that these were to be exercised 
'subject to any directions of the Minister'. And, as other 
statutory bodies of varying degrees of independence from 
ministers and public service departments came into existence, 
they too were attached, more or less loosely, to these 'core' 
entities to satisfy the requirements of parliamentary 
representation as well as establishment and policy control 
(Wettenhall, 1973:244-5; 1976:14-15).
The new administrative system had a firm 
constitutional basis. While the term 'responsible 
government' did not appear in the Commonwealth Constitution, 
Sections 62 and 64 clearly envisaged ministerial 
administration with ministers as members of, and hence 
answerable to, parliament. Moreover, the only generic form 
of administrative organization referred to in the document 
is the 'department of State' (S.64). But no explicit 
proscription was placed on other forms. Indeed specific 
statutory, non-ministerial administrative agencies are 
mentioned, or hinted at, in two places. The clearest 
instance is Section 101, which requires the establishment 
of an Inter-State Commission 'with such powers of
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adjudication and administration as the Parliament deems 
necessary’, subject to constitutional requirements
concerning its broad functions and the terms and conditions 
of appointment of its members (SS.101-104). According to 
Quick and Garran (1976:899,895), the founding fathers 
intended the Commission to be 'an impartial and non-political 
tribunal', with 'a large measure of independence from 
parliamentary control'3.
The other area in which the Constitution seems to have 
envisaged the use of a statutory authority is conciliation 
and arbitration. Section 51 xxxv empowers the Commonwealth 
to legislate with respect to 'conciliation and arbitration 
for the prevention and settlement of disputes extending 
beyond the limits of any one state'. The exercise of this 
power would almost certainly have been assumed to entail the 
creation of a statutory tribunal (or a number of such 
bodies), a form of organization already in existence and the 
subject of much interest in Australasia at the time of 
Federation (see Reeves, 1969). That this is what the 
founding fathers had in mind is confirmed by their frequent 
references to 'tribunals' and 'courts' in the discussion of 
this sub-clause in the Conventions of 1891 and 1898 (see
Quick and Garran, 1976:645-7).
It is not clear, however, what conclusions, if any,
3. Quick and Garran claim that the body was 'directly 
iggested by' the Inter-State Commerce Commission created by an 
:t of the United States Congress in 1887. They also note that, 
l its judicial powers, it bears a close resemblance to the 
jmmission established by the English Railway and Canal Traffic 
:t 1888 (1976:896,898).
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can be drawn from the fact that the Constitution apparently 
sanctions non-ministerial administration in these cases. 
They certainly furnish strong evidence that the ministerial 
department was not felt to be appropriate for all executive 
functions and would need to be supplemented by special 
purpose statutory authorities. Nonetheless, it might be 
argued that, because the Constitution makes no general 
reference to such an alternative form of administration, the 
intention was that the ministerial department should be 
employed in all but those cases where the Constitution has 
provided otherwise. Independently of the fact that it has 
had no impact on administrative history, this is a highly 
unconvincing interpretation4. A somewhat more plausible 
argument is that Sections 61, 62 and 64 together place a
restraint on the freedom of action of statutory authorities 
vis-a-vis ministers and thus on the form of their 
accountability. This argument is examined and rejected later 
in this chapter, but it too is of doubtful historical 
importance. While the Westminster model has undoubtedly 
influenced arrangements for the accountability of statutory
4. In all of the systems of government which influenced the 
unding Fathers, the legislature had a constitutionally 
fettered power to create statutory authorities and all had made 
equent and recent use of the device. In the case of the 
(stralian colonies, as we have seen, the period in which the 
famonwealth Constitution was drafted was one of considerable 
perimentation with the device. The High Court has acknowledged 
e legal power of the parliament to confer statutory functions 
persons or bodies other than ministers and the Governor- 
neral (R v. Macfarlane ex parte O'Flanagan (1923) 32 CLR 518) 
d to create statutory authorities 'enjoying some real 
dependence from ministerial control' (Australian National 
rlines Pty. Ltd, v. the Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 29; 
iStralian Coastal Shipping Commission v. O'Reilly (1962) 107 CLR 
) (Finn and Lindell, 1982:179).
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authorities, as amply illustrated in this thesis, it has not 
required the assistance of a restrictive constitutional 
interpretation to achieve such a result.
Notwithstanding the strong influence of Westminster 
principles on the organization of the new government, before 
long the statutory authority became an important component 
of the administrative system. The causes of this development 
were similar to those in the Australian states and also 
included the influence of practice in the states. During the 
first quarter century of the Commonwealth’s existence 
authorities were created in all of the broad functional 
categories into which they are typically classified today. 
Further, the structural forms and statutory mechanisms for 
accountability which were to constitute the pattern for the 
subsequent use of the device had almost all found practical 
expression.
Apart from the group of in-house, 'watchdog' 
authorities created during the first parliament 
(Auditor-General, Public Service Commissioner and Chief 
Electoral Officer), the earliest statutory authorities were 
several regulatory offices (a Commissioner of Patents (1903), 
a Registrar of Copyrights (1905) and a Commonwealth 
Practitioners' Board (1907)), the quasi-judicial Commonwealth 
Arbitration and Conciliation Court (1904), and a group of 
'executive' offices and boards5 (separate Military and Navy
5. All statutory authorities which do not exercise purely 
visory functions are arguably executive authorities (but note 
e reservations of Finn and Lindell, 1982 as to whether 
atutory authorities exercise 'the executive power of the 
mmonwealth'). But it is customary to classify such bodies
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Boards (1904), a Commonwealth Statistician (1905), a 
Commonwealth Meteorologist (1906) , a Commissioner of Pensions 
(1908) and a Commissioner of Land Tax (1910) )* 6. In the case 
of most of the regulatory and executive authorities, however, 
there was little sense of separation from departmental 
structures: positions were filled by public servants and 
statutes made provision for close ministerial control of 
office-holders. In 1911 the first of the Commonwealth's 
statutory trading corporations, the Commonwealth Bank, came 
into existence, followed by the Commonwealth Railways in 
1917. The first statutory advisory body was the Marine 
Council created by the Navigation Act 1913 . As with the best 
known of the early bodies in this category, the Tariff Board 
(1921), the government was, under the Act, legally required 
to refer certain matters to the Marine Council for its 
advice. In 1914 the River Murray Commission was established 
to administer the River Murray Waters Agreement signed by the 
Prime Minister and the Premiers of South Australia, Victoria 
and New South Wales. This body, the first joint Commonwealth 
-State authority, was granted limited powers to operate water
according to one scheme or another (compare Wettenhall, 1976 and
SSCFGO, 1982a). Commonly utilized categories include quasi­
judicial, regulatory, trading or business, primary produce 
marketing and granting. Authorities which cannot be readily 
placed in any of the common categories or whose functions cannot
be easily distinguished from those performed by ministerial 
departments are often referred to as executive authorities. I
have followed this practice on several occasions in this thesis.
6 A detailed account of the creation of Commonwealth 
statutory authorities over the years from Federation to the mid- 
1950s is provided by Wettenhall (1956). I have drawn upon this 
work for the information contained in this paragraph and, as 
indicated, for other detail concerning the provisions of early 
enabling legislation discussed in subsequent pages.
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storage facilities and to fix navigation tolls, in accordance 
with the rather unsatisfactorily narrow objects on which the 
participating governments could agree. (In practice, its 
role was to be even more restricted, testifying to the 
limitations of joint administrative structures in a 
federation.) (see Wettenhall, 1956:308-9; Clark, 1983). By 
1920, with the creation of an Institute of Science and 
Industry (later to become the Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organization), the Commonwealth had also 
utilized the statutory authority to make its first foray 
into promotion of the arts and sciences. Finally, in the 
early 1920s, coincidental with the emergence of the Country 
Party as a force in national politics, the first group of 
Commonwealth primary produce marketing and regulatory 
authorities were established. Like those which were to 
follow, the earliest of these bodies - the Dairy Produce 
Control Board, the Dried Fruits Control Board and the 
Australian Meat Council, all created in 1924 - were 
organically linked to grower organizations through the direct 
election of board members and through funding arrangements.
With the expansion of these categories of authority, 
after 25 years of existence Commonwealth government was being 
carried on by ten ministerial departments, nine major 
statutory corporations and some three dozen unincorporated 
executive, advisory, regulatory and quasi-judicial appellate 
statutory authorities (Wettenhall, 1956:224). Not only were 
statutory authorities well represented in Commonwealth 
administration, but a number of them were also impressively
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powerful and independent. Indeed, this period witnessed the 
establishment of what has been seen as a distinctive and 
enduring pattern, or style, of public policy in which the 
statutory authority became the administrative vehicle for 
certain central values of Australian politics.
That pattern of public policy has been defined by Emy 
(1974:500-49) as the delegation of key aspects of national 
policy making to virtually closed sub-systems presided over 
by statutory bodies. The task of the latter was to adjust 
the material interests of particular interest groups and 
settle inter-group conflict by 'non-political' means, often 
involving quasi-judicial procedures or expert inquiry. As 
we have seen, the view emerged in colonial Australia from the 
early 1880s that, while extensive governmental activity was 
either desirable or inevitable in Australia, some activities 
could only be soundly administered if they were taken out of 
the arena of popular and parliamentary politics. The 
statutory authority made this outcome possible. Developing 
the insights of Hancock (1930), Miller (1959) and Parker 
(1965), Emy has argued that the use of the statutory 
authority by Commonwealth governments in the early decades 
of the twentieth century was part of a model of democratic 
society based on the principle of an equitable distribution 
of the benefits of state power between 'legitimate' groups. 
On Emy's account, each major producer group had come to 
believe it had a just claim to a 'fair share' of public funds 
and saw the state's role as that of providing the 
institutional means to enable group members to enjoy a
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'secure and private existence'. Acceptance of this outlook 
by the political representatives of these groups provided 
the mechanism through which the latter were provided with 
discrete institutional arenas, insulated from 'politics', in 
which they could be closely involved in the making of 
decisions to protect their material well-being (see, 
especially, Emy 1974:339-50; 533-5).
The key administrative entities upon which Emy's 
argument relies are the Conciliation and Arbitration Court 
(later Commission) which protected the economic return to 
labour, the various primary produce marketing and 
co-operative authorities which did the saune for farmers, and 
the Tariff Board which protected manufacturers. This 
machinery was largely in place by the end of the 1920s. A 
less important example from the saune period cited by Emy is 
the Repatriation Commission which applied the same principle 
to the interests of First World War servicemen (1974:540-41). 
The independence which governments and parliament were 
prepared to allow statutory bodies in this period is 
dramatically illustrated by the first of these bodies which 
was able, quite autonomously, to redefine its function in a 
radical manner. Having been originally established for the 
sole purpose of settling inter-state industrial disputes, the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Court simply assumed a wage 
fixing role which gave it de facto responsibility for 
national wage policy (Emy, 1974:501-2).
While it is thus arguable that a number of early 
Commonwealth authorities owed their existence to a
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discernible philosophy, this was less true for the contents 
of authority statutes. In some cases, such as the 
Commonwealth Railways Commissioner, legislative draughtsmen 
drew upon the models provided by similar state bodies. Nor 
did time and an accumulation of Commonwealth authorities 
bring the possibility of such borrowing to an end. As late 
as 1949, for instance, the Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric 
Authority was modelled on the Tasmanian Hydro-Electric 
Commission (the blue-print for which, in turn, had been the 
statute of the Victorian State Electricity 
Commission)(Wettenhall, 1956:398; 1968:351). There was 
nevertheless a degree of experiment; necessarily so where no 
comparable state organization existed, as in the case of the 
Repatriation Commission created by the Australian Soldiers 
Repatriation Act 1917. Soon, however, the drafting of 
authority statutes was also being influenced by Commonwealth 
precedents. The War Service Homes Commission (established 
1918), for instance, was based on the Railways legislation, 
as in many respects was the Institute of Science and 
Industry (1920) (Wettenhall, 1956:158,220).
It might be imagined that this imitative process 
would, over time, have produced considerable consistency in 
the basic provisions of statutory authority legislation. But 
a growing diversity among statutes was at least as evident 
as any shared ground. Bodies varied in their financial and 
personnel arrangements, in their legal status (whether 
incorporated or not), in their internal organization 
(specifically, the size and composition of the governing
36
entity established by statute and the institutional 
arrangements for handling policy and executive management), 
in their relationships with ministers and parliaments (for 
instance, the nature of ministerial controls, or the role of 
parliament in the dismissal of authority members) and in 
their reporting obligations, to mention only the most obvious 
areas. Moreover, in many cases the differences were largely 
unrelated to any differences in the functions of authorities.
This heterogeneity was not necessarily due to a desire to 
innovate; for even if legislators had wished to conform to 
previous practice they were confronted quite soon with widely 
differing precedents. Nevertheless, at times there appears 
to have been an almost perverse unwillingness to employ 
particular statutory provisions outside their original 
application (see Wettenhall, 1956).
The underlying cause of the great variability in 
authority statutes was that governments and parliaments did 
not possess a strong sense that they were working with an 
administrative form alternative to that of the ministerial 
department. This has remained true, to some extent, down 
to the present; but it was especially so in the early 
decades of federation when it was not uncommon for prominent 
statutory authorities to be described as departments. The 
statutory authority offered the possibility of a limited 
departure from orthodox ministerial administration, for a 
purely practical purpose - namely, to relieve the 
administration of a given function of particular consequences 
of that orthodox form. There was no desire to view the
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resulting organization as belonging to a distinct 
administrative 'sector'; on the contrary, each body tended 
to be viewed as an exception to the 'normal' arrangements, 
the individual solution to a unique administrative problem. 
In such circumstances it is not surprising that there was 
little concern with consistency when a new authority was 
created, and a complete lack of interest in the development 
of a set of principles for statutory authority design (or 
even in the idea of a periodic review of authority 
legislation on the statute books to bring it into conformity 
with changing attitudes towards such matters as 
accountability).
There was, nevertheless, one important development 
concerning the form of the authority created by statute, but 
related as well to its general administrative purpose, which 
should be noted. The earliest Commonwealth executive and 
trading authorities tended to be single-seated bodies rather 
than multi-member boards. In some cases (for example, the 
Commonwealth Railways) this was simply a consequence of the 
unreflective imitation of existing state authorities. But 
on other occasions this style of authority was deliberately 
chosen and argued for. In the debate on the Commonwealth 
Bank Bill, for instance, opposition speakers argued that a 
board was needed so that excessive power would not be placed 
in the hands of one man. Prime Minister Fisher replied that 
a board would be superfluous. The main function of private 
bank board members, he said, was to 'select a competent 
general manager and then religiously draw their fees'. In
38
the case of a public sector bank, he added, the positive 
aspect of this function would be performed by the government, 
and parliament was well placed to exercise whatever 
additional supervisory activity might be undertaken by a 
board (Wettenhall, 1956:148). The unicephalous model was the 
norm until the early 1920s, but during the incumbency of the 
business-minded Bruce-Page government (1923-29) the 
multi-member board gained the dominance it has held ever 
since . As far as the Labor party is concerned, the 
proposal of the Scullin Labor government to use a board for 
the Australian Broadcasting Commission (established in 1932) 
represented something of a watershed in the party’s views on 
the matter, although the Labor governments of the 1940s 
occasionally showed a tendency to revert to the party's
goriginal preference for a statutory general manager alone .
Labor's original attitude undoubtedly reflected an 
ideologically determined distaste for private business 
practice, just as the conservative parties' identification 
with private enterprise produced a favourable disposition 
towards the board form. But differences in party positions 
probably also owed something to differing views about the
In opting for the multi-member authority, Bruce and his 
ministers were self-consciously drawing on the private enterprise 
model. Supporting his legislation of 1923 for a part-time, 
policy board to head the Commonwealth Shipping Line, Bruce stated 
:hat 'The Board will be like the ordinary board of directors of 
a company...' (Wettenhall 1956:193).
g An example is the 1945 amendments to the Commonwealth 
Bank Act discussed below. The Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric 
Authority Act 1949 and the Commonwealth Science and Industry 
Research Organization Act 1949 also created single level 
governing structures, albeit with multiple membership.
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degree of independence vis-a-vis government which it was 
desirable for statutory authorities to possess. During the 
1920s and very early 1930s Labor had, in fact, been totally 
opposed to the creation of statutory authorities. The 
underlying reason, one suspects, was the ability of the 
device to frustrate governmental control. But the party's 
public rationale was couched in classical Westminster terms: 
if government were to be truly responsible, ministers must 
possess complete control over all government activities (see 
Wettenhall, 1964:19).
Residues of this position continued to influence Labor 
party thinking long after it ceased to be policy, and a 
certain distrust of the board form may well have been part 
of this same syndrome. Some evidence is provided by the 
amendments to the Commonwealth Bank Act introduced in 1945 
by the Chifley Labor government. With vivid memories of the 
Scullin government's unsuccessful attempt to impose its 
policy on the Bank board in the early 1930s, the government 
sought to strengthen the hand of the government against the 
Bank. The amendments included the removal of the board 
structure imposed by the Bruce-Page government. The 
alternative viewpoint was put in the parliamentary debate by 
Opposition leader Menzies, for whom the board was justified 
as a means of assisting authorities to resist governmental 
pressure (Wettenhall, 1956:356)9.
Menzies' defence of the board is worth quoting: 'The 
great advantages of a Board are the bringing together of a 
diversity of experience, the added judgement produced by frank 
discussion by competent men, the added strength in joint 
responsibility and the publicity which a board of directors
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Boards are better able to play such a buffer role if 
a distinction is made between policy and executive functions, 
with the former allocated to the board and the latter to a 
chief executive officer appointed by the board. This is the 
private enterprise model. It combines the benefits for 
policy-making and public confidence of a plurality of mostly 
part-time directors, with the managerial advantages of a 
single source of command. The model was not used during the 
early decades of the Commonwealth's existence; single-tiered 
authorities (single or multi-member) were the only structures 
employed. A statutory structure of board and general manager 
seems to have been first utilized for the Commonwealth Bank 
in 1924 and the Australian Broadcasting Commission in 1932 
(Wettenhall, 1961:29). But by the beginning of the post-war 
period it had become the preferred form for trading and 
related authorities.
A board may also be favoured because it enables 
particular interests, singly or jointly, to be represented 
in the governing structure. This explains the extensive use 
made of the multi-member authority for the performance of 
advisory functions. The advantages of such representation, 
including heightened legitimacy and a better information base 
for decision-making, have also been sought for executive,
strongly adhering to a view can secure for that view in the event 
)f great conflict of opinion ... one man, himself dependent for 
appointment on the government of the day, is not in a strong 
position to resist or argue about the instruction of a Treasurer 
or a government; but a board of directors, consisting of people 
Kho are in every other respect independent of the Government is 
.n a far better position to object ... to argue . . . and to 
mblicise its own views', (cited by Wettenhall, 1956:356).
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trading and regulatory bodies. In the inter-war period and 
during the 1940s formally representative boards were 
reasonably common; but some notable failures due to the 
dissension and rigidity created by board members acting as 
delegates of their interest groups led post-war governments 
to make less use of the device, except in the case of primary 
product marketing authorities (Wettenhall, 1956:235,387). 
Informal or indirect interest representation through 
statutory boards, however, continued (and continues) to be 
extensively practised.
Evolution of Statutory Provisions for Accountability 
As outlined earlier, the Westminster tradition came to define 
administrative accountability in terms of specific forms of 
parliamentary control - namely, control of annual expenditure 
through the Gladstonian 'circle' of financial scrutiny, and 
control of day-to-day administration through the agency of 
ministerial responsibility. In addition to parliamentary 
control, there were more detailed bureaucratic controls over 
finance, staffing levels, recruitment of personnel and terms 
and conditions of employment, the most important of which 
were concentrated in the Treasury in Britain but shared 
between Treasuries and powerful Public Service Boards in 
Australia. With the emergence (or, in the case of the 
states, the re-emergence) of statutory authorities in 
established systems of responsible government, a version of 
the same accountability regime was imposed on them as well.
The arrangements for statutory authorities were
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distinguished from those for ministerial departments mainly 
in the extent to which the familiar Westminster mechanisms 
were applied. Parliamentary financial controls, for 
instance, were relaxed for some authorities, either by 
completely dispensing with parliamentary appropriation of 
funds, as was often done for trading corporations, or 
aggregating appropriations under a small number of general 
heads of expenditure. In many cases staffing controls were 
reduced or eliminated by exempting authorities from 
particular aspects of Public Service Board supervision. Most 
importantly, ministerial control, and hence ministerial 
responsibility, was circumscribed to a greater or lesser 
extent by enabling statutes.
There was, however, one new element in the 
accountability regime devised for statutory authorities. 
Both as a means of compensating for the diminution in 
parliament's capacity to exert control through the standard 
Westminster channels and in acknowledgement of their origin 
in legislation enacted by parliament, statutory authorities 
were generally required to submit annual reports to ministers 
for tabling in parliament. This practice supported the idea 
(discussed in Chapter 2) that statutory authorities were in 
some degree directly accountable to parliament.
Parliamentary authorization and scrutiny - that is, 
the appropriation of authority funds (mainly applicable to 
non-commercial authorities) and the standard parliamentary 
opportunities for questioning ministers and publicising 
issues - forms the backdrop for the specific accountability
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mechanisms contained in modern authority statutes. These are 
of two main sorts. Firstly, certain obligations are 
typically imposed on authorities, the most important of which 
are to furnish an annual report, along with an audited 
statement of accounts; to keep the minister informed of 
operations and to supply such additional reports as the 
minister requests; to submit estimates of expenditure in the 
form desired by the minister (for approval in the case of 
non-commercial authorities); and to seek ministerial approval 
for contracts and borrowings involving more than specified 
amounts of money. Secondly, several important discretionary 
powers are assigned to ministers. In addition to the power 
inherent in their right to withhold approval of 'on-budget' 
authorities' expenditure plans, ministers appoint statutory 
office-holders and are frequently empowered to issue 
directions to authorities.
This brief description suggests the centrality of 
ministers to the accountability arrangements for statutory 
authorities, a phenomenon which reflects the influence of the 
Westminster notion that ministers are the key link between 
parliament and the administration. Some provisions 
conferring power on ministers have changed little over the 
years. For instance, statutory requirements for authorities 
to seek approval for such matters as the borrowing or 
expenditure of moneys above specified amounts, or the fixing 
of salaries above a specified limit, were a feature of the 
system of controls for nineteenth century statutory 
authorities. Power in these matters has always been a
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monopoly of the executive, and there seems to have been no 
argument that parliament or other actors could usefully share 
it. In one notable case, however, a nineteenth century 
parliament was successful in having reserved to it an 
important power of approval. The landmark legislation of 
1883 establishing the Victorian Railway Commission subjected 
decisions to establish new railway lines to parliamentary 
approval in the form of an Act of parliament (Wettenhall, 
1961:24-5). The same provision was adopted for the 
Commonwealth Railways; but its use in that instance did not 
stimulate comparable reservations of power in future 
authority statutes.
In general, however, the role of ministers in 
accountability regimes has grown significantly over the 
period since Federation - and probably most rapidly in the 
decade or so from the mid-1930s to the late 1940s. This 
development was related to the increasing dominance of 
parliament by the executive. As with departmental 
administration, the increasing volume of government business 
in the parliament meant a decrease in the average amount of 
attention devoted to both legislation and annual estimates 
of expenditure. Further, the growth of government meant a 
diminution in parliament’s capacity for administrative 
scrutiny through traditional mechanisms. But in the 
particular case of statutory authorities, parliament's 
position vis-a-vis ministers was also weakened by changes 
over time in the form of certain provisions in enabling 
statutes. The latter changes are worth closer examination,
45
in particular because they symbolise the decline in 
parliament's ability to claim a direct relationship with 
statutory authorities.
One small yet important change concerned the 
appointment of statutory office-holders. The statutes of 
early Commonwealth authorities normally accorded parliament 
a definite role in the appointments process, if only a 
limited one. A suggestion in the debate on the Railways Bill 
1917 that parliament, rather than the government, should 
actually choose the Commissioner was met with a firm 
statement of the ministerial perspective on parliament: 'We 
have responsible government. How can Parliament appoint 
except by entrusting the Executive with the selection?' 
(Watt, House of Representatives, CPD, 2 August 1917:764; 
cited in Wettenhall, 1956:154). Significantly, the 
participants in the debate accepted the question as a 
rhetorical one. However, as with a number of other early 
authority statutes, the Railways legislation gave parliament 
a part to play in the removal of the statutory office holder. 
The Commissioner could be suspended by the minister on 
specified grounds - inability, inefficiency, mismanagement, 
misbehaviour, refusal or neglect to carry out the provisions 
of the Act - but such action was required to be followed by 
the tabling in parliament of a statement of reasons, and 
parliament was empowered to overturn the decision. When the 
appointment of the War Service Homes Commissioner was 
terminated in 1921, the presence of such a provision in the 
statute made it mandatory, as well as politically necessary,
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for the minister to justify his action in detail to the 
parliament (Wettenhall, 1956:162-7). In a few instances, 
most notably the Institute of Science and Industry Act 1920, 
suspension itself was dependent on parliamentary initiative, 
in the form of a resolution of both houses praying for 
removal by the Governor-General. This provision was first 
employed at the Commonwealth level in the legislation 
establishing the office of Auditor-General, and was evidently 
still seen as a live option in 1939 when it appeared in the 
Bill for the abortive National Insurance Commission 
(Wettenhall, 1956:422). However, even the weaker form of 
parliamentary supervision of dismissals was being displaced 
by this time. It was employed for the Commonwealth Coal 
Commissioner as late as 1944 (Wettenhall, 1956:304), but not 
considered for the Australian Broadcasting Commission by a 
parliamentary review of that body's enabling legislation two 
years earlier (JPCWB, 1942). The stronger provision has not 
appeared in legislation for new authorities in the post-war
period and the weaker provision has been employed only very
, 10 rarely .
10 But statutory provision for parliamentary supervision 
of dismissals continues to be employed. Indeed, it provides a 
good example of the way in which legislative draftsmen may keep 
a provision alive through their tendency to borrow from the 
nearest available model. Thus legislation establishing several 
industry policy bodies created in recent years has followed the 
example of the Industries Assistance Commission in requiring 
ministers to table reasons for a dismissal and empowering 
parliament to reinstate. The provision was employed for the 
iTariff Board (the predecessor of the Industries Assistance 
jCommission) in 1921 when it was in general use. But three recent 
instances of its use in the industry policy field seem to be 
virtually unique among the large number of authorities created 
lover the past several decades. The relevant Acts are the Steel 
Industry Authority Act 1983 (No.124), the Automotive Industry
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This development was part of what has been identified 
as a general movement around the time of the Second World War 
to reduce the amount of detail in authority statutes, leaving 
the executive with greater discretion concerning the precise 
form and extent of accountability. Such a change has been 
noted, too, for the financial provisions authority 
legislation (Wettenhall, 1956:401). It has also occurred in 
the case of the terms and conditions of appointment. These 
were once commonly laid down in some detail, but modern 
statutes normally specify only that they are to be 
communicated in writing to appointees. Moreover, in recent 
times discretion has often been extended to the size of 
statutory boards, which in Australia (though not in Britain) 
had hitherto, almost without exception, been fixed by 
statute* 11.
Whereas the various matters just considered are 
perhaps best understood as more or less incidental 
consequences of the changing circumstances of government, a 
second factor seen to have increased the importance of the 
minister in accountability arrangements is more directly 
related to issues of principle in the constitution and 
operation of statutory authorities. This involved an 
implicit reassessment around the time of the Second World War 
of the large degree of statutory independence often conferred
Authority Act 1984 (No.106) and the Anti-Dumping Authority Act 
1988 (No.12).
11. Wettenhall (1956:193) found only one exception - the 
Commonwealth Shipping Line established in 1923. For two recent 
instances among many, see the Wheat Marketing Act 1984 (No.141) 
and the Australian Sports Commission Act (No.77).
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on authorities in earlier years. The trend is difficult to 
identify precisely because it was not transmitted through 
formal policy statements, nor did it involve the wholesale 
revision of previous statutes. Instead, it was manifested 
in the odd statutory amendment, in a greater preference for 
including a power of ministerial direction in statutes 
creating new authorities and, allegedly, in a greater desire 
on the part of ministers and governments to make use of their 
formal powers, especially in matters of finance, to control 
authorities more closely. It is a trend whose strength has 
also tended to be exaggerated, as is shown later in the 
chapter. For the present, however, the history of the 
statutory provision giving ministers the right to issue 
directives may be outlined as a guide to the evolution of 
official attitudes towards the nature of the balance which 
should be struck between authority independence and 
ministerial control.
The Ministerial Power of Direction
The ministerial power of direction is no recent innovation: 
its Australian origins have been traced at least as far back 
as the early years of the Victorian railway authority 
(Wettenhall, 1961). The original Victorian Railways 
Management Act contained no such provision, but confined the 
discretionary power of the responsible minister to 'a few 
narrowly defined matters' (1961:24). However, 
dissatisfaction with the new form of administration, and in 
particular with the lack of executive and parliamentary
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control over the Commissioners, resulted in a major revision 
of the legislation in 1891. The draft Bill added a list of 
13 subjects upon which it was proposed to give the minister 
power to initiate action which the Commissioners could 
ultimately be compelled to carry out. That this provision 
did not survive the passage of the Bill through parliament 
was due, according to Wettenhall (1961:51), to the 
opposition of Deakin who felt that it created 'a Bill of 
details' whereas what was required was 'a Bill of 
principles'. The relevant clause was thus redrafted to 
enable the Minister, at any time, to issue a request in 
writing to the Commissioners 'to propose a scheme for 
effecting an increase of income or a decrease of expenditure 
or for carrying out any matter of policy'. If the minister 
were dissatisfied with the scheme proposed, he could 
substitute one of his own which the Commissioners were 
required to take 'all necessary steps' to implement 
(1961:51).
This statutory power was introduced to Commonwealth 
administration in the Commonwealth Railways Act 1917 and was 
soon extended to a number of important authorities, including 
the War Service Homes Commission (1918), the Repatriation 
Commission (1917, 1920) and the Institute of Science and 
Industry (1920). It is worth noting that, in its original 
use, the power was not completely general, as it was 
ostensibly confined to matters of 'policy' . Nor was its 
application free of checks: the Commissioners might 
publicise their disagreement with a ministerial policy
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through the 'scheme' they were obliged to devise, and could 
possibly persist in their opposition until the matter was 
finally decided by the Governor-in-Council (Wettenhall, 
1961:51). In contrast, the statutes of Commonwealth 
authorities often made no attempt to limit directions to 
matters of general policy, or to provide any safeguards 
against capricious intervention.
In the light of what has been said about the 
differences in attitudes towards the statutory authority form 
of the Labor and non-Labor parties in the inter-war period, 
it is not surprising that they also differed in their 
approaches to the ministerial power of direction. While 
Labor favoured a broad or unrestricted definition of the 
power, its opponents tended to employ a narrower definition 
or to eschew the power altogether. The difference was 
exemplified in the handling of the legislation to establish 
the Australian Broadcasting Commission. The Scullin Labor 
government's draft Bill of 1931 subjected the proposed 
statutory corporation to an unrestricted power of direction. 
But the fall of that government meant that the legislation 
was actually introduced into parliament by the succeeding 
Lyons (United Australia Party) ministry. The latter found 
its backbench supporters strongly opposed to the powers 
conferred on the minister, and, as a result, amended the 
offending provision to replace the general directive power 
with several specific powers. The minister was, 
nevertheless, left with substantial powers, including the 
right through written instruction to prohibit the
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broadcasting of any matter (Wettenhall, 1956:278-80; Rydon, 
1952a) .
Meanwhile, the Scullin government's conflict with the 
Commonwealth Bank Board in the early 1930s had created a 
political issue of the lack of a statutory power of direction 
over that authority. The matter was considered by the Royal 
Commission into Monetary and Banking Systems 1936-37, a 
majority of the Commissioners finding in favour of stronger 
governmental control. They argued that, in the event of a 
conflict between a government and the Board over monetary 
policy, a serious attempt should be made to reach agreement 
by discussion. But this having failed, the view of the 
government should prevail. The Bank should be provided with 
'an assurance that [the government] accepts full 
responsibility for the proposed policy'; it should then be 
'the duty of the Bank to accept this assurance and carry out 
the policy of the Government' (RCMBS, 1937:206). The Royal 
Commission's emphasis on the need for governments to have the 
final say in matters of policy both reflected the influence 
of a longstanding practice in authority design, albeit one 
not consistently followed, and reinforced the case for 
following it in the future. Evidence of the Commission's 
impact has been identified in the United Australia Party 
government's National Insurance legislation of 1939, which 
broke with that party's previous attitude by making the 
incorporated Commissioners subject to ministerial control 
(Wettenhall, 1961:88).
A ministerial power of direction, broadly stated and
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freely utilized, might virtually abolish the distinction 
between statutory authority and ministerial department. In 
acknowledgement of this fact, the Royal Commission sought to 
revive the practice of restricting the power to matters of 
policy alone. The Commonwealth Bank Act 1945 and the Act 
creating a Coal Commissioner passed in the previous year 
adopted this restriction. The notion of a practical 
distinction between high policy and business administration 
would have been especially appealing in the case of the 
Commonwealth Bank of the 1930s, which combined the separable 
functions of a central bank (responsible for such tasks as 
note issue) and a banking service to the public of a kind 
similar to its private counterparts. Drawing attention in 
his Second Reading speech to the mechanism for resolving 
disagreements between the government and the Board, the 
minister (Chifley) stated that: ’This procedure is to be
invoked only in matters of policy affecting the interests of 
Australia and there can be no interference in the 
relationship of the Bank with its customers, or in matters 
of day to day administration'. However, Menzies noted in 
reply that the Bill did not define 'policy', which could as 
a result encompass 'matters great or small' (House of 
Representatives, CPD, 21 March 1945:753,754; cited by 
Wettenhall, 1956:354). This was a point Menzies had also 
made with some force in the earlier debate on the Coal 
Commissioner legislation. As he argued on that occasion, the 
restriction provided no safeguard against undue political 
influence because anything in which the government decided
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to take an interest, down to the employment of particular 
individuals, might 'with perfect honesty' be described as a 
policy matter (House of Representatives, CPD, 2 and 3 March 
1944:882; cited by Wettenhall, 1956:305-7).
If, as minister H.V. Evatt conceded in the Coal 
Commissioner debate, it were 'quite impossible to define 
policy' (p.881) - that is, to determine objective criteria 
for distinguishing policy from administration - it is not 
surprising that efforts were made to devise stronger means 
to dissuade capricious or unjustifiable ministerial 
interventions. Once the non-Labor parties had largely 
accepted the case for a directive power they naturally paid 
more attention to this problem. However, it was a Labor 
government which implemented the seminal Report of the Joint 
Parliamentary Committee on Wireless Broadcasting (JPCWB, 
1942) which specified a rigorous set of arrangements to 
restrain, while preserving the effectiveness of, the power 
of direction. Under the Australian Broadcasting Act 1942 the 
minister retained the power to order or prohibit, 'in the 
public interest', the broadcasting of any matter. But, to 
ensure that this power was exercised only after due 
deliberation and with adequate publicity, all directions were 
required to be in writing; the Australian Broadcasting 
Commission's annual report was required to list all 
broadcasts made, or suppressed, under direction, together 
with any directions given other than in the prescribed form; 
the Commission was empowered to determine the conditions 
under which 'political' broadcasts were to be made; and a
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parliamentary standing committee was interposed between the 
minister and the organization (Rydon, 1952b; Wettenhall, 
1956:278-96). In 1951 the Menzies Coalition government 
experimented with a slightly different formula in amending 
the Commonwealth Bank Act to strengthen the constraints on 
the government's ability to direct that body. Any direction 
had now to be made in writing, it had to be tabled in 
parliament within a specified number of sitting days, and the 
Bank acquired the right to table its view on the issue 
(Wettenhall, 1956:353-6).
In the mid-1950s the difficulties of the 
minister-authority relationship were addressed afresh once 
more, this time by the Public Accounts Committee in its 
reports on maladministration in the Australian Aluminium 
Production Commission (JCPA, 1954;1955). The Committee's 
approach owed a good deal to British thinking about the 
'public corporations' established to manage the industries 
nationalized by the Attlee government. In accordance with 
that body of thought, its conclusion was that statutory 
authorities should enjoy substantial autonomy on a day-to-day 
basis but should be obliged to keep the minister continually 
informed of operations (in order to 'preserve... the 
doctrine of ministerial responsibility'). Otherwise, all 
that was needed, in the Committee's view, were powers to 
'permit the necessary exercise of a defined ministerial 
control' (JPAC, 1954:48). What the Committee seems to have 
had in mind was demonstrated in the next piece of authority 
legislation to be passed by parliament (the Export Payments
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Insurance Corporation Act 1956). This combined specified 
prohibitions on ministerial intervention with a list of 
several clearly defined policy matters on which ministerial 
approval was required, and utilized the formula recommended 
by the Royal Commission of 1937 for resolving disagreements 
over failures of the minister to approve requests 
(Wettenhall, 1956:500-2).
By the early post-war period, then, a consensus of 
sorts was apparently emerging. It had two parts. On the one 
hand, it acknowledged that ministers should normally have the 
capacity to ensure their policies are implemented, if 
necessary against the wishes of an authority and its 
employees. This principle was clearly upheld by the Royal 
Commission and the two parliamentary inquiries referred to 
above; on the two earliest occasions (in connection with the 
Commonwealth Bank and the Australian Broadcasting Commission 
respectively) in circumstances where the introduction of a 
directive power was highly controversial. And the 
recommendations were accepted, and acted upon, by governments 
of both party persuasions. These developments were of 
considerable significance: they represented a reassertion, 
in the face of at least some colonial and early Commonwealth 
practice, of the Westminster principle that ministers, and 
ministers alone, should have responsibility for policy. On 
the other hand, genuine efforts had been made to devise means 
to preserve a meaningful degree of autonomy for statutory 
authorities. The particular Acts referred to above, 
considered in chronological order, incorporate successively
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stronger, more soundly based safeguards against capricious 
or unpublicised ministerial interference.
On its face this consensus provided a solution to the 
problem of statutory authority accountability, in the form 
of clearly demarcated spheres of responsibility protected by 
appropriate sanctions. But there were flaws in the 
consensus; and the putative solution was brittle, if not 
illusory. One problem was the by now well established 
tradition of unsystematic, highly individualised authority 
design, which reflected a continuing reluctance to view 
statutory authorities generically. The lesson drawn from 
an inquiry into one authority, or the application to one 
authority of a particular statutory formula to regulate 
minister-authority relations, was not necessarily viewed as 
relevant to other cases. None of the formulae considered 
above became a generally accepted model. The influence of 
the several inquiries was narrow and short term rather than 
broad and enduring; and the inquiries themselves saw little 
need to address one another's findings and recommendations, 
despite differences in the latter. As a result, none of the 
statutory formulae considered above became a generally 
accepted model. Some, but by no means all, later legislation 
displayed a concern to balance ministerial control and 
authority autonomy. But very few statutes have been as 
rigorous in their approach to this task as those outlined 
above.
The other problem was that the relevant actors made 
little use of the particular statutory mechanisms. For all
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its value as an indicator of changes in professed attitudes 
towards the balancing of independence and control in 
statutory authority administration, the power of ministerial 
direction is an unreliable guide to the point at which that 
balance has been struck in practice. Ministers have seldom 
if ever issued formal directions to authorities. 
Authorities, for their part, have also been loath to exercise 
their statutory rights - for instance, in the case of some 
trading authorities, to invoke 'recoup* provisions 
(Wettenhall, 1966; Shand, 1982:54-5). In some cases this 
aversion to formalising the key relationship in the 
accountability regime has probably meant that the authority 
has more de facto independence than might be inferred from 
its statute. But it can also signify that ministers find it 
more politically convenient to use less visible channels of 
influence, often based on authorities' dependence on central 
government agencies for resources. By mid-century a number 
of commentators were suggesting that formal and informal 
changes had tilted the balance decisively away from 
independence and towards ministerial control (Kewley and 
Rydon, 1949 and 1950; Rydon, 1952a and 1952b; Webb, 1954 and 
1955; Kewley, 1957; Encel 1960).
The Second World War, which had greatly changed the 
circumstances of Commonwealth government, was viewed by these 
writers as a watershed in the history of the statutory 
authority, dividing an era of independence from an era of 
control. Such a change might also have constituted a sort 
of solution to the traditional 'problem' of statutory
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authority accountability, albeit at the risk of destroying 
the primary rationale for the creation of statutory 
authorities. The argument is thus worthy of examination; 
the more so because a relatively low level of academic 
interest in Commonwealth authorities between the mid-1950s 
and the mid-1970s meant that the conventional wisdom of the 
earlier period has not been evaluated in the light of later 
experience.
A Premature Obituary for Statutory Authority Independence 
A particularly clear and forceful statement of the case was 
made by Webb (1954). Webb resolved statutory authority 
autonomy into two components: 'economic' autonomy and
political, or 'cultural', autonomy. Economic autonomy, he 
argued, had been restricted in two main ways over the 
preceding 20 years: firstly, freedom in staffing matters had
been reduced 'by requiring conformity to public service 
salary scales' and, secondly, financial independence had been 
weakened by 'restrictions on borrowing powers, by requiring 
Ministerial approval of capital expenditure beyond a 
specified amount, and by prescribing the form of accounts and 
requiring the auditing of accounts by the government auditor' 
(1954:102-3). Moreover, in Webb's view these developments 
were not merely products of administrative fashion or party 
political preference but were manifestations of a fundamental 
change in the economic role of government. Under the 
combined stimuli of depression, war and Keynesian economic 
thinking, other Western countries had also both expanded and
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increased central control over their public sectors. There 
was, Webb conceded, no strictly necessary connection between 
'economic' autonomy and 'political' autonomy. But he 
believed that in practice it was difficult to preserve the 
latter without the former, if only because 'economic' issues 
could not be neatly separated out from issues of other sorts. 
In short, 'the end of laissez-faire was the end of the 
autonomous public corporation' (p.103).
Other factors were identified by Webb and others as 
reinforcing this process of change. The growth in popularity 
of ministerial powers of direction (which were also employed 
in the same period in the British nationalised industry 
statutes) has already been discussed. A trend towards the 
placement of departmental representatives on authority boards 
was also observed. The practice received legislative 
recognition in the Broadcasting Act 1948, which provided for 
an officer from each of the Treasury and the Postmaster- 
General's Department to be added to the Australian 
Broadcasting Commission's board. But this merely formalised 
a policy which had been adopted, in the absence of statutory 
requirement, for authorities such as the Australian National 
Airlines Commission and the Overseas Telecommunications 
Commission created immediately after the war (Wettenhall, 
1956:379). By 1955 Webb was able to record that over the 
past decade or so Treasury officials had been 'planted out 
in almost every sizeable statutory corporation in the 
Commonwealth' (Webb, 1955a:164).
Webb and his contemporaries were undoubtedly correct
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about the direction of change in the early post-war years, 
but they tended to exaggerate the strength and permanence of 
the forces underlying the changes. In fact, the process of 
increasing control over statutory authorities owed as much 
to transient factors as it did to any decisive historical 
shift towards central economic planning. Of the former, by 
far the most important was the presence in office of the 
Labor party, whose 'majoritarian' conception of democracy 
(see Lijphart, 1984) had given it a traditional preference 
for a strongly centralised, or 'command', system of 
government. By the mid-1950s the Menzies Coalition 
government was reassessing the practice of appointing 
departmental commissioners (for example, it was discontinued 
for the Australian Broadcasting Commission in 1956 
(Wettenhall, 1956:379)) and had shown itself prepared to 
bestow considerable autonomy upon particular corporations (as 
in the Australian Shipping Commission Act 1956). From the 
late 1950s to the early 1970s Liberal governments created a 
number of authorities which were as independent as most if 
not all pre-war bodies12.
The confidence with which interpretations of the
Among the most notable of these were the Export 
Payments Insurance Corporation (established 1956), the Australian 
Shipping Commission (1956), the National Capital Development 
Commission (1957), the Housing Loans Insurance Corporation 
(1965), the Commissioner for Restrictive Trade Practices (1965) 
and the Australian Industry Development Corporation (1970). The 
latter authority was accorded a statutory independence as 
complete as that of virtually any (non-judicial) body created by 
the Commonwealth parliament. Ministerial direction was 
proscribed, the Corporation was free of all staffing controls and 
its accounts were not required to be audited by the Auditor- General .
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future direction of change were made in the 1950s owed much 
to the perception that the trend to tighter control was a 
world-wide phenomenon. Webb (1954:102) could point, for 
instance, to the passage in the United States and Canada 
respectively of the Government Corporations Control Act 1945 
and the Financial Administration Act 1951. But in both of 
these countries the following three decades were to see a 
progressive emasculation of these Acts as many new bodies 
were exempted from their provisions (see Seidman, 1980:265- 
76; Langford, 1980; Wilson, 1981:353-82).
The analysis under discussion also contained an 
element of straightforward exaggeration of the extent of 
post-war departure from previous practice, based on the 
attribution of a somewhat mythical degree of autonomy to pre­
war authorities. Some of the restrictions which Webb saw as 
having added significant new shackles to post-war authorities 
were in fact in widespread use throughout the period to 1940. 
For instance, it is difficult to find an example of a 
statutory corporation created in these years whose accounts 
were not required to be audited by the Auditor-General. The 
tightening of controls in the post-war period was a matter 
of degree rather than of qualitative change.
The commentators of the 1950s were particularly 
impressed by the contrast between the freedom in staffing 
matters possessed by major pre-war authorities and the strong 
external controls generally imposed on post-war authorities.
62
This change was indeed genuine and marked13. But the initial 
burst of enthusiasm for subjecting statutory authorities to 
staffing regimes similar to those of government departments 
gave way quite soon to satisfaction with a more moderate 
degree of control. Governments came to look upon themselves 
as having a menu of available options from which they could 
select the one most appropriate for the particular case. By 
the 1970s and early 1980s three such options were in active 
use. At one end of the range, the statutes of trading 
authorities sometimes left recruitment and the fixing of 
terms and conditions of employment in the hands of authority 
boards. In other cases, amounting in total to around 50 
authorities at the end of this period, statutes required 
Public Service Board approval for particular aspects of 
staffing, chiefly determination of salaries and conditions of 
employment. Finally, authority staff might be fully 
incorporated into the Commonwealth Public Service, as tended 
to occur with regulatory and advisory bodies (see, for 
instance, Public Service Board, 1983:148-50).
The move in the 1940s towards greater uniformity in and 
central control over staffing employed various statutory means. 
In a few cases, such as the Australian Broadcasting Commission 
and the Overseas Telecommunications Commission (established 
1946), enabling Acts set out in considerable detail conditions 
similar to those employed by regular public servants. In other 
cases the authority was permitted to appoint its own staff on 
salaries and conditions determined by the authority, but only 
with the approval of the Public Service Board. Central control 
sometimes extended beyond the terms and conditions of employment. 
For instance, the staff of the Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric 
Authority established in 1949 were also required to be selected 
by recruiting methods determined by the Public Service Board. 
The Commonwealth Science and Industry Research Organization Act 
1949 went another step further and required Public Service Board 
approval of the size of the clerical and administrative 
establishment (Wettenhall, 1956:304,394-5).
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Further, there is evidence of a significant, if 
selective, reversal of the early post-war approach to 
staffing control. Under the Fraser (Coalition) and Hawke 
(Labor) governments of the late 1970s and the early 1980s 
there was a tendency to give trading (and related) 
authorities more autonomy in this respect than had been 
granted those created by the Chifley and early Menzies 
governments. The history of the Australian Broadcasting 
Commission constitutes something of an index of changing 
governmental attitudes: its substantial freedom under its 
original Act of 1932 was progressively undermined by 
amendments in 1942 and 1946, but inquiries by the Postal and 
Telecommunications Department (1976) and a Committee of 
Review (CRABC, 1981) argued in favour of much greater 
autonomy and their recommendations were subsequently given 
statutory embodiment (see Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
Act 1983)14 .
The view articulated by Webb and shared by other 
commentators of the day, that a tightening of staffing and 
financial controls invariably implied a lessening of policy 
independence, did not go completely unchallenged. In a 
debate conducted in the pages of Public Administration 
(Sydney) in 1953, the Chairman of the Australian Broadcasting 
Commission (ABC), Richard Boyer, disagreed with Rydon's
On the other hand, it should also be noted that the 
late 1970s saw the imposition upon statutory authorities of 
important non-statutory controls, such as staff ceilings and 
industrial disputes settlement procedures, as well as two 
controversial Commonwealth employment Acts (Wettenhall, 1983:43- 
7).
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characterisation in these terms of the ABC's recent history 
(Rydon 1952a, 1952b, 1953a, 1953b; Boyer, 1953a, 1953b). 
Boyer (1953a:57) objected to what he saw as Rydon's 
'absorption in the administrative framework as... an absolute 
touchstone on the issue of independence'. More important, 
he argued, were firstly, the statutory provisions directly 
concerned with the control of programing and secondly, the 
spirit in which the government administered the Act. He 
noted that legislative change had not been all in the one 
direction, and that in the vital area of the broadcasting of 
political or controversial matters statutory protection of 
ABC autonomy had actually been strengthened in the 1940s. 
He also asserted that a principal support of ABC independence 
had been the respect for the body's integrity demonstrated 
in the government's approach to appointments. Rydon (1953a, 
1953b) was prepared to engage Boyer on the ground chosen by 
the latter, namely the demonstrated effectiveness or 
otherwise of programming independence, but the debate was 
ultimately inconclusive because the combatants differed over 
what independent behaviour on the part of a public 
broadcasting agency should entail.
It is possible to elaborate on Boyer's point that, as 
far as statutory authority independence is concerned, much 
will depend in practice on the attitudes and intentions of 
governments which have the task of administering the 
statutes. There is an obvious truth here, which those 
commentators in the 1950s who believed they were witnessing 
the passing of statutory authority independence took as much
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to heart as Boyer. All accepted that, while the contents of 
statutes were by no means irrelevant to the independence- 
control issue, the informal relationships which were only 
partly shaped by statutory control mechanisms were crucial. 
It was for this reason that Webb (1955a) castigated those 
advocates of the statutory corporation he called 'romantics' 
individuals who simply assumed that certain desired 
administrative attributes, such as entrepreneurial flair, 
capacity for rapid decision making, flexibility and the like, 
were inherent features of the statutory corporation. 
However, post-war Australian administrative 'realists' or 
sceptics, such as Webb and Rydon, may have fallen into a 
different version of the same trap. Australian commentators 
were justified in inferring that the strengthening and 
multiplication of statutory controls they observed 
represented a desire on the part of the government to 
exercise closer supervision of authorities. But they may 
have exaggerated the extent to which governments would seek 
to translate potential into actual control. Certainly little 
or no evidence has been produced to support the assumption 
that governments have in general been zealous about control.
In fact, the only systematic evidence that has been 
collected, through a survey conducted by the Royal Commission 
on Australian Government Administration, suggests that the 
actual level of control exerted over statutory authorities 
in general in the early 1970s was neither high nor perceived 
by the authorities as onerous. Only 20 percent of the more 
than 100 authorities providing usable answers to the
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questionnaire reported a 'substantial' degree of ministerial 
control over 'policy and functions', while the figure dropped 
to 2 percent for control of 'day-to-day administration'. 
(The corresponding figures for departmental control were 6 
percent and 4.2 percent.) Some two-thirds of authorities 
submitting usable replies stated that controls had no 
'adverse effect' on their relationship with the responsible 
minister or department, and a similar proportion reported 
that this relationship was neither too close nor too distant. 
By contrast, 14 percent believed that controls had had an 
adverse effect on their relationships with ministers and 
departments, with 8 percent believing that his relationship 
was 'too close'. As to the effect of all forms of control, 
more than half of the 70 organizations giving usable replies 
found controls 'generally satisfactory', while only 10 
percent regarded them as 'generally unsatisfactory'15. Even 
allowing for some slackening of enthusiasm for the control 
of authorities since the 1950s, it is difficult to believe 
that a similar survey conducted in the earlier period would 
have produced the dramatically different results required to 
support the hypothesis of a high level of actual control.
It is not possible, therefore, to agree with the 
conventional academic wisdom of the early post-war period. 
Webb and his colleagues had not identified forces which would 
completely transform the circumstances of statutory 
authorities in Commonwealth government. On the other hand,
. The above statistics were drawn from tables summarizing 
the results of the survey (see Wettenhall 1976:348-60,322-8).
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neither had they completely misread the situation. While 
there was to be no neat historical transition from an era of 
independence to an era of control, some of the factors which 
were cited as evidence did persist. In particular, 
reasonably strict financial controls, ministerial powers of 
direction, and the appointment of departmental 
representatives to authority boards tended to feature more 
frequently in post-war accountability regimes. Moreover, it 
is not implausible to relate this somewhat greater concern 
with formal control to a more purposive approach to the 
disposition of resources which Keynesian demand management 
policy would have tended to encourage. Thus in these years 
the old Australian pattern of public policy, based on the 
powerful, autonomous statutory authority, was becoming less 
representative of the generality of governmental activity, 
though it endured in its areas of original application.
As a postscript, we might note a more recent echo of 
the general case we have considered. Goldring and Wettenhall 
(1980) and Goldring (1980) claim to have identified a trend 
in judicial interpretation which may deny authorities a legal 
basis for opposition to ministers. If correct, their 
argument would provide strong alternative support for the 
notion of a dramatic historical shift from statutory 
authority autonomy to a situation where there is little to 
distinguish between statutory authorities and ministerial 
departments as far as relations with ministers are concerned. 
The evidence comes chiefly from two High Court cases - 
involving Ipec Air Pty Ltd (1965) and Ansett Transport
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Industries Pty Ltd (1977) - and, in particular, from the 
judgement of Windeyer J. in the former case and Murphy J. and 
Barwick C.J. in the latter16. On both occasions the Court 
considered the position of the Director General of Civil 
Aviation in relation to the minister - specifically, the 
extent to which the exercise of a discretion vested in such 
an officer by statute should be influenced by ministerial or 
governmental policy. In 1965 Windeyer seems to have been 
alone in holding that:
The Director-General is the officer whose written 
permission must be produced to the Customs. But... 
that does not mean that he is to grant or refuse 
permission according to some view of his own... his 
duty is to obey all lawful directions of the Minister 
under whom he serves the Crown (Windeyer, 1965; cited 
by Goldring, 1980:372).
Goldring has claimed, however, that by the time of the Ansett 
case this view had come to represent the majority position 
on the Court. Statements from the judgements of Murphy J., 
Barwick J., Gibbs J. and Aickin J. are quoted in support of 
this contention. Goldring's conclusion is that 'The view of 
the High Court today is that functions that can be 
characterised as administrative must be exercised in 
accordance with government policy' (1980:375).
The statements quoted by Goldring suggest that the 
justices had very much in mind the fact that the statutory 
officer in question was, despite his statutory status, 
operating within the context of a ministerial department of 
which he was, in another guise, an ordinary senior officer.
16. The cases were R v. Anderson; ex parte Ipec Air Pty Ltd 
(1965) 113 CLR 177 and Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) 
Pty Ltd v. The Commonwealth (1977) 139 CLR 54.
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But Goldring did not see this as preventing a conclusion
about statutory authorities in general:
at least in the absence of clear words in a statute 
which provides that the activities of a statutory 
authority will be free from ministerial control, the 
High Court will read the statute consistently with 
its view of responsible government, and will find the 
statutory authority is required to obey and implement 
directions given to it by the Minister...(p.369)
Goldring went on to suggest that even an explicit statutory
guarantee of autonomy might be illusory:
some statutes do purport to exclude the right of the 
Minister to give directions to the authority, but... 
in view of... the requirement of the Constitution for 
responsible government, there must be some doubt 
about the validity of such exclusions (p.376).
There must, however, be considerable doubt about the 
validity of this reading of the judicial position. A major 
weakness of the case is its almost entirely speculative 
nature, there having not been a decisive test of the issue 
in the courts. Moreover, it rests on a dubious extrapolation 
from the position of statutory officers within ministerial 
departments to that of statutory authorities in general. 
Even in the case of the statutory officers, as he 
acknowledged, Goldring's interpretation of the particular 
judgements runs counter to a traditional principle in 
administrative law whereby a person having an independent 
discretionary power may not exercise it 'under dictation', 
or 'fetter' his/her discretion by accepting the constraint 
of an external rule or policy (Goldring, 1980:375).
Finally, Finn and Lindell (1982) have argued cogently 
against the interpretation of the Constitution which
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underlies Goldring's thesis. Goldring assumes that any body 
charged with effecting some purpose expressed in legislation 
is part of the executive government and is thereby subject 
to Section 61. He also assumes that Section 61 imposes some 
positive constraints on the exercise of executive power and, 
in particular, that such power must be exercised in a manner 
consistent with the principles of responsible government 
which the High Court has found to be dictated by the 
Constitution. This reading of the Constitution, rather than 
the evidence from the statutory officer cases, is probably 
the mainstay of Goldring's conviction that ministers cannot 
be deprived of all power to impose policy upon independent 
agencies. Finn and Lindell dispute both assumptions. They 
argue, admittedly also without the positive support of 
judicial exegesis, that Section 61 neither defines nor 
assumes a definition of executive power; that parliament 
itself decides whether or not the statutory powers it creates 
are part of the executive power of the Commonwealth; that 
when parliament confers statutory functions on an independent 
agency it is not vesting the executive power of the 
Commonwealth in that agency, but is creating an 'independent 
responsibility'; and that parliament is, as a result, 
completely unconstrained as to the form of accountability it 
may impose on an independent agency (1982:185-93).
Thus neither of the arguments examined gives reason 
to think that the 'problem' of authority independence was 
objectively any less pressing, or indeed any different, in 
the 1970s and 1980s than it had been before World War Two.
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Certainly observers were still stating it in identical terms. 
By the late 1970s, however, an additional factor was 
contributing to concern about statutory authority 
accountability and the role of the statutory authority 
generally in the system of government. This was the alleged 
abuse of the administrative form through the excessive 
creation of statutory bodies. To conclude our survey of the 
history of the 'problem* of statutory authority 
accountability we must now turn to the phenomenon of 
statutory authority growth in the post-war period.
Statutory Authorities Out of Control?
The Second World War was a pivotal event in the history of 
Australian government; not because it gave rise to important 
new political movements or changed the institutional 
landscape significantly (it did neither of these things), but 
because it ushered in a greatly expanded role for the 
Commonwealth government. The latter, from its high post-war 
expenditure plateau, grew strongly and largely without 
controversy until the mid-1970s (see Groenewegen, 1982). In 
those decades changes in the nature and scope of Commonwealth 
activity, as well as in its general level, provided fresh 
stimuli for statutory authority creation.
Table 1.1 shows the numbers of authorities created (or 
reconstituted by legislative enactment) across a range of 
functional categories in each five year period between 
Federation and 1984 (see also Appendix 1).
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Table 1.1 Creation of Statutory Authorities, 1901-1984
Number of Authorities by Function*
Period Trading Regulatory Appellate Executive Research/ Advisory Total
Education
1901-4 0 3 0 7 0 0 10
1905-9 0 4 0 5 0 0 9
1910-14 1 4 0 6 0 1 12
1915-19 3 1 0 6 0 0 10
1920-24 3 5 2 7 2 1 20
1925-29 1 3 3 6 1 0 14
1930-34 0 2 0 4 3 1 10
1935-39 2b 6 0 3 0 1 12
1940-44 3 3 1 1 1 3 12
1945-49 9 8 2 16 4 4 43
1950-54 6b 1 0 2 1 1 11
1955-59 5b 4 1 7 1 8 26
1960-64 1 2 0 7 1 5 16
1965-69 2 2 3 5 1 6 18
1970-74 12 6 6 10 6 18 58
1975-79 n c 12 5 26 4 20 78
1980-84 6 11 2 16 2 18 55
a The functional categories are those utilized by Wettenhall
b Includes one 
not strictly
body incorporated under a 
a statutory authority.
Companies Act and
c Includes two of the bodies identified above.
Sources: Wettenhall (1977, 1979, 1984, 1986).
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The table reveals that the rate of creation has been 
greater, on average, in all categories in the post-war 
years than previously, in most cases substantially so. 
This has allowed statutory authorities to retain their 
prominence in the bigger post-war Commonwealth public 
sector. It is also noticeable that the post-war rate of 
creation, in general and within particular categories, has 
been decidedly 'bumpy', with pronounced dips following 
periods of intense activity over the first two decades. 
However, the most recent period, from the early 1970s to 
the mid-1980s, was an especially active one: an initial 
upswing in governmental growth saw the rate of increase in 
the numbers rise sharply; that rate then dipped moderately 
while remaining high by historical standards during a time 
of restraint of public sector growth; and finally, in the 
early to mid-1980s, it turned upwards again towards its 
earlier peak. An important consequence of the higher rate 
of creation (and reconstitution) of statutory authorities 
over the past several decades is that the contemporary 
corpus of Commonwealth authorities is largely a product of 
the post-war years.
Looking past the numbers at the nature of the bodies 
created, one can detect in the changing pattern of 
creation, of which Table 1.1 gives but the outline, a broad 
shift in the character of Commonwealth activity. The 
changes reflect an increasingly active federal government 
whose major resource has been its financial strength and 
predominant role in economic management; which has been
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constrained in its ability to engage in public enterprise; 
and which has lacked direct, or exclusive, access to key 
areas of public policy. They also reflect a shift in the 
form of government intervention in Australia over the 
course of the twentieth century. While the impact of 
public enterprise has waned, this development has been 
'counterbalanced by the growth of allocative and regulatory 
intervention and by rising public expenditures on social 
(welfare) policies' (Butlin, Barnard and Pincus, 1982:320). 
Moreover, the role of the Commonwealth government since the 
war has been fundamental to this shift, as the growth of 
allocative and regulatory intervention has coincided with 
its centralisation (Butlin et al., 1982:108-47,331-4). In 
these circumstances, many post-war statutory authorities, 
like many ministerial departments, have functioned as 
agencies of regulatory or allocative influence. Bodies 
concerned with the allocation of funds have been especially 
prominent, in line with a situation in which around a half 
of the Commonwealth's total outlays has been accounted for 
annually by 'transfer payments and advances' (ACIR, 
1982:50-51).
These points may be related to the contents of several 
of the largest categories in Table 1.1. In the executive 
category bodies making financial grants to private 
individuals and organizations became more prominent in the 
period under consideration. A number of these bodies are 
involved in industrial development, but others are 
concerned with such different purposes as support of the
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arts and sport. Several important trading enterprises 
created in recent decades also have important financing and 
funding roles17. The record of creation of advisory bodies, 
on the other hand, bears the imprint of a different mode of 
allocative activity on the part of the Commonwealth, namely 
the use of conditional grants to determine or influence the 
spending priorities of state governments. As this strategy 
developed momentum in the 1960s and 1970s, statutory bodies 
were employed to provide advice on expenditure priorities, 
to monitor spending programmes and to evaluate outcomes. 
Turning to the regulatory category, the Commonwealth's 
greater regulatory importance after 1945 was responsible 
for a steady, if numerically modest, flow of new 
authorities, including a number of important primary 
produce marketing bodies and, from the mid-1960s, 
successive bodies in the trade practices field. Moreover, 
as the scope of Commonwealth activity expanded, statutory 
bodies were created to co-ordinate national regulatory 
programmes in such areas of shared federal powers as 
companies and securities law and criminal investigation.
Mention might also be made of bodies involved in 
research, educational and training activities. To the 
entities accounted for under this heading in Table 1.1 may 
be added some dozen and a half primary produce 'research 
committees' created between 1955 and the early 1980s which
These include the Australian Industry Development 
porporation (created in 1970), the Australian Overseas Projects 
Corporation (1978), the Primary Industry Bank of Australia (1978) 
ind the Aboriginal Development Commission (1980).
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have been included in the advisory category. Together 
these two groups constitute an important contribution to 
post-war changes in the pattern of statutory authority 
creation. However, their significance differs. The 
emergence of the primary produce bodies reflects the new 
dominance of the Commonwealth in the management of rural 
industry (Butlin et al., 1982:332-3). The other bodies, 
particularly the various ’institutes'18, seem to signify 
an effort by the Commonwealth to produce some tangible 
manifestation of its involvement in the research and 
educational field otherwise dominated by state-created 
entities.
So far we have attempted to explain the post-war 
pattern of authority creation in terms of the changed 
nature of the Commonwealth government's intervention in 
Australian society. In general terms, the argument has 
been that the number of statutory bodies has grown at an 
increased rate because the Commonwealth government has 
undertaken more activities of kinds for which the statutory 
authority has been traditionally favoured. This is 
undoubtedly a major part of the story. But it is also 
likely that growth in the size (level of activity), 
complexity (technical and informational requirements of
18. These include the Australian Institute of Aboriginal 
Studies (created in 1964), the Australian Institute of 
Criminology (1971), the Australian Institute of Marine Science 
(1972), the Institute of Family Studies (1975), the Australian 
Institute of Multicultural Affairs (1979) and the Australian 
Institute of Sport (originally incorporated under the Australian 
Capital Territory Companies Ordinance, converted to a statutory 
authority in 1986).I
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activities) and scope (range of activity) of government 
have contributed a separate impetus to authority creation. 
The role of these factors may be briefly outlined.
As far as size is concerned, there is some evidence 
that the political and organizational factors which have 
more or less stabilised the number of departments of state 
over the post-war period have provided an incentive for the 
'hiving off' of largely self-contained activities, in order 
to relieve pressure on the parent organization or to 
improve the performance of the hived off activity. This 
rationale played a role in the establishment of such 
disparate entities as the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(in 1975), the business enterprises Telecom and Australia 
Post (in 1975), and the regulatory body the Australian 
Broadcasting Control Board (in 1948)19.
An important effect of the second factor, growing 
complexity, has been the creation of at least two sorts of 
advisory body. Firstly, increasing interrelationships 
between policy areas and programmes have arguably produced 
a need for bodies to 'liaise' and 'co-ordinate' . Secondly, 
the informational requirements and technical content of 
public programs have expanded and become more 
sophisticated, leading governments to create bodies to tap 
non-governmental sources of information and expert 
knowledge. Both types of body are represented in the
Commonwealth's collection of statutory advisory
_______________________1Q1 . This conclusion is based on an examination of the 
parliamentary debates on the enabling legislation for these 
authorities.
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authorities. But statutory authorities performing the 
functions described are only the tip of the iceberg; they 
are well and truly outnumbered by non-statutory bodies (see 
SSCFGO, 1986).
Finally, growth in the scope, or range, of 
governmental activity may also have contributed to the 
increased rate of statutory authority creation in several 
functional categories. From around the early 1970s 
Commonwealth and state governments alike began to adopt new 
policy responsibilities in areas such as environmental 
management, arts and culture, consumer affairs and 
aboriginal and ethnic affairs. On the one hand, 
initiatives in these fields were a response to the 
appearance of new interest groups; on the other, they 
strengthened, or stimulated the formation of, interest 
groups. Statutory bodies were created to placate the new 
groups by providing tangible symbols of governmental 
concern, to facilitate the participation of the groups and, 
if possible, to win their support.
The factors discussed above also help explain the 
pattern of statutory authority creation after 1970, when 
the rate of appearance of new bodies increased markedly. 
But the principal cause of the higher level of creation in 
the mid-1970s was the Whitlam Labor administration (1972- 
75). Three features of that administration are of 
particular importance in this context. Firstly, the 
Whitlam government brought about a sharp rise in 
governmental expenditure. Whereas the ratio of
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Commonwealth government outlays to Gross Domestic Product 
had risen by 1.4 percent from 1960 to 1965 and by the same 
amount from 1965 to 1970, in the three year period between 
June 1973 and June 1976 it rose 3.3 percent (from 15 
percent to 18.3 percent) (ACIR, 1982:40-41). Thus there 
were more funds available for the creation of machinery of 
government of all kinds, and ipso facto for new statutory 
authorities. Secondly, the administration was also largely 
responsible for a similar rise in the level of state 
government outlays. Much of the increase was accounted for 
by 'specific purpose', or 'tied', Commonwealth grants, 
employed to give the Commonwealth leverage over state 
policy-making20. And, following the example of Menzies 
Liberal governments of the 1950s and early 1960s, a number 
of statutory authorities were established to support the 
Commonwealth's 'new federalism' initiatives. Thirdly, the 
Whitlam government, independently of the strategy just 
outlined, significantly broadened the scope of Commonwealth 
government, embracing in particular new forms of public 
enterprise and regulation, and other new activities related 
to 'quality of life' or 'post-affluence' issues. 
Involvement in each of these areas favoured the creation of 
statutory authorities.
The above factors are in the nature of indirect
. Between 1973 and 1976 state government outlays as a 
proportion of GDP rose 3.2 percent, from 14.7 percent to 17.9 
percent (ACIR, 1982:40-41). Specific purpose payments as a 
proportion of all funds received by the states from the 
Commonwealth rose from 12.7 percent in 1972 (16.3 percent in 
1969-70) to a peak of 33.3 percent in 1975-76 (ACIR, 1982:79).
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influences on statutory authority creation. But the 
Whitlam government also showed enthusiasm for the statutory 
authority device per se, as an alternative to existing 
ministerial departments. This was most evident in the case 
of a substantial group of advisory commissions established 
at that time. These bodies have been described by Lloyd 
and Reid (1974:258) as a 'Parallel Public Service' because 
their functions were not distinguishable from the 
mainstream activities of ministerial departments; they 
were staffed under the Public Service Act; and personnel 
control was similar to that of an ordinary department, with 
the chairmen exercising the powers of departmental 
permanent heads21.
On a favourable view, there were two justifications 
for the creation of these advisory commissions (Lloyd and 
Reid, 1974:256-7). Firstly, and most importantly, there 
was the government's perception that the radical departures 
in policy it envisaged after 23 years of conservative 
government required fresh ideas, an enormous amount of new 
information, new analytical techniques and, most of all, a 
high level of commitment on the part of administrators to 
what was being attempted. Statutory commissions, by giving 
ministers the capacity to recruit expertise from outside 
the public service and to establish teams of committed 
individuals, seemed to satisfy these requirements. A
Advisory commissions were created in each of the 
following policy areas: Australian heritage, children, cities, 
hospitals and health services, law reform, schools, social 
welfare, technical and further education.
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second rationale for the commissions, in light of the 
government's 'new federalism' strategy, was that their 
differentiation from the Commonwealth's administrative core 
and their collegial structure (which permitted a degree of 
state participation) made them a more appealing vehicle for 
Commonwealth-state 'co-operation'.
During its three years in office, the Whitlam 
government created around 60 statutory authorities at a 
record annual rate22. A measure of the 'productivity' of 
the government in this respect is that, at the end of its 
relatively short life, between 30 and 40 percent of the 
total number of Commonwealth statutory authorities were an 
outcome of its efforts23. This statistic is perhaps even 
more striking when it is appreciated that the collection of 
authorities then in existence represented a very high 
proportion of the sum total of those created over the 75 
years since Federation. It is not possible to say 
precisely what that proportion was, as comprehensive data 
on extinctions of statutory authorities does not exist. 
But Wettenhall's detailed charts of statutory authority 
development suggest that the bodies have had a high 
survival rate, aside from short periods when limited
22. This figure excludes Australian Capital Territory 
authorities, but includes a handful of existing authorities whose 
statutory powers, functions or structures were altered in a 
significant way. The statistic is based on the answer to a 
parliamentary question (see House of Representatives, CPD, 8 
September 1977:998-1010).
23. RCAGA (1976:83) speaks of having identified 'more than 
200' statutory authorities, but only 170 bodies are listed by 
Wettenhall (1976:361-4) including six bodies formed under 
Companies Acts without statutory backing.
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assaults have been made by incoming governments on the work 
of their displaced rivals - as in the cases of the Scullin 
Labor government (1929-32) and the early post-war Menzies 
Coalition governments (see Wettenhall, 1977; 1979; 
1984:159-66; 1986:207-8). A limited exercise of this kind 
occurred when the incoming Fraser Coalition government 
abolished or aborted some half-dozen prominent Whitlam 
government authorities24.
The Whitlam government was removed from office in 
1975. The present study takes account of around seven more 
years of Coalition government and several years of a Labor 
government under Prime Minister Hawke which has been quite 
different in style from its Labor predecessor. Neither of 
the two recent administrations has displayed the same 
fondness for the statutory authority which characterised 
the Whitlam government. On the contrary, both have adopted 
a rather critical attitude towards its use. Nevertheless, 
statutory authorities have continued to be created at rates 
well in excess of those registered for the years between 
1945 and the early 1970s. The Fraser Coalition 
administration, at times a strident advocate of smaller 
government, created or reconstituted (and hence identified 
itself with) some 80 authorities, at a relatively high rate 
of around 11.5 per year (Wettenhall, 1984:111). Its Labor 
successor returned the rate to its earlier peak during its
24. The bodies abolished were the Children's Commission, 
:he Cities Commission, the Social Welfare Commission, the 
Technical and Further Education Commission and the Road Safety 
ind Standards Authority.
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first two years in office by creating and reconstituting 
some 44 authorities (Wettenhall, 1986:96). However, one 
must be a little wary in using figures for very recent 
years for purposes of historical comparison, as the ratio 
of 'reconstitutions' to completely new authorities has 
risen markedly and the number of abolitions has also 
increased. It appears that there is in the 1980s 
considerably more gardening going on among the tangled 
statutory authority thickets than has ever been the case in 
the past. Moreover, a good deal of this activity reflects 
a concern with reform of the machinery of government in 
general, and statutory authorities in particular, which has 
gathered force since the late 1970s.
The rising numbers of Commonwealth statutory 
authorities in the post-war period, and especially their 
sharply rising numbers in the 1970s, form the essential 
background to current debate over the role and 
accountability of these bodies. There are, it is feared, 
too many bodies for ministers and parliament to be able to 
subject each to effective supervision and scrutiny. Small 
bodies, in particular, tend to fall from view in the 
mushroom-like growth of administrative entities outside 
departments of state. The problem is illustrated by the 
fact that it took a number of years in the 1970s for 
something approaching an exhaustive list of Commonwealth 
authorities to be compiled25. The proliferation of
25. The task began with RCAGA (1973-76) and was completed 
by Wettenhall (1979) and the Senate Standing Committee on Finance 
and Government Operations (1979a; 1982a).
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statutory authorities has thus contributed directly to 
concern about their accountability. It has also 
highlighted the lack of consistency in authority design 
which has magnified the difficulty of overseeing this part 
of the administration. Further, the anxiety about 
statutory authority numbers has been reinforced by the 
attitude that many such bodies are created for 
unjustifiable, or more particularly administratively 
unjustifiable, reasons. In the absence of a clear and 
appropriately restrictive understanding of the proper use 
of the statutory authority form, it is felt, bodies have 
been created unnecessarily - and once established have, 
through a demonstration effect, stimulated further abuse of 
the device.
Conclusion
This chapter sought to do several things. One was simply 
to indicate the nature of the administrative entities with 
which this thesis is concerned and to locate them within 
the Australian Commonwealth public sector. Another purpose 
was to outline the arrangements through which statutory 
authorities are held publicly accountable and to argue that 
the choice of those arrangements has been strongly 
influenced by Westminster assumptions about accountability 
and the existence of ministerial administration at the 
heart of the system of government. A third purpose was to 
show that, despite possible indications to the contrary, 
the tensions between administrative independence and
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control which defined the classical problem of statutory 
authority accountability have not dissipated over the 
course of the twentieth century. Statutory authorities 
were not completely subordinated to ministers and central 
agencies (as early post-war writers expected), nor did 
there emerge a strong consensus around clearly defined, 
complementary roles for minister and statutory authority 
(towards which influential inquiries of the 1930s and 1940s 
seemed to point the way). Finally, the growth in statutory 
authority numbers in the post-war period was outlined. It 
was suggested that this phenomenon, particularly the rapid 
rate of creation in the 1970s, contributed importantly to 
making the accountability of statutory authorities a major 
issue in Commonwealth government over recent years.
These themes are taken further in the next two 
chapters. Chapter 2 reviews notable contributions to 
Australian thought about the role and accountability of 
statutory authorities to reveal the absence of an 
authoritative body of theory which might support a truly 
distinctive position for the statutory authority in the 
framework of government. Chapter 3 focuses on the recent 
reform movement and seeks to show how constraints inherent 
in traditional ways of thinking about and dealing with the 
question of accountability have shaped efforts at 'reform'.
CHAPTER 2
THEORY AND PRACTICE
It was suggested in Chapter 1 that both the place of the 
statutory authority in Australian Commonwealth government and 
arrangements for their accountability have been strongly 
influenced by the centrality of the 'Westminster model' to 
Commonwealth government. This Chapter looks at the matter 
from a slightly different perspective. Its purpose is to 
argue that the task of establishing adequate accountability 
regimes for Commonwealth statutory authorities has been 
impaired by the lack of an authoritative body of theory to 
define and support roles for the relevant actors distinct 
from those enjoined by 'Westminster', or responsible 
government, theory.
That neither the design nor the operation of formal 
accountability arrangements for statutory authorities has 
been a conspicuously theory-governed activity is implicitly 
accepted by most commentators. The point is also well 
illustrated in Chapter 1 with reference to the unplanned 
diversity among statutory accountability provisions and to 
the reluctance of those on either side of the minister - 
authority relationship to make use of certain statutory
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provisions. Indeed, one observer has recently gone so far 
as to speak of ’an almost total absence of theory in relation 
to the modern statutory authority', a state of affairs which, 
he claims, has led in practice to ’confusion’ concerning 'the 
rights, responsibilities and behaviour of the parties 
involved’ (Forrest, 1983:88).
Given the alleged dearth of theory, it appears as 
something of a paradox that Australian administrative history 
in fact contains a number of competing theoretical guides to 
the place of the statutory authority in the framework of 
government. Various contributions to a theoretical 
literature have been made over the period since the 'revival' 
of the statutory authority in the 1880s, often by individuals 
with considerable relevant experience in either state or 
Commonwealth public sectors. Together these comprise a 
fairly substantial body of thought and prescription about 
issues central to this thesis.
The problem, then, is not a lack of theory, but rather 
that no single set of ideas has won authoritative status 
among practitioners of public administration. The present 
chapter elaborates this argument. There are two sections to 
the chapter. The first section discusses some important 
historical contributions to Australian statutory authority 
theory and identifies among them several distinctive 
theoretical positions. The second section examines the 
extent to which each of these positions has achieved 
institutional embodiment.
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Rival Conceptions of Statutory Authority Status and 
Accountability
The leading historian of Australian statutory authority 
theory, R.L. Wettenhall (1983:17-21), has argued for a two- 
category typology of 'formulations' of the relationship of 
statutory authorities to parliament and the executive. In 
one category he places formulations which conceive 
authorities as having a direct responsibility to parliament 
(as distinct from ministers) and hence as being closely 
controlled by parliament. The other category contains those 
formulations which conceive authorities as ’remote' from 
parliamentary control, but which accord ministers an 
important, if latent, supervisory role. This typology is 
founded on two historical exemplars, or 'models', namely the 
Victorian Railways Commissioners established in 1882 and 
their New South Wales counterpart of six years later (see 
also Goldring and Wettenhall, 1980).
The following discussion draws on Wettenhall's work, 
but it departs from his approach in some significant 
respects. Most importantly, it breaks the close connection 
between schools of thought and historical exemplars. There 
are two main reasons why this has been done. Firstly, it has 
been felt necessary to reject the sharp distinction 
Wettenhall makes between the Victorian and the New South 
Wales approaches to the creation of railway authorities. An 
explanation is provided below; for the present it need only 
be observed that without the exemplars the typology is rather 
less compelling. Secondly, I have in any case wished to
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preserve a clear distinction between ideas and practice in 
order not to prejudge the issue of the relationship between 
the two spheres. Wettenhall's talk (1983:18) of the 
Victorian and New South Wales railways experiments as 
'models' (for subsequent practice? for subsequent thinkers?) 
blurs this distinction, while also implying a greater degree 
of self-conscious development of intellectual traditions than 
seems warranted.
In place of Wettenhall's typology, we begin with a 
simple working distinction between bodies of thought which, 
for reasons of accountability, place considerable emphasis 
on the need to reconcile the statutory authority with 
responsible government and bodies of thought which do not 
have such an emphasis. Examples of the latter category of 
ideas considered here are the product of thinkers who 
advocate a highly independent status for the statutory 
authority - either because they accept that a large measure 
of accountability must simply be foregone, perhaps in the 
name of efficiency, or because they envisage the satisfaction 
of public accountability by means other than direct or 
indirect responsibility to parliament. As we shall see, 
there is room for considerable variety within these broad 
categories; so much so that once they have served their 
modest heuristic purpose, they will be abandoned in favour 
of a more refined and meaningful differentiation between 
three substantive theoretical positions.
The 'responsible government thinkers' will be 
considered first, commencing with nineteenth-century
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statesman and Premier of New South Wales, Henry Parkes, in
the context of his attempt to emulate the Victorian
achievement in removing the railways from ministerial
administration1. Parkes has a strong claim to be regarded
as Australia's first theorist of the statutory authority.
But, as Wettenhall has shown, his staunch support of
responsible government was, paradoxically, the main feature
of his public pronouncements on the Railways Act 1888. He
affected a very uncompromising stance on the matter:
I am not one of those, and never have been and never 
shall be, who would create any board or commission or 
constituted body whatever to take away the duties 
... of responsible ministers. Responsible
government, if it means anything, means that in all 
the absolute executive work of the country, as well 
as in the administrative work of the country, there 
should be someone directly responsible to Parliament; 
and so far as I am concerned, I will never be a party 
to weaken, or loosen, or diffuse that responsibility, 
but will endeavour to keep it clear and intact as 
between the government of the day and the parliament 
of the day (N.S.W. Parliament, Debates, Vol.28, 27
October 1887: 803-4; cited Wettenhall, 1960:464)2.
The weakness of the Victorian system of railway
administration established in 1883, in Parkes' view, lay in
its departures from the principles of responsible government.
For instance, he criticised the fact that under the Victorian
Act the Commissioners could not be removed except by the
action of parliament. The approach dictated by responsible
government was, Parkes thought, to make the commissioners
removable by the Governor in Council but to require
1. The following discussion of the New South Wales and 
Victorian railways authorities of the late nineteenth century 
draws heavily on Wettenhall (1960 and 1961).
2. See also the very similar statement by Parkes in N.S.W. 
Parliament, Debates, Vol.26, 9 June 1887:1993.
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parliament's approval of ministers' recommendations to remove 
(N.S.W. Parliament, Debates, Vol.28, 27 October 1887:804). 
He also found the administrative structure adopted by the 
Victorians, which involved both a minister for railways and 
a body of autonomous commissioners, to be 'inconsistent with 
the genius of responsible government' as well as simply 
irrational and productive of confusion (N.S.W. Parliament, 
Debates, Vol.21, 5 August 1886:3853).
The New South Wales Act, in contrast, was held by its 
author to preserve responsible government3. It purported to 
do this, firstly, by enshrining a strict separation between 
the limited responsibilities which were conferred on the new 
authority and those responsibilities which were to be 
exercised in the normal way - that is, in accordance with 
responsible government. The latter included a considerable 
range of activities. To begin with, the function of 
constructing new lines was distinguished from that of 
operating established lines and assigned to the Public Works 
Department. It was thus subject to full ministerial 
responsibility and to the supervision of a new parliamentary 
Public Works Committee. Further, full ministerial 
responsibility was maintained for the power to appoint, 
suspend and remove commissioners; for the exercise of 
certain substantive powers, such as the disposal of lands, 
the purchase of supplies and the making of by-laws - all of 
which required the government's approval; and for the
3. This and the following two paragraphs are based on 
Wettenhall (1960:464-8) and the Government Railways Act 1888, 51 
Viet. No.35.
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management of railway finances. The latter were to be 
handled in identical fashion to those of a government 
department: expenditure would have to be in accordance with 
estimates approved by the government and with the 
corresponding parliamentary appropriation (Wettenhall, 
1960:466-7 ).
On the other hand, the operation of established 
railway lines, except in the respects mentioned above, was 
to rest unambiguously in the hands of the statutory 
commissioners. Parkes' aim, like that of other railway 
reformers of his time, was to eliminate 'political influence' 
from railway administration and, with it, the twin evils of 
patronage and 'log rolling' widely held to have played havoc 
with efficient management. He saw this as requiring, first 
and foremost, the prevention of parliamentary interference 
in day-to-day railway affairs. Thus ministers could 
legitimately refuse to seek answers to parliamentary
questions; and, where an inquiry was called for, the
executive rather than parliament would carry it out.
Parliament's rights in this area were restricted to the use 
of two blunt instruments: it could turn out the ministry if 
it were unsatisfied with the latter's supervision of the 
commissioners and it could alter the policy framework through 
fresh legislation.
The executive, too, was to be distanced from the 
business of running the railways. In Parkes' view, 'the 
management of the railways completed and handed over for 
public traffic ought to be kept distinctly separate from the
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policy of the government', and guided solely by 'principles 
of commercial probity and intelligence' (N.S.W. Parliament, 
Debates, Vol.26, 9 June 1887:1992,1994). But, again, he did 
not believe that this necessarily implied a weakening of 
responsible government. Responsible government demanded that 
there be someone directly responsible to parliament for all 
administrative and executive work. Under Parkes' scheme 
there would be no minister for railways as such, but a 
minister with another portfolio would hold a watching brief 
over the commissioners to ensure that their performance was 
in conformity with the statute. But this minister's 
authority would be 'dormant' rather than 'active': it would 
be invoked only in an 'emergency' and then only in order to 
enforce compliance with the policy laid down in the 
legislation. In Wettenhall's words, the intended overall 
effect was as follows:
The railway undertaking was... to be subordinate to 
the Government, but one step further removed from the 
direct control which characterised the conventional 
ministerial departments (1960:467).
It was noted above that Wettenhall has drawn a strong 
distinction between the arrangements just discussed and those 
established by Victorian Railway Commissioners Act 1883. 
Because of the importance of this distinction to Wettenhall's 
well known characterisation of the Australian history of 
statutory authority theory, it is necessary to explain why 
the latter has not been accepted as the basis of the present 
discussion. Wettenhall (1960:465; 1980:136; 1983:17) has 
summarised the Victorian railway 'model' by quoting the
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Statement of a contemporary observer, J. Reid, to the effect 
that 'the railways were... removed from political influence 
and placed under the control of a board of three 
commissioners, who were rendered independent of the 
Government of the day, and responsible only to Parliament'4. 
However, it is clear from Wettenhall's own writings on the 
subject that careful distinctions need to be made between the 
contents of the legislation, the legislators' understanding 
and description of what they were doing, and the 
parliamentary behaviour which followed from that 
understanding.
Wettenhall has demonstrated that both ministers and 
ordinary members of parliament talked as though they were 
establishing the sort of system described by Reid. 
Nevertheless, despite Parkes' emphasis on the difference in 
the principles on which his legislation was based and those 
followed by the Victorian parliament, the two Acts were in 
most essential respects very similar. Certainly there is 
nothing in the legislation to suggest that the Victorians 
intended to make the Commissioners directly responsible to 
parliament while their counterparts in New South Wales sought 
virtually to extinguish parliamentary influence. In fact, 
the powers of parliament over the two statutory bodies were 
identical. Both Acts included provisions requiring 
parliamentary authorisation of expenditure; regular and 
comprehensive reporting through both annual and quarterly
. The source for Reid's statement is Sydney Quarterly 
Magazine, June 1887, pp.140-1.
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reports submitted to the minister for tabling in parliament; 
an annual audit under the Audit Act (and hence, in a sense, 
under parliamentary authority); and parliamentary control 
over the removal of the commissioners. Nor is there any hard 
evidence in the Acts that the executive was intended to play 
a more prominent role in railway management in New South 
Wales than in Victoria. Again the respective statutory 
provisions concerning the responsibilities of ministers were 
very similar5.
Any differences between the two colonies in the 
relationships between the railway commissioners, minister and 
parliament must therefore have been a matter of behaviour 
rather than of law or institutional design. And on 
Wettenhall's account, which there is no reason to doubt, the 
New South Wales commissioners were accorded a significantly 
greater measure of independence from both parliament and 
ministers than was the case in Victoria (1960:467-8). In 
Victoria members of parliament had been encouraged to believe 
that the new arrangements were designed to preserve, and even 
to enhance, parliamentary supervision and they seem to have 
acted on that assumption. Moreover, the retention of a 
railway portfolio which was often the sole responsibility of 
a minister was a recipe for ministerial interference, not 
only as a result of the restlessness and ambition of under­
employed ministers of railways but also because it created 
a natural focus for parliamentary pressure (Wettenhall,
5. The above claims are based on a comparison of the New 
South Wales Act (see footnote 3) and the Victorian Railway 
Commissioners Act 1883, 47 Viet.No.767.
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1961:26-7). In practice, it would seem that the Victorian 
'model' featured very much the same set of parliamentary 
control mechanisms as were employed for ministerial 
departments. It is not surprising, therefore, that within 
a decade legislation was introduced to increase ministerial 
control over the commissioners6. Thus, notwithstanding the 
pronouncements which accompanied the establishment of the 
railways authority in the early 1880s, the conclusion seems 
inescapable that the Victorian experience was, from the 
start, as much a demonstration of the grip of conventional 
responsible government norms on the minds of politicians as 
an instance of self-conscious modification of those norms. 
The Victorian scheme had the merit of being the first of its 
kind, but its intellectual basis was a rather muddled 
compound of the thinking behind the later New South Wales 
scheme and the familiar arrangements for ministerial 
departments.
It need not be doubted, however, that the Victorian 
innovation in railway administration gave currency to the 
idea that the statutory authority, as a creation of 
parliament, should be directly responsible to the parliament. 
Also convincing is Wettenhall's claim that this idea became 
a persistent strand in Australian administrative thought. 
It was articulated perhaps most clearly by Boyer (1957) 
during his time as chairman of the Australian Broadcasting 
Commission (ABC).
6. On the 1891 amendment to the Act, see Wettenhall (1961:44-51).
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The title of Boyer's article - 'The Statutory 
Corporation as a Democratic Device' - is significant. By 
'democratic' he meant fully accountable to parliament. In 
his view the creation of a statutory authority represented 
a decision by parliament to depart from minister-centred 
administration:
What in fact happens is that some portion of the 
Minister's responsibility is delegated to the 
Corporation and with it an equivalent degree of 
accountability. Indeed, it may be said that the 
Statutory Corporation is responsible, not to its 
Minister, but to Parliament through its Minister. In 
other words, Parliament requires of a Statutory 
Corporation the same degree of accountability as it 
requires of its Ministers(1957:31).
The intended equivalence in the status vis-a-vis parliament 
of statutory authority members and ministers was, Boyer 
thought, indicated by their similar tenures, the one group 
coming up for re-election and the other for re-appointment 
at roughly the same intervals of time. Further, he saw 
statutory boards and ministers as comparable in another 
sense. In the case of modern statutory authorities, of which 
the ABC was a leading example, the board was modelled on the 
directorate of a joint stock company. Its role was not to 
undertake 'functional administrative duties', but to 
'supervise the permanent executive' and 'guide policy'. Thus 
the relationship of the board to its permanent executive was 
'precisely that of a minister to his permanent departmental 
officers'(1957:33).
For Boyer, then, the status of a statutory authority 
is that of a minister, at least in its relationship to 
parliament. It is, therefore, to be directly accountable to
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parliament. The mode of its accountability, however, is 
through a minister. The minister's role should be, for the 
most part, the essentially passive one of vehicle of 
communication between parliament and the authority. As a 
result, ministers should not refuse to answer questions about 
the policy or administration of a statutory authority, as had 
happened in Britain. Boyer, it seems, understood the 
responsibility of ministers regarding parliamentary questions 
as similar to their responsibility for the authority's annual 
report. In both cases they would simply present to 
parliament information provided by the authority.
However, Boyer's discussion of the means by which 
parliament is to hold statutory authorities 'directly' 
accountable was, unfortunately, quite brief and rather 
ambiguous. For instance, he failed to distinguish clearly 
between the government and the parliament, referring at one 
point to parliament' s power of appointment to boards when all 
statutes place this power completely in the hands of the 
government (by making the Governor-General, the Governor- 
General in Council or, in some recent cases, the minister the 
appointing authority) (see 1957:34). The responsible 
government tradition tends to yoke together parliamentary and 
ministerial control of administration - on the assumption 
that the former is achieved via the latter - and Boyer's 
usage would seem to be a consequence of this (increasingly 
misleading) habit of thought. Such usage is, however, merely 
confusing in a discussion which is premised on the notion 
that the statutory authority requires weak ministerial
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control and strong parliamentary accountability.
The striking omission in Boyer's discussion, 
paralleling a similar weakness in the parliamentary 
arrangements for the Victorian railway authority some 70 
years before, was any developed sense that new machinery and 
powers might be required to give life to the special form of 
accountability which was envisaged. It is true that, among 
Boyer's list of the 'reserve powers' which elected 
representatives needed to hold over statutory authorities, 
there is mention that authorities should cooperate as 
required with ad hoc inquiries by parliamentary committees. 
But there was no suggestion that parliamentary committees 
should play a larger role in the scrutiny of statutory 
authorities, either in order to emphasize the direct nature 
of an authority's responsibility to parliament or to police 
the relationship between minister and authority to prevent 
undue ministerial interference. In particular, it was 
surprising that no reference was made to the brief 
experiment, little more than a decade earlier, with a 
Commonwealth parliamentary standing committee on broadcasting 
designed to fulfil both of these functions for Boyer's own 
institution (the ABC) (see Rydon,1952b).
It may be concluded, then, that Boyer's abstract 
notion of the place of the statutory authority in the 
framework of government was quite distinctive, but that its 
translation into institutional terms was heavily influenced 
by the conventional arrangements of responsible government.
We now turn to examples of administrative thought
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which make much less effort to relate the statutory authority 
to the institutions and processes of responsible government. 
This thinking combines a strong emphasis on the value of 
administrative autonomy for certain activities, with a 
pessimistic (or realistic) view of the capacity of political 
actors to follow a self-denying ordinance of non­
intervention. Those who have expressed these attitudes have 
tended to eschew nice distinctions between parliamentary and 
ministerial control, and to insist that authorities should 
be substantially independent of both government and 
parliament.
Such was the position adopted by F.W. Eggleston (1932) 
in his classic analysis of the expansion of the state in 
Victoria. Eggleston claimed that he had begun his 
ministerial career as a firm supporter of the Victorian 
Liberal position of the day that the statutory corporation 
had reconciled public enterprise with efficient business 
management, thereby making 'socialism' a sound policy. In 
his view the statutory corporation offered, in potential, the 
twin advantages of insulating administration from politics 
and of facilitating a rudimentary form of what is now termed 
'accountable management'7. But the first of these
7 • Eggleston claimed the statutory corporation offered the 
following 'extraordinary' advantages:
' . . . it gave executive authority free from pressure of 
political influences and polarisation of parties; the 
objects which the concern was intended to realise, and 
the powers which it needed, could be set out in the 
enabling Act; within these powers the managers could lay 
down their own policy, and act on it; they did not need 
to wait for decisions of political heads, necessarily 
influenced in every case by political exigency; their
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attributes was, for Eggleston, the key to success or failure. 
The best results were achievable only where there was no 
continuing political input into management. Objectives 
should be clearly stated in the enabling Act and a 'financial 
scheme' devised, but thereafter the managers, adequately 
empowered for their tasks, should be left strictly alone to 
lay down policy and follow it through. Eggleston claimed 
that experience had demonstrated that this was the most 
successful approach. Where a statute had granted the 
administrative body complete control of an undertaking, 
reserving no power of direction for government or other 
authority, the result had 'nearly always been good' (1932:46- 
51,47) .
Unlike Parkes, Eggleston was quite prepared to 
acknowledge and accept the trade-off upon which this approach 
was based, namely that 'efficiency in administration is 
purchased by a sacrifice of democratic control' (p.50). It 
was only if parliamentary accountability were dispensed with 
that responsibility could be placed firmly on the shoulders 
of the appointed managers: 'any attempt to control their 
policy from outside will impair their responsibility and the 
key principle of efficient administration will vanish'
acts were not acts of State; they could sue and be sued 
even in tort. The system was sound because it recognized 
the sovereign principle of reposing responsibility in 
individuals under conditions where responsibility could 
be discharged; the managers would be blamed for their 
failure; their whole prestige in the community was bound 
up with success. This responsibility made for caution... 
The principle of responsibility was bound up with 
finance... men of character would not accept a position 
unless they had examined the financial scheme and found 
it sound' (1932:46-7)
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(p.51). But how was managerial responsibility to be 
enforced? Eggleston saw very little need for external 
enforcement. The threat of refusal to reappoint authority 
members on the expiry of their term of office was the 
ultimate sanction, but it was a rather blunt instrument. 
Eggleston placed his faith much more in the professional 
integrity of expert managers and their desire to preserve 
their social standing. For him it was virtually axiomatic 
that 'a small body of managers with complete responsibility 
will always seek to show the best financial results' (p.51). 
This was the main reason he was so sanguine about the risks 
of freeing administration from political control.
Eggleston's position was a particularly uncompromising 
one. On his view the statutory board's responsibility to the 
community was quite separate from (indeed, was parallel to) 
that of parliament. Furthermore, in the language of 
representation theory, he saw the responsibility of a 
statutory authority to the public as that of a 'trustee' 
rather than a 'delegate' (see, for instance, Pennock, 
1979:321-31). It was the duty of managers to look to the 
permanent interest of the public in the efficient use of 
resources, even where this meant resisting their wishes as 
expressed by groups in the community ('the Interests' as 
Eggleston termed them) or by an organised parliamentary 
majority. However, because he had become convinced that 
politicians were increasingly unable or unwilling to 
sacrifice control as completely as he thought necessary, 
Eggleston concluded that statutory trading corporations would
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inevitably produce bad results. He therefore argued for the 
abandonment of this administrative experiment (see especially 
1932:287-303).
The final contribution to statutory authority theory 
to be considered here is that of F .A. Bland, once described 
as 'Australia's greatest student of the public corporation' 
(Wettenhall, 1956:112)®. Bland shared the view of his 
contemporary, Eggleston, that a clear choice needed to be 
made between comprehensive political control of an area of 
administration and complete autonomy. He also shared 
Eggleston's recognition that Australian politicians had been 
reluctant to make this choice. The reality was, he believed, 
that administrative independence was 'out of harmony' with 
responsible government. But Australians had refused to admit 
this and, in attempting to have the best of the two worlds 
of efficiency and parliamentary democracy, they had, Bland 
feared, frequently achieved the worst of both (Bland, 
1937:41).
Unlike Eggleston, however, whose concerns in matters 
of administration were more narrowly focused on the field of 
public enterprise, Bland was as anxious about the 'dangers 
of official despotism' or 'bureaucracy' (in the sense in 
which the term was originally used in Britain)* 9 which were 
associated with administrative autonomy as about the adverse
®. My understanding of the range of Bland's thought has
benefited from a reading of Wettenhall (1956:90-112). The
following is, however, substantially my own interpretation of his
work.
9. On the use of the term in nineteenth century England, 
see Albrow (1970:21-6).
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consequences (in the form of inefficiency) of inappropriate 
political control (Bland, 1937:48; 1923:5). On the 
assumptions of conventional academic thinking about 
government in Australia, Bland should have been caught in a 
hopeless contradiction: public accountability and 
independence from political control were, and still are, 
widely regarded as incompatible objectives. But Bland was 
able to distance himself sufficiently from the responsible 
government tradition to conceive of the possibility of making 
officials responsible to the general public other than by 
subjecting them to the control of ministers formally 
responsible to parliament - or, indeed, having them answer 
directly to parliament, whether 'through’ a minister (Boyer's 
notion) or otherwise. Thus he argued that:
... it is not inconsistent with the principle or the 
theory of representative government to remove certain 
functions or certain agents of government from the 
immediate control of Cabinet, provided responsibility 
can be sheeted home to the official for his acts 
(1934:95).
Not content merely to raise the possibility of an 
alternative mechanism of accountability, Bland (1945, 1935, 
1937) attempted to show how such a solution might be 
achieved. His fundamental assumption, as Wettenhall 
(1956:101) has shown, was that there existed a unique 
administrative function which, in recognition of its 
distinctiveness, ought to be removed from its subservience 
to the political mode of accountability and accorded its own, 
quite separate, quasi-judicial accountability regime (see 
also Bland, 1935). For this purpose he suggested the
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establishment of one or more suitably empowered 
administrative tribunals, perhaps including an 
'Administrative Supreme Court'. With such a system in place 
he considered there need be no qualms about administrative 
independence:
we could easily confer the widest autonomy upon 
Statutory Corporations in matters of administration, 
for if the public interest was challenged by any of 
their actions, the Government, or other interested 
party, could bring a suit before the appropriate 
tribunal to remedy the alleged injury (1937:49).
From the vantage point of the 1980s Bland's idea is 
apt to seem a striking anticipation of Australia's recently 
established institutions of administrative law. To a degree 
this is so. But there are also major differences. The field 
of authority of his proposed bodies, for instance, was to be 
far wider than that possessed by any current administrative 
tribunal:
Are the members of a Statutory Corporation 
inefficient? Is the Corporation acting capriciously? 
Do circumstances no longer justify its continuance? 
Are fares and freights too high? Are bounties and 
subsidies necessary for an industry? These are 
matters which ought not to be left to the caprice of 
a political party, for the test is 'the public 
interest', and ought to be determined in a judicial 
fashion... (1937:49).
Further, his was in large measure a traditionally based 
proposal, which explicitly extended the 'diffusionist', or 
insulationist, principle of public policy (discussed in 
Chapter 1) underlying such distinctively Australian 
administrative experiments as Public Service Boards, 
Arbitration Courts and the Tariff Board.
The impressive feature of Bland's thought is not so
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much his specific prescriptions as his pluralistic conception 
of administrative accountability. It is the latter which 
explains why he did not opt exclusively for a quasi-judicial 
solution to the problem of reconciling administrative 
independence and accountability, but displayed an interest 
in the development of a variety of forms of accountability. 
Bland saw more clearly than many students of public 
administration, in his time or since, that ministerial 
responsibility and established mechanisms of parliamentary 
control could not bear the strain (even in the 1920s!) which 
modern government had placed upon them (see, for instance, 
1923:6-7, 78-83). Supplementary forms of public control of 
administration needed to be established, both for democratic 
reasons and to reduce those pressures and incentives for 
undue political interference in administration which made for 
inefficiency. Administrative tribunals were one promising 
avenue. But Bland's writings contain discussions of other 
possibilities. In the late 1920s, for instance, he argued 
that the 'expert' executive boards of monopoly enterprises 
should be replaced by representative policy boards with 
separate nominated chief executives. Railways, ports, posts, 
and water and sewerage would, he thought, be 'more 
appropriately conducted on a basis of representation of 
interests', because '[o]nly when the authority is
representative can we delegate financial autonomy with 
complete confidence' (Bland, 1929:13; cited by Wettenhall, 
1956:96). He also supported in general, and in the
particular case of public broadcasting, the creation of
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advisory committees or councils, along the lines of those 
which have been employed in Britain's nationalised 
industries, as a direct channel of communication between 
statutory corporations and their clients or customers in the 
community (Wettenhall, 1956:109).
But it would be misleading to exaggerate Bland's 
departure from the parliamentary tradition. His pluralistic 
approach was able to accommodate an important role for 
parliament in administration, alongside the non-parliamentary 
innovations he advocated. Accordingly, throughout his 
career, Bland strongly supported the formation of 
parliamentary standing committees to enhance parliament's 
capacity to oversee public administration, particularly that 
conducted by statutory corporations (see Bland, 1935).10
Bland's multi-stranded approach to administrative 
accountability sets his treatment of statutory authorities 
apart from that of Eggleston. Both thinkers supported the 
role of the highly independent authority. But Bland's 
ability to understand accountability in terms of the 
simultaneous operation of a variety of mechanisms and, in 
particular, his emphasis on the potential importance of non-
10. Bland's submission to the Joint Parliamentary Select 
Committee appointed in 1941 to inquire into public broadcasting 
has been seen as a major influence behind the decision to create 
a standing parliamentary committee under the 1942 amendment to 
the broadcasting legislation (Wettenhall, 1956:109). His 
commitment to the work of parliamentary committees continued 
when, after resigning from the Chair of Public Administration at 
the University of Sydney in 1948, he was elected to the 
Commonwealth House of Representatives. He was chairman of the 
Joint Committee on Public Accounts during that body’s inquiries 
into the statutory authority scandal of the mid-1950s concerning 
the Australian Aluminium Production Commission (Wettenhall, 
1956:111).
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ministerial accountability mechanisms, pointed to the 
possibility that statutory authority independence might be 
gained without the large sacrifice in accountability which 
Eggleston seems to have accepted as necessary.
In the present chapter nothing more will be said about 
this interesting set of ideas drawn from Bland's writings. 
The reason is that they lie, to a large extent, outside the 
terms in which debate has historically been conducted in 
Australia. We shall have cause to recall them in Part III, 
however, where a case is advanced for reconsidering the 
position of the statutory authority in the light of a 
pluralistic conception of accountability.
In the thought of Parkes, Boyer, Eggleston and Bland 
we have four separate perspectives on the statutory 
authority, each of which combines a positive evaluation of 
the device (or at least a recognition of its inevitable 
importance in modern Australian government) with a 
distinctive conception of its status and accountability. For 
the purposes of the remainder of this chapter, however, we 
shall distil from these individual perspectives three general 
theoretical positions corresponding to the most common 
answers to what has, historically, been the key question 
concerning the accountability of statutory authorities: What 
should be the relationship between the authority, on the one 
side, and ministers and parliament, on the other? The first 
position, roughly that of Parkes, may be termed the 'arm's 
length' position. It treats the authority, along responsible 
government lines, as subordinate in important respects to a
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minister, who is responsible for supervising its performance 
and, when appropriate, representing it in parliament. But 
it departs from the model of the ministerial department in 
advocating a more attenuated, or circumscribed, relationship 
between minister and authority - and, hence, between 
parliament and authority. The second (or 'parliament- 
centred' ) position, involving a different sort of 
modification of responsible government, views the statutory 
authority in Boyer's terms as an attempt by parliament to 
bypass the minister. A direct relationship is seen to exist 
between the authority and parliament; and the status
accorded the authority vis-a-vis parliament is more or less 
that of a minister. The final position (which will be 
referred to as the 'authority-centred' position) is a 
composite of Eggleston and Bland. It breaks more radically 
with responsible government. Only minimal links are retained 
between the authority and both minister and parliament. The 
authority is created by parliamentary enactment and may be 
altered or abolished by the same process. It may be 
appointed by the government. But, in general, it dwells at 
the very edge of the system of responsible government. 
Indeed, its important powers create a substantial sphere 
within which the authority, beholden neither to minister nor 
parliament, has virtually the status of parliament itself.
The Impotence of Theory
Each of the theoretical positions outlined above offers a 
sort of solution to the problem of statutory authority
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accountability. This is so because each is premised on an 
unambiguous assignment of responsibilities, including duties 
of forbearance, to the relevant actors. Thus each clearly 
specifies the degree and form of accountability that should 
be sought. The first position promises limited 
accountability through the agency of ministerial 
responsibility, while enjoining parliamentary forbearance; 
the second promises full, or at least substantial, 
accountability to parliament, but requires the minister to 
play the largely passive role of 'parliamentary liaison 
officer' (Forrest, 1983:95); while the third holds that an 
appropriate level of independence for the authority is 
consistent only with a minimal degree of accountability 
through the conventional institutional channels.
The task of the remainder of the chapter is to 
determine the extent to which each of these positions has 
influenced, or organised, practice. Particular attention is 
paid to the institutional, as distinct from the behavioral, 
support which can be identified for each. There are two main 
reasons for this focus. Firstly, there is the practical 
difficulty that behavioral evidence, especially for the past, 
is not readily available. Secondly, and more importantly, 
the appropriate evidence for the impact of theory is 
precisely changes in institutional arrangements. For, if a 
coherent set of normative ideas comes to govern the behaviour 
of groups of actors within a governmental context, it is 
reasonable to assume that such ideas will ultimately be 
embodied in formal arrangements.
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It is convenient to begin the discussion with the 
'authority-centred' position because enough has already been 
said to show that its claim to relevance is weak. It was 
noted in Chapter 1, for instance, that Commonwealth 
authorities have always been attached upon creation to 
particular ministers, with the consequence that the latter 
have acquired certain supervisory responsibilities. Further, 
it was argued in Chapter 1 that the highly independent 
authority, although supported in the early decades of the 
century by what Emy (1974) has called a 'diffusionist' 
philosophy of public policy, underwent something of a decline 
in the years around the Second World War, and has lost 
further ground over the past decade or so.
Even in the 1920s and 1930s Bland and Eggleston were 
under no illusion that the sort of arrangements they 
advocated actually existed. Indeed, their writings were 
explicitly diagnostic and prescriptive rather than 
descriptive. In particular, they were both very conscious 
that politicians had not been prepared on the whole to 
sacrifice control to the degree they wished to see. Thus 
Bland claimed that ' it will be too often found that the 
Statutory Corporation is a veil for political control, which 
is all the more sinister because the people have been led to 
believe that the Corporation was "independent"' (1937:45; see 
also 1923:129). For his part, Eggleston conceded that in 
some cases complete autonomy was simply not feasible for the 
trading authorities with which he was concerned. Where, for 
instance, the enterprise had a 'developmental character', as
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was often the case in nineteenth and early twentieth-century 
Australia, it was impossible to lay a sound financial basis 
and, as a result, some political control, with a consequent 
division of responsibility, was inevitable. While Eggleston 
thought that developmental state enterprise was decreasing 
in importance as the Australian (and particularly the 
Victorian) economy matured, he saw other factors emerging to 
ensure that political control would at the least grow no 
less. Most importantly, the popularity of 'socialistic' 
ideas in modern politics meant that efficiency was not 
regarded as an overriding value in the provision of state 
services. Competing social objectives, such as the transfer 
of resources from class to class, were equally valued by the 
community and its political representatives. But 'experts' 
were ill-suited to the task of advancing social policy: they
could be relied upon to undertake a specific function 
efficiently, but would not 'flatter the hopes of socialists 
or readjust economic conditions'. The result was pressure 
upon governments and parliament to retain power over policy 
(Eggleston, 1932:48,294).
As for the most recent past, a desire to increase 
political control of public administration has been an 
important theme in debate about Commonwealth administrative 
reform in the 1970s and 1980s11. The philosophy behind this 
trend has been explicitly anti-diffusionist; that is, it has 
encouraged a more positive view of political input into
11. More will be said about this theme in Chapter 9 of this 
thesis.
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public policy, an enhancement of the policy-making capacities 
of ministers (individually and collectively), and the fixing 
of responsibility for policy more firmly upon elected office 
holders. This development, in itself, has undoubtedly 
undermined residual intellectual support for the use of the 
statutory authority to create what Emy (1974:533) described 
as 'quasi-legislative subsystems'12. But its effects have 
also been reinforced by the beginnings of a movement away, 
under the impact of national economic decline, from the 
socio-economic policy 'strategy' bound up with leading 
agencies of 'diffusion', such as the Arbitration Commission, 
the Industries Assistance Commission and the primary produce 
marketing boards (see Castles, 1988). An aspect of the 
latter movement has been a perceived need, on the part of the 
Commonwealth government, to strengthen its control of 
national economic policy in order to implement strategies to 
improve Australia's competitive strength in the world 
economy.
Whatever the precise combination of causes, a majority 
of the bodies, or groups of bodies, held by Emy (1974:500-41) 
to exemplify the continuing diffusionist character of 
Australian public policy - namely, the Industries Assistance 
Commission (IAC), the primary produce marketing authorities 
(SMAs), and the Australian Industry Development Commission 
(AIDC) - have subsequently had (or are projected to have) 
their status significantly redefined by statutory amendment.
12. This term describes a situation where a body 'possesses 
m  innovative and quasi-autonomous status for the development of 
>olicy within its sphere' (Emy, 1974:533).
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As a result of such changes as the tightening of statutory 
policy guidelines (in the case of the IAC), the introduction 
of new ministerial powers to guide or direct policy (AIDC, 
IAC, SMAs), the removal of power to initiate action (IAC) and 
a radical alteration in the method of appointment (SMAs), 
each is formally a good deal less like a quasi-legislative 
subsystem13. Each is, thus, also much less readily 
identified with our ’authority-centred' conception of the 
statutory authority's status and accountability.
What of the 'parliament-centred' position? Again, 
some doubt has already been cast on the distinctiveness and 
historical importance of this position in comments above on 
both the intellectual foundations of the original Victorian 
railway authority and the ideas of Richard Boyer. The 
argument in favour of its past relevance must rest on either 
or both of two main claims: that there has existed a 
convention constraining or enabling ministers to play a 
passive, liaising role; or that special mechanisms have 
provided unique opportunities for direct communication, 
parliamentary scrutiny and genuine parliamentary influence. 
Examination of these claims will show that they cannot 
support a strong case for an effective direct linkage between 
parliament and statutory authorities.
The first claim would seem to have been the main
13. The changes to the IAC and the AIDC were introduced in 
the Industries Assistance Commission Amendment Act 1984 (No.118), 
the Australian Industry Development Corporation Act 1975 (No.4) 
and the Australian Industry Development Corporation Amendment Act 
1983. The changes to the SMAs are explained in Department of 
Primary Industry (1986). They have been gradually introduced 
through amendments to individual enabling statutes.
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empirical basis for Boyer's argument, in so far, that is, as 
the latter was intended to be interpretive and descriptive 
rather than prescriptive. Boyer (1957) did not, however, 
advance this claim explicitly. He merely pointed to, and 
applauded, the preparedness of Australian parliaments to 
allow, and Australian ministers to seek answers to, most 
parliamentary questions about statutory authorities, a 
practice which was in marked contrast to that of Westminster 
with regard to the nationalised industries. But neither 
Boyer nor anyone else has seriously attempted to show that 
a convention of the required sort does exist. It has been 
suggested that in the case of certain authorities, for 
instance tertiary education institutions, ministers have been 
prepared to act simply as conduits for information and that, 
for its part, parliament has refrained from pressing claims 
of accountability against the relevant ministers (Forrest, 
1983:95). Undoubtedly ministers do very often play such a 
role with regard to parliamentary queries concerning a wide 
range of authorities. But there is good reason to doubt that 
an arrangement where the minister is the only, or principal, 
point of contact between parliament and an authority is an 
intrinsically stable one for the generality of authorities. 
Wilding (1982) has argued persuasively that ministers are 
unlikely to tolerate having to be publicly answerable for an 
administrative agency while exercising minimal, if any, 
control over it. It follows that the more active the 
interest taken by parliament in the affairs of a particular 
body - and, hence, the more exposed the minister to potential
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embarrassment - the more likely the minister will be to 
eschew a ’liaison officer' role and strengthen control over 
the body. The 1980s have provided some good examples of this 
process, particularly in connection with criticism of the 
Australian Dairy Corporation, the Australian Bicentennial 
Authority and the Australian Institute of Sport14.
The process just outlined is, nevertheless, not an 
inevitable one. The argument of the previous paragraph was 
based on the assumption that the minister has been 
overwhelmingly the most important channel of influence 
between parliament and statutory authorities. But, as we 
have noted, there are other possible institutional links. 
If sufficiently strong, these might lessen the likelihood of 
pressure being automatically applied to the minister when an 
authority comes under criticism. Consequently, they might 
remove the trigger for instability in the relationships
between minister, parliament and authorities. Moreover, such 
further institutional links might function as important 
symbols of the difference in status between statutory
authorities and ministerial departments and thereby help to 
encourage attitudes and practices which recognise that 
difference. This takes us, then, to the second of the 
supporting claims.
The main evidence for the claim that special
mechanisms exist to facilitate the direct accountability of 
statutory authorities to parliament is the requirement for
14. See House of Representatives, CPD, September and
October 1981 (ADC); September and October 1985 (ABA); November 
1985, 17 April 1986:2560-5 and 22 May 1986:3788-92 (AIS).
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statutory authorities to submit annual reports for tabling 
in parliament. This matter will be dealt with at length in 
a later chapter. For present purposes we may note that the 
above requirement was until recently far from universal. 
Moreover, it is well known that the Commonwealth parliament 
has traditionally paid little attention to authority reports. 
These have never been debated upon their tabling in the House 
of Representatives and for 80 years no effort was made to 
ensure that they received any institutionalised form of 
parliamentary consideration.
It might perhaps also be held that the origin of 
authorities in Acts of parliament has provided a unique 
potential for parliamentary review of the mandates and 
performance of authorities. The trouble with this claim is 
that there is no evidence that this potential has been 
realized. There has traditionally been no requirement for 
such review and no parliamentary machinery to undertake the 
task. Moreover, the premise of the claim is itself dubious 
as parliament's active involvement in the creation of 
statutory authorities underwent a progressive decline over 
the years. This was a consequence of growth in the 
legislative programs of governments, without compensating 
increases in sitting hours or parliamentary size, and the 
tightening of executive control of parliament (especially the 
House of Representatives) bound up with this process (see 
Reid and Forrest, 1989:191-239). Wettenhall (1956:469-70) 
found that by the 1950s parliamentary debates were totally 
lacking in critical scrutiny of either rationales for the
118
creation of authorities or relationships between authorities 
and other institutions.
The opportunities for direct parliamentary involvement 
with statutory authorities discussed above would seem to be 
for periodic scrutiny and review of individual authorities. 
What of day-to-day issues? Boyer seems to have been content 
to rely heavily on parliamentary questions to ministers to 
deal with day-to-day contingencies. But it has been 
suggested above that additional mechanisms independent of 
ministers, may be required if ministers are to be persuaded 
to confine themselves to a liaison role.
An obvious instrument for parliamentary investigative 
work of this kind is the select committee. Select committees 
would also seem to provide convenient means for pursuing more 
general inquiries into the operation of one or more statutory 
authorities. The Commonwealth parliament has traditionally 
employed a variety of such committees, and from time to time 
in the past has used them to conduct investigations into 
specific matters concerning statutory authorities. The Joint 
Committee of Public Accounts inquiry into maladministration 
in the Aluminium Production Commission conducted in the mid- 
1950s is a well known example (JCPA, 1954 and 1955). So is 
the creation in 1941 of the specific-task Joint Parliamentary 
Committee on Wireless Broadcasting to inquire into and report 
on, inter aliaf the performance of the Australian 
Broadcasting Commission (see Rydon, 1952a and 1952b). Before 
the 1970s, however, parliament had, with one minor exception, 
never seen fit to create an investigatory committee with a
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Standing brief to engage in regular, direct oversight of one 
or more statutory authorities. The presence of a committee, 
or committees, of this type would have added considerable 
weight to any claim that the 'parliament-centred' position 
was important in Commonwealth public administration. It is 
also true that their absence weakens such a claim, for they 
might well have been employed. Although parliamentary 
scrutiny of administration by select committee has been much 
more fashionable in Westminster-style government systems 
after the mid-1960s than it ever was before, there can be no 
suggestion that the idea was unknown in Australia earlier in 
the century. In fact, it had been argued by F.A. Bland as 
early as 1923 that a system of committees should be 
established for such a purpose. And Bland (1923:131-2) 
referred explicitly to the role they might play with respect 
to statutory authorities15. Moreover, the Commonwealth 
parliament's awareness of the idea before the end of the 
Second World War is evidenced by the single short-lived 
exception to the neglect of such instruments, the Standing 
Committee on Broadcasting established under the Australian 
Broadcasting Act 1942.
The latter committee is of some interest, not only
15. Bland argued that '... there should be constituted for 
each important set of governmental functions a Standing Committee 
of members of the House to which would be attached official 
representatives of the various departments, and . . . these 
committees would be the main channel through which the House 
would be informed of the policy and activity of the departments. 
It would seem that the Chairmen of these committees might very 
well be the parliamentary authority to whom questions respecting 
these quasi-independent Commissions would be addressed, even 
though the responsibility for moving the House in any direction 
would still remain with the Ministry' (1923:131-2).
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because of its uniqueness but also because its statutory 
function quite clearly expressed a parliamentary desire to 
establish a strong direct link with a particular statutory 
authority. The committee was designed to work on references 
given to it by either house of parliament or by the minister, 
but the minister was required to refer any matter which the 
ABC (or the Federation of Commercial Broadcasting Stations) 
nominated for the committee's attention. Thus, as well as 
scrutinising the ABC on behalf of the parliament, the 
committee was intended to play a role in supervising the 
relationship between the minister and the authority. The 
committee was an active one; but, ironically, its
considerable activity seems to have been the cause of its 
being regarded by both ministers and parliament as an 
unsuccessful experiment. Its ability to involve itself in 
the detail of broadcasting administration was seen to have 
greatly complicated administration with little compensating 
benefit, especially as its recommendations were largely 
ignored by government and received little parliamentary 
support. The committee's statutory basis was removed by the 
Broadcasting Act 1948 and it was 'neither reappointed nor 
mourned' upon the creation under this Act of the Australian 
Broadcasting Control Board (Wettenhall, 1956:493)16. Its 
perceived failure would appear to have closed the door on the 
idea of special parliamentary machinery to scrutinise 
statutory authorities. Despite the example of the British
16. Wettenhall's discussion of the Committee was based on 
dackay (1957).
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House of Commons Select Committee on Nationalised Industries 
(see Coombes, 1966), which was a fixture at Westminster from 
its establishment in 1956 until its abolition in 1979, that 
door was to remain shut for 30 years.
With the creation of a range of new committees by the 
Senate in 1970, and in particular the commencement of 
inquiries in late 1977 by the Senate Select Committee on 
Finance and Government Operations under a reference on 
statutory authorities, the Commonwealth parliament's 
relationship with statutory authorities entered a new phase. 
Discussion of the situation since the mid-1970s shall, 
consequently, be reserved for Parts II and III of the thesis. 
The conclusions to be drawn from the present analysis thus 
relate principally to the first seven decades of federation.
Most of the main evidence for the idea that 
Commonwealth statutory authorities have, in some meaningful 
sense, traditionally been accountable directly to the 
parliament has now been evaluated. There is, however, one 
phenomenon, largely of historical interest, which may be 
dealt with briefly before the discussion is drawn to a close. 
This is the practice, in the case of a limited number of 
Commonwealth statutory authorities, of appointing members of 
parliament to boards17. In Britain before the mid-
17. As of 1984, the following authorities were required by 
their enabling statutes to contain members of parliament (other 
than ministers): Advisory Council on Australian Archives, 
Advisory Council for Inter-Government Relations, Australian 
Council for Union Training, Council of the Australian Institute 
of Aboriginal Studies, Council of the Australian National 
University, Council of the National Library of Australia, 
Parliamentary Retiring Allowances Trust. Several other 
authorities also contained parliamentary members: Commonwealth
L
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nineteenth century - that is, before the consolidation of the 
ministerial department and individual ministerial 
responsibility - parliamentary (including ministerial) 
representation on authority boards was a leading mechanism 
of administrative accountability (Willson, 1955). It 
subsequently lost importance, but nevertheless continued to 
be employed in a minor way until well into the twentieth 
century as a means of ensuring that selected authorities were 
directly answerable to the House of Commons (Willson, 1953; 
cited by Forrest, 1983:93). In the case of the Australian 
Commonwealth Parliament the appointment of a member of 
parliament to an authority, whether in accordance with a 
statutory requirement or not, seems not to have carried with 
it any formal obligation to represent the authority in 
parliament, for instance by answering questions about its 
operations or presenting relevant legislation18. This is 
certainly the current situation, as was confirmed by the 
answer to a question asked in the Senate in 1984. The 
questioner asked, inter alia, whether an extension of 
parliamentary representation on statutory boards might not 
be a way of improving their accountability to parliament 
(Senate, CPD, 12 September 1984:884). The answer provided 
sometime later emphasised that members were appointed to such 
positions solely for the contribution they might make to the
Science and Industry Research Organization Advisory Council, 
Australian War Memorial and the Australian Bicentennial Authority 
(Senate, CPD, 24 October 1984:2404-5).
18. There is no mention in the standard authorities on the 
Commonwealth parliament (Odgers, 1976; Pettifer, 1984) of any 
such obligation having been recognized.
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authorities concerned. It was stated, further, that:
The question of accountability to Parliament is a 
separate one. Accountability is generally achieved 
through the requirement that authorities be 
answerable to Ministers who in turn are accountable 
to the Parliament (Senate, CPD, 24 October 
1984:2405) .
This revealing statement underlines the general 
finding of the present discussion, namely that the 
’parliament-centred' position on the statutory authority has 
traditionally had little influence on the institutions of 
Commonwealth government. Moreover, the statement provides 
support for our argument that the development of 
institutionalised direct links between parliament and 
authorities has been deterred by the centrality of ministers 
to accountability arrangements for statutory authorities.
We turn, finally, to the ’arm’s length' model in which 
the statutory authority is, like a department of state, 
conceived as subordinate to a minister, but is a step - or, 
'an arm's length' - removed from direct ministerial control. 
From what has been said about the prominence of ministers in 
the accountability regimes of statutory authorities, it is 
not surprising that of the three theoretical positions we 
have canvassed this is the one which has found the greatest 
degree of institutional support. We have already 
acknowledged as much by choosing Parkes' railways legislation 
to illustrate the position. Despite the relatively 
favourable circumstances for its propagation, however, the 
'arms's length' position has, like the others, largely failed 
to provide a strong framework for practice.
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The two essential features of the Parkesian approach 
were, it seems, both realised in the system of railway 
administration which resulted from the Act of 1888. The 
first feature, to recapitulate, was a strictly circumscribed 
relationship between minister and statutory authority. As 
described earlier, Parkes wanted the management of 
operational railways to be 'kept distinctly separate from the 
policy of the government' and governed solely by commercial 
principles. His view of the minister-authority relationship 
was based on the notion of a once and for all distinction 
between policy and administration enshrined in the enabling 
statute. In accordance with that view there was no positive 
power of ministerial direction, and the policy 
responsibilities of the minister were confined to considering 
requests concerning those matters specifically reserved by 
the Act for his approval. An 'arm's length' relationship (a 
term apparently not used by Parkes) was, consequently, built 
into the legislative foundation of the authority. The second 
feature of the Parkesian approach, it will be recalled, was 
the duty it placed on ministers to protect the authority from 
parliamentary influence. It is often suggested that the 
doctrine of ministerial responsibility has over time been 
subtly transmuted from 'a sword in the hand of parliament' 
to a 'shield on the arm of the executive'. But here 
ministerial responsibility, in relation to statutory 
authorities at least, was overtly specified in the latter 
terms. Moreover, according to Wettenhall (1960:467-8), upon 
the establishment of the New South Wales railway authority,
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successive ministers conformed to this view of their role 
and, in particular, refused to provide answers to detailed 
parliamentary questions about railway operations19.
Parkes' scheme was, however not reproduced in the 
Commonwealth sphere. We shall consider first the strict 
division of responsibilities between minister and authority 
which characterised Parkes' approach. The statutory basis 
of this arrangement was weakened quite early on by the 
adoption of the ministerial power of direction as a common 
component of regimes of control and accountability for 
statutory authorities. Implicit in this development was a 
loss of support for the notion of a fixed distinction between 
fundamental policy (laid down by statute) and day-to-day 
management (the responsibility of the authority). In place 
of this notion there developed a belief that ministers 
require power to determine, in the light of changing 
circumstances and their political judgement, how the 
authority should deal with important issues. The import of 
the change was that for many statutory authorities the 
existence of an arm's length relationship came to depend 
largely on ministerial forbearance.
But the evidence is not all the one way. As discussed 
in Chapter 1, attempts were made to circumscribe the
19. It will be noted that the result of these arrangements 
was an authority with a degree of independence in practice very 
like that advocated by Eggleston and Bland. As suggested at the 
outset, the distinction which has been made in this chapter 
between Parkes and these two writers is based wholly upon Parkes' 
insistence on the compatibility of his proposals with responsible 
government and the attention he gave to the working out of such 
a reconciliation.
126
directive power, in particular to confine its use to matters 
of general policy. It was also noted that formal directions 
have been issued by ministers only very rarely and that the 
Coombs' Commission survey found that Commonwealth 
authorities, on the whole, did not believe that ministerial 
intervention was either great or especially burdensome. A 
possible interpretation of these facts is that governments 
have accepted something of the spirit of the Parkesian 
approach.
What of the other feature of Parkes' approach, the 
limitations placed on the ability of parliament to involve 
itself in the affairs of statutory authorities? 
Parliamentary questions are the traditional means by which 
Westminster-style parliaments have engaged in day-to-day 
scrutiny of public administration and were apparently the 
main focus of Parkes' efforts to restrain parliamentary 
influence. But in Britain, where the arms' length principle 
was rigorously applied to the administration of the 
industries nationalised by the post-war Attlee government, 
several of the standard channels of parliamentary scrutiny 
of administration have been closed or severely restricted. 
Alongside restrictive rulings on the admissibility of 
questions and ministerial reluctance to supply answers to 
questions (Hanson, 1951; Chester, 1970; Prosser, 1986:194- 
8)20, the Comptroller and Auditor-General has been denied
20. Before long, however, there was a trend away from the 
initial, very restrictive approach. This followed a more lenient 
ruling announced by the Speaker of the House of Commons in 1948. 
De Smith records that 'Ministers have not often refused to answer 
a question on the ground that it related to day-to-day management
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access to the books and records of public corporations 
(Prosser, 1986:204-10). After 1967 the difference between 
accountability regimes for ministerial departments and 
nationalised industries became even more pronounced with the 
establishment of a Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration, or ombudsman, whose field of operation 
excluded the nationalised industries (Padfield, 1972:266-71; 
Prosser, 1986:190-2).
The situation is very different in Australian 
Commonwealth government. The practice followed by the 
Commonwealth parliament with regard to parliamentary 
questions about statutory authorities, including trading 
authorities has by and large always been fairly close to that 
for questions concerning ministerial departments. Access to 
statutory authorities by both the Auditor-General21 and the 
Ombudsman is also roughly similar to the access they have to 
ministerial departments. These aspects of the Commonwealth 
situation are explored in detail in Part II of this thesis.
On the balance of the evidence, then, we may conclude 
that, like the other two positions we have considered, the
>r administration though some of the questions tabled and 
inswered might well have been rejected on that ground' (Street 
m d  Brazier, 1981:229). As De Smith shows, however, British 
members of Parliament have generally resorted to the stratagem 
)f asking whether the Minister will give particular directions 
:o the board of a nationalised industry. Australian members of 
>arliament have not needed such a stratagem.
21. It is significant that, at the very time the influence 
>f the arm's-length doctrine was reaching its zenith in Britain, 
todit Amendment Act 1948 (No. 60) conferred on the Auditor-General 
in explicit right to 'full and free access to all accounts, 
Dooks, documents and papers in the possession of ... any 
luthority established or appointed under any law of the 
Commonwealth'.
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arm's length position has not been a strong influence on the 
institutions and practices of Commonwealth public 
administration.
Conclusion
This chapter has elaborated the suggestion in Chapter 1 that 
Commonwealth statutory authorities have historically proved 
unable to establish a truly distinctive and well defined 
place for themselves within the framework of government. We 
have shown that, despite the existence of several coherent 
rationales for highly modified accountability arrangements, 
the conventional arrangements of responsible government have 
tended to predominate. Strangely, however, this has not 
prevented commentators (such as those referred to in Chapter 
3 and Part II) from drawing, or assuming, a sharp distinction 
between the levels of public accountability achieved by 
ministerial departments and statutory authorities. One 
reason would seem to be that the lack of distinctive 
institutional arrangements has made the very existence of 
statutory authorities seem unjustified, leading observers to 
posit all sorts of ulterior motives for their creation. A 
second reason is that there seems to be a widespread belief 
(reflected in text book wisdom such as that considered at the 
beginning of Part II) that the arm's length principle does 
apply. And that principle has just sufficient hold over 
practice to sustain that belief.
The argument that our three positions have not been 
strongly institutionalised was not intended to imply that
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they have had no influence whatsoever. A measure of 
influence is most readily observed in the case of the arm's 
length position, which has provided Commonwealth governments 
with conveniently flexible concepts (the arm's length 
metaphor itself and the notion of a distinction between 
policy and 'day-to-day management') and such slight 
intellectual support as has been found necessary to suppress 
outbreaks of parliamentary zeal. In Australia the need for 
such support has been especially slight in the past. For 
instance, by comparison with Britain in the post-war period 
(see Prosser, 1986), there has been very little serious 
public scrutiny and criticism of the rationales of prevailing 
arrangements. Governments and parliament alike have, in 
other words, been largely content to 'muddle through' without 
troubling themselves about the niceties of administrative 
theory. Of the other two positions, the 'parliament-centred' 
one has been decidedly the less influential, while the 
influence of the 'authority-centred' one has been in decline 
for a long time. Nevertheless, each has at least been 
represented in what small amount of serious public discussion 
there has been. Moreover, they have contributed to the stock 
of intellectual ammunition, or armour, available to 
institutional actors seeking either to challenge existing 
arrangements or to defend a stake in the status quo. As 
debate over the need for reform grew in intensity in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, the value of theoretical weapons 
became correspondingly greater and the salience of the 
several positions we have examined might have been expected
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to increase. The next chapter, focusing on the recent reform 
movement, will allow us to see whether this has happened.
CHAPTER 3
THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY REFORM MOVEMENT
Over recent years the history of the statutory authority in 
Commonwealth public administration has entered a new phase 
characterised by an unaccustomed concern about questions of 
role and accountability. Of particular significance is the 
fact that, for the first time in Australia, politicians have 
shown a sustained interest in the reform of statutory 
authorities. The present chapter addresses this phenomenon.
Recent interest in statutory authority reform has been 
a product of at least three general factors. We have already 
identified one leading influence in the popular view of the 
mid-1970s that both the number and rate of creation of 
statutory authorities were unjustifiably high. The potential 
for a backlash was realized when, amidst talk of the need to 
'de-commission' Australia, the Whitlam Labor government's 
statutory authorities became a political issue in their own 
right. Labor's advisory commissions, discussed in Chapter 
1, were particularly controversial. Commonwealth public 
servants tended to view these bodies, along with certain 
other machinery of government changes, as evidence of Labor's 
lack of respect for the existing administrative structure 
(Lloyd and Reid, 1974:273-4; Sexton, 1979:177-99). Injected
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into the political process by the conservative parties, this 
concern was an important cause of growing demands for formal 
guidelines to control the creation of statutory authorities. 
The case for such guidelines, reflecting the view that 
statutory authorities had been created indiscriminately, was 
to become a central component of the reform movement.
A second important stimulus to statutory authority 
reform was provided by the slowing of economic growth and 
consequent budgetary pressures which Australia shared with 
other Western nations in the mid-1970s. Of particular 
relevance to the Commonwealth government was the decline in 
its financial status from net creditor vis-a-vis other 
sectors of the Australian economy to net debtor in 1974 
(Howard, 1984:357). Constraints on the resources available 
to government stimulated efforts to upgrade financial 
management, improve the monitoring of efficiency and 
strengthen central control over resource allocation (see 
Howard, 1984). In this environment the degree of financial 
autonomy possessed by trading authorities was apt to appear 
an obstacle to rational financial management1. Also, 
attention began to be drawn to the growing number of 
subsidiary bodies sponsored by trading and primary produce 
marketing authorities over which control was often especially 
tenuous (see SSCFGO, 1981; Wettenhall, 1983:39-41). More 
generally, the absence of regular reviews of effectiveness
1. The fiscal importance of trading authorities is 
underlined by the fact that in 1980 state and Commonwealth non­
budget authorities accounted for some 43 percent of public sector 
capital outlays and just over half the public sector deficit 
(Mathews, 1983:49-51)
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lent credence to the notion that authorities often 
represented a waste of resources because they tended to 
outlive, or stray from, the purposes for which they were 
created.
A third background factor is the reassertion over 
recent years of the value of effective political control in 
public administration. This theme had its origins in the 
exposure over a least two decades of the growth of 
bureaucratic power in formally democratic polities, in 
particular the weakening position of ministers vis-a-vis 
permanent officials (on Australia, see AIPS, 1972; Juddery, 
1974; Wilenski, 1978 and 1979; Weller and Grattan, 1981)2. 
The need for a response was recognized in a number of 
inquiries into government administration and these, in turn, 
legitimized certain efforts to augment the authority and 
resources of the elected component of government (see Smith 
and Weller, 1978). For statutory authorities the 
consequences were pressures for greater ministerial control 
together with heightened parliamentary interest in their 
activities.
The several environmental factors identified above
2. Bureaucratic power has long played a central role in 
Australian society, as a succession of writers including Hancock 
(1930), Eggleston (1932) and Encel (1970) have recognized. As 
early as the 1920s, Bland (1923) expressed concern about the 
asymmetry of power in the relationship between officials and 
ministers. But two factors in particular served to heighten 
interest in the issue and create pressure for reform in the 
1970s. One was the exposes of 'mandarin power' in Britain by 
Castle (1973) and Crossman (1975 and 1976), ministers in Labour 
governments of the 1960s. These were widely read and discussed 
in Australia. The other was the friction, noted above, between 
the Whitlam government (1972-75) and the Canberra bureaucracy.
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both stimulated a desire for reform and influenced the 
content of the reform program. But the argument to be
developed here is that the preoccupations of the reformers 
are best understood not so much as a response to contemporary 
stimuli but as strongly reflective of received ideas about 
the nature and administrative requirements of accountability 
in government. The latter, in turn, derive from the history 
we have examined in Chapters 1 and 2.
The matters dealt with in this chapter do not exhaust 
all aspects of recent statutory authority reform. We are 
concerned here solely with the movement for a stronger 
framework for statutory authority administration which 
culminated in the production of three official reform 
documents in 1986 and 1987 (Minister for Finance, 1986 and 
1987; Department of Primary Industry, 1986)3. This was the 
most visible part of reform activity in the 1980s, but it was 
far from the only relevant activity. Indeed it will be 
suggested in Part III of the thesis that a range of less 
prominent ideas and institutional changes, which only partly 
overlap with the subject matter of the government's policy 
papers, have contributed considerably more to the goal of 
accountability for statutory authorities. The chapter is 
also selective in its treatment of the three official 
documents mentioned above. Through these documents, the 
government distinguished three categories of bodies 
'ordinary' statutory authorities, government business
3. The first and second of these papers will be referred to 
respectively as the Policy Discussion paper and the Policy 
Guidelines paper.
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enterprises (GBEs) and statutory marketing authorities (SMAs) 
- for which it devised partially differentiated sets of 
administrative arrangements. We shall concern ourselves at 
present with the broad thrust of reforms for the first and 
second categories.
The Policy Papers in Context
As has been hinted above, the reform policy papers of 1986 
and 1987 did not spring into existence fully formed from the 
head of the Minister for Finance. They represented the 
conclusion of a decade of inquiry, argument and agitation 
within the political parties and the institutions of 
government (state as well as national)4. It is helpful to 
examine the policy papers in this context because they 
consist largely of claims and prescriptions with little in 
the way of supporting argument and analysis. For the latter 
one needs to turn to the earlier work upon which these 
documents ultimately rest. The bodies mainly responsible for 
that earlier work were the Royal Commission on Australian 
Government Administration (RCAGA) and the Senate Standing 
Committee on Finance and Government Operations (SSCFGO). In 
this section we shall examine the institutional context of 
the reform movement, focusing in particular on the influence 
of these two bodies. This will lay the basis for a closer
. The work of the Victorian Parliament's Public Bodies 
Review Committee (see especially PBRC, 1980 and 1981; Frazer and 
McAnalley, 1986) was a particularly important influence on the 
Federal Parliamentary Labor party. But other state parliaments 
were also active in this area in the early 1980s (see, in 
particular, NSW PAC, 1983 and WASCGA, 1983a, 1983b and 1985)
136
look at the content of the reform literature in the next 
section.
As the Policy Discussion paper of 1986 acknowledged, 
RCAGA (1974-1976) effectively launched the movement for 
reform. The Commission's terms of reference gave it a broad 
mandate to examine the place of statutory authorities in 
Commonwealth government. It thus set to work on the first 
ever systematic inquiry on this subject, collecting a large 
amount of information through a questionnaire distributed to 
more than 100 authorities, a day-long meeting of authority 
representatives and over 90 written submissions (Wettenhall, 
1976:348). Further, a consultant's report by R.L. Wettenhall 
(1976) was commissioned to assist in interpreting the data. 
Despite the effort expended, however, the relevant sections 
of the RCAGA Report (1976) demonstrated little theoretical 
novelty or boldness and were justly criticised as lacking 
'depth or bite' (Self, 1978:317). This was partly explained 
by the overtly exploratory nature of the Commission's 
research, but it also reflected a preoccupation with limited, 
highly practical issues ('achievable reforms') especially in 
the personnel area. The themes of the Report regarding 
statutory authorities were, in a sense to be explained below, 
highly conventional. But this did not make them unimportant 
as far as the cause of reform was concerned. The nature and 
composition of RCAGA made it an ideal vehicle to promote what 
is described below as the 'orthodox administrative viewpoint' 
on statutory authorities. Its report provided the most 
authoritative and influential statement of that viewpoint in
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Commonwealth administrative history. Accordingly, it made 
the conventional a force for change. Further, by confirming 
the importance of the roles played by statutory authorities 
while highlighting deficiencies in our knowledge about 
statutory authority administration, RCAGA provided a stimulus 
for further inquiry.
Nevertheless, RCAGA's immediate consequences were not 
great. Its substantive recommendations were relatively few 
in number and generally mundane (see RCAGA, 1976:415-6). Two 
of the more important were implemented by statutory 
amendments in 19795, but others had not been addressed by 
the time the Fraser Coalition government left office in 1983. 
Such was the fate of what that government, as the recipient 
of the Report in 1976, took to be its main finding. This was 
the desirability of developing, on the basis of additional 
work, a set of 'broad guidelines' for the creation of 
statutory authorities. In his ministerial statement to 
Parliament on the Report, Prime Minister Fraser announced the 
establishment of a working party of officials to prepare a 
guideline document 'as soon as possible' for the Government's 
consideration (Fraser, 1976:3592). The working party, headed 
by an ex-commissioner of the Public Service Board, reported 
in 1978, but no governmental action ensued (Collings, 1978; 
Wettenhall, 1986:75). Some five years later the report of
5. These were recommendations (39 and 40 of RCAGA, 1976) 
that the Audit Act be amended to enable the Auditor-General to 
conduct efficiency audits of statutory bodies and that the right 
of the Public Accounts Committee to investigate the financial 
affairs of bodies whose accounts do not form part of the accounts 
of the Commonwealth should be more firmly established.
138
the next major administrative inquiry, the Review of 
Commonwealth Administration (Chairman J.B. Reid), drew 
attention to the fact that the promised guidelines were yet 
to appear (RCA, 1983:32)6. RCAGA may have articulated an 
influential case for modest reform and to a considerable 
extent set the terms of future inquiry, but this did not put 
it in a position to prompt government to adopt its reform 
proposals.
It has been observed that, as agents of reform, 
traditional administrative inquiries suffer from the defect 
that they disband upon the presentation of their report and 
recommendations (Wilenski, 1986:262). Thus there passes from 
the scene the leading organizational advocate of reform, with 
no guarantee that the cause will be taken up by a suitably 
single-minded and influential successor able to maintain the 
momentum into the implementation phase where vested interest 
and the 'problematics of attention' pose serious obstacles 
(note March and Olsen, 1983). In the case of RCAGA on 
statutory authorities, the danger that the reforming impulse 
would be frustrated was even greater than usual, given that 
the potentially most far-reaching recommendation (the 
guidelines) presupposed considerable further investigation 
and deliberation within government.
In these circumstances it is not difficult to 
appreciate the importance of the SSCFGO's preparedness to 
take up the cause of reform, to use its prestige and links
6. By this time the guidelines under consideration 
apparently dealt with the 'operation' as well as the 
establishment of statutory authorities (RCA, 1983:32).
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with party leaders to continue to press for action, and to 
undertake its own programme of research, deliberation and 
public inquiry to develop more detailed recommendations.
The Committee quite deliberately picked up the baton 
laid down by RCAGA upon the presentation of its report in 
July 1976. It had been established in 1970 as part of a 
system of seven Legislative and General Purpose Standing 
Committees, with a subject area encompassing 'finance for the 
States, statutory authorities and Local Government' (see 
Odgers, 1976:482). But its major programme of work on 
statutory authorities began only in 1977, when it received 
a Senate reference to investigate and report on the following 
matter:
The continuing oversight of the financial and 
administrative affairs or undertakings of 
Commonwealth statutory authorities, and other bodies 
which the Commonwealth owns wholly or substantially, 
and on the appropriateness and significance of their 
practice in accounting to the Parliament (Journals of 
the Senate, 1977, 288).
The work of the Committee under this reference, which 
included eight substantial reports in the period of its 
greatest activity between 1978 and 1985 (SSCFGO, 1979a, 
1979b, 1980a, 1980b, 1981, 1982a, 1982b, 1985)7, represented 
the partial realization of a longstanding aspiration. The 
view that the Commonwealth Parliament should possess a 
specialist statutory authority committee had been stated 
sporadically since the British parliament decided to create
7. To this list should be added the report of the Senate 
Select Committee on Statutory Authority Financing (1983), a body 
appointed to continue work on a matter under consideration by the 
SSCFGO before the 1983 election.
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a Select Committee on Nationalized Industries in the mid- 
1950s. Even before the British Committee had come into 
existence the political scientist Leicester Webb had advised 
the Joint Committee on Public Accounts that a similar 
committee for the Commonwealth Parliament was 'worth 
considering' (Webb, 1955b:96). Later on, the idea was 
supported by the Clerk of the Senate in his influential 
report of 1969 on a standing committee system for the Senate 
(see Odgers, 1976:481-2)®; by Wettenhall's consultant's 
report for RCAGA and the RCAGA Report itself (Wettenhall, 
1976:334; RCAGA, 1976:91); and, several years after the 
SSCFGO had begun work under its reference on statutory 
authorities, by the Fraser government's Review of 
Commonwealth Functions (RCF) (Fraser, 1981:1851)* 9.
Thus the specialized statutory authority committee - 
or, at least in the case of RCAGA, a more narrowly focused 
government business corporation committee - was a long 
available 'solution seeking an occasion' (note March and 
Olsen, 1983). As is often the case with such phenomena, the 
problems for which it was held to be the solution tended to 
differ somewhat with the times and the advocate. RCAGA 
envisaged the committee undertaking compliance and efficiency 
reviews, thereby complementing the work of a proposed new 
House of Representatives committee on administrative 
efficiency (1976:91,113-4). The RCF, in conformity with its
®. The Clerk's report was appended to SSOC (1970).
9. The RCF recommended the establishment of a new Joint 
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Statutory Authorities (Fraser, 1981:1851).
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'razor gang' image, emphasized a culling function - the 
committee would 'review the performance, role, functions and 
continued need for all authorities' (Fraser, 1981:1851). For 
political scientists Webb (1955b:96) and Wettenhall 
(1976:334) the existence of such a committee promised to 
encourage a more informed attitude towards statutory 
authorities and, in particular, a better understanding of the 
peculiar problems and needs of trading authorities10.
The Committee's own attitude towards its role, 
however, was probably closest to that preferred by the RCF. 
This is hardly surprising given that the RCF and the SSCFGO 
were active at the same time, in an atmosphere marked by 
generalised hostility towards statutory authorities and 
particular concern with their growing numbers and alleged 
lack of public accountability. The influence of these 
attitudes was reinforced by the fact that they were strongly 
held by Senator Peter Rae, the Committee's chairman 
throughout its period of most active interest in statutory 
authorities (see Rae, 1982:241-2 and passim).
The SSCFGO exerted substantial influence on the Hawke 
government's reform program. Influence flowed through both 
party and executive channels. During 1982 the parliamentary 
Labor party had a Task Force on Government Administration 
working to produce recommendations on a range of 
administrative matters. The final discussion paper of this
10. Webb (1955b:96) thought that, by promoting a clearer 
understanding of 'the place of public corporations in the general 
scheme of government', such a committee would help resolve 'the 
problems of control and responsibility' with which the Public 
Accounts Committee had wrestled in the mid-1950s.
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body formed the basis for Labor and Quality of Government, 
a document presented before the March 1983 election by party 
leader Hawke and Task Force Chairman Gareth Evans as a 
statement of 'the basic direction in which the Hawke Labor 
government will be heading' (LQG, 1983:6). The three pages 
devoted to 'public authorities' were heavily and openly 
indebted to the SSCFGO, to the extent that on several 
subjects (annual reports, finance and budgeting, the use of 
the statutory authority form) it was simply proposed that 
particular Committee recommendations be implemented (1983:20- 
1) . On the executive side, an interdepartmental committee 
was established during the Fraser years to monitor SSCFGO 
reports and prepare cabinet submissions from time to time on 
matters raised by the Committee (Wettenhall, 1986:75). It 
was only after the change of government, however, that this 
work began to bear fruit.
Thus RCAGA and the SSCFGO laid the intellectual 
foundations for the policy papers of 1986 and 1987, while the 
SSCFGO provided the institutional pressure necessary to 
sustain an interest in reform. As we have suggested, one 
good reason for placing the policy papers in a context which 
includes the activity of these bodies is that it facilitates 
understanding of the underlying ideas. But another reason 
for doing so is that such a perspective helps to counteract 
the tendency to succumb to a reactive conception of 
governmental reform initiatives, in which action is always 
understood as a simple response to an objective problem. 
There is a sense in which such a conception is necessarily
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true. Within resource constraints governments do indeed 
respond to those matters perceived as most urgently requiring 
remedial action (providing such action is believed to be 
possible). However, sophisticated accounts of agenda setting 
in politics recognize that the concept of a policy problem 
is itself highly problematic. What is perceived as a problem 
requiring action will be heavily dependent on the scarce 
resource of policy-maker attention, as well as fluctuations 
in the immediate political environment (see Kingdon, 1984; 
March and Olsen, 1983).
These factors are quite evident in the present case. 
The process leading to the appearance of the policy papers 
was governed by contingency throughout. We have noted the 
fortuitous role played by the SSCFGO. But policy-maker 
attention and fluctuations in the immediate political 
environment continued to be decisive once the Labor party 
took its vaguely formulated reform proposals into government. 
The eventual decision to adopt a formal, comprehensive reform 
policy was partly a response to a perceived need within the 
Labor party to redefine its view of the role and 
relationship of government to Commonwealth trading 
authorities in the light of an increasingly articulate and 
influential privatisation lobby within the opposition parties 
(see Dawkins, 1986). The reform policy was also a product 
of the desire to complete the process of public sector reform 
begun in 1983 and 1984 with white papers on public service 
and budgetary reform respectively (Dawkins, 1983 and 1984). 
This general reform process, in turn, is said to have been
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highly dependent on the appointment of the reform-minded John 
Dawkins as Minister Assisting the Prime Minister in Public 
Service Matters in mid-1983. In the early months of the 
Hawke government interest in administrative reform had 
allegedly begun to wane as urgent, unforseen problems 
inevitably emerged to capture the attention of the new 
ministry (Wilenski, 1986:270). Again, when Dawkins left the 
Finance portfolio after the December 1984 election there was 
speculation that his successor would lack the commitment to 
prevent the increasingly contentious subject of statutory 
authority reform from being forced off the political agenda 
(Wettenhall, 1986:76). Even after the publication of the 
Policy Discussion paper in 1986 the appearance of a white 
paper was highly uncertain (Dodson, 1986; Fewster, 1986). 
As we shall see, the approach to reform was significantly 
modified in response to intense opposition before the Policy 
Guidelines paper was published more than 18 months later.
Not only is the recognition of problems an uncertain 
process, but problems, solutions (or policies) and actions 
are not necessarily linked in a tight sequence. Recognition 
of problems does not always give rise to the search for 
solutions and the discovery of solutions does not always lead 
to action. Nor does this process always proceed logically. 
Solutions, for instance, may precede the definition of 
problems. As the argument of the next section will help 
confirm, the statutory authority reform proposals were not 
in any straightforward sense a reaction to a new problem such 
as a discovery about standards of accountability or
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revelations about deficiencies in the performance of 
particular authorities. Rather they were a consequence of 
a 'highly contextual' combination of 'people, choice 
opportunities, problems and solutions' which transformed 
relatively longstanding 'problems' and solutions into a case 
for action. In March and Olsen's terminology the statutory 
authority reform 'opportunity' had some of the 
characteristics of a 'garbage can' (1983:285-7; note also 
Kingdon, 1984).
The Rhetoric of Statutory Authority Reform
It was suggested above that the reform movement, whose 
origins and progress have now been outlined, was based on 'an 
orthodox administrative viewpoint' on statutory authorities.
I must now explain and defend that claim.
Let us begin by noting several recurrent popular 
criticisms of statutory authority administration. These are 
that rationales for creation of authorities lack clarity; 
that statutory provisions, especially those broadly concerned 
with accountability, are excessively variable; that 
insufficient respect is often shown for authority 
independence; and that there is a tendency towards a 
blurring of the division of responsibilities (particularly 
between minister and authority) typically associated with 
this form of administration11. These purport to be
11. Some of these criticisms can be found in the pre-World 
War Two writings of Bland (for example, 1923 and 1937). But they 
are better represented in the post-war literature, such as Webb 
(1954 and 1955a), JPAC (1954 and 1955) and the work of the other 
political scientists of this period discussed in Chapter 1.
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empirical observations. But like, for instance, the frequent 
denunciations of the legalism, conservatism and weak 
government allegedly promoted by federalism (see Sharman, 
1980), they have a highly conventional, almost ritualistic 
character.
This fact tells us as much (or more) about our values 
as about statutory authority administration. An aversion to 
administrative 'disorder' and 'irrationality' is deeply 
rooted in modern 'legal rational' (Weber, 1968) or 
'rationalist' (Oakeshott, 1962) societies. It reflects the 
belief that rational (that is, purposive, logical, maximally 
efficacious) collective action is both possible and desirable 
and that organization is its essential instrument.
These values give rise to what March and Olsen (1983) 
have called an 'orthodox administrative rhetoric', a language 
of administrative rationality which has typified drives for 
administrative reorganization. This rhetoric has been widely 
criticised for its descriptive inadequacies. Indeed, March 
and Olsen present administrative reorganization in twentieth- 
century America as a recurring dialogue between the rhetoric 
of 'orthodox administrative theory' - which typifies the 
early phase of reorganizations - and the rhetoric of 
'realpolitik', equally orthodox, which emphasizes the
Amongst these writers, interest in the administrative problems 
of the statutory authority appears to have been importantly 
influenced by the attention being given in Britain to the 
relationships between government and the industries nationalised 
by the Attlee Labour administrations (1945-51). A small but 
significant indication of this influence is the adoption by early 
post-war Australian writers of the British term 'public 
corporation' to identify their field of study.
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explanatory salience of power, interest, competing values and 
group conflict - and which tends to inform post­
reorganization analyses. But, despite its inadequacies, the 
first sort of rhetoric persists because it expresses basic 
cultural values.
There is in Australia, I contend, an orthodox 
administrative rhetoric about statutory authorities, of which 
the standard criticisms noted above are the negative aspect. 
This rhetoric has two main components. As with the orthodoxy 
identified by March and Olsen, it evinces a rationalistic 
antipathy to what it sees as 'ad hocery', inconsistency, 
overlap, fragmentation and other evidence of incoherence in 
the machinery of government. But it also incorporates an 
assumption about the inferiority of the statutory authority 
vis-a-vis the ministerial department which earlier chapters 
have suggested is a product of the history of our 
governmental institutions. The core of this rhetoric of 
administrative orthodoxy is expressed in the following 
propositions:-
(i) differences in administrative forms should be based 
in deliberate, rational choices about appropriate 
means to achieve desired ends;
(ii) the statutory authority is normally inferior to the 
ministerial department as an instrument of 
administration in a democracy;
(iii) because of (ii), the statutory authority should be 
used only in exceptional circumstances and then only 
in accordance with a limited number of strictly
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defined, cogent rationales;
(iv) once established, however, a statutory authority 
should be permitted a genuine measure of 
independence; and
(v) to achieve (iv) and to avoid overlap and 'buck- 
passing1 , there should be a clear assignment of 
responsibilities to minister, statutory authority and 
any other actors involved.
This orthodoxy has been the rhetoric of reform. The 
case for statutory authority reform, as developed by the 
various bodies and individuals discussed above, consisted 
largely in an elaboration of these five propositions. This 
is not to say that the movement for reform did not involve 
fresh inquiry; but the understandings, hypotheses and 
conceptions of relevant facts which directed inquiry and 
helped determine its conclusions were drawn from that amalgam 
of Westminster presupposition and administrative rationalism 
identified above.
In what follows I shall trace the five themes of the 
orthodox administrative viewpoint on statutory authorities 
through the principal intellectual contributions to the 
reform movement as I have identified them. In dealing with 
RCAGA, however, I shall refer not only to the Commission's 
final report (RCAGA, 1976) but also to the consultant's 
report prepared by Wettenhall (1976). The latter set the 
tone for the former (though some differences are noted below) 
and traverses much of the same ground, but it is generally 
richer in argument. Interestingly, Wettenhall is also
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explicit about his role as a mouthpiece for an orthodoxy. 
Thus he observed that his report did not challenge 
'established theory', but was intended 'to reinforce the 
teachings' of that theory or 'to pull practice back into line 
where it appears to have seriously diverged from that theory' 
(1976:341).
Because it is the pivot on which the whole case for 
reform turns, we begin with the second of the above themes 
(Proposition (ii)). This is the assumption, rooted in the 
institutional history and the theory of government discussed 
in previous chapters, that the statutory authority is a 
subordinate or 'exceptional' instrument which, in 
Wettenhall's words, should be reserved 'for special cases 
that do not fit [the] normal, standard ministerial/ 
departmental pattern' (1976:330). Before a statutory 
authority is created, according to successive recent reports 
and policy statements, the particular benefits hoped for 
should be weighed against the general disadvantages of that 
administrative form compared with the ministerial department. 
The two disadvantages commonly referred to are the 
'inflexibility' which the statutory authority allegedly 
introduces into public administration and the classical 
problem of accountability.
Inflexibility results, according to the RCAGA report, 
from the fact that the legislative basis of statutory 
authorities 'sometimes causes them and others to regard their 
objectives as unchanging, and makes the adjustment of their 
functions to meet evolving circumstances relatively
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difficult' (RCAGA, 1976:82). By comparison, in the words of 
the SSCFGO's Fifth Report, the ministerial department has a 
'basic advantage': 'when governmental functions being 
performed by departments change . . . the consequent structural 
alterations are relatively simple: the Administrative Orders 
can be changed and staff can be transferred' (SSCFGO, 
1982a:22-3).
The other alleged disadvantage, that of 
accountability, has received varying degrees of emphasis in 
the reform literature, but has been raised in all the main 
contributions. Least was made of it in the RCAGA report, 
where there was reference to, but no opinion expressed as to 
the validity of, 'a classic argument ... that the more 
independent the body is from the responsible minister, the 
less accountable it is to him and ultimately to parliament' 
(1976:82). The failure of the commissioners to identify 
themselves firmly with this argument was not surprising given 
that elsewhere in the same report they had advocated a degree 
of independence from ministers for departmental managers 
without accepting that any diminution of public 
accountability must result. (On the contrary, they believed 
that such a change would improve accountability)12. In this 
light what is surprising is that the report makes no attempt 
to challenge the 'classic argument'.
Wettenhall's report was less circumspect. 
Accountability concerns were explicitly cited as a
12. This aspect of the RCAGA report is discussed at length 
in Chapter 9 of this thesis.
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potentially decisive argument against the creation of 
statutory authorities. For instance, Wettenhall seems to 
have found such concerns telling against the strategy 
promoted by the British Fulton Committee of 'hiving off' from 
departments to statutory authorities activities which are 
largely self-contained and not closely related to day-to-day 
political issues:
We have no easy solutions to the problems of 
accountability that this course produces, and no 
guarantee that the work will be better done than in 
a department (1976:332).
The SSCFGO, in its turn, was particularly dogmatic on 
this issue. It explicitly identified the choice between 
ministerial department and statutory authority as one between 
'responsibility and accountability', on the one side, and 
'independence' in administration, on the other (SSCFGO, 
1979a:18). Moreover, the Committee left no doubt about its 
preference for ministerial administration: that system had 
'served Australia well' and appeared 'to provide an adequate 
measure of responsibility and accountability' (1979a:9). 
Such claims were made in the Committee' s First Report on 
statutory authorities without supporting argument or evidence 
and virtually without acknowledgement that there might be 
imperfections in the administrative accountability achieved 
in practice through ministerial departments. It was noted 
that it has become 'fashionable to deride the anonymity of 
the [central] bureaucracy and its freedom to operate behind 
the screen provided by the system'. But the Report suggested 
that such concerns were exaggerated or misplaced, because 'in
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fact the minister is seen to be ultimately responsible for 
the activities and actions of his department' (1979a:9). A 
very similar viewpoint was later expressed, in abbreviated 
form, in the Policy Discussion paper where ministerial 
departments are said to possess the 'decided advantage of 
making the relevant Minister directly [sic] responsible to 
the community' (Minister for Finance, 1986:4).
The other foundation of the campaign for reform has 
been the alleged irrationality of existing arrangements. 
March and Olsen have observed that the 'rhetoric of 
administration proclaims that explicit, comprehensive 
planning of structures is possible and necessary, that 
piecemeal change creates chaos' (1983:282). This has its 
counterpart in the present case. Wettenhall began his report 
by lamenting the 'confusing' manner in which the device has 
been used: '...we blur the accepted categories, create 
hybrids, insert statutory authorities within departments and 
so on' . He warned that ' . . .we are unlikely to find solutions 
in this field unless we appreciate the enormity of the task, 
the very great extent of the confusion and inconsistency that 
exists in our present arrangements . . . ' . Too often, 
Wettenhall claimed, statutory authorities had been created 
without adequate justification (1976:314,317,341). RCAGA 
generally concurred with these views, though its language was 
milder. It noted that in 'many' cases statutory authorities 
overlapped in their functions with departments and that it 
was 'difficult to ascertain' in some of these cases why the 
form had been chosen. In other cases statutory authorities
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had 'possibly' been created for unacknowledgeable reasons 
such as 'a desire to forestall criticism about the growth of 
the main federal bureaucracy' (RCAGA, 1976:81,86). At the 
beginning of its inquiries a year or so later the SSCFGO also 
claimed that there had been 'no generally accepted rationale 
for the creation of authorities' (SSCFGO, 1979a:14). The 
assumption underlying all of these criticisms is that 
articulated by Proposition (i) above. That assumption 
strongly informed the support of RCAGA and the SSCFGO for a 
rationalisation of existing arrangements.
Perceptions of the inherent inferiority and overuse 
of the statutory authority form led logically to a desire to 
restrict as well as to rationalise its use. The main means 
advocated to achieve this outcome was the establishment of 
formal guidelines for statutory authority creation (in 
accordance with Proposition (iii)). Consequently, attempts 
to specify a more precise and restrictive set of conditions 
for the use of the statutory authority were prominent in the 
main contributions to the reform movement.
In general this work proceeded via critical reviews 
of the various public justifications for creating statutory 
authorities, with the aim of identifying spurious or 
inadequate rationales. The main differences among the 
several contributions can be illustrated by comparing the 
RCAGA report with Wettenhall's report. Both Wettenhall and 
RCAGA began with the principle that a separately staffed 
authority should not be created unless there is a clear case 
for a significant degree of independence from ministerial
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administration. But Wettenhall was more willing than RCAGA 
to identify the 'need for independence' with a specific set 
of functions or circumstances and, further, to treat that 
need, thus objectified, as a sufficient condition for the 
creation of a separate authority. The condition was 
satisfied, in Wettenhall's view, where the government wished 
to involve itself in trading or 'business' activities; in 
'higher educational, opinion-forming or research-type' 
activities; and in judicial, quasi-judicial and some sorts 
of grant allocating activities. It was also satisfied where 
the government wished 'to include directly in management 
representatives of a range of community interests' 
(Wettenhall,1976:331) . RCAGA seems to have been more 
permissive in the range of considerations it was prepared to 
countenance as providing good arguments for independence. 
Unlike Wettenhall, it did not counsel against the use of 
statutory authorities to 'hive off' executive activities of 
a specialised, or detailed, and self-contained nature - and, 
indeed, apparently envisaged this as a potentially acceptable 
usage (RCAGA, 1976:84-5). On the other hand, RCAGA viewed 
the need for independence as something which could not be 
determined in advance of the particular case. On each 
occasion the onus should be placed on those proposing a new 
statutory authority to demonstrate that need. Moreover, 
RCAGA tended to regard a sound argument for administrative 
independence as providing only a necessary condition for the 
establishment of a statutory authority. It showed more 
concern than Wettenhall with the proliferation of separate
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organizations as distinct from separate authorities. RCAGA 
therefore felt it important to emphasize that the need for 
an independent authority could often be met within the 
departmental framework by vesting a permanent official with 
the necessary statutory powers (1976:85)13. This seems 
quite at variance with Wettenhall's report: it was precisely 
the category of 1intra-departmental authorities' which 
Wettenhall considered the most dubious and the most in need 
of severe pruning (see Wettenhall, 1976:331-2,335).
Subsequent work on guidelines to regulate statutory 
authority creation drew from both of these sources. The 
major SSCFGO contribution, in particular, has aspects in 
common with both the Wettenhall and RCAGA reports. But the 
RCAGA report ultimately proved the stronger influence. Thus 
the Policy Discussion paper contained an appendix outlining 
governmental functions 'illustrative' of those for which some 
independence from ministerial control is often sought. But 
it also stated that performance of such functions should not 
in itself be regarded as making the statutory authority form 
appropriate (Minister for Finance, 1986:40-1). Also, both 
the Policy Discussion and Policy Guidelines papers saw the 
establishment within departments of distinct organizations 
and the vesting of statutory powers in departmental officers 
as desirable alternatives, in many circumstances, to the
13. The commissioners suggested further that the case for 
creating separate organizations would be weakened if their 
proposals for permitting greater delegation of authority within 
departments and greater flexibility in the design of 
organizational structures under a revised Public Service Act were 
accepted (RCAGA, 1976:82, 86; also 72-3, 256-60).
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creation of totally separate statutory authorities (Minister 
for Finance, 1986:7; 1987:7).
If the advocates of reform have wished to see less use 
made of the statutory authority and a more consolidated and 
uniform system of administration, they have also tended to 
insist that where the case for a separate authority satisfies 
the more rigorous tests recommended the resulting body should 
be permitted to exercise a significant degree of 
independence. This is Proposition (iv) of the orthodoxy. 
Wettenhall and RCAGA took a very clear position on the 
matter, presenting independence for statutory authorities as 
a simple requirement of rationality in administration. Since 
the need for administrative independence justifies the 
creation of statutory authorities, independence should be 
manifested in their operation. Form and substance, 
appearance and reality should coincide (Wettenhall, 1976:332- 
3 and passim; RCAGA, 1976:91-2). But none of the reformers 
held that independence should be absolute. All accepted that 
governments require a greater capacity to determine 
authorities' activities than is conferred by their ability, 
with parliamentary concurrence, to achieve changes in the 
functions, objectives and policy guidelines laid down in 
enabling legislation. As a result, in much of the literature 
the case for independence has been subsumed under Proposition 
(v) of the orthodoxy - the need for a clear division of 
responsibilities between minister and authority.
Implicit in the idea of a strong division of 
responsibilities is the need for mechanisms to ensure that
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boundaries are not undermined or overridden with impunity. 
Most importantly, if ministers are to have a general power 
of direction as all the reformers wished, mechanisms are 
needed to ensure that a respect for the independent status 
of the statutory authority is preserved. Wettenhall's report 
catalogued, and argued for the application of, the full range 
of mechanisms which have been devised for this purpose. 
These included statutory requirements that governments accept 
public responsibility, through the 'Commonwealth Bank 
formula', for the consequences of ministerial directions; 
that senior appointments to the service of an authority be 
made 'in the first instance' by the statutory board and not 
the government; that both short and indefinite term 
appointments of board members be avoided; that departmental 
officers appointed to authority boards be explicitly freed 
of their departmental obligations; and that 'recoup' 
provisions be universally employed for business authorities, 
allowing authorities to be compensated for losses incurred 
as a result of ministerial interventions. Such mechanisms 
support operational autonomy, but cannot guarantee it given 
the range of subtle and not so subtle pressures that 
ministers may bring to bear. For this reason Wettenhall also 
argued that ministers, members of parliament and departmental 
advisers should be encouraged to practice 'ordinances of 
self-denial' until there is evidence of 'a serious break­
down' in authority administration. As well as ministerial 
restraint, there should be greater recognition within 
parliament that the requirement for authorities to submit
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annual reports was intended to provide a partial substitute 
for intensive questioning. Further, channels of 
communication between ministers and authorities should not 
entail the close involvement of ministers' departments in 
authority affairs (Wettenhall, 1976:332-40).
Wettenhall's strong case for statutory authority 
autonomy amounted to support for something like the arm's- 
length position discussed in Chapter 2. The SSCFGO 
articulated very much the same sort of case14. But it is 
not necessary to go this far in order to satisfy Propositions 
(iv) and (v) of the administrative orthodoxy. RCAGA also 
recognized a need for autonomy and a clear division of 
responsibilities, but suggested that this should not be 
interpreted as an absence of links with other actors.
RCAGA showed at least as much concern as Wettenhall 
about the need to circumscribe the capacity for ministerial 
intervention. It emphasized that the desired degree of 
ministerial policy guidance should be clearly specified in 
the enabling legislation. It recommended uniform provisions 
ensuring that the use of the ministerial power of direction 
should be a public and responsible act: directions should 
be in writing, they should be listed in the authority's 
annual report, and they should be tabled in parliament.
14. On the points of difference between Wettenhall and 
RCAGA, the SSCFGO adopted the same positions as the former. For 
instance, the Committee followed Wettenhall in emphasizing the 
value of the 'recoup' principle (see SSCFGO, 1982a:93-105). 
Mso, as a result of its examination of the arrangement for 
departmental representation on the Australian Dairy Corporation, 
the SSCFGO supported Wettenhall's opposition to the widespread 
use of departmental representatives (see SSCFGO, 1981:247-9; 
1982a:76-7).
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(This was to become a standard item in contributions to the 
reform literature). In order to reduce further the scope for 
confusion of responsibilities, RCAGA recommended the 
selective use of statutory guidelines - statements of 
objectives or purposes, considerations to be taken into 
account, heads of government policy to be regarded - in 
preference to an open-ended directive power.
But RCAGA's enthusiasm for authority autonomy was 
moderated by a recognition of the danger that autonomy might 
spell isolation. Difficulties experienced by some bodies in 
gaining access to ministers suggested a need for the latter 
to ensure that lines of communication were maintained. 
Consequently, RCAGA recommended regular conferences between 
departmental heads and heads of statutory authorities, with 
the occasional participation of ministers. In contrast to 
Wettenhall's preference for an absence of contact between 
departments and authorities, RCAGA argued for a 'close 
working relationship'. This was especially necessary, it 
suggested, in the case of newly established bodies, where it 
was desirable for the two to work together to achieve an 
acceptable division of functions and to avoid overlap. For 
these reasons RCAGA was less anxious than Wettenhall about 
the appointment of departmental officers to governing boards 
as a means of coordinating the work of departments and 
statutory authorities (RCAGA, 1976:86-90).
Once more, the government's policy papers tended to 
follow RCAGA. They specified that the relationships 
determining the extent of an authority's independence would
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be set out clearly in enabling legislation. To ensure that 
the independence thus granted should be respected, the policy 
papers stated that the provisions described above for 
publicising ministerial directions would also be included in 
enabling legislation (Minister for Finance, 1986 and 1987:9). 
But, like RCAGA, the government claimed that 'arrangements 
supplementary to those prescribed in legislation' or designed 
'to amplify or expedite observance of its provisions' would 
always be necessary (p.8). A reading of the documents 
suggests that the principal 'arrangements' referred to here 
are those intended to ensure that authorities comply with 
government policies, especially in the areas of income, 
employment and industrial relations. But, as the policy 
papers follow RCAGA in supporting the appointment of 
departmental officials to statutory boards, it is likely that 
day-to-day liaison with government departments is also 
implied. The policy papers argue that such supplementary 
arrangements are not detrimental to 'the concept of a 
statutory authority', but are beneficial to efficiency and 
'often essential' to accountability (1986 and 1987:8).
In showing how the key contributions to the reform 
movement expressed a particular received wisdom about the use 
of the statutory authority, we have completed the task of 
this section. But one further point must be made. It has 
been argued that the assertions and prescriptions which 
constitute the policy papers of 1986 and 1987 are 
recognizable products of this received wisdom. As we have 
seen, however, there was some variability among the several
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contributions. When the policy papers are compared with the 
other documents it is noticeable that the former 
consistently express positions which maximize the discretion 
of the government and its ability to exercise control over 
authorities.
This is evident in the two key areas of guidelines for 
statutory authority creation and relationships between 
statutory authorities and ministers. The Policy Guidelines 
paper shows that the government failed to follow through with 
the task of developing a detailed set of restrictions on the 
creation of authorities begun by Wettenhall and RCAGA and 
continued by the SSCFGO. Ministers are left not only with 
absolute discretion but also with no guidance as to its use. 
With regard to the second area, ministers' powers over 
authorities are often expressed in descriptive and 
probabilistic terms (what the minister may do, what will 
usually or normally happen) whereas authorities' obligations 
towards ministers tend to be expressed in imperative and 
unqualified terms15. Further, on every aspect of this
15. The tendency in the policy papers to maximize 
ministerial discretion and minimize the discretion of the 
statutory authority goes beyond recommendations about the form 
of relevant statutory provisions. Two examples occur in the 
section of the Policy Guidelines paper on 'powers of direction'. 
On the issue of financial compensation for an authority adversely 
affected by a ministerial direction, ministers are given a double 
discretion. It is stated that 'consideration' will be given to 
including a provision for compensation 'in the context of the 
circumstances of individual authorities'. In anticipation, one 
assumes, of a continuation of the practice whereby many statutes 
make no reference to compensation, it is stated that 'the matter 
(including any necessary amendment to the statute) may be 
considered on a case-by-case basis' (emphasis in original). The 
other example is the general obligation which it is claimed 
authorities are under to 'take account' of relevant Government 
policies, 'irrespective of whether there are express powers of
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relationship - appointment of the chief executive officer (by 
board or by minister), departmental members of governing 
boards, the question of financial compensation for the effect 
of ministerial directions, the appointing authority (minister 
or Governor-General), size of boards (definite or indefinite) 
and terms of membership (definite or indefinite) - the policy 
papers provide the minister with the greatest flexibility 
consistent with the broad consensus underpinning the reform 
movement.
We may reasonably conjecture that this outcome is to 
be explained, at least in part, by the institutional 
interests of ministers. But it has arguably received further 
support from conventional assumptions about accountability 
which give pride of place to ministerial control and 
ministerial responsibility. Light may be cast on this latter 
point through a closer examination of the treatment of 
accountability in the reform literature. It is to this task 
we now turn.
The Long Shadow of Ministerial Responsibility 
We shall focus in this section on the SSCFGO reports on 
statutory authorities. These contain the most extensive 
treatment of accountability in the reform literature and were 
arguably an important source of key statements in the policy 
papers. For our purposes, one of their most interesting 
aspects was their attempt to promote (to employ the language 
of the previous chapter) a 'parliament-centred', as opposed
direction' (Minister for Finance, 1987:9).
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to a 'minister-centred', conception of accountability. It
is instructive to trace the way in which the inclination to
articulate an unconventional approach, which a parliamentary
body such as the SSCFGO might have been expected to find
congenial, was compromised from within by the weight of
conventional thinking which places ministerial responsibility
at the heart of the understanding of accountability.
There is a good deal of evidence in the relevant
SSCFGO reports to suggest that the Committee was strongly
drawn to the idea that statutory authorities might be made
directly accountable to parliament. The First Report on
statutory authorities set out the basic claim:
There is a direct link [in the form of the enabling 
Act] between the Parliament and a statutory 
authority. This link requires that authorities 
account to the Parliament . . . The Committee is 
concerned that because some authorities have 
considerable operating independence, a belief has 
arisen in some areas that they are not subject to the 
scrutiny of Parliament. Operating independence 
should not be confused with freedom from ultimate 
responsibility to the elected governing body 
(1979a:62).
These comments hark back to events earlier in the 1970s. 
Following difficulties experienced by Senate estimates 
committees in gaining the cooperation of some authorities, 
most notably the Australian Broadcasting Commission, the 
Senate had passed a resolution affirming the rights of the 
parliament. This asserted that while statutory authorities 
may need to be distanced from ministerial control to achieve 
the necessary operating independence, they may be called to 
account by the parliament whenever the latter chooses 
(Journals of the Senate, 1971:827; see also Odgers,
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1976:425). The SSCFGO's First Report also argued that when 
the first Commonwealth authorities were created there was a 
clear understanding that they should be accountable 'to the 
whole Parliament rather than to the minister', the 
implication being that this was an ideal from which 
subsequent practice had lamentably departed (1979a:62).
The SSCFGO looked to several instruments to develop 
parliament's 'direct link' with statutory authorities. The 
main one was the annual report, described by the Committee 
as 'a primary method' of establishing accountability 
(1979a:62). Hence the emphasis (discussed in a later 
chapter) placed by the Committee on improving the timeliness 
and content of annual reports. The annual report was seen 
as valuable both in its own right and as a trigger for other 
mechanisms of accountability. Thus ' [t]he presentation of 
a report would be an appropriate time for the Parliament to 
consider the general question of an authority's activities'. 
The Committee envisaged the organized review of reports by 
parliamentary committees, leading in turn to more selective, 
in-depth evaluations of the performance of particular 
authorities (1979a:82,82-4). In its First Report the 
Committee was also enthusiastic about the use of 'sunset' 
provisions requiring legislative review and reauthorisation 
of authorities at set intervals. It argued that sunset 
should be 'an integral feature' of the creation of new 
authorities:
the Government, when creating a new statutory 
authority should as a matter of course give positive 
consideration to including a 'sunset' provision in
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the enabling Act. If the Government then decides not 
to include such a provision, the Parliament should be 
fully informed of the reasons... Parliamentary 
Legislation Committees could then give specific 
consideration to the appropriateness or otherwise of 
the exemption (1979a: 92)16.
Finally, the Committee argued for the strengthening of other 
mechanisms assisting direct parliamentary scrutiny of 
authorities. To assist the work of the Senate Estimates 
Committees, it suggested that authorities' proposed 
appropriations should be more detailed and that better 
explanatory notes should be provided (1979a:68-70 )17. 
Elsewhere the Committee argued that a wider range of Auditor- 
General audits should be available to parliament (1982a:131).
Not only did the SSCFGO promote the idea of direct 
accountability of statutory authorities to parliament in this 
positive fashion, but it also sought in various ways to 
undermine the centrality of ministers to arrangements for 
accountability. One instance was the suggestion in the 
Committee's report on maladministration in the Australian 
Dairy Corporation that some form of parliamentary oversight 
of the appointment of authority members was worthy of 
consideration (1981:319; note also 1982a:69). A more radical 
recommendation resulted from the Committee's support in its 
Fifth Report for an extension of ex post facto performance 
evaluation for business authorities and a corresponding 
reduction of emphasis on ex ante justification of inputs,
16. By the publication of its Fifth Report , however, the 
SSCFGO had reached the view that sunset provisions should only 
be applied 'selectively and sparingly' (1982a:49-56)
17. Compare the more grudging support for the work of the 
Senate Estimates Committees by RCAGA (1976:112-3).
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choices and strategies (1982a:101). (This idea is discussed 
at length in Chapter 7). The recommendation was that the 
'often extensive' requirements in authority statutes for 
matters to be approved by ministers should be entirely 
eliminated. Ministers would continue to be able to determine 
such matters by utilizing their power of direction. But, 
partly because of its proposed arrangements for publicising 
directions, the Committee believed that ministers would 
employ this device only occasionally (1982a:70-1).
Perhaps the strongest support the SSCFGO received for 
its apparent desire to break the dominance of the minister 
in accountability relationships and thereby open the way for 
greater importance to be placed on direct relationships with 
parliament was provided by academic lawyers Finn and Lindell 
(1982) in a paper prepared for the inquiry preceding the 
SSCFGO's Fifth Report on statutory authorities. (The Fifth 
Report was the final statement of the SSCFGO's position on 
a broad range of matters raised in its First Report). The 
paper, included as an appendix to the Report and invoked as 
an authority in the text, addressed the constitutional 
aspects of statutory authority accountability. Its salient 
feature was a denial that ministers possess any privileged 
status vis-a-vis statutory authorities. Finn and Lindell 
argued that ministers have no rights or obligations with 
regard to statutory authorities other than those imposed on 
them by enabling statutes (that is, by parliament).
So the Committee seemed committed to a substantial 
revision of accountability arrangements for statutory
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authorities. In the light of the evidence of this commitment 
discussed above, it is surprising that Chapter 6 of the Fifth 
Report - entitled 'Ministers and Authorities' - went a long 
way towards reinstalling the minister to a central position 
in these arrangements. This is a very poorly argued part of 
the Report, but it merits attention because of the support 
it provided for key assertions in the government's subsequent 
policy papers.
At least three quite different sorts of statement 
about accountability can be found in this chapter. The first 
was essentially the Boyer position discussed in Chapter 2 of 
this thesis:
in the same way [sic] in which ministers are required 
to be responsible to Parliament for the 
administration of their executive power, so statutory 
authorities are required to be responsible to the 
parliament for the executive powers which have been 
vested in them . . . [But t]he method by which the 
accountability . . . occurs is through the 
minister...(1982a:59,61).
This recalls Boyer's view that the minister is simply the 
neutral conduit through which an authority's accountability 
is expressed: he/she tables the annual report and conveys 
answers to parliamentary questions but accepts no 
responsibility for what is communicated. This position might 
perhaps be held to narrow the range of links which parliament 
may establish with statutory authorities - if, that is, it 
is assumed that accountability must be through the minister. 
But it is generally consistent with the parliament-centred 
position which we have associated with the SSCFGO.
Similar comments might be made about the second
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position on accountability articulated in the chapter. This 
appears to identify statutory authority accountability 
exclusively with two instruments: the tabling of an annual 
report and the issuing of ministerial directions as specified 
in the statute (1982a:62).
The third position is, however, a major surprise. The 
argument here is 'that the Constitution does entail 
ministerial responsibility for the activities of 
authorities'. RCAGA is cited, without warrant, as an 
authority for this claim. But there is no attempt to prove 
that the Finn and Lindell paper was incorrect in its reasoned 
dismissal of the same position. Instead, the Report proceeds 
to endorse a viewpoint it wrongly attributes to Finn and 
Lindell (one which is, in fact, specifically refuted by them) 
according to which ministers possess a 'residual' power under 
the Constitution to direct an authority to act in accordance 
with its statute and to draw parliament's attention to any 
failure to comply with an enabling Act or the law in general 
(1982a:61-2) .
No attempt is made by the Committee to reconcile these 
three positions with each other or with themes found 
elsewhere in SSCFGO reports. Indeed, the Committee 
apparently saw no possibility of inconsistency. The 
particular ambiguities and deficiencies of the Committee's 
analysis are, however, not of great interest in themselves. 
For our purposes the salient feature of Chapter 6 of the 
Fifth Report is simply the impression it creates that the 
minister necessarily plays a fundamental role in
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accountability arrangements.
It would appear that the government and its advisers 
found this part of the Committee's output congenial and were 
happy to accept it as authoritative. Although the SSCFGO is 
not referred to in the relevant sections of the policy 
papers, an implicit appeal to its authority is arguably 
reflected in the air of certainty with which contentious 
propositions are stated as facts. Thus it is simply asserted 
that '[authorities are accountable to the Parliament through 
the responsible Minister' and that '[t]he responsibility of 
a Minister for an authority derives from sections 61 and 64 
of the Constitution' (Minister for Finance, 1986 and 1987:8). 
Moreover, as with the SSCFGO position noted above, the policy 
papers seem to present ministerial responsibility as 
conferring powers and imposing obligations which are 
independent of the enabling Act:
Even where independence is stipulated, the activities 
of an authority will normally be monitored by the 
Minister to ensure satisfactory observance of the 
requirements of the existing charter. . . and the 
general quality of performance ... In meeting these 
obligations, the Minister needs to be kept regularly 
advised of the activities of an authority. If 
suitable procedures do not exist for this purpose 
they should be established... (p.8).
An important feature of the policy papers was a demand for 
statutory authorities (business authorities in particular) 
to convey much more information to ministers than had been 
required hitherto. The argument that ministerial 
responsibility is fundamental to statutory authority 
accountability provided a useful justification for this
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demand - a justification which purports to stem from the 
Constitution itself. It need hardly be added that the policy 
papers were only weakly influenced by those parts of the 
SSCFGO reports devoted to what we have termed a parliament- 
centred view of accountability18.
Cracks in the Consensus:____ Rival Conceptions of
Accountability?
The development of that part of the reform movement discussed 
so far was largely a consensual process. The differences we 
have noted among the various contributors were not publicly 
debated and were in any case probably outweighed by 
similarities. This is not surprising. It may well be that 
a reform 'opportunity' will typically be as much, or more, 
an occasion for the reiteration of a common stock of 
venerable ideas as for innovation (note March and Olsen, 
1983). But the attempt to translate traditional wisdom into 
action may sharpen latent differences of perspective and 
interest. We have seen that the policy papers selectively 
emphasized aspects of received ideas to strengthen the 
position of ministers as much as possible. This was accepted 
without serious disagreement in the case of 'ordinary' 
statutory authorities. But a similar approach to the subject 
of government business enterprise reform produced virtually 
open conflict. The emergence of conflicting points of view 
in turn raised the possibility of alternative definitions of
18. Such influence might, however, be associated with the 
sections of the policy papers devoted to annual reporting and 
review (see Minister for Finance, 1986 and 1987:10, 19).
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the problem to be addressed and alternative prescriptions for 
action.
The disagreement engendered during the preparation of
the Policy Discussion paper is reflected in that paper's
acknowledgement that 'divergent views' existed on the subject
of ministerial controls. As outlined in the paper, one view
was that authorities should be given 'a clear legislative
charter and strict accountability requirements' but then
allowed to run their enterprises free of the constraints of
direct ministerial controls. The other view canvassed was
based on the observation that 'management decisions in
certain areas will have immediate implications for the
Government's ability to achieve its policy objectives' and
held that 'responsible Ministers' could not distance
themselves from the day-to-day decisions of business
enterprises and must therefore retain controls (Minister for
Finance, 1986:25). The paper did not express a clear
preference between those approaches but ostensibly leant
towards a reduction of controls:
. . . the Government intends that existing direct 
controls will be reduced. In the process of 
strategic planning, case-by-case assessments will be 
made of controls that are to be maintained over the 
life of a plan, perhaps in modified form, and those 
which the Government is willing to relax or waive in 
the context of implementing a specific plan.
Controls to be considered in this respect could 
include: contract approval ceilings; purchasing and
offsets; and borrowings, including the subjection of 
enterprises' loan raisings to Loan Council procedures 
(p.25).
This compromise position was consistent with the 
desire shown throughout the Policy Discussion paper to secure
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the uniform application of some contemporary notions of good 
administrative practice regarding statutory authorities, 
while retaining significant ministerial potential for 
control. But it was seen by Commonwealth government business 
enterprises as a demonstration of the government's bad faith. 
The enterprises pointed out that the paper contained clearly 
specified proposals for the imposition of new ministerial 
controls (involving the Minister for Finance and the 
Treasurer as well as the portfolio minister) and new 
obligations on authorities to supply information as part of 
the processes of corporate planning, setting financial 
targets and reporting. But, against the certainty of these 
new constraints, the paper's proposals for a reduction of 
ministerial controls were, as illustrated by the above 
quotation, vague as to the nature, extent and timing of 
reductions19.
Conflict within the government and its administrative 
agencies over government business enterprise reform extended 
throughout the first two terms of the Hawke Labor government. 
It delayed the appearance of the proposals in the Policy
19. My understanding of attitudes within statutory 
uthorities towards the Policy Discussion paper is based 
irimarily on written responses submitted to the government by a 
umber of authorities. The authorities were the Australian 
'elecommunications Commission, the Australian Postal Commission, 
he Overseas Telecommunications Commission, Aussat, the 
lUstralian National Railways Commission, the A.C.T. Health 
lUthority, the National Capital Development Commission, the 
lUstralian Film Commission and the Australian Broadcasting 
lommission. These documents were supplied to me by the 
>articular authorities and are unpublished. But note also Maltby 
1986), Brack (1986), Bolitho (1986), and Smith (1986). I was 
ilso assisted by the individuals from a number of Commonwealth 
lepartments and statutory authorities whom I interviewed in 
February 1989.
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Discussion paper for some two years and then threatened the 
translation of that document into an official policy paper. 
The Policy Guidelines paper which eventually emerged in 
October 1987 was explicitly distinguished by the Minister for 
Finance from the 'detailed White Paper' which had been 
planned. Moreover, the 'change of emphasis' which the 
government admitted its approach had undergone was 
acknowledged to be a response to the criticism attracted by 
the Policy Discussion paper (Minister for Finance, 1987:3-4).
The 'change of emphasis' amounted to the abandonment 
of an attempt to impose uniform requirements on government 
business enterprises, whether through a single omnibus 
legislative enactment of the Canadian sort20 or otherwise. 
The main innovations foreshadowed in the Policy Discussion 
paper - strategic plans, financial targets, improved annual 
reporting and the reduction of ministerial controls over day- 
to-day operations - survived in the Policy Guidelines. But 
it was now stated that reform would proceed on an 
'enterprise-by-enterprise basis'. Moreover, the government 
announced its conversion to the view that 'the onus for 
achieving improvements in the performance of government 
business enterprises rests primarily with the boards of 
individual enterprises and their portfolio ministers' 
(Minister for Finance, 1987:4).
The Policy Guidelines also sought to soften the impact 
of the new ministerial controls to be introduced. Corporate 
plans would not now be subject to ministerial approval as
20. See Statutes of Canada 32-33 Eliz.II 1984, c.31
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suggested in the earlier paper, though the minister would be 
able 'to suggest to the board that a preferred strategy of 
the corporate plan be reconsidered to better reflect relevant 
government policies'. The role of the minister with regard 
to financial targets was no longer to 'determine' the targets 
but to 'consider' targets 'developed and set' by the 
enterprise and to 'accept' or 'formally vary' them. 
Similarly, the determination of an annual dividend to be paid 
to the government was stated more firmly to be a matter for 
the authority, with the role of the minister again being to 
accept or formally alter the payment (Minister for Finance, 
1987:21-2).
The literature on the policy papers has tended to
explain the conflict over government business enterprise
reform in terms of the workings of bureaucratic politics, or
desires to expand or protect 'turf'. Wettenhall (1986:78)
saw the main source of tension as the perception of 'line'
departments and their ministers that the reform proposals
provided the coordinating departments and their ministers,
the authors of the proposals, with 'additional ways of
interfering' in the work of line departments. But following
the evidence of government business enterprise initiative in
the attack on the Discussion paper, Wettenhall (1988)
accorded a greater role to the enterprises themselves:
. . . they contested what they saw as the envisaged 
shift of significant elements of managerial power 
from their various corporate headquarters (not 
usually in Canberra) to bureaucratic offices in 
Canberra (p.246).
An alternative to the straightforward 'protection of turf'
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explanation is the suggestion, also reported by Wettenhall 
(1988:247), that the controversy reflected a ’clash of 
administrative cultures': the engineering or technocratic 
culture which tends to dominate the management of the large 
public enterprises conflicting with the economics-oriented 
culture of the central agencies.
These are worthwhile observations. A 'bureaucratic 
politics' account of the events under discussion is not 
difficult to accept. To the elements of such an explanation 
noted above one might wish to add others, for instance a 
sense of the uniqueness of one's activity which is produced 
by the 'professional fiefdoms' which are the larger trading 
authorities (see Wettenhall, 1988:249). It has been observed 
that the 'deepest conviction' of British nationalised 
industries is that they are all special cases and should not 
be subjected to uniform treatment (Tivey, 1979:169). Such 
an attitude can also be found in the critical responses of 
Commonwealth government business enterprises to the Policy 
Discussion paper and undoubtedly explains the pressure they 
applied to have the government adopt a case-by-case approach 
to reform21.
But there are always a number of ways of under­
standing any piece of human history. We are particularly 
interested here in the ideas at work, that is the 
justifications for or rationalisations of action. At this 
level, the debate was influenced by the report of academic 
Hugh Stretton on governmental relations with trading
21 See footnote 19.
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authorities, which was commissioned by Finance minister 
Dawkins (Stretton, 1984). Stretton's paper was to play a 
significant role in subsequent events. Elements were 
incorporated in the Policy Discussion paper, while it seems 
that each side in the growing conflict within the government, 
the bureaucracy and the Labor party sought to identify its 
position with that of Stretton. In Stretton's terms trading 
authorities could be designed in accordance with either a 
'public authority model', emphasizing detailed supervision 
and regulation by ministers and officials, or a 'public 
enterprise model', giving 'undivided control and 
responsibility' to the board and requiring the latter to 
answer for its performance. Stretton's analysis was 
essentially a new version of the old idea that there is a 
trade-off between business efficiency and political control, 
and that the establishment of a trading authority should 
involve a substantial sacrifice of the latter in order to 
maximize the former. The combined effect of the traditional 
idea and Stretton's new version of it produced a tendency, 
especially among the authorities and their supporters, to 
view the reform exercise as a conflict between a desire to 
increase control in the name of accountability and an 
emphasis on 'entrepreneurial flair' and economic efficiency.
But another interpretation is possible if we take into 
account an element of the debate which has so far been 
ignored. This is the idea (developed at length in Chapter 
7) that accountability for statutory authorities, especially 
trading authorities, consists in periodic external evaluation
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against clearly specified statutory objectives, with a 
background of continuous internal evaluation and regular, 
published performance measurement. Within the reform 
literature we have been considering Wettenhall's report is 
the only place where accountability is explicitly defined in 
these terms (1976:333). But the idea is touched upon in
Stretton's report and is an implicit theme in the 
government's policy papers. As we shall see in Chapter 7, 
what we may call a 'managerialist' conception of 
accountability has been a key element in the reforms actually 
implemented in Commonwealth trading authorities in the 1980s. 
When the conflict over government business enterprise reform 
is placed in this context it appears to reflect competing 
conceptions of the requirements of accountability. On one 
side is the strong orientation to ministerial control found 
throughout the policy papers and justified by reference to 
the responsibility of ministers for policy and administrative 
performance. On the other is the more structured, less 
detailed ministerial involvement required by the 
'managerialist' view of accountability and argued for by the 
authorities along with Wettenhall, the SSCFGO and Stretton. 
If this interpretation has any validity it suggests that 
conflict over the reforms had begun to push debate beyond 
traditional terms and understandings. However, it must be 
stated that the evidence for the interpretation is not 
strong, especially since none of the participants in the 
debate over the policy papers seems to have perceived a clash 
between the two positions outlined above.
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The Need for a New Approach
The main conclusion of this chapter is that the recent 
movement for statutory authority reform was in thrall to a 
rather narrow orthodoxy whose questionable presuppositions 
were never challenged. As a result, the movement by and 
large perpetuated the historical tendencies in the treatment 
of statutory authorities discussed in the first two chapters. 
Arguments for accountability arrangements to be significantly 
modified in accordance with something like the 'arms length' 
and 'parliament-centred' positions discussed in Chapter 2 
were advanced by Wettenhall and the SSCFGO respectively. But 
these were effectively countered by claims about the 
centrality of ministerial responsibility to accountability 
for statutory authorities.
The reform movement largely failed to deliver on its 
central promise, the establishment of some sort of 
comprehensive regulatory framework for statutory authorities. 
Meaningful formal guidelines for the creation of statutory 
authorities, such as were clearly envisaged by the SSCFGO for 
instance, were never promulgated. The guidelines for 
'structure, management and review' which formed the bulk of 
the Policy Guidelines paper were simply a summary of current 
practice. Consequently, they allowed considerable room for 
continued variation from one case to another. Finally, the 
government conceded to the government business enterprises 
the right to negotiate the implementation of reforms on a 
case-by-case basis.
Perhaps the greatest failing of the reform movement
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was that it produced no clear conception of the positive 
contribution that the statutory authority might make to 
government, while reinforcing the negative attitudes towards 
statutory authorities which had developed from the mid-1970s. 
The change in attitudes over the decade in which the reform 
movement developed was remarkable. Examination of a set of 
parliamentary debates on the enabling legislation of 
authorities created in the mid-1980s revealed a dramatic 
increase in antagonism towards statutory authorities among 
members of parliament, compared with a sample of debates from 
the mid-1970s22. Some of the change could be explained by 
the growth of a general disaffection with 'big government' 
and the associated resurgence of economic liberalism in 
Australian politics (see, for example, Sawer, 1982). But 
some was a product of growing disapproval of the statutory 
authority as an administrative form. At the beginning of the 
1980s ministers were acknowledging the presence among members 
of parliament of 'certain views about statutory authorities' 
(R. Ellicott, House of Representatives, CPD, 21 August 1980, 
631). But by the mid-1980s Hansard was regularly recording
22. The parliamentary debates examined concerned six 
statutory authorities established between late 1984 and early 
1986. The bodies selected included a trading authority (the 
Federal Airports Authority), two executive authorities (the 
Australian Trade Commission and the Australian Institute of 
Sport), two authorities combining advisory and executive 
functions (the Australian Sports Commission and the Automotive 
Industry Authority) and an advisory authority (the National 
Occupational Health and Safety Commission). Debates during the 
same period on amendments to the statutes of several existing 
authorities - the Housing Loans Insurance Corporation, the Snowy 
Mountains Engineering Corporation and the National Capital 
Development Commission - were also examined. The debates from 
the mid-1970s against which these were compared are detailed in 
Part II of the thesis.
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sweeping denunciations of the entities. For instance, the 
Australian Trade Commission was condemned as 'just another 
directionless quango, soaking up taxpayers' money without 
providing any substantial benefits', while the Federal 
Airports Corporation was dismissed as 'another unnecessary 
statutory authority' (P. Durack, CPD, Senate, 5 December 
1985, 3083; C. Puplick, CPD, Senate, 13 February 1986, 238). 
A critic of the proposed Australian Sports Commission quoted 
approvingly the view of a voluntary sporting body 'that 
statutory authorities are cumbersome, unwieldy, costly, 
difficult to change and virtually impossible to dismantle' 
(P. Fisher, House of Representatives, CPD, 16 May 1985, 
2575). Perusal of almost any recent debate concerning the 
establishment of a statutory authority would reveal any 
number of similar comments. Speakers rarely cite any source 
to justify their adherence to such views, but occasional 
references to the SSCFGO are sufficient to suggest a major 
role for such campaigners for reform in stimulating hostility 
(see, for example, A. Cadman, House of Representatives, CPD, 
16 May 1985, 2513). By the mid-1980s the intense generalised 
negativity characterising debate about statutory authorities 
had arguably become a barrier to understanding and sensible 
prescription.
The twin failings of the reform movement noted above 
produced a most unsatisfactory gulf between the desires for 
major change which were engendered and the meagre results 
achieved. The failure to introduce meaningful restrictions 
on statutory authority creation gave no reason to predict a
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significant reduction in the numbers of bodies produced. 
Indeed, the most likely result is a continuation of the 
historically high rates of creation which were achieved 
during the early 1980s by governments nominally committed to 
tough stances against the use of the statutory authority. 
Nor do the government's guidelines preclude significant 
variation in frameworks of management and accountability for 
statutory authorities, another frequent cause of criticism 
over the years.
Two general responses to this impasse are possible. 
One is cynicism. The gap between analysis and prescription, 
or promise and performance, might be viewed as yet another 
example of the failure of political actors to live up to the 
principles they have ostensibly embraced. But this is a 
superficial response which ignores the evidence of 
inadequacies in existing analyses of statutory authorities. 
The alternative response is to argue for fresh analysis of 
the issues surrounding the use of statutory authorities. The 
present study adopts this approach for the issue of 
accountability. But another issue may be briefly considered 
here. This is the assumption, prominent in recent criticism, 
that the lack of constraints on the creation of statutory 
authorities has been responsible for an excessive use of this 
instrument. It is likely that a good case could be made that 
the choice of the statutory authority instrument is a more 
complex matter, less conducive to the indiscriminate creation 
of statutory authorities than is suggested in analyses, such 
as that of the SSCFGO, associated with the reform movement.
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Two main points may be made to illustrate the lines 
along which such a case might be developed. To begin with, 
the decision to create a statutory authority is not a 
completely arbitrary matter. From a reading of SSCFGO 
reports, for instance, one would tend to conclude that 
statutory authorities are generally created to administer 
freshly acquired governmental functions. But in very many 
cases this is not so. Instead it is the experience of 
performing some activity within a ministerial department, or 
through a non-statutory body of some kind, which suggests the 
advantages of statutory authority status. One would not want 
to deny the importance of bureaucratic politics (or interest 
group politics) in this process, as the acquisition of 
statutory authority status gives a body greater visibility 
and independence and often also greater command of
resources. But those with a material interest in such an 
outcome will frequently need to negotiate the obstacle of an 
inquiry of some sort, whose independence may be bolstered by 
the inclusion of 'outsiders'. An inquiry or review is 
increasingly the norm before any major policy proposal, 
especially if it involves legislation, is carried forward to 
cabinet (see Prasser, 1985, 1986 and 1989). It would be
naive to suggest that this is always a serious obstacle. 
Nevertheless, to be successful a recommendation for a new 
statutory authority often needs to be supported by a reasoned 
case set out in the report of one of these inquiries.
The second point is that a sophisticated understanding
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of the 'calculus of instrument choice'23 would reveal a more
even balance between the incentives and disincentives for
statutory authority creation facing ministers than seems to
have been recognized by would-be reformers. Several factors
ignored by this literature would seem to be important. One
is uncertainty about the required policy response. Where it
is unclear precisely which powers and what organizational
arrangements would best suit a particular administrative
task, or where objectives are uncertain, there will be an
incentive to utilize an administrative form which may be
readily altered or which will permit governments to make
frequent marginal adjustments in policy. Such circumstances
can be expected to occur quite commonly, either because of
governmental inexperience in a policy area or because of
instability in particular policy environments. Resort to a
statutory authority in such conditions will involve a serious
risk of entrenching an inappropriate administrative structure
which may, in turn, prove a source of embarrassment to the
government. Secondly, calculations of political advantage
may impinge directly on the choice of agency type. Such
calculations may just as easily favour ministerial
administration as administration by a statutory authority.
Thus Trebilcock, Prichard, Hartle and Dewees (1982) have
suggested for Canadian regulatory policy that
... a high degree of uncertainty as to either the 
impact of alternative policies on different interests 
or the intensity of voter preferences as to these 
impacts, or the potential for ongoing mutually
23. The term is taken from Trebilcock, Prichard, Hartle and 
Dewees (1982). This paragraph draws upon that work.
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advantageous accommodations between a political party 
and concentrated interest groups, are likely to argue 
for direct regulation where politicians can closely 
monitor and direct the administration of the 
regulatory regime (p.89).
There is no reason to believe that such pressures do not 
apply with equal force in Australia. They may explain, for 
instance, why the Commonwealth Postmaster-General's 
Department survived until 1975 despite repeated authoritative 
recommendations for postal and telecommunications services 
to be run by independent statutory commissions (see RCPTTS, 
1910 and RCPEE, 1920-21). Thirdly, additional monitoring and 
coordination costs are entailed for ministers in the choice 
of the statutory authority instrument. These arise because 
the relative decision-making freedom possessed by statutory 
authorities creates the potential to pursue objectives at 
variance with governmental policies or preferences. Hence 
the need to monitor authorities to ensure that governmental 
objectives continue to be accorded due consideration and that 
authorities' activities harmonise with, or at least do not 
conflict with, other governmental policies. Monitoring and 
coordination costs can be expected to be weighed against the 
advantages to ministers of distancing themselves from the 
administration of an activity when a choice of agency type 
is made24.
24. An extreme example of a coordination cost was the legal 
action taken by the government of Prime Minister Bruce to prevent 
the Commonwealth Shipping Board pursuing a certain commercial 
policy (see Wettenhall, 1983:49 and The Commonwealth and the 
Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (on the Relation of Edwards) 
v. The Australian Commonwealth Shipping Board and Another (1926- 
27), 39 CLR 1.
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These factors may upon investigation prove to be 
important constraints on the use of the statutory authority 
instrument. The absence of any reference to such possible 
constraints in the Australian literature, including the 
influential analysis conducted by the SSCFGO, has undoubtedly 
heightened the popular appeal of the case for restrictive 
formal guidelines for statutory authority creation. But as 
this prescription has proceeded from no explicit theory of 
the choice of agency type (and only very rudimentary and 
inadequate implicit theories) its worth is questionable.
The remainder of this thesis is devoted to a re- 
evaluation of the assumptions about accountability which have 
strongly underpinned orthodox thinking about statutory 
authorities in Australia. Part II begins that task with a 
fresh examination of the extent to which statutory 
authorities are accountable on a traditional understanding 
of the requirements of accountability. The analysis then 
progresses, in Part III, to a consideration of alternative 
understandings of administrative accountability which, it 
will be argued, are of growing importance in contemporary 
government.
PART II
PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OF STATUTORY
AUTHORITIES RECONSIDERED
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In Part I it was argued that accountability for
Australian statutory authorities has traditionally been
highly derivative of the theory and practice of
accountability in ministerial administration. Accountability
for statutory authorities and ministerial departments alike
has meant 'parliamentary control' of administration. It will
be shown in Part III that persistent criticism of the
effectiveness of traditional arrangements for parliamentary
control has begun to produce a movement towards a more
complex system of accountability. Nevertheless, these
arrangements, strengthened in some cases by innovations in
parliamentary machinery, remain of primary importance for the
accountability of statutory authorities as well as
ministerial departments. A primary aim of Part II of the
thesis is to demonstrate this point.
The point requires an extensive demonstration because
it conflicts with a widespread perception that the
parliamentary control of statutory authorities in Australia
is especially defective. A convenient statement of this
belief is provided by Aitkin and Jinks (1982:216):
... Australian parliaments have made no provision for 
the kind of special scrutiny of statutory bodies that 
exists in the [British] House of Commons, and MPs may 
know nothing more of them than is contained in their 
annual reports, which sometimes reach parliament a year 
or more late and could not all be absorbed by a member 
in any case... The vast majority of statutory bodies 
are virtually free from scrutiny...
This statement is misleading in two important respects. 
Firstly, as we shall see, it greatly exaggerates the extent 
to which statutory bodies escape the standard parliamentary 
monitoring processes. Secondly, the claim that Australian
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parliaments lack the special means of scrutinizing statutory 
bodies which exist at Westminster is not only factually 
incorrect for a number of parliaments1, including the 
Commonwealth, but is based on a reading of comparative 
parliament - statutory authority relations in Britain and 
Australia which is almost a precise reversal of the actual 
situation. It may be assumed that the special machinery 
referred to by Aitkin and Jinks is the now defunct Select 
Committee on Nationalised Industry (SCNI). Australian 
parliaments have indeed lacked exact counterparts of this 
body. But it is important to understand that the historical 
reason for the SCNI's emergence was the strict arm's-length 
doctrine which was applied to the governance of the 
nationalised industries. As noted in Chapter 2, application 
of this doctrine either seriously weakened or eliminated all 
of the mechanisms of parliamentary scrutiny of the 
industries. The SCNI was called into existence to compensate 
in part for this loss. In Australia, in contrast, the arm's- 
length doctrine was, as we have seen, never embraced formally 
or, with any conviction, informally. As a consequence, 
Australian parliaments were not denied access to statutory 
authorities and so did not have the same incentive to press
1. Several Australian parliaments possessed a specialised 
public bodies committee by the early 1980s: the Senate Standing 
Committee on Finance and Government Agencies was given 
responsibility in 1977 for the 'continuing oversight' of 
Commonwealth statutory authorities and government-owned bodies; 
the Public Bodies Review Committee of the Victorian Parliament 
was established in 1980; and the Western Australian Legislative 
Council's Standing Committee on Government Agencies was 
established in 1982, It may be noted that the Aitkin and Jinks 
statement appears in identical form in the third edition of their 
book published in 1985.
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for alternative arrangements for scrutiny.
This is not to say that parliamentary scrutiny of 
Commonwealth statutory authorities is without special 
problems. Certain obstacles additional to those involved in 
scrutiny of other areas of administration do exist and are 
described in the following chapters. The main argument of 
this chapter is, however, that parliamentary scrutiny and 
control of Commonwealth statutory authorities is greater than 
is generally conceded and indeed compares fairly well with 
the situation for ministerial departments. It is contended 
that this was the case even before the means by which 
parliament exercises its traditional 'control' function were 
improved in the 1970s and 1980s. But a secondary purpose of 
the chapter is to show that over the past decade or so 
innovation in parliamentary machinery and more stringent 
obligations imposed on statutory authorities have
considerably enhanced the ability of the Commonwealth 
parliament to interest itself in the affairs of statutory 
authorities. Only some of the reforms responsible are
discussed in the present chapter; others, involving 
mechanisms which fall outside the traditional notion of 
'parliamentary control', are dealt with in Part III.
'Pariiamentary control', as it is understood here, 
refers to the aspiration of classical interpreters of 
parliamentary government such as Mill (1971) and Bagehot 
(1973) that administrators should be continuously responsive 
to the concerns of members of parliament, as these are 
incorporated in legislation or expressed from time to time
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in connection with particular policies or actions2. Such 
responsiveness does not necessarily require active 
supervision - the sort of continuous monitoring and detailed 
intervention which is exercised in the control of a machine 
for instance. A reasonable likelihood that instances of 
maladministration would come to the attention of members of 
parliament is an obvious precondition. But the power on 
which parliamentary control was for the most part 
traditionally held to rest was deterrent power, or what Reid 
(1966:159) has described as ’the latent sanctions inherent 
in possible inquiry'. Ultimately, deterrence was seen to 
depend on a combination of the sheer unpredictability of 
parliamentary interest and parliament's ability to invoke 
severe sanctions3.
2. 'Parliamentary control' is an ambiguous concept (Reid 
and Forrest, 1989:341) and one whose applicability to 
contemporary Westminster-style parliaments is contested (see 
Norton,1985:6; Crick, 1964:77; Pettifer, 1981:34-7; but note 
Reid and Forrest, 1989:387-8). However, the purposes of the 
present study do not require discussion of these matters.
3. Finer (1957:143) exemplifies the traditional 
understanding of parliamentary control:
Every action may provoke a question, every question an 
adjournment debate, and every adjournment a full dress 
debate ... By question and debate, all administration, in 
detail and in the large, is kept under a constant and 
ceaseless review, where the most trivial detail may be 
fraught with enormous consequences, where the Opposition 
spends the whole time seeking the Executive's weak point, 
and having once found it, has boundless opportunities to 
hammer and hammer away, constantly keeping it before the 
public eye.
On the deterrent power of the pariiamentary question, Finer 
quoted Hugh Gaitskell: 'Anybody who has ever worked in a Civil 
Service Department would agree with me that if there is one major 
thing which leads civil servants to be excessively cautious, 
timid and careful to keep records which outside the Civil Service 
would be regarded as unnecessary, it is the fear of the 
Parliamentary question' (1957:141).
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Parliamentary control of administration is thus related 
to the three fundamental sanctions, or powers, available to 
parliament: its power to legislate, its power to withhold 
support from ministers, and its power (circumscribed by the 
financial initiative of the Crown) to appropriate monies . 
The three forms of control which correspond with these powers 
form the basic principle of organization of Part II. 
Legislative control is treated in Chapter 4, administrative 
oversight in Chapter 5, and financial control in Chapter 6.
CHAPTER 4
LEGISLATION
The contribution of legislation to public administration is 
two-fold: it empowers administrators (ministers or 
authorities specifically created by statute) and it 
simultaneously sets limits to, or controls, their activity. 
In his comparative study, Sharkansky (1979:31-66) has argued 
that Australian public sector managers are especially 'law- 
abiding' and that more importance is placed on legislation 
as a means of administrative control in Australia than in 
some other liberal-democracies. This would suggest that, in 
the absence of the special legislation governing large groups 
of statutory bodies which exists in some countries, the 
parent statute of a statutory authority should be a major 
component of the parliamentary control regime. The purpose 
of this chapter is to show that such is indeed the case for 
Commonwealth statutory authorities.
There is a basic sense in which the authority statute 
promotes parliamentary control. This can be appreciated when 
a comparison is made between statutory authorities and 
ministerial departments in terms of the ease with which 
organizational change can be effected by the executive.
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Parliament's formal control of the process of creation and 
establishment of an operating framework for statutory 
authorities is in stark contrast to its complete absence of 
control over the creation and abolition of departments of 
state or the allocation of functions between departments. 
But how meaningful is the parliamentary control achieved? 
A first step in answering this question is to consider how 
and to what extent the provisions of enabling statutes 
attempt to constrain authorities.
The Enabling Statute
It has already been observed that the detail of statutory 
provisions varies enormously among authorities, to an extent 
in accordance with the different purposes for which they are 
created. Nevertheless, a standard set of matters is normally 
addressed, of which the most important are functions, powers, 
structure, staff, procedures, finance and accountability. 
These may be briefly described with reference to selected 
statutes covering a variety of agency types. The statutes 
selected were those creating the Australian 
Telecommunications Commission (Telecom), the Australian 
National Railways Commission (AN), the Australian Industry 
Development Corporation (AIDC) (trading authorities), the 
Australia Council (a granting authority), the Australian 
Broadcasting Tribunal (ABT) (an adjudicatory/regulatory 
authority) and the Australian Science and Technology Council
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(ASTEC) (an advisory authority)1.
The length and specificity of the statement of 
statutory functions varies considerably between statutes, 
though functions are frequently couched in quite general 
terms. Provisions assigning functions to trading authorities 
can be particularly short and sweeping. For instance, 
Telecom's main function is 'to plan, establish, maintain and 
operate telecommunication services within Australia' , and it 
is authorised 'to do anything incidental or conducive to the 
performance' of this function. The chief functions of AN and 
the AIDC are stated in similarly brief but generous terms. 
In other instances the functions of a new body are less self- 
evident and therefore need to be described more exhaustively. 
But they may nevertheless remain quite permissive. Thus 
fairly detailed lists of functions are laid down for the 
Australia Council and ASTEC, but the descriptions are again 
full of generalities. This is particularly so in the former 
case, the Council being instructed to formulate and carry out 
policies designed, among other things, 'to promote excellence 
in the arts' and 'to foster the expression of a national 
identity by means of the arts' . In comparison, the functions 
of the ABT are described in more precise and prosaic terms, 
no doubt reflecting both the more circumscribed nature of the 
Tribunal's work and a greater desire to carefully delimit the
1. The statutes are the Telecommunications Act 1975 
(No.55), the Australian National Railways Act 1975 (No.26), the 
Australian Industry Development Corporation Act 1970 (No.15), the 
Australia Council Act 1975 (No.11), the Broadcasting and 
Television Act 1942 (as amended) and the Australian Science and 
Technology Council Act 1978 (No.81)
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activities of a body with considerable power and commercial 
importance.
Functions differ from objectives, as well as from 
policies. It is worth noting, therefore, that some 
authorities are assisted in interpreting and performing their 
functions by the inclusion in statutes of policy guidelines 
or statements of objectives. The terminology varies: some 
statutes speak of 'duties', others of 'matters to be taken 
into account', or more simply to 'policy' or 'objectives'. 
And there is just as much variety in the length and detail 
of the relevant provisions. For instance, while the ABT is 
simply instructed to consult with the commercial broadcasting 
and television stations with which it deals, Telecom's Act 
contains a four part section outlining the 'duties of the 
Commission' and the AIDC Act contains a fairly extensive 
section on policy.
The statutory provisions laying down the powers of 
authorities necessarily vary greatly depending on their 
functions. Trading authorities for instance must be granted 
the extensive range of powers they require to carry on a 
business enterprise, whereas no more than a few, limited 
powers are required by the average advisory body. It is 
usual for an authority to be given both general powers to do 
all things necessary for the performance of its functions and 
particular powers to do certain specified things, 
identifiable as indispensable for the particular authority. 
For Telecom and AN, for example, the latter include special 
provisions authorising entry to and utilisation of publicly
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and privately owned land. Trading authorities may also be 
empowered to act as governmental agents or to form companies, 
or to enter into joint ventures, or to borrow moneys. On the 
other hand, regulatory and adjudicatory bodies, such as the 
ABT, mainly require the power to make enforceable orders.
Just as important as the grant of power to an 
authority are the limits which are placed on the exercise of 
such power. Such limits are imposed either by specifying the 
manner in which certain powers may be exercised or by 
requiring ministerial approval for some actions. Examples 
of the first mechanism are provided by the Broadcasting and 
Television Act which specifies the form of the orders which 
may be made by the ABT (S . 17 (2)), and the Telecommunications 
Act which instructs Telecom to do as little damage to private 
property as possible and to pay compensation (S.20). The 
other mechanism is widely employed to set limits to the 
freedom of authorities to enter into contracts, borrow 
moneys, form subsidiary companies and so on. Finally, it is 
necessary to note that the legal powers and obligations of 
an authority will vary according to whether or not it is 
given corporate form. Trading authorities and some executive 
authorities (for example the Australia Council) are 
established by statute as bodies corporate with perpetual 
succession and the capacity ’to sue and be sued' in the 
corporate name.
Another set of provisions relate to structure. These 
provisions constitute the authority board and determine its 
relationship to the management of the authority. The matters
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dealt with include the size and composition of the board; 
the methods of appointment and termination of appointment; 
the term of office of members and whether they are to hold 
office on a full-time or a part-time basis; the terms and 
conditions of the appointment of 'acting', or 'associate', 
or 'deputy' or 'co-opted' members; arrangements for 
remuneration and allowances; qualifications and
disqualifications for membership of the board; and 
requirements for disclosure of financial interests by board 
members. As for the role of the board in authority 
management, the statute determines whether or not the board 
chairman is also to be the chief executive and, if not, how 
the chief executive is to be appointed (by the board or by 
the government), on what terms and conditions, and whether 
the appointee may (or must) be a member of the board. The 
tendency is for the roles of chairman and chief executive to 
be combined in advisory, regulatory and quasi-judicial 
authorities and separated in trading authorities. This is 
the case for the particular authorities under consideration, 
but as with the other matters mentioned above there is some 
variability among Commonwealth authorities.
The statute also makes provision for the staff of the 
authority. As noted in Chapter 1, there are several broad 
types of staffing arrangement. The largest difference is 
between, on one side, quasi-judicial and advisory
authorities, such as the ABT and ASTEC, whose staff are 
typically employed under the Public Service Act and, on the 
other side, trading authorities, such as Telecom and AN,
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which tend to have the freedom to set terms and conditions 
for their staff. A middle group, to which the Australia 
Council belongs, is empowered to determine terms and 
conditions but only with the approval of the Public Service 
Board. Where an authority employs a very large staff and has 
no statutory relationship with the Public Service Board, as 
is the case with Telecom, Australia Post and AN, the statute 
may deal with staffing arrangements in considerable detail.
Regarding procedures, all constituting statutes lay 
down simple, familiar rules for the conduct of meetings of 
the board. But regulatory or quasi-judicial authorities, 
whose functions require the holding of hearings or inquiries, 
are subjected to additional sets of statutory procedural 
rules. For instance, inquiries held by the ABT are governed 
by detailed statutory provisions covering the need for an 
inquiry, public notification, the circumstances under which 
an inquiry may move into private session, evidence, rights 
to appear and to have legal representation, punishment of 
witnesses, the reaching of decisions, the preparation of 
reports and a number of other matters.
Not all authorities have their financial arrangements 
specified by statute. But authorities which spend large sums 
of money are commonly subject to statutory provisions 
regarding such practices as the keeping of accounts and 
records, banking, application of moneys, preparation of 
estimates, limitations on contracts, audit and liability to 
taxation. In the case of trading authorities matters such 
as the capital of the authority, financial policy,
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borrowings, application of profits or surplus revenue and 
requirement to pay a dividend are also regularly treated in 
the statute.
The final major aspect of authority operations which 
receives attention in statutes is the obligation to account. 
This involves a statutory requirement that the authority 
submit to the minister an annual report, plus financial 
statements certified by the Auditor-General to have satisfied 
conventional criteria. A further provision requires the 
minister to table the report and financial statements in the 
parliament. Some statutes require the inclusion of 
particular items in annual reports (for example ministerial 
directions) and specify a particular form for financial 
statements. Provision is also sometimes made (for instance 
in Telecom’s and AN’s enabling legislation) for the minister 
to call for such further reports as may be required.
Thus the existence of a statutory authority testifies 
to the fact that the body’s functions, powers, structure and 
so on have received explicit parliamentary approval. 
Moreover, these organizational attributes can only be altered 
with the consent of parliament, by the passage of amending 
legislation. Our survey of selected statutes suggests that 
this is a matter of some importance. Despite the 
permissiveness which tends to characterise certain standard 
provisions, especially statements of functions, the statutes 
do typically institute a real measure of control over a range 
of key administrative features. In terms of its mission, 
structure, powers and standard operating procedures,
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therefore, every statutory authority is a creature of 
parliament. A ministerial department, on the other hand, is 
in an important sense solely an expression of the will of the 
executive, although it should not be forgotten that the 
powers a department (that is, a minister) may exercise and 
the purposes it may adopt are generally specified in 
legislation.
It is worth noting, finally, that managers of 
statutory bodies take the enabling statute very seriously as 
an instrument of control. The executive quoted by Sharkansky 
(1979:45) expressed an attitude which is widely shared among 
his counterparts in Australian statutory authorities: 'It 
must be explicitly permitted in the statute, or clearly 
derivable from the language of the statute. If it's not in 
the law, we don’t do it'2.
A Parliamentary Instrument?
The statute is thus an instrument of control, but can it 
truly be described as a parliamentary instrument? As is well 
known, little is as it seems with parliament. In particular, 
while its formal legislative role is great, in practice the 
situation is quite otherwise. In terms of the way it 
allocates its time, there is no doubt that the Commonwealth 
parliament is first and foremost a legislature. Between 1970 
and 1980, for example, 53 percent of the sitting time of the 
House of Representatives each year was devoted to the
2. As Sharkansky (1979:45) notes, however, the source of 
amendments to statutes is often the managers themselves.
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consideration and passage of legislation. However, all but 
a minuscule proportion of this legislation was sponsored by 
the government and most of it passed through parliament 
according to the tight, government-imposed timetable which 
is now a dominant feature of parliament (see Pettifer, 
1981:778-80). The overwhelming majority of the amendments 
carried were proposed by ministers; back-bench members, once 
prolific movers of amendments, had by this time virtually 
vacated this field of activity in favour of the front benches 
(see Reid, 1982:48-9). While the volume of legislation dealt 
with by the Commonwealth parliament per year in the mid-1970s 
was some four times that considered half a century earlier, 
the number of sitting days had remained at a similar level 
(see Pettifer, 1981:744-7). Moreover, the growing pressure 
on the parliamentary timetable led in 1963 to the 
introduction of new procedures allowing the Committee stage 
to be by-passed in the House of Representatives3. As a 
result, the number of Bills which received Committee scrutiny 
each year in the House in the 1970s and 1980s was about the 
same as in the 1920s (Pettifer, 1981:746-7). Given that no 
new machinery for the detailed examination of legislation has 
succeeded in taking root in the House, this indicates a 
marked reduction in the ability of that chamber to give close 
attention to the individual provisions of Bills, including 
those Bills creating statutory authorities.
Is it not the case then that parliament merely 'rubber
3. See House of Representatives Standing Orders, Standing 
Order No.222.
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stamps' the executive's proposals for statutory authorities? 
The answer is that, while there is certainly something to be 
said for this position, it is significantly exaggerated. The 
necessary correction can be made both in general terms and 
by looking at specific cases. Some familiar qualifications 
to the theme of executive dominance may be briefly outlined 
first. Most importantly, the Senate has a constitutional 
power of review which it has stood ready to exert whenever, 
as for most of the past two decades, its partisan composition 
has given it the necessary incentive (see Reid and Forrest, 
1989:200-15). Also the Senate's Legislative and General 
Purpose Committees play a role, in some cases (discussed 
below) an important one, in the consideration of legislation. 
Further, Opposition front benchers regularly move and argue 
for amendments to legislation. The fact that few of these 
are accepted is important, but the influence of Opposition 
criticism and the presentation of alternatives may be greater 
than can be readily measured. For instance, ministers 
themselves move large numbers of amendments to legislation, 
some of which are formulated to meet Opposition criticism. 
Moreover, even if parliamentary pressure does not bear fruit 
immediately it may make an impact through subsequent amending 
Acts. It is worth noting that some authority statutes have 
been amended fairly frequently, creating a corresponding 
number of opportunities for past criticisms and suggestions 
to be acted upon4. Finally, while backbench government
4. The number of amending Acts to the end of 1983 for the 
statutes discussed above are as follows: Broadcasting and
Television Act 1942 (7 since the creation of the ABT in 1976);
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members apparently no longer see it as part of their function 
to move amendments to legislation, they do still criticise 
legislation at times in parliament and they certainly push 
for amendments behind the doors of the party room (see 
Solomon, 1986:76-89; but note Uhr, 1981:40-1). Ministers 
must sometimes give ground to their party colleagues.
In these ways the attitudes of members of parliament 
contribute to determining both the broad uses to which the 
statutory authority device is put and the contents of 
authority statutes. But it would be useful to know more 
about the nature of this contribution. How actively are 
members normally involved in the fashioning of statutes and 
what are their attitudes towards the authority statute as an 
instrument of control? In other words, does their 
involvement in making this legislation give it the character 
of a distinctively parliamentary instrument? These questions 
were addressed through an examination of selected 
parliamentary debates concerned with the creation of 
particular authorities. The examples chosen include those 
authorities whose statutes have been discussed above, minus 
AN but plus the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (an 
executive authority), the Trade Practices Commission (TPC) 
(a regulatory/quasi-judicial authority), the Australian 
Statistics Advisory Council (ASAC) and the Broadcasting
Australian National Railways Act 1917 (11), Telecommunications 
Act 1975 (3), Australian Industry Development Corporation Act 
1970 (3) Australia Council Act 1975 (2), Australian Science and 
Technology Council Act 1978 (0).
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Council (advisory authorities)5. All the authorities were 
created in the 1970s, most in the first two-thirds of that 
decade. They are thus a reasonably youthful selection of the 
Commonwealth's statutory bodies but are not so recently 
created for the debates on their legislation to have been 
influenced by the heightened interest in statutory 
authorities of the 1980s.
Certain aspects of bills establishing statutory 
authorities receive a disproportionate share of the attention 
of members of parliament. In the debates under examination 
members showed a clear preference for discussion of the goals 
or ends of the policy for which the statutory authority is 
the means (that is, the authority's 'mission') over 
operational and procedural matters. This is not surprising, 
particularly as many members will lack the expertise to 
involve themselves in the technical detail of such matters 
as administrative law or commercial accounting. Their 
inclination will be to keep to the more familiar territory 
of political principle and constituency needs. As a 
consequence other parts of authority legislation are 
relatively neglected.
Partly because of this preference among members it is 
difficult to generalise about these debates. Even where two 
Bills establish bodies with similar general functions there
5. References for ministers' speeches introducing the 
Second Reading debates are as follows: House of Representatives, 
CPD, 5 May 1970:1597 (AIDC); 23 July 1974:485 (Australia 
Council; 20 February 1975:552 (AN); 27 February 1975:835 (ABS 
and ASAC); 18 November 1976:2862 and 13 October 1977:2004 (ABT 
and Broadcasting Council); 13 April 1978:1502 (ASTEC); Senate, 
CPD, 30 July 1975:540 (TPC); 23 April 1975:1265 (Telecom).
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will often be a lack of consistency in both the time devoted 
to particular matters and the views which are expressed. 
Issues, it is clear, are determined by a complex combination 
of factors, only some of which have to do with the objective 
attributes of pieces of legislation. One of the factors most 
responsible for the variation in the degree and kind of 
parliamentary scrutiny which occurs is the level of political 
controversy surrounding the substantive policy for which the 
statutory authority is the vehicle. Individuals are also 
important: often the airing of a significant issue or point 
of view is instigated by one speaker, whose contribution may 
either stimulate others or be submerged because of the lack 
of interest of his/her colleagues.
Before the content of the debates is addressed, it is 
relevant to observe that governments were compelled to accept 
amendments affecting the statutory basis of more than half 
the authorities to which we have referred6. This statistic 
owes something to the time period in which several of the 
authorities were created (the years of the Whitlam Labor 
government) and perhaps to other atypical characteristics of 
the authorities selected. But the situation which produced 
three out of the five amendments, namely a Senate in which 
the governing party or coalition did not have a majority, has 
been the norm rather than the exception since the late 1960s 
(see Sharman, 1986). Thus the ability of parliament to amend 
proposals to establish statutory authorities should not be
6. The Bills amended were those establishing Telecom, AIDC, 
TPC, ABS and ASAC.
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neglected.
The salient features of the selected debates may now 
be briefly discussed. Given what has already been said about 
members' interests, it is no surprise that the statement of 
functions was the most regularly and extensively commented 
on of the standard legislative provisions. Functions were 
treated as a guide to the broad policy to be pursued through 
the authority and were commended or criticised in this 
light7. Members showed themselves to be alert to the 
possibility of an overlap or duplication of functions with 
other public bodies8. But statutory functions were rarely 
seen as a limiting device or as a means of ensuring 
performance of activities in accordance with parliamentary 
intentions. Only in the TPC and AIDC debates did members 
view statements of functions in this way. Otherwise, little 
or no emphasis was placed on the need for functions to be 
defined precisely and restrictively despite some very 
permissive phraseology, most notably in the Australia Council 
Bill. In no case was there any discussion as to whether 
functions were consistent or compatible. The remarkable 
failure in the debates on the ABT to explore the possible 
incompatibility between the body's quasi-judicial and 
regulatory functions, in spite of the Green Inquiry's recent 
identification of this as one of the problems for which the 
new arrangements should supply a solution (see Postal and
7. Statements of functions were criticised in the debates 
on enabling legislation for Telecom, ASTEC, AIDC and TPC.
8. This concern was raised in the debates on AIDC, ASTEC 
and TPC.
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Telecommunications Department, 1976:23, 70-1), demonstrates 
the degree to which members can be blind to this 
consideration. On the other hand, the debates on Telecom and 
the AIDC did reveal considerable interest in statements of 
policy guidelines or duties in statutes as a means of 
regulating the activities of authorities. In no case, 
however, was there a demand for the inclusion of statutory 
objectives; indeed there was no sign that members recognised 
any distinction between functions and objectives.
The very significant powers commonly granted to 
statutory authorities - especially to trading, regulatory and 
quasi-judicial authorities - might be expected to be 
carefully scrutinised by contributors to the pariiamentary 
debates. But the evidence from our sample of debates reveals 
a distinct lack of consistency in concern about authorities’ 
powers. The differences in the treatment of the TPC and the 
ABT legislation in this regard were particularly marked. The 
former example shows that wide or loosely defined grants of 
power may be a target for criticism and that ministers may 
be pressured to justify particular discretionary powers 
proposed for a new authority. In this debate, and in that 
on the ABS, much attention was paid to the rights of 
individuals and private organisations vis-a-vis quasi- 
autonomous boards. Demands were made for powers to be 
defined more carefully and narrowly and for appeal mechanisms 
to be strengthened (in the case of the TPC), and for the 
exercise of the authority's powers to be supervised more 
closely by parliament (in the case of the ABS). The debate
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on the ABT, by comparison, featured remarkably little concern 
with the statutory regulation of discretionary powers in the 
interest of either individual rights or democratic control9.
As we have noted, in addition to allocating powers to 
authority boards, constituting statutes also confer various 
powers of control and direction on ministers. One of the 
most consistent features of the debates under examination was 
the greater readiness of speakers to see danger in ministers' 
powers than in those granted to boards; indeed, in a number 
of cases (for example ABT, TPC, AIDC, ASTEC) many members 
showed a clear preference for powers to be given to boards 
rather than to ministers10. In only one of the debates 
(that on Telecom) was there any significant expression of 
opinion in favour of greater ministerial powers. This 
asymmetry of outlook on the part of members of parliament was 
perhaps most graphically illustrated in the debate on the 
AIDC Bill. Here was a proposed authority with a high degree 
of autonomy whose functions, powers and obligations were in 
some instances specified in quite broad terms. However, 
those who expressed concern about the relevant provisions did 
not complain that excessive discretion was being placed in 
the hands of the board, but rather that governments may 
succeed by formal and informal means to influence the 
decision-making of the authority! The debates thus revealed
. That there were important deficiencies with the 
legislation in these respects was demonstrated several years 
later by the Administrative Review Council (ARC, 1981 and 1982).
10. Note the similar finding by Slatter (1982:33-41) in his 
study of comparable debates in the Canadian House of Commons.
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a strong sense among members of parliament that the role of 
the enabling statute is to empower and control the new 
decision-makers it establishes, not to confer discretion upon 
ministers.
However, treatment of ministerial powers of control 
and direction in these debates also demonstrated a lack of 
inclination among members of parliament to rise above the 
particular case and ask what should be the relationship 
between the political executive and statutory authorities 
performing particular sorts of functions. For instance, 
Opposition speakers were just as ready to complain about the 
existence of a ministerial power of direction in the ASTEC 
statute as in the TPC statute. But whereas there are obvious 
risks in allowing ministers too much power over quasi­
judicial bodies, it is arguable that the putative role of 
advisory bodies - to assist governments to formulate policy - 
makes it appropriate for ministers to determine their work 
programs.
This partial survey of the several debates shows that 
parliament *s role in forging the primary legislative 
instruments for the control of statutory authorities is far 
from negligible, though it is haphazard and often 
superficial11. A factor contributing to the inadequacies in 
the scrutiny of enabling legislation has been the absence of 
select legislation committees in the House of Representatives 
(apart from a brief period of tentative experimentation in
11. Compare Slatter’s conclusion that parliament cannot be 
counted on as a 'consistent polisher' of legislation dealing with 
administrative agencies (1982:36).
209
the late 1970s) and the failure of the Senate to employ its 
select committees in the regular scrutiny of legislation (see 
Aldons, 1985:337-9; but note Uhr, 1981:42-3)12. The 
problem is compounded by the fact, already noted, that only 
a small minority of Bills today are taken through the 
committee stage in the House of Representatives.
The Scrutiny of Bills Committee
In what has been said so far about the parliamentary 
consideration of authority statutes the 'administrative law' 
aspects of the latter, especially the powers conferred on 
authorities to make subordinate legislation and to exercise 
discretion, have been passed over. The omission must now be 
rectified. In this area the record of the parliament in 
devising means of controlling particular aspects of 
administrative activity regulated by legislation has been 
relatively impressive, and increasingly so in recent years.
Parliament has a power of disallowance over 
subordinate legislation and from 1932, the date of 
establishment of the Senate Standing Committee on Regulations 
and Ordinances, it has possessed a body able to scrutinise 
these statutory instruments and alert the parliament to 
instances of abuse (Odgers, 1976:460-5; Reid and Forrest, 
1989:219-30). However, there are certain limitations on the
12. On the House of Representatives' experiment, see Reid 
and Forrest (1989:197-9, 361-2). It should be noted that the 
Senate moved to improve its performance in this area in late 
1989. It adopted as 'continuing orders' recommendations of the 
Select Committee on Legislation Procedures (1988) designed to 
ensure that '[m]ore bills than at present be referred to 
committees' (Senate, CPD, 4 December 1989:3808,3851).
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Committee's activity. It may comment only on matters of form 
and not on the policy content of regulations. Further, its 
remit to examine delegated legislation does not extend to 
scrutiny of the power to make regulations conferred by the 
primary legislation. It was partly in order to redress the 
latter limitation that the Senate Standing Committee for the 
Scrutiny of Bills was established in 1981 (see generally 
Tate, 1984; SSCSB, 1985).
The new committee is not concerned solely with 
delegated legislation. Its function is to exercise a 
'watching brief' over all legislation coming before the 
Senate in order to identify those provisions which involve 
'the possibility of infringements of rights and liberties or 
the erosion of the legislative power of the Parliament' 
(SSCSB, 1985:2). The Committee's terms of reference identify 
five criteria for its work: it must report on legislative 
provisions which -
(i) trespass unduly on personal rights and liberties;
(ii) make rights, liberties and/or obligations unduly 
dependent upon insufficiently defined administrative powers;
(iii) make such rights, liberties and/or obligations 
unduly dependent upon non-reviewable administrative 
decisions;
(iv) insufficiently subject the exercise of legislative 
power to parliamentary scrutiny (SSCSB, 1985:9).
These criteria are especially relevant to much 
legislation constituting statutory authorities. As a result 
statutory authority legislation is often commented upon by
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the Committee. It must be emphasized, however, that the 
Committee does not take the view that provisions infringing 
its principles are necessarily objectionable. Its claim is 
simply that such provisions deserve careful scrutiny before 
receiving parliamentary endorsement.
The Committee has exercised considerable influence in 
its short life. At the most general level it has played an 
important educative role. One of the weaknesses of 
parliamentary consideration of legislation in general, and 
statutory authority legislation in particular, has been the 
lack of ability or willingness of most members consistently 
to pursue issues of administrative law. By alerting members 
to provisions which require special attention from this point 
of view and providing some analysis of the relevant issues, 
the Committee has demonstrably improved the discussion of 
Bills in parliament13. Like the Regulations and Ordinances 
Committee, it can also claim to have influenced the 
preparation of legislation. As early as 1982 a minister 
acknowledged 'a hidden flow-through effect into the 
Departments', resulting in ' a heightened awareness, in the 
pre-legislative stage ... of the sorts of principles with 
which the Committee is concerned.' (see Tate, 1984:20-1).
On those occasions when the Committee has pressed its
13. For instance, SSCSB (1986:12) identifies some half 
dozen parliamentary debates on particular Bills during 1985-86 
in which the Committee's 'Alert Digests' and reports were 
referred to 'extensively' . It was noted that 'the Senate in 
particular drew attention to [the Committee's] comments, pursued 
matters on which the Committee had received responses from the 
relevant Minister and sought responses on the floor of the Senate 
where a written response had not been forthcoming' .
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concerns, its influence can be gauged by the willingness of 
governments and private members to move amendments in 
accordance with its comments. On this measure the impact has 
been considerable: between 1982 and 1986, 63 government-
sponsored amendments resulted and 88 amendments were proposed 
by other members and Senators (of which 50 were successful) 
(SSCSB, 1986:10,13). A sizeable proportion of these were 
concerned with statutory authority legislation. In 1985, for 
example, the Committee played an important role in bringing 
about amendments to five important pieces of statutory 
authority legislation14. Among these the Veterans'
Entitlements Bill (dealing with the Repatriation Commission 
and the Veterans' Entitlements Board) attracted by far the 
most attention: 28 amendments were moved in the Senate, of
which 25 were successful. These dealt with a range of 
important matters including the lack of provision of 
parliamentary scrutiny of the exercise of a number of the 
powers conferred on the Repatriation Commission (for example 
the power to establish a Veterans' Children's Education 
Scheme), failure to provide for review of decisions regarding 
various allowances and funeral benefits, failure to stipulate 
that the time and place at which a person may be required to 
attend to answer questions and produce documents must be 
reasonable, and the creation of an offence for the making of 
false or misleading statements which did not specify that the
14. These were the Australian Sports Commission Bill 1985, 
the Australian Trade Commission Bill 1985, the Veterans 
Entitlements Bill 1985, the Automotive Industry Authority 
Amendment Bill 1985 and the Trade Practices Amendment Bill 1985. 
For details of the amendments, see SSCSB (1986).
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accused must have known that this was so.
Conclusion
The contention of this chapter has been that through the 
enabling statute parliament exercises a modest but 
significant measure of control over Commonwealth statutory 
authorities. Two objections have been considered. These 
are, firstly, that statutory provisions are too permissive 
to constitute a meaningful set of controls and, secondly, 
that the authority statute is not truly a parliamentary 
instrument as parliament merely 'rubber stamps' the 
executive's legislation. Our examination of several sorts 
of evidence suggests that, while these objections undoubtedly 
carry considerable weight, they exaggerate the weakness of 
parliamentary control through enabling legislation. Clearly, 
however, there exists a good deal of unrealized potential for 
greater parliamentary influence, in particular in the form 
of select legislation committees.
CHAPTER 5
ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT
Once a statutory body has been established, parliament's 
traditional instruments for scrutiny, criticism and inquiry, 
backed by the sanction of withdrawal of support for 
ministers, become key determinants of the potential for 
active parliamentary control. Familiar procedural mechanisms 
for administrative oversight in more or less regular use in 
the Commonwealth parliament (with some variations in form and 
usage between House of Representatives and Senate) include 
questions without notice, questions on notice, discussions 
of matters of public importance (House of Representatives) 
or urgency debates (Senate), and various speaking 
opportunities for backbenchers (the Address in Reply to the 
Speech from the Throne at the start of each session, the 
second reading debate on the main Appropriation Bills twice 
a year, half-hour Adjournment debates at the close of the 
majority of sitting days, and the 'grievance debate' every 
second Thursday morning). Further, 'want of confidence' or 
'censure' motions may be moved from time to time against the 
government as a whole or a particular minister. Finally, 
either house may employ its formidable powers of inquiry,
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normally exercised through a standing or ad hoc select 
committee, to mount a full investigation into any aspect of 
public administration (see Odgers, 1976:475-6; Pettifer, 
1981:604-39) .
As measured by the proportion of parliamentary time 
devoted to it, the function of scrutiny facilitated by the 
devices listed above is one which is rated highly by the 
parliament. Between 1970 and 1980 more than 25 percent of 
the sitting time of the House of Representatives was utilised 
in this way (see Pettifer, 1981:486). Moreover, this 
statistic does not take account of the channel for scrutiny 
provided by the large number of questions 'on notice' to 
which the government must produce written replies.
In order to determine the efficacy of administrative 
oversight as a means of parliamentary control over statutory 
bodies we must do three things. Firstly, we must ask whether 
parliamentary procedures pose special problems for the 
scrutiny of statutory bodies. Secondly, we must discover the 
extent to which the available opportunities are actually used 
to focus on matters concerning statutory authorities. And 
finally, we need to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
resulting scrutiny. This chapter addresses these tasks. The 
empirical base for much of the chapter was provided by a 
comprehensive examination of material on seven statutory 
bodies in the Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates for the 
years 1981 to 19841.
1 • The authorities are the Australian Telecommunications 
Commission (Telecom), the Australian National Railways Commission 
(AN), the Australian Industry Development Corporation (AIDC), the
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Parliamentary Procedure
We begin with the issue of parliamentary procedure. Under 
Westminster-style administrative arrangements ministers 
represent the administration to parliament and administrative 
oversight by parliament normally rests on the principle of 
ministerial responsibility. This suggests the possibility 
that the possession by statutory authorities of decision­
making powers whose exercise is more or less independent of 
ministerial authority may impose special constraints on 
parliamentary scrutiny by making ministers less able or 
willing to supply information or take action. We have 
observed that in Britain ministerial responsibility has been 
interpreted as imposing severe restrictions on the use of 
Question Time to question ministers about the exercise by 
non-ministerial authorities of their statutory powers.
However, as we have noted, the situation in the 
Australian Commonwealth parliament is and has always been 
much more relaxed. This is so despite the fact that the 
relevant Standing Order is taken word for word from Erskine 
May* 2. The institution of 'questions without notice', one of
Australia Council, The Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (ABT), 
the National Companies and Securities Commission (NCSC) and the 
Australian Science and Technology Council (ASTEC). Several other 
authorities were monitored in a less systematic way. These 
include the Australian National Airlines Commission, the 
Australian Shipping Commission and the Australian Broadcasting 
Commission (Corporation from 1983). The time period was chosen 
both to provide recent evidence (the research was undertaken in 
1986) and to include roughly equal periods of Coalition and Labor 
government.
2. House of Representatives Standing Orders, Standing Order 
No.142: 'Questions may be put to a Minister relating to public 
affairs with which he is officially connected, to proceedings in 
the House, or to any matter of administration for which he is
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many antipodean departures from Westminster practice, is a 
major reason for the leniency shown to questions in 
Australian parliaments which would not be permissable on a 
strict application of May's Parliamentary Practice. Thus the 
Standing Orders seem never to have been interpreted in such 
a way as to impose special restrictions on the questions 
which may be asked about statutory authorities. Pettifer 
(1981:490) states simply that 'The practice of the House has 
been to allow such questions'. Moreover, this is also true 
of questions on notice, to which the rules of form and 
content are more stringently applied. Of course, there is 
no obligation on ministers to answer questions. As in
Britain, the fact that a question addresses matters outside 
the scope of a minister's authority may be cited by a 
minister as an adequate reason for refusing to supply an 
answer to all or part of the question. Given the Speaker's 
reluctance to rule questions out of order on such grounds in 
Australia, it is surprising that ministers in practice make 
only very infrequent use of this option. Pettifer (1981:490) 
notes again that 'on all but relatively rare occasions full 
replies have been provided'.
The evidence from the survey of the parliamentary 
record undertaken for the present study confirms that 
ministers are usually just as ready to answer questions on 
statutory authorities as on departments of state. It is 
noteworthy that in no case was an answer refused on the 
argument that the matter was beyond the authority of the
responsible'.
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minister. Answers were, however, occasionally refused. 
Pettifer (1981:491) notes that ministers have sometimes 
refused to supply answers on the ground that disclosure of 
certain information could cause commercial disadvantage to 
authorities operating in a commercial environment. No 
examples of such refusals were produced by the survey3. The 
nearest instance was the reply to a question on notice 
regarding the provision by the AIDC of low interest housing 
loans to its staff. The minister observed that particulars 
of remuneration and benefits provided to staff of private 
enterprise firms are confidential between employer and 
employee and asserted his belief that AIDC staff should not 
be placed in a different position (Senate, CPD, 24 August 
1983:213). Among the seven selected authorities, the 
Australia Council furnished the only other instance of a 
minister refusing to answer on the grounds of principle. 
Several questions on notice relating to the business 
arrangements and commercial viability of magazines receiving 
subsidies from the Council's Literature Board were denied an 
answer because the information had been supplied to the Board 
under agreement that it would be kept confidential (House of 
Representatives, CPD, 2 May 1984:1695).
The device of the parliamentary question is used not
3. But in the same period other authorities were 
occasionally protected in this fashion. For instance, a question 
on notice seeking information on elements of the running costs 
of two Australian National Line vessels for each of the preceding 
five years was met with the following blunt reply: 'The
information sought is commercial in nature and I believe it would 
not be appropriate to seek such information from owners or 
operators of the ships' (House of Representatives, CPD, 31 May-1 
June 1984:2703).
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only to seek information but also to press for action. On 
a slightly larger number of occasions than they refused to 
supply information ministers emphasized the statutory 
autonomy of the authority in refusing, or denying authority, 
to take the recommended action. Several questions concerning 
the Australia Council and the Australian Broadcasting 
Tribunal received this sort of treatment. In the case of the 
trading authorities ministers are more likely to cite 
prudential, or policy, rather than legal reasons for their 
non-involvement, especially where commercial decisions about 
provision of services (such as a particular airline service) 
or prices are concerned. This reflects the fact that 
ministers do usually have the requisite power should they 
wish to use it. There were, however, no instances of 
ministerial refusals to act in response to questions about 
the particular trading authorities selected for examination. 
In general, when urged to do something about the quality of 
services or particular policies (including pricing policies) 
adopted by any authority, ministers either agreed to take the 
matter up with the authority or (where there had been advance 
warning of the question and time for consultation) provided 
the authority’s reasoned defence of its position.
The principle of ministerial responsibility might also 
be thought to restrict the use of discussions of 'matters of 
public importance' to raise issues relating to statutory 
authorities. In determining whether a matter of urgency is 
proper to be discussed, or which of two or more proposed 
matters should receive priority, the Speaker at Westminster
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is expected to take into consideration the extent to which 
the matter concerns the administrative responsibilities of 
ministers or could come within the scope of ministerial 
action (May, 1976:339). Pettifer (1981:508) confirms that 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives will 'pay regard' 
to these factors in determining whether a matter of public 
importance is in order. But this restraint (if it is one) 
stops well short of prohibiting 'discussions' about statutory 
authorities. The considerable ministerial capacity for 
involvement in the affairs of most authorities provides 
oppositions with a ready means of gaining acceptance of 
proposed 'matters' which provide opportunities for quite 
extensive discussion of authority operations. In the period 
1981-84 this avenue was employed on a number of occasions to 
focus parliamentary attention on specific issues involving 
particular authorities. Moreover, it is doubtful whether 
members of parliament perceive any constraint when they hang 
their urgency motions on the actions of some minister. As 
we shall argue, the game of parliamentary politics in any 
case produces a natural inclination to focus attention on 
ministers at every opportunity.
The final procedural obstacle to be considered is the 
parliament's sub judice rule, which might be thought to pose 
special difficulties for the scrutiny of authorities 
performing functions of an adjudicative nature. But the rule 
seems not to constitute a serious impediment. The 
implication to be drawn from Odgers (1976:250-3) and Pettifer 
(1981:464-8) is that it is applied only to matters awaiting
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decision in courts of law and to proceedings before Royal 
Commissions which are concerned with issues of fact or 
findings relating to the propriety of the actions of specific 
persons. The only other body referred to by these 
authorities is the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission, the proceedings of which are permitted to be 
discussed except where any references would cause 'a real and 
substantial danger of prejudice to the proceedings' 
(Pettifer, 1981:465). While this does suggest a possible 
limitation on the rights of members to pursue issues arising 
out of proceedings before administrative tribunals, Pettifer 
(1981:508) observes that in 1969 a proposed discussion of 'a 
matter of public importance' relating to a matter currently 
before the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission was ruled 
to be in order on the ground that it was not before the 
Commonwealth Industrial Court. It is also relevant to note 
that the policy of the presiding officers of the Commonwealth 
Parliament is to restrict the application of the rule as much 
as possible. But, again, it must be kept in mind that a 
minister remains perfectly free to choose as his or her 
ground for refusing to supply an answer to a parliamentary 
question the argument that a quasi-judicial authority's 
deliberations should not be subject to political pressure or 
comment. Unfortunately, the survey of questions upon which 
this section is based does not allow us to say how often, if 
at all, ministers resort to this tactic as questions asked 
about the Broadcasting Tribunal were not of a kind which 
could have induced such a response.
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It may be concluded that parliamentary procedures do 
not place significant special impediments in the way of 
parliamentary oversight of statutory authorities.
Parliamentary Interest in Statutory Authorities 
Members of parliament are virtually as free to scrutinise 
statutory authorities as they are to scrutinise ministerial 
departments. But to what extent do they exploit the 
opportunities they possess? A priori, there is a case for 
saying that opportunities for scrutiny are likely to be 
significantly underexploited. To anticipate later
discussion, parliamentary politics on the Opposition side is 
a game of 'get the minister' . It might be thought to follow 
that the attenuated relationship between ministers and 
statutory authority administration would act as a 
disincentive to parliamentary interest in statutory 
authorities.
The parliamentary record offers little support for 
this hypothesis. Statutory authorities as a group attract 
substantial attention, although there is great variation in 
the amount of scrutiny which individual bodies receive. The 
numbers of questions asked provide a useful measure of the 
level and distribution of parliamentary interest. Table 5.1 
shows the numbers of questions directed at selected 
authorities in the period 1981 to 1984.
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Table 5.1 Parliamentary Questions on Selected 
Statutory Authorities, House of 
Representatives, 1981-84®.
Number of Number of











National Companies and 
Securities Commission










a The numbers refer to questions which mentioned the body 
rather than to questions which raised matters for which 
the body was responsible.
b Not included are 17 questions without notice and 85 
questions on notice which addressed telephone and 
telegraph services (see above).
Source: Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates.
Among these bodies much more attention was devoted on average 
to the trading authorities than to the rest; and among the 
latter the granting authority was monitored more closely than 
the regulatory and adjudicative/licensing bodies, which in 
turn were the subject of more debate and questions than the 
advisory body. This pattern of attention is partly a
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function of the choice of authorities, and it is not 
difficult to find examples of non-trading authorities (for 
example, the Australia Council) which excite more 
parliamentary interest than trading authorities (for example, 
the AIDC), or of advisory bodies (for example, the Industries 
Assistance Commission) which consume more debating and 
questioning time than selected examples from each of the 
other categories. But, as a general rule, authorities which 
immediately affect the daily lives of large numbers of 
Australians as a result of the services they provide are, not 
surprisingly, of greater concern to members of parliament 
than others. The same is true for ministerial departments.
It is well established that Australian members of 
parliament, like their counterparts elsewhere, place a high 
priority on the 'ombudsman' work they perform for their 
constituents (see Emy, 1974:469-80). It is logical that this 
should express itself in the use of the parliamentary forum 
(even if only as a secondary option when direct 
representations to ministers have not had the desired result) 
to pursue grievances or queries about levels and quality of 
services, pricing policies, the need and potential for new 
services, anomalies in existing services, the particular 
economic consequences (for example, increased unemployment) 
of given authority decisions or policies and so on. A 
constant stream of questions, oral and written, and speeches 
in Adjournment and Grievance debates address such subjects 
as they concern Telecom, Australia Post, the Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation, Australian Airlines, Qantas,
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Australian National Railways, the Australian National 
(shipping) Line, the Commonwealth Bank and the like.
In 1983 and 1984, for instance, all of these 
mechanisms were used by a group of Members and Senators to 
voice the concern of constituents in rural areas about 
Telecom's new 'Countrywide Calling' policy. This had 
resulted in some telephone subscribers losing their access 
to untimed local calls and various other anomalies. The 
campaign waged by members of parliament featured much 
questioning and speech-making in parliament. But it also 
involved private representations to the Minister for 
Communications, the lobbying of Telecom regional managers and 
meetings, arranged by the Minister, with Telecom head office 
personnel.
It would be difficult to distinguish the relative 
contributions of each of these channels of influence in 
bringing about the adjustments which were subsequently made 
by Telecom. Parliament offers a means of publicising this 
sort of issue and bringing added pressure to bear on the 
authority via its link with a minister. But one suspects 
that the questions and speeches have as much, if not more, 
to do with the desire of members to broadcast the fact that 
they are working diligently on behalf of their constituents. 
Nevertheless, members obviously do believe in the efficacy 
of 'raising a matter in parliament', and if this belief is 
held sufficiently widely and strongly it must become self- 
fulfilling.
In this case the interest shown by members of
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parliament led in February 1984 to an inquiry by the House 
of Representatives Expenditure Committee into Telecom's zonal 
charging policies. Reports were produced in October 1984 and 
November 1986 (HRSCE, 1984 and 1986a). By the latter date 
many of the 23 recommendations of the 'phase I* report had 
been accepted by both the government and Telecom and a number 
were being implemented. So what began as merely a large 
number of parochial grievances culminated in a fairly major 
parliamentary investigation of an authority's performance in 
relation to important aspects of its mandate.
This outcome was unusual, but the example provides a 
good illustration of the uses to which the opportunities for 
backbench contributions to the scrutiny of statutory 
authorities (and public administration more generally) are 
normally put. Through such channels a succession of 
individual cases and operational matters concerning statutory 
authorities are aired in parliament.
However, the process does have its weaknesses as a 
form of scrutiny. For instance, rarely is any attempt made 
to connect service or operational matters with more general 
issues of agency policy regarding objectives and the 
efficient employment of resources. The function which is 
performed is undoubtedly important, but it produces only a 
superficial form of accountability. Moreover, because the 
process depends heavily on the initiating role of citizen 
grievance, the accountability that it does secure will be 
very unevenly spread among statutory authorities. While 
some, such as Telecom, are quite extensively monitored,
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albeit too often only at the level at which they interact 
with members of the public, others are scarcely noticed due 
to their lack of visibility in the community at large. 
Finally, the nature of Question Time and Adjournment and 
Grievance debates militates against systematic or prolonged 
scrutiny. Unlike the situation at Westminster, where a ’rota 
system' operates for parliamentary questions and 
supplementary questions are allowed, the content of a 
sequence of questions in the Commonwealth parliament will 
usually be wholly random4. Similarly, the five minutes 
allotted to each speaker in the half-hour Adjournment debates 
and the ten minute slots allocated in the hour or so occupied 
by Grievance debates (on the relatively rare occasions when 
these are held)5 are hardly conducive to sophisticated or 
organized criticism of aspects of public administration. In 
practice they are devoted almost entirely to constituency 
matters, various good causes with which members are 
associated, and disparate issues of national and 
international politics.
'Questions on notice' would seem to have more 
potential as a means for a member of parliament to scrutinise 
in an organized manner the policies and performances of a 
statutory authority. Questions seeking detailed, technical 
or statistical information are generally asked in this way
4. This is especially true of the House of Representatives 
where immediate supplementary questions are virtually non­
existent (Pettifer, 1981:497).
5. The average number of days on which grievances were 
debated in the House of Representatives in the years 1975-80 was 
8.33 (see Pettifer, 1981:515).
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and there is no limit to the number an individual member may 
ask. Examples of the use of this device in the manner 
outlined can be found, but they are not common. Moreover, 
they are usually furnished by shadow ministers. In 1981, for 
instance, the shadow ministers for Transport (Morris) and 
Primary Industry (Kerin) asked questions which elicited a 
good deal of information about the financial performance of 
Australian National Railways and the Australian National 
Line, in the first case, and the appointment of industry 
representatives to statutory marketing corporations for 
primary products, in the second (House of Representatives, 
CPD, 5 May 1981:2012 and 26 May, 1981:2589-91). These
examples are notable because the reforms undertaken by the 
two individuals when they became ministers after the 1983 
election reveal that their questions on notice had been part 
of the process of planning new policies. Examples of
systematic scrutiny by means of questions on notice by shadow 
ministers from the period after the change of government in 
1983 include a series of questions seeking information on, 
and attempting to expose anomalies in, the Telecom 
Countrywide Calling policy, and a 17 part question probing 
weaknesses in the arrangements governing Trans Australia 
Airlines' financial accountability (House of Representatives, 
CPD, 7 March 1984:687-8). The extent to which this device 
is utilized by shadow ministers as compared with backbench 
members and Senators is demonstrated by the statistic that, 
of the 37 questions on notice asked about Telecom in both 
houses during 1984, 30 came from the shadow minister for
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Communications.
The Opposition front bench dominates Question Time in 
parliament for reasons which have little to do with the lack 
of desire of backbenchers to participate, but its grossly 
disproportionate share of the questions put on notice 
concerning statutory authorities suggests that backbenchers 
generally do not have a great deal of interest in, or use 
for, the detailed information which could be elicited through 
an organized series of questions. Rare instances of such 
activity - for example, the scrutiny by a Labor member in 
1982 of Telecom's ability to plan for and meet the demand for 
telephone services in particular rapidly developing areas - 
demonstrate the undeveloped potential of this device as a 
mechanism for serious administrative scrutiny by private 
members (House of Representatives, CPD, 18 August 1982:649- 
50) .
We may conclude that members of parliament make 
substantial use of standard parliamentary mechanisms in order 
to scrutinise statutory authorities. However, the nature and 
level of members' interests dictate that the potential for 
scrutiny will not be fully exploited. In this, though, there 
seems to be little to distinguish the treatment of statutory 
authorities from that of public administration in general.
The Context of Parliamentary Politics
To this point the discussion has largely ignored the context 
within which parliamentary scrutiny of public administration 
occurs. Parliamentary politics, focused as it is on the
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successes and failures of ministers, has an adversarial 
character. This follows from the design of responsible 
parliamentary government. The essence of parliamentary 
government is that ministers and not others are responsible 
to parliament for the conduct of public administration. 
Parliamentary procedures translate this constitutional 
doctrine into practice. They facilitate the questioning and 
criticism of ministers, but provide no regular opportunities 
for holding other officials to account. Additionally, they 
emphasize the division of each house of parliament into 
government and opposition sides and operate to promote debate 
between the two. In Australia the adversarial character of 
parliamentary politics is strongly reinforced by several 
other factors. These include highly disciplined 
parliamentary parties, the strongly two-sided nature of 
partisan alignment (especially in the House of 
Representatives) and the sense of an almost continuous 
election campaign created by frequent elections.
Parliamentary scrutiny within such a system is very 
far from being a disinterested activity performed by 
’parliamentarians' seeking to keep government administration 
efficient, effective and accountable. The devices which 
permit oppositions to determine a portion of the 
parliamentary agenda are seen instead as so many 
opportunities to attack and discredit ministers, with a view 
to lowering the standing of the government in the eyes of the 
public. In scrutinizing the administration oppositions 
naturally tend to focus on matters which promise to advance
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this objective.
Whatever the strengths and weaknesses of such a 
pattern of politics in other respects6, it is arguably less 
than ideally suited to the scrutiny of statutory authorities 
because of its preoccupation with ministers. As we have 
seen, there is little evidence that pariiamentary procedures 
prevent scrutiny of statutory office holders' activities. 
But the structure of incentives in parliamentary politics 
dictates that only where shortcomings in statutory authority 
administration provide a means of 'getting at' ministers will 
oppositions feel it worthwhile to mount co-ordinated or time- 
consuming attacks.
The parliamentary record for the first half of the 
1980s illustrates this point. Two incidents concerning 
statutory authorities were given enormous prominence in this 
period: the breach of an international agreement by a 
subsidiary of the Australian Dairy Corporation (ADC) and the 
probity of the financial settlement negotiated for the Chief 
Executive Officer of the Australian Bicentennial Authority 
(ABA) upon his resignation. These matters were pursued by 
oppositions in 1981 and 1985 respectively to the limit 
allowed by parliamentary procedure. The character of the 
questions and debates recorded in Hansard shows why: in each 
case it was possible to link a minister (in the latter case 
the Prime Minister) directly with maladministration. Where 
such a linkage could not be plausibly inferred, as for
6. For criticism of the 'adversary system' in the British 
context see Finer (1975 and 1980) and Johnson (1977).
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instance with allegations of maladministration in the ABA 
prior to the Chief Executive's departure, oppositions not 
surprisingly showed much less interest. Moreover, in the ADC 
and ABA cases parliamentary questions and debates were 
overwhelmingly concerned with the role played by ministers.
For any issue in statutory authority administration 
there is much the Opposition can do to ensure that the focus 
of criticism is the minister rather than the statutory 
office-holders. As we have observed, most authority statutes 
give a minister a wide power of direction and this leaves 
ministers open to attack for failures of omission as well as 
failures of commission. The parliamentary record shows that 
the opportunity thus afforded oppositions is exploited quite 
frequently. For instance, ministers are urged through 
parliamentary questions to take action to deal with staffing 
and industrial relations problems in Telecom, Australia Post 
and Qantas, or to instruct the Australian Broadcasting 
Tribunal and the Australia Council to reverse particular 
decisions. The tactic of charging that ministers are either 
negligent in failing to resolve the problems of statutory 
authorities or else in agreement with authorities' actions 
is also employed in launching and debating urgency, matter 
of public importance and censure motions.
In this way the 'political logic' of parliamentary 
scrutiny leads oppositions to attribute an exaggerated degree 
of responsibility to ministers for the activities of 
statutory bodies. As noted in an earlier chapter, Wilding 
(1982) has suggested that the same logic may produce a
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tightening of the relationship between minister and statutory 
authority, diminishing the practical distinction between 
ministerial and non-ministerial administration. If ministers 
are pressed too hard in parliament on administrative matters 
entrusted by law or practice to statutory office-holders, 
they will tend to take action to avoid further political 
embarrassment. This will typically involve a strengthening 
of ministerial control.
Some evidence in support of this hypothesis is 
provided by the outcomes of the Dairy Corporation and 
Bicentennial Authority episodes, particularly the latter. 
In that case criticism was levelled at the Prime Minister's 
supervision of the financial settlement associated with the 
enforced resignation of the Chief Executive of the Authority 
(see House of Representatives CPD for September and October 
1985). The Prime Minister's defence rested heavily on the 
'very considerable difficulties' posed by the statutory 
independence of that body. It was not surprising, therefore, 
that after sustained parliamentary attack he announced a 
series of measures to tighten ministerial control. 
Henceforth the authority would be required to supply monthly 
reports on its programs and quarterly financial estimates; 
a senior departmental officer would attend board meetings; 
and the capacity of the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet to monitor the ABA would be bolstered through the 
establishment of a separate Bicentennial Division, supported 
by two branches, reporting to a Deputy Secretary (House of 
Representatives, CPD, 8 October 1985:1594 and 11 October
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1985:1907). The rationale of these changes would seem to be 
that Prime Minister Hawke had felt the need to give himself 
a capacity for control commensurate with the level of 
responsibility the parliament had shown it wished to exact.
Wilding's argument clearly has some force. But it 
should be noted that the pressures on ministers are not all 
in the same direction. Ministers are just as readily 
criticised by their parliamentary opponents for seeking to 
infringe authority independence as for not supervising 
authorities sufficiently closely. Ministers with
responsibility for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
are always candidates for such criticism. Among our seven 
selected authorities there were in the period 1981-84 two 
good examples of members of parliament assuming the role of 
defender of statutory authority independence. During the 
period of the Fraser government the Labor Opposition 
frequently supported Telecom against various government 
policies which threatened Telecom's growth potential and 
autonomy. The imposition of staff ceilings on the authority, 
a governmental veto on its expansion into the profitable 
'interconnect' market, perceived constraints on its ability 
to increase capital expenditure at an optimal rate, the 
government's keenness to introduce a separately owned and 
controlled communications satellite which Telecom saw as a 
potential competitor in some of the most lucrative areas of 
communications, and, finally, the establishment of the 
Davidson inquiry to determine how the private sector might 
play a greater role in the provisions of telecommunications
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services were all issues which brought the Opposition and 
individual Labor members of parliament to the defence of 
Telecom's interests in 1981 and 1982. As the various matters 
were interrelated and came to be seen by the government's 
opponents as products of a continuing 'campaign' by the 
government against Telecom, most of the devices for 
parliamentary scrutiny we have discussed were utilised in the 
opposition's own prolonged attack. The other example 
occurred in 1983 when Liberal Senators made use of question 
time and the committee stage of the passage of an 
Appropriation Bill to defend the independence of the 
Australia Council against alleged ministerial pressure. 
Parliamentary activity of this sort helps to counterbalance 
the incentives to greater ministerial control discussed 
above.
In this chapter so far it has been shown that the 
Commonwealth parliament makes substantial use of its devices 
for administrative oversight in order to scrutinize statutory 
authorities. But we have also noted certain inadequacies in 
the scrutiny of administrative agencies generally, stemming 
from the interests of members of parliament and the character 
of parliamentary politics. We have found no indication that 
statutory authorities are neglected by comparison with 
ministerial departments. However, we have identified some 
adverse consequences of the fact that the scrutiny of 
statutory authorities is constrained to follow the form 
devised for ministerial administration. It remains to 
consider a prominent reform designed to address some of the
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deficiencies we have observed.
Scrutiny by Committee
Since the 1960s, widely acknowledged weaknesses in the 
traditional means of parliamentary oversight of 
administration have led to an increased use of standing 
select committees in Australia and elsewhere. The 
Commonwealth parliament, especially its Senate, joined the 
trend in the 1970s. As we saw in Chapter 2, Commonwealth 
statutory authorities have been subjected from time to time 
in the past to inquiry by ad hoc and standing select 
committees. But with the creation in particular of the House 
of Representatives Standing Committee on Expenditure and the 
Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Government 
Operations, this activity became much more frequent. A brief 
account of the work of those two bodies will serve to 
demonstrate the increased level and quality of scrutiny which 
has resulted7. It should be noted that we are presently 
concerned mainly with the use of select committees in their 
traditional manner - that is for special or ad hoc inquiries
7. This section deals with the situation prior to the major 
changes in the Committees of the Commonwealth parliament 
announced in late 1987 (see Reid and Forrest, 1989:380-1). The 
introduction of a standing committee system into the House of 
Representatives at that time saw the Expenditure Committee 
abolished and a Standing Committee on Finance and Public 
Administration put in its place. In the Senate, the Standing 
Committee on Finance and Government Operations became the 
Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration. At the 
time of writing it is too early to attempt an evaluation of the 
new arrangements. However, the creation of a committee system 
in the House seems to demonstrate the persistence of the trend 
identified above and to extend further the potential for scrutiny 
by committee discussed in this section.
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- rather than for the regular scrutiny of each statutory 
authority. The latter subject is treated in subsequent 
chapters.
The House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Expenditure, established in 1976, was modelled on the 
Expenditure Committee of the House of Commons and was vaguely 
intended to improve the capacity of the House to scrutinise 
the expenditure plans of the government (see Garland, 1978; 
Uhr, 1981:26-7). However, the failure of the government to 
publish forward estimates before 1983 or to follow the 
practice of the British government in preparing White Papers 
on public expenditure meant that the Committee devoted much 
of its attention to the other function implicit in its broad 
terms of reference, the conduct of 'effectiveness reviews' 
of public expenditure programmes. Among the reports which 
resulted from this form of inquiry were a number which 
evaluated the general performance of particular statutory 
authorities, including the Australian Industry Development 
Corporation (AIDC), the Australian National Railways 
Commission (AN) and the Australia Council (HRSCE, 1980, 1982, 
1986b). A further two reports (HRSCE, 1984 and 1986a) were 
devoted to Telecom's zonal charging policies.
The Committee's inquiry into the AIDC was its first 
into the operations of a statutory authority. The aim of the 
inquiry, which was its own justification, was 'to ensure that 
a major statutory body ... was required to explain, to 
document and to justify its performance far beyond the 
disclosures contained in its Annual Report to the Parliament'
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(HRSCE, 1980:1). In fact the report went further than 
assessing the performance of the Corporation against its 
statutory objectives. Considerable attention was also given 
to the continuing relevance of the objectives themselves and 
to the various statutory constraints on the Corporation's 
activities. The Committee's interest in accountability was 
underlined by recommendations designed to clarify the body's 
objectives, its financial relationship with the Commonwealth 
and the relationship between chairman and chief executive.
The other reports referred to above conformed in 
general terms to this model, with individual variations 
determined by the circumstances of the authority and the 
breadth of the inquiry. Thus the AN's large annual operating 
losses, funded from the Budget, and its doubtful progress in 
eliminating these in accordance with a governmental direction 
provided a clear focal point for the Committee's inquiry. 
The recommendations of this report were designed to improve 
the ability of the Commission to operate as a commercial 
enterprise and addressed the need for alterations to the 
statute, strengthened financial accountability, better 
corporate planning and the rapid adoption of sound commercial 
arrangements for performance of 'public service obligations' . 
The Committee's review of the Australia Council took a 
slightly different form due to the fact that it was part of 
a broad inquiry into the Commonwealth's role in arts funding 
and 'the effectiveness and efficiency of the procedures for 
delivery of Commonwealth assistance to the arts'. 
Nevertheless, the recommendations showed a concern with the
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Council's objectives, structure and relationship with the 
government which was basically similar to the approach of the 
earlier reports. The two reports on Telecom, on the other 
hand, were more narrowly focused, reflecting their origins 
in particular objections raised by members of parliament on 
behalf of their constituents. As a consequence, while the 
recommendations touched upon the Commission's objectives and 
general performance, there was no attempt to deal 
comprehensively with these matters. In accordance with the 
nature of the report, the aspect of Telecom's public 
accountability which received most attention was its customer 
relations mechanisms and policies.
As this partial survey suggests, the Expenditure 
Committee's reports on statutory authorities represent an 
almost continuous stream of investigation of non-ministerial 
administration by the House of Representatives over recent 
years. Furthermore, the reports themselves are substantial 
studies, as befits a committee possessed of full 
parliamentary powers of investigation including the ability 
to call for and examine witnesses, papers and records. 
Whether or not the recommendations of the Committee are 
implemented, the process of inquiry is, as the Committee has 
suggested, a mechanism of accountability in its own right. 
Additionally, the publicity given to the Committee's findings 
through public hearings and upon the release of reports has 
undoubtedly contributed to better informed public and 
parliamentary debate on the problems associated with both the 
particular bodies examined and statutory authorities
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generally.
Governments in the 1980s find it difficult to ignore 
committee reports and are under pressure to respond 
reasonably promptly. In May 1978 Prime Minister Fraser 
announced a government undertaking to provide responses to 
reports within six months of their presentation, and in 
August 1983 the new Labor government committed itself to a 
reduction in the period of response to three months (House 
of Representatives, CPD, 25 May 1978:2465-6; Senate, CPD, 24 
August 1983:141). While these limits are frequently 
exceeded, and were exceeded in two of the three relevant 
cases among those under discussion, they have created 
expectations which it may be costly for governments to 
disappoint too severely (but note Aldons, 1986).
But getting governments to respond to reports is only 
part of the battle. An examination of the responses to the 
reports on the AIDC, AN and the first of the two on Telecom 
reveals that the Committee met with only mixed success in 
having its recommendations adopted. In the first of these 
cases the government took the view that it would not be 
appropriate to provide a detailed response while the Campbell 
Committee of Inquiry on the Australian Financial System was 
considering some of the same matters. The Treasurer stated 
that a copy of the report had been formally referred to the 
Campbell Committee inquiry into Australia's financial system, 
but added that he proposed to introduce legislation to raise 
the AIDC's statutory debt gearing ratio in accordance with 
the spirit of one of the findings of the report (House of
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Representatives, CPD, 20 August 1980:496-8). The report on 
AN met with greater immediate success. The Minister for 
Transport stated that the government agreed with the 
Committee's general argument about the need to re-establish 
the Commission on a more fully commercial basis and observed 
that many of the recommendations were reflected in the new 
AN Bill then before the parliament. Reasons were given for 
the rejection of several recommendations, but several others 
received no comment (House of Representatives, CPD, 10 
November 1982:2977). Finally, the response to the report on 
Telecom fell somewhere between these two outcomes. Telecom 
commented on each of the recommendations and committed itself 
to changes in accordance with many of them - but only to an 
extent, and over a time period, consistent with 'financial 
responsibility' (House of Representatives, CPD, 15 November 
1985:2940-41).
While the Expenditure Committee justified its 
inquiries into statutory authorities partly in terms of the 
need for authorities to be actively accountable to 
parliament, its main priority was, as we have seen, to 
evaluate the effectiveness of public expenditure programmes. 
The choice of subjects for inquiry (that is, authorities 
which control or expend large amounts of public funds) and 
the nature of the inquiries themselves (that is, full scale 
investigations of single authorities) were heavily influenced 
by this conception of the Committee's purpose. When we turn 
to the work on statutory authorities undertaken by the Senate 
Standing Committee on Financial and Government Operations
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(SSCFGO), however, we find a stronger direct concern with the 
issue of accountability.
Various aspects of the SSCFGO's approach have assisted 
its ability to promote accountability issues. From its 
genesis through to the mid-1980s its activity ranged widely 
from surveillance of the whole statutory authority sector to 
detailed inquiries into particular authorities, and included 
both exploration of the deficiencies in existing practice and 
promotion of a major revision of the whole accountability 
regime for statutory authorities. The practice of the 
Committee was to monitor authorities' annual reports and to 
use lateness of submission and Auditor-General's 
qualifications as guides to the selection of individual 
authorities for further investigation. Consequently the 
choice of subjects for inquiry was part of a broader stream 
of scrutiny and publicity designed to bring about a general 
improvement in the performance of authorities in accounting 
to the parliament.
A related aspect of the Committee's modus operandi 
which suited its overall purpose was its willingness to 
explore issues in varying degrees of depth. Thus a single 
report sometimes contained a survey of the reporting record 
of a multitude of authorities, a series of brief remarks 
about particular annual reports to alert the authorities 
responsible to matters which the Committee would pursue if 
remedial action was not taken, and several case studies based 
upon committee inquiry into 'problem' authorities. Where it 
was deemed appropriate, however, a large scale inquiry would
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be undertaken. One such inquiry produced probably the best 
known of the Committee's reports, that on the Australian 
Dairy Corporation and its Asian Subsidiaries, which ran to 
more than 300 pages (SSCFGO, 1981).
The terms of reference which authorised 'continuing 
oversight' of the affairs of statutory authorities also 
empowered the Committee to investigate and report on 'the 
appropriateness and the significance of their practice in 
accounting to the parliament'. In accordance with this 
aspect of its responsibilities, the Committee conducted 
research to identify anomalies and deficiencies in current 
accountability arrangements. This work was not confined to 
the relationships between authorities and parliament. Given 
the lack of a systematised bank of data about Commonwealth 
statutory authorities at the time the Committee commenced its 
inquiries, the Committee felt justified in devoting 
substantial effort to compiling information about the numbers 
of authorities, the work they perform, their economic 
significance and the varying legislative provisions which 
prescribe the ways in which they must account. This 
comprehensive program of inquiry resulted in a similarly 
comprehensive approach by the Committee to the reform of the 
accountability regime for statutory authorities. 
Additionally, the Committee conducted inquiries into various 
aspects of statutory authority financing, including the 
funding of superannuation (see SSCSAF, 1983). Some of the 
issues it raised in this area are important to the 
accountability of statutory trading enterprises.
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To conclude this overview of the work and work-style 
of the SSCFGO, it is worth noting the considerable extent to 
which the different components of the Committee's work under 
its reference on statutory authorities complemented each 
other. As is suggested by the manner in which authorities 
were selected for inquiry and the Committee's preoccupation 
with the issue of accountability, even the most detailed 
reports on individual authorities often attempted to link 
particular findings with the Committee's broader concerns. 
The report on The Superannuation Investment Trust (SSCFGO, 
1985) illustrates this characteristic approach. The report 
contained a number of findings on the immediate matters at 
issue - the investment policies and practices of the 
authority and the working relations between the Chairman and 
the Chief Investment Manager - and recommended improvements 
in the process of appointment of the chairman and a 
continuation of efforts within the authority to upgrade 
financial management and to review the organization. But it 
then sought to apply the experience of the SFIT to statutory 
authorities generally, addressing such matters as the 
standards of conduct expected of a Commonwealth statutory 
authority and its chairman, arrangements to ensure 
consideration of government policy by authorities and 
problems in the accountability of subsidiaries. The 
Committee used this opportunity to reiterate several of the 
themes of its previous reports, and recorded its 
disappointment that governments had not seen fit to respond 
to certain recommendations of its Fifth Report. Finally, an
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appendix contained an examination of the Government's Bill 
to amend the Act constituting the SFIT and recommended 
changes based on both the general and the particular concerns 
raised in the Report.
It is thus demonstrably true that the growth of 
committees increased the potential for parliamentary scrutiny 
of Commonwealth statutory authorities. By the late 1970s 
there was little doubt that parliament had become a 
significant active influence on these bodies. Moreover, in 
the light of our discussion of the work of the Expenditure 
Committee and the SSCFGO, it seems that the Aitkin and Jinks 
statement about the lack of special instruments for 
pariiamentary scrutiny of statutory authorities was simply 
incorrect as far as the Commonwealth is concerned. Whether 
the SSCFGO has been as effective as the British Select 
Committee on Nationalised Industries is a different matter, 
but one whose examination is foreclosed by a denial of the 
Australian body's comparability. By and large the new 
committee activity was of a familiar sort - the investigation 
of instances of maladministration or administrative 
difficulty brought to the parliament's attention. But there 
was now also a greater capacity and willingness to conduct 
inquiries before the matters investigated had reached crisis 
point or where there was little possibility of crisis. 
Further, our discussion has provided a glimpse of a new, more 
systematic approach to authority scrutiny in the activity of 
the SSCFGO. As we shall see, this development was reinforced 
by others in the area of financial control and in the way
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consideration of authority annual reports has begun to be 
integrated into the routine task-load of the Senate's 
specific purpose standing committees.
Conclusion
The conclusion of this chapter has been amply foreshadowed. 
Parliament is actively involved in the oversight of 
administration in Commonwealth statutory authorities. The 
effectiveness of the arrangements is certainly open to 
question. But they are not significantly less effective as 
part of the accountability regime for statutory authorities 
than they are for other governmental agencies.
CHAPTER 6
FINANCIAL CONTROL
Finance is the life blood of the modern 'provider state'. 
It is not surprising therefore that legislatures are liable 
to see their power and status as intimately related to their 
capacity to exercise financial control. In countries with 
Westminster-derived constitutions there are special 
historical as well as pragmatic reasons for considering 
'Parliamentary Control of the Purse' the keystone of 
responsible government. Australia, as one such country, has 
drawn heavily on British views not only about the importance 
of financial control but also about the machinery for 
achieving it. Financial scrutiny in the Commonwealth 
parliament has, as a consequence, been modelled on the 
Gladstonian 'circle' of parliamentary control. The idea has 
been explained by Reid (1966:58) as follows:
Gladstone's expenditure circle started with the 
Executive's presentation to the House of Commons of 
annual and comprehensive estimates; it ran through 
the long and tedious procedures for parliamentary 
vote and legal appropriation, the departmental 
spending processes, and the keeping of annual cash 
accounts; the next point was the audit of accounts, 
on behalf of Parliament, by the Comptroller and 
Auditor-General, to ensure that money had been spent 
in accordance with the appropriations made; and, 
finally, the circle returned to Parliament via the 
House's Committee of Public Accounts and its follow-
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up enquiry into the criticisms made in the auditors' 
report.
It is against the backdrop of broadly similar machinery in 
operation in the Commonwealth Parliament that an analysis of 
the financial control of Commonwealth statutory authorities 
must proceed1.
While it is appropriate for our present purposes to 
focus on traditional processes of financial control as they 
impinge on statutory authorities, it is also important to 
understand that in recent years there has been, in the 
Commonwealth Parliament as elsewhere, a significant expansion 
of the nineteenth century conception of expenditure control. 
Particularly in the later stages of the control cycle, it is 
apparent that the interests and outlook of the relevant 
actors (principally the Audit Office and the Joint Committee 
of Public Accounts) have broadened in a way which is adding 
a new dimension to administrative accountability. It is now 
common to describe the change as involving a movement away 
from a preoccupation with the 'control of inputs' into 
administrative agencies towards a concern with 
'accountability for agency outputs'. Nothing more will be 
said about this development in the present section, but its 
considerable importance for the accountability of statutory 
authorities will be discussed at length in the next chapter.
There have in fact been two recent trends of 
importance in parliament's financial scrutiny of statutory
1. Parliamentary procedures for financial legislation have, 
however, evolved considerably since Gladstone's time. For an 
account of the changes at Westminster see Reid (1966) and for the 
Australian Commonwealth Parliament see Reid and Forrest 
(1989:347-60).
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authorities. Alongside the development in financial 
accountability to which attention has just been drawn, there 
has been a drive to extend and tighten the application to 
statutory authorities of traditional controls. In the 
abstract the two trends, emphasizing on the one hand closer 
external control of authorities and on the other greater ex­
post accountability, seem contradictory. Certainly to those 
running statutory bodies the inconsistency between greater 
control, implying reduced responsibility, and greater 
accountability, implying greater responsibility on the part 
of the authority, has appeared manifest. But parliament's 
limited freedom of manoeuvre and limited capacity to view 
problems synoptically meant that its approach was bound to 
be piecemeal and opportunistic, with any inconsistencies only 
slowly being recognized as such, let alone dealt with. Once 
members of parliament became convinced that the parliament 
needed to pay more attention to this sector of government it 
was natural for them to attempt to strengthen all of the 
existing links between parliament and statutory authorities 
as well as to develop whatever new links seemed desirable. 
The initial reaction by the parliament to the eruption of 
concern about statutory authorities in the 1970s was 
understandably to put in place and to pull the 'levers' of 
control and accountability with which it was most familiar. 
Other initiatives have gradually taken shape alongside the 
responses informed by traditional thinking, and so far only 
a small amount of rationalization has been found necessary.
Our present interest then is in those changes aimed
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at completing or reinforcing the Gladstonian circle as it 
applies to statutory authorities. We shall begin with the 
first stage of the control process, examination by parliament 
of estimates of expenditure and appropriation of funds.
The Weakness of Traditional Arrangements
This would appear to be one of the weakest points in the 
parliamentary control of statutory authorities - especially 
of those authorities which are wholly or substantially funded 
outside the budget from their own revenues and loan raising 
activities. As we have seen, in the case of trading 
activities the statutory authority form is often employed 
quite deliberately to remove financial decision-making from 
the parliamentary arena. These authorities do not require 
parliamentary authorization of their expenditure plans; 
consequently there would seem to be little more to be said 
about them in the present context. The situation of the 
remaining authorities (the overwhelming majority) is less 
clear-cut. But again there would seem to be no difficulty 
in drawing the conclusion that parliamentary capacity to 
scrutinise and alter expenditure plans is less than is the 
case for ministerial departments. For while these 
authorities are wholly or very largely funded by moneys 
appropriated from Consolidated Revenue by pariiamentary 
enactment, they often receive their allocation in a small 
number of consolidated blocks, or 'votes', rather than in the 
larger number of more differentiated votes through which 
ministerial departments are funded. For instance, a glance
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at the schedule of estimates accompanying Appropriation Bills 
No. 1 and No. 2 for any recent year will reveal that the 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation receives its funding 
under only two headings, as does the Australian Science and 
Technology Council; and that the Australia Council, the 
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal and the National Companies 
and Securities Commission are funded by single line votes. 
This form of appropriation gives budget-dependent authorities 
some of the autonomy of the 'non-budget1 sector and 
'financial enterprise' sector authorities. But greater 
autonomy in this respect must surely mean reduced 
parliamentary control of finance.
The above argument is at once correct and misleading. 
There is little doubt that parliamentary control of the 
funding and the expenditure decisions of statutory 
authorities (of all sorts) is indeed very weak. But we 
should not jump to the conclusion that this constitutes an 
important difference between statutory authorities and 
ministerial departments. Formal and informal constraints on 
parliament's ability to scrutinise and alter the expenditure 
estimates of administrative agencies in general greatly 
reduce the advantage to parliament of a requirement that it 
vote detailed appropriations.
Before turning to the familiar obstacles to meaningful 
parliamentary involvement in matters of finance, we may note 
that some trading authorities have less financial autonomy 
vis-a-vis parliament than implied above. Chronic loss-making 
authorities -notably in the 1980s the Australian National
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Railways and the Australian Shipping Commission - receive 
annual subsidies from the budget which are fully subject to 
parliamentary scrutiny. Further, even authorities which do 
not require continued budgetary support have from time to 
time received 'one-off* injections of public funds. The 
'capital injections' provided by the Hawke government in 1983 
to the Australian Industry Development Corporation, the 
Australian National Airlines Commission and the Australian 
Shipping Commission are recent examples. Both sorts of claim 
on Consolidated Revenue provide the potential for 
parliamentary scrutiny of, and parliamentary influence over, 
more or less broad areas of particular authorities' financial 
decision-making processes.
That this potential is not realized in practice tells 
us as much if not more about the weakness of parliament's 
capacity for scrutiny of financial administration generally 
as it does about the special difficulties parliament faces 
in dealing with trading authorities. It will be instructive 
to consider an example. In the additional estimates of 1983 
$115M was earmarked to augment the working capital of the 
Australian National Airlines Commission (TAA). As this 
amount represented not only a substantial item in the 
additional estimates but also an increase in TAA's equivalent 
of paid up capital of around 360 percent, it naturally 
attracted attention in the Second Reading debates and in the 
relevant Senate Estimates Committee.
The Opposition's contribution was based on the 
reasonable proposition that information concerning the
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authority’s financial management and any assurances sought 
or given about the use of the funds being provided was 
necessary for a proper evaluation of the item. In the House 
of Representative's debate the Opposition spokesman on 
aviation, Mr Spender, noted the discrepancy between the $25M 
that the previous (Coalition) government had authorised and 
the present sum. Querying the grounds for the government's 
decision, he asked whether the minister had called for 
financial forecasts or cash flow statements from TAA. 
Further, since the government had portrayed the decision as 
a shareholders' commercial injection of funds, he argued that 
the minister should be able to say what return on the funds 
was expected (House of Representatives, CPD, 11 May 1983:422- 
4).
In his reply the Minister (Mr Beazley) sketched the 
financial circumstances which he claimed had led to the 
decision: the fact that under the previous government TAA 
had not been allowed to build up reserves of funds leading 
it to depend too heavily on borrowings, and the heavy cost 
of the government-imposed obligation to operate uneconomical 
services. He also produced evidence of TAA's efforts to 
improve its efficiency through decreases in staff numbers, 
rationalisation of services, better controls over capital 
expenditure and the introduction of innovative fares to 
stimulate demand and increase market share (House of 
Representatives, CPD, 11 May 1983:445-9). But he did not 
address the specific matters raised by Spender.
And that was where the scrutiny of this item of public
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expenditure ended in the House of Representatives2. The 
'capital injection' along with the rest of the additional 
estimates was approved by the House, like each annual budget, 
without any effort at further inquiry or amendment. The 
matter was also examined in the Senate - more exhaustively 
but with much the same result (see especially Senate 
Estimates Committees, Hansard, 12 May 1983:185-8). In 
essence parliament received little more than an assurance 
that the government had 'inspected the books' before it 
determined the quantity of funds it would make available to 
the airline, as no information was supplied which would allow 
an independent judgement about the merits of the expenditure. 
The fact that parliament was content with this owed something 
to the government's appeal to the commercial prerogatives of 
a business authority in order to justify not releasing 
certain information. But it had far more to do with the 
ability of a Commonwealth government to rely implicitly on 
the support of its party majority in the House, and with 
constitutional provisions and 'conventions' according the 
government strong control over financial measures (see Reid 
and Forrest, 1989:347-60 and passim). Government dominance 
in such instances arguably also owes something to the 
acquiescence of the Opposition and the Senate. A more 
aggressive parliament, and one more interested in scrutiny 
of financial administration, might have made more of the
2. Later in the year, however, Spender pursued the matters 
raised in the House in several questions on notice. But the 
answers eventually provided more than six months later added 
little to what had already been said (see House of 
Representatives, CPD, 7 March 1984:687-8).
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opportunity presented by the capital injection.
This takes us back to the institutional weakness of 
parliament in the estimates process. It is clear that 
parliamentary examination of appropriation bills cannot 
afford regular opportunities for scrutiny of off-budget 
authorities' expenditure plans. Nor should it. But the fact 
that the expenditure estimates of ministerial departments and 
other statutory authorities do regularly come before 
parliament is not a sufficient condition for meaningful 
parliamentary involvement. A variety of factors work to 
eliminate the capacity of members of parliament to contribute 
at the estimates stage. Some are more or less broadly 
constitutional or have to do with party discipline. These 
have been briefly referred to above. Others are attitudinal 
and have to do with the parochial and idiosyncratic concerns 
of members of parliament and what has been referred to as 
their lack of 'affinity' for questions of finance (Emy, 
1978:483). The predilections of members of parliament help 
explain why contributions to Second Reading and Committee 
stage debates of appropriation bills are frequently dominated 
by references to matters requiring expenditure in members' 
electorates or to members' pet projects. A third set of 
factors is procedural in nature. Since there have been 
attempts in recent times to reform parliamentary procedures 
so as to increase the involvement of members in the estimates 
process, it is relevant for us to look a little more closely 
at this area.
The main opportunity for detailed examination of
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proposed expenditure occurs at the Committee stage of the 
consideration of the main appropriation bills. The preceding 
Second Reading debate is inevitably too unfocused for this 
purpose. Although the Second Reading debate continues over 
several weeks and provides a generous allotment of speaking 
time, it is by tradition a broad ranging debate on public 
affairs for which the Standing Order on relevance is 
suspended3.
In the House of Representatives estimates are dealt 
with in 'Committee of the Whole' . A close examination of the 
treatment of the estimates of several departments and 
associated statutory authorities in two years confirmed 
claims about the weakness of the arrangements4. The most 
obvious problem is that insufficient time is allocated. The 
Labor party's transport spokesman, Peter Morris, might have 
been referring to the normal situation in Committee of the 
Whole consideration of any group of estimates when he 
commented as follows about the time constraint on scrutiny 
of the Transport and Aviation Department's estimates for 
1982-83:
Disgracefully the Committee is to be allowed one hour 
to examine, question and discuss the hundreds of 
items of expenditure involved. Of that 60 minutes 
the Opposition is to be allowed 3 speakers, each for 
10 minutes. In practical terms that means a fraction 
of a minute per item of expenditure. This makes an 
absolute farce of parliamentary procedure and of any 
responsible consideration of the vast amount of
3. See House of Representatives Standing Order No.81.
4. Committee of the Whole debates on the estimates for the 
departments of Communications, Attorney-General, Home Affairs and 
Environment, and Transport were examined for the years 1981 and 
1982.
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public money involved (House of Representatives, CPD, 
14 October 1982:2111).
In these circumstances it is not surprising that proceedings 
in the Committee of the Whole tend to repeat in abbreviated 
form the Second Reading debate. Moreover, even this cursory 
treatment is lacking for the additional estimates contained 
in Appropriation Bills 3 and 4 which are normally introduced 
in April of each year. These bills are not taken through a 
committee stage in the House of Representatives.
Another problem with the House estimates committee 
stems from the fact that business is organized as for a 
Second Reading debate. One consequence is that the relevant 
minister participates only once, making it difficult for 
members to probe the rationales for particular items of 
expenditure. Ministers are under virtually no pressure to 
justify the policies implicit in the estimates as the 
procedure allows them simply to omit any reference to 
sensitive matters or those for which they may have inadequate 
information. For the same reason these sessions do not 
provide an opportunity for members to acquire new information 
about financial administration. Also, as with the Second 
Reading debate, the practice of the House is to disregard the 
requirement of relevance to the estimates5.
Taking such procedural factors into account, it is 
little wonder that members' speeches in the Committee of the 
Whole are largely dispiriting catalogues of constituents'
5. See the comment of the Chairman of Committees, House of 
Representatives, CPD, 19 October 1982:2223.
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grievances, interspersed with partisan rhetoric and pleas for 
public spending on members' hobby-horses. The important 
conclusion for our argument is that it would be a gross abuse 
of language to describe Committee of the Whole examination 
of departmental estimates as an exercise in financial control 
by parliament. When the relevant facts are taken into 
account, that parliament sees no estimates or only 
consolidated estimates of statutory authorities reflects much 
less adversely on the relative public accountability of the 
latter.
Estimates Committees
Advocates of procedural reform have long argued that members 
could do better if given the opportunity through the 
establishment of systems of estimates committees. Members 
of Commonwealth Parliament themselves have shown some 
willingness to experiment along these lines. This has been 
particularly true of the Senate where in 1970 five six-member 
estimates committees were established to examine and report 
on the expenditure proposals contained in Schedule 2 of the 
Appropriation Bills prior to the consideration of the Bills 
in the committee of the whole. Senate estimates committees 
have been appointed by resolution at the commencement of each 
subsequent parliament. They examine the additional estimates 
(associated with Appropriation Bills Nos 3 and 4) as well as 
those associated with the annual budget6. By comparison
6. For details of the procedures and operation of Senate 
estimates committees see Odgers (1976:421-6). For commentary on 
their work see Emy (1978:483-5), Uhr (1981:19-22) and Reid and
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with the Senate, however, the House of Representatives has 
lacked a spirit of innovation: estimates committees were 
given a brief trial between 1979 and 1981 but have not been 
appointed subsequently (Uhr, 1981:13-15; Reid and Forrest, 
1989:356-7).
The most obvious result of the introduction of Senate 
estimates committees has been roughly a doubling of the time 
spent on the estimates by that house* 7. But the change in 
the nature of the proceedings has been equally dramatic. In 
accordance with guidelines circulated in 1970, not only is 
the appropriate Senate minister normally present throughout 
but departmental officials and representatives of budget- 
dependent statutory authorities are also available to answer 
questions. While the committees have continued to focus on 
Schedule 2, members are assisted in their efforts to look 
behind the often uninformative items by the substantial 
Explanatory Notes which agencies are required to provide in 
accordance with guidelines established by the Senate. These 
often extensive documents provide breakdowns of individual 
items and a variety of detailed information about the 
resources utilized and the work performed by agencies. The 
record of committee proceedings shows that the explanatory 
notes are used constantly by Senators.
Perhaps most importantly, estimates committee members 
have through their conduct contributed directly to the
Forrest (1989:358-60).
7. For the five years prior to 1970 the Senate averaged 
42.5 hours on the estimates; in 1970 it spent 74 hours and in 
1975 86 hours (Odgers, 1976:424).
260
creation of a new approach. Members and chairmen have not 
insisted on a rigorous interpretation of members' rights 
under the formal (Committee of the Whole) procedures where 
to do so would inhibit the effectiveness of scrutiny. 
Estimate Committee meetings operate as question and answer 
sessions. It is important, therefore, that members have 
resisted the temptation to make speeches. Ministers too have 
played their part by not over-exploiting their right to 
refuse to provide information about 'policy', by not 
interposing themselves continually between officials and 
committee members, and by keeping their responses reasonably 
short and relevant. This contrasts with the operation of the 
House of Representatives' estimates committees between 1979 
and 1981 where there seems to have been a greater tendency 
for ministers and members to enter into debate8.
It is important to add that the questions and answers 
do relate to the estimates, though the latter are often used 
as a basis for the exploration of a wide range of operational 
and policy matters. In this respect they compare favourably 
with the Canadian parliament's estimates committees, the work 
of which was described in a recent careful study as having 
'nothing to do with the Estimates' (Slatter, 1982:71; see 
also p.67)9.
From the point of view of parliamentary scrutiny of
8. But note Uhr's concern (1981:20-21) that the smaller 
role played by ministers in Senate estimates committees is a 
threat to ministerial responsibility.
9. But see Emy (1978:484) for other criticisms of the 
estimates committees.
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statutory authorities, a great benefit of the Senate 
estimates committees is that they allow members of parliament 
to question senior representatives of those bodies10. In 
fact these meetings are the only regular formal opportunity 
members of parliament have for direct contact with such 
individuals. The meetings thereby go some way towards 
overcoming the impediment to parliamentary scrutiny posed by 
traditional parliamentary procedures based on the assumption 
of full ministerial responsibility* 11.
The Senate had an early opportunity to assert the 
right of estimates committees to scrutinize the expenditure 
proposals of statutory authorities. In its Report to the
Such representatives are not always present, however. 
For instance, in the period 1981-84 a representative of 
Australian National Railways (AN) was present at less than half 
the relevant meetings of Estimates Committee F. As a result 
questions were often answered by departmental officials whose 
knowledge of the financial administration of AN was demonstrably 
limited. Moreover, on only one occasion was AN represented by 
a senior officer. At the two meetings in 1981, for example, the 
Budget Officer was the only AN representative present. His 
junior status and lack of support meant that he had to take many 
questions on notice. In 1985 the Committee saw fit to draw 
attention to the difficulties caused by the lack of suitable 
witnesses (SEC, 1985:201-2).
11. It is surprising, therefore, that there was pressure 
from Senators in the mid-1980s to reduce non-ministerial 
representation at estimates committee meetings. In his opening 
statement to Estimates Committee A in September 1984, the 
minister announced that, in response to a request from Senator 
Peter Rae to restrict the number of officials appearing at 
committee meetings, no representatives of Telecom, Australia 
Post, the Overseas Telecommunications Commission and Aussat Pty 
Ltd were present. He suggested that where they were able 
departmental officers would respond to questions about these 
authorities, and in other cases questions would be taken on 
notice. Senator Rae welcomed the arrangements as a means of 
avoiding unnecessary costs and lent his support to moves to 
further reduce the attendance of officials on the grounds that 
'much of the information is now provided automatically in the 
explanatory notes' (Senate Estimates Committee A, Hansard, 4 
September 1984:139-40).
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Senate in November 1971, Estimates Committee B (chaired by 
Peter Rae) noted that its examination of the estimates for 
the Australian Broadcasting Commission was 'hampered by a 
lack of officers with sufficient authority and information 
to reply adequately to questions asked by Senators' (SEC, 
1971:20). It stated that
The Committee is of the opinion that whilst it may be 
argued that these bodies [statutory corporations] are 
not accountable through the responsible Minister of 
State to Parliament for day to day operations, 
Statutory Corporations may be called to account by 
Parliament itself at any time and that there are no 
areas of the expenditure of public funds where these 
corporations have a discretion to withhold details or 
explanations from parliament or its committees unless 
the parliament has expressly provided otherwise
(p.20).
During the consideration of Appropriation Bill (No.l) 1971-72 
in the Committee of the Whole this statement was adopted as 
a resolution of that Committee (Journals of the Senate, 9 
December 1971:827). It was reaffirmed by the Senate in 1974 
(Journals of the Senate, 23 October 1974:283) and its 
acceptance by the Senate as a settled principle has been 
cited on subsequent occasions to bolster the authority of 
Estimates committees in their dealings with particular 
authorities12.
Statutory authorities with no reliance on annual 
parliamentary appropriations presumably fall into that 
category of agencies, referred to in the above quotation, for 
which parliament has provided other means of financial 
accountability. Their expenditure plans fall outside the
12. See for instance Senate Estimates Committee A, Hansard, 
31 May 1984:373 and Estimates Committee F Report (SEC 1985:201- 
2).
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purview of the estimates committees and have never been 
sought by the latter. Even in the case of Australian 
National Railways which has been regularly and heavily 
subsidised from the budget there has been no suggestion that 
the authority of the estimates committees encompasses a right 
to scrutinise spending plans in order to satisfy itself that 
the level of subsidy represents a justifiable use of public 
funds. It is arguable, however, that financially independent 
authorities are nonetheless spenders of public funds and 
should as a consequence be subjected to the estimates 
scrutiny process. Such an approach would of course be 
inconsistent with the present system, based as it is on the 
Appropriation Bills. Moreover, there are other parliamentary 
mechanisms for inquiry into the finances of statutory trading 
authorities. As a result, there has been no serious attempt 
to use estimates committees for this purpose.
However, it has been a practice for time to be made 
available in the relevant committee for questioning of 
representatives of the authorities attached to the 
Communications portfolio (Telecom, Australia Post, the 
Overseas Telecommunications Commission and Aussat Pty Ltd). 
The arrangement is most likely explained by the high level 
of interest among members of parliament in the activities of 
Telecom and Australia Post and their desire to have extra 
opportunities to raise grievances and acquire information. 
In these meetings there is no pretence of systematic scrutiny 
of the authorities’ expenditure plans or management. 
However, questions are often directed to these areas and,
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except for the fact that time is not devoted to these bodies 
on a regular basis, the result is often not inferior as an 
exercise in financial scrutiny to that achieved with many 
budget-funded agencies.
Among budget-dependent authorities the effectiveness 
of estimates committee scrutiny varies considerably in 
accordance with such factors as the size of expenditures 
involved and the extent to which authorities' activities are 
meaningfully summarised by expenditure figures. Authorities 
whose importance is unrelated to the size of their budgets 
and whose expenditures are largely accounted for by staff 
costs are likely to receive less attention than others. 
These characteristics are typically associated with 
regulatory and quasi-judicial authorities. Because the 
powers exercised by such bodies are not reflected in their 
relatively small and undifferentiated budgets, the latter do 
not provide a means of addressing the aspects of the bodies' 
operations which are most important for their accountability. 
For instance, the criteria by which the Australian 
Broadcasting Tribunal (ABT) and the National Companies and 
Securities Commission (NCSC) use the substantial 
discretionary powers at their command cannot be readily 
pursued in the estimates committee forum. In the light of 
this constraint, it is not surprising that examination of the 
Senate estimates committee treatment of estimates for the ABT 
and the NCSC for the years 1981-84 revealed only a meagre 
amount of time and effort devoted to scrutinising these 
bodies' expenditure proposals.
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Other authorities, the Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation and the Australia Council for example, score well 
against the above mentioned criteria and consequently receive 
a good deal of attention from the estimates committees. The 
case of the Australia Council, one of the selected 
authorities whose scrutiny by parliament in the period 1981- 
84 has been closely examined for the purposes of this 
chapter, may be used to illustrate the potential value of 
estimates committees.
There are several factors behind the success of 
estimates committee meetings involving the Australia Council. 
The Council contributed through the regular attendance of the 
chairman or general manager, along with other senior staff. 
On the other side, members demonstrated considerable 
interest, as reflected in the fact that the meetings were 
usually quite long and regularly explored a wide range of 
funding and operational matters. Further, meetings were well 
organized with the committee chairman leading the committee 
through the various areas of activity in a manner which was 
both systematic and well understood by members. The 
committee was also well supplied with background information: 
in addition to the Explanatory Notes provided ahead of the 
meeting, a variety of other documents were frequently offered 
at the commencement and during the course of meetings.
Some deficiencies are nevertheless apparent in the 
operation of the meetings. The way in which the information 
was supplied caused problems for committee members on a 
number of occasions. Moreover, even where explanatory
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material was available there was no certainty that it would 
be used, and committee members occasionally admitted that 
they had not read the Notes. Other problems stemmed from the 
complexity of the Australia Council’s organization. Although 
most committee members seemed to have familiarised themselves 
in a general way with the Notes, the questions asked often 
reflected a lack of knowledge about the structure and mode 
of operation of the body. In many cases such knowledge might 
have been readily acquired from annual reports and other 
material published by the Council. The evidence from 
estimates committee meetings is, however, that few members 
of parliament are willing or able to become experts on any 
area of public administration. But, given this fact, the 
meetings serve a useful function in raising the level of 
sophistication of members' understanding of administrative 
structures and processes.
The predominant themes in members' questions in the 
years selected for examination reinforce this impression of 
the committees' worth. The policies of the specialist arts 
boards and, to an even larger extent, policies on such 
matters as the mobility of, and deployment of orchestras by, 
the Opera and Ballet companies were of constant interest. 
The apportionment of responsibilities between the Council and 
the subordinate yet powerful art-form boards was explored in 
various ways through questions about the mechanisms securing 
the accountability of the boards to the council, the reasons 
for particular organizational changes, the levels at which 
different sorts of funding decisions are made and the timing
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of those decisions. A third group of questions focused upon 
the consequences for the Australia Council of government 
decisions about the overall funding level. These themes were 
all fairly predictable. However, some matters in which one 
might have expected considerable interest were not well 
represented in the questions. For instance, although 
questions were asked about the criteria employed by boards 
in the making of grants, they were asked less frequently and 
less insistently than might have been expected from members 
of parliament * concerned with accountability or from 
politicians under pressure from aggrieved constituents and 
local and state governments. Even more surprisingly, while 
explanations were sometimes required of particular components 
of the Council's budget, there was hardly a complaint about 
a particular funding decision. This is hardly to be 
regretted, however, as it suggests the committee was able to 
leave behind the preoccupation with particular constituency 
matters which is so evident in other areas of parliamentary 
activity.
A final aspect of estimates committee scrutiny of the 
Australia Council may be noted. At a meeting of Estimates 
Committee D (Hansard, 13 September 1984:300-1) a Senator 
asked a series of questions about the decision-making 
processes of the seven art-form boards which are responsible 
for deciding the allocation of arts support moneys to the 
individuals and organizations applying for grants. She was 
informed that the boards' expenditure decisions are mostly 
made after the passage of the Budget Bills and in some cases
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at various stages over the financial year. While the 
extensive Explanatory Notes purported to show how the Council 
planned to distribute its funds, the Senator was surprised 
to discover that this did not convey anything like a full 
picture of the ultimate uses to which the money was to be 
put. She drew the obvious conclusion that rolling programmes 
of expenditure, while readily justifiable in the light of the 
Australia Council's function, inhibit committee scrutiny. 
It may be assumed that financial scrutiny of other granting 
authorities is similarly weakened.
What conclusions can be drawn about the consequences 
of estimates committee activity for parliamentary control of 
statutory authorities? It could be argued that the 
committees have in some measure indirectly increased 
parliamentary control of finance for all budget-dependent 
agencies (including, that is, the great majority of statutory 
authorities). Their contribution could only be indirect 
because the committees were designed to supplement rather 
than replace the Committee stage in the passage of the 
Appropriation Bills. Their function is solely an 
'explanation-seeking' one; they do not have the power to 
amend estimates. However, by providing Senators with a much 
better information base they have probably enhanced the 
Senate's ability to force ministers to justify expenditures. 
They are certainly referred to frequently in parliamentary 
debates on public expenditure. It is also likely that in 
framing their estimates government agencies have become more 
conscious of the need to satisfy parliament.
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The development of program budgeting which has from 
1986 changed the form of the budget papers will arguably 
further assist parliament's scrutiny of the estimates by 
making budgetary information more meaningful in policy terms. 
But it is too early to say what difference program budgeting 
will make to the estimates process. A glance at recent 
Budget documents reveals that the new approach is still in 
its infancy. Indeed for some statutory authorities (for 
example, the Broadcasting Tribunal and the Australia Council) 
the superiority of 'Portfolio Program Estimates' over its 
predecessor document in terms of the amount of information 
conveyed is by no means obvious, though the classification 
is undoubtedly a more meaningful one. Over the next decade, 
however, it is possible that the role of the Senate estimates 
committees will undergo major change. In its report for the 
year 1985-86, Estimates Committee A (SEC, 1986:17) argued 
that program budgeting offered more potential for effective 
scrutiny and control:
The "stewardship" emphasis of scrutiny under the 
traditional format is becoming more automated and 
subject to control techniques such as cash limiting.
...the Parliament, with scarce resources of time and 
personnel, should concentrate more on performance and 
on the results achieved for the appropriations it 
votes.
Among the changes which the Committee believed this 
reorientation would entail were 'an inevitable increase' in 
the involvement of estimates committees in judgements on 
policy matters. It also foresaw 'a shift in emphasis from 
consideration of the current year's estimates to the previous 
year's expenditure', in line with the new focus on 'outputs'
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and performance (SEC, 1986:19). These changes may well be 
desirable, but if they were to occur the unique function 
presently performed by estimates committees would be 
abandoned for activities more like those of the Public 
Accounts and Expenditure Committees.
The value of estimates committee scrutiny varies among 
statutory authorities. It is of greater value for 'spending' 
agencies and of lesser value for agencies whose principal 
activity is regulatory or adjudicatory. (There is a similar 
variation in the value of the process among ministerial 
departments). Within the former group there are special 
problems with bodies such as the Australia Council which need 
to spread the making of important expenditure decisions over 
the financial year. The process is obviously of least value 
to parliament for the authorities which are largely outside 
its ambit: trading authorities are dealt with either 
superficially or not at all.
The claim that estimates committees have increased 
parliamentary control of finance is, however, subject to an 
important caveat. There is little evidence that members of 
parliament have become more willing to exert active control 
by seeking to modify estimates. The initiative of members 
of the House of Representatives in this area is in any case 
limited. Under House of Representatives Standing Orders 
(No.292) only ministers may move amendments which would 
increase proposed appropriations. Senators are not similarly 
constrained, although under section 53 of the Constitution 
the Senate may not directly amend budget bills but only
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'request' amendments. The Senate does have a history of 
modifying financial legislation (see Odgers, 1976:410-19). 
But Senators' experience with estimates committees does not 
seem to have encouraged a greater desire to refashion 
expenditure proposals.
Ultimately, the fact that parliament is not interested 
in modifying the detail of the estimates means that the 
number of separate items under which funds are appropriated 
is largely irrelevant to the question of parliamentary 
control. The very detailed estimates which have been 
traditionally associated with the budgetary process for 
ministerial departments have had much more to do with 
Treasury/Department of Finance control than with 
pariiamentary control (note Howard, 1986:54). We can 
conclude, therefore, that while the expenditure estimates of 
financially independent statutory authorities are certainly 
less subject to parliamentary influence than are those of 
departments of state, the consolidated estimates of budget- 
dependent statutory authorities do not imply any meaningful 
diminution of effective parliamentary control. To argue 
otherwise would be to contend that the contemplated move to 
more consolidated estimates for departments in accordance 
with current budgetary reform (see Howard, 1986:54-5) would 
also reduce parliamentary control. Despite some 
dissatisfaction among members of parliament with changes in 
the form of the budget, this view does not seem to have much 
support.
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Ex Post Facto Financial Scrutiny
Let us now turn to the end of the Gladstonian circle to 
examine the other main point at which parliament is involved 
in the financial control process. The traditional instrument 
of its involvement here is the Joint Committee of Public 
Accounts (JCPA) . But the work of the Auditor-General's 
office forms the basis of that of the JCPA and needs to be 
considered first.
A primary issue is whether or not the Auditor-General 
is able to audit agencies which are not funded by 
parliamentary appropriation. It has already been noted that 
there is no Australian counterpart to the principled 
limitations on parliamentary audit which were applied in 
Britain as part of a series of measures designed to isolate 
public corporations from parliamentary influence. Under the 
Audit Act the Commonwealth Auditor General has long had ' full 
and free access' to statutory authorities generally13. 
Moreover, as the Audit Office noted in 1985 the enabling 
legislation of 'most' (in fact, almost all) statutory 
authorities 'includes express references to the appointment 
of the Auditor-General, his powers, responsibilities, and the 
submission and frequency of audit reports' (Auditor-General, 
1985a:50). On very rare occasions, however, parliament has 
written into authorities' enabling legislation other 
arrangements for audit. The most important recent instance
13. Audit Amendment Act 1948 (No. 60) conferred on the 
Auditor General an explicit right to 'full and free access to all 
accounts, books, documents and papers in the possession of ... 
any authority established or appointed under any law of the 
Commonwealth.
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was the Australian Industry Development Corporation Act of 
1970 which gave the Corporation board the right to utilize 
any approved auditor. But the history of this legislation 
is a good illustration of the move to tighten parliamentary 
controls. An amendment to the Act in 1983 repealed the 
previous audit provision and made the Auditor-General auditor 
of the Corporation and its subsidiaries14.
While the principle of Auditor-General access to 
statutory authorities is thus well established, the Auditor- 
General ' s reports indicate several unresolved problems. 
Firstly, the absence of complete uniformity in basic audit 
provisions produces certain anomalies. For instance, in a 
few cases only a partial audit can be performed and the 
Auditor is not authorised to report the results of his audits 
(Auditor-General, 1985b:21-2). Secondly, over the past 
decade Auditors-General have complained regularly of 
restrictions on their ability to audit the subsidiaries of 
statutory authorities (see for example Auditor-General, 
1986:89). As with the parent authorities, however, the trend 
in recent years has been towards greater access. Again the 
1983 amendments to the AIDC Act, which inter alia appointed 
the Auditor-General auditor of the five subsidiary companies, 
furnish an important example. Finally, on a couple of 
occasions in the 1980s conflict has arisen over the extent 
of the Auditor-General's authority to comment on the 
commercial judgements and methods of statutory trading
14. Australian Industry Development Corporation Amendment 
Act 1983 (No.122). Note that under S.29(8) the Corporation 
retains the right to engage a private auditor as well.
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enterprises and government-owned companies. Spokesmen for
the particular bodies (Qantas and the AIDC) have argued that
the responsibility of the Auditor-General ceases once he has
satisfied himself that the actions taken are not unlawful and
do not prevent the accounts from giving an accurate view of
the company's affairs. The Auditor-General has argued in
response that he has a general responsibility to ensure that
Commonwealth enterprises are accountable, and that S.51A of
the Audit Act gives him authority to include in his reports
any information which he considers necessary to achieve that
aim (see JCPA, 1985a:4-5, 22-3).
Today the Auditor-General undertakes two types of
audit of statutory authorities. The first is an updated
version of the traditional 'regularity audit' which involves
inspection of financial systems, transactions and records in
order to determine compliance with accounting,
administrative, budgetary and financial statutes and
regulations; examination of the 'probity and propriety' of
all administrative decisions; and review of internal control
and audit arrangements (Auditor-General, 1986:81). The
second is termed 'performance' auditing by the Audit Office
and is described by the latter as:
^valuation of economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
of management of departments and other Commonwealth 
bodies, including review of: (i) utilization of
human, financial and other resources; information 
systems, performance measures and monitoring 
arrangements; and (ii) procedures followed by 
auditees for remedying identified deficiencies 
(P-81).
Authority to undertake this second type of audit, the need
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for which had been argued in the RCAGA Report of 1976, was 
conferred on the Auditor-General by an amendment to the Audit 
Act in 197915. The development of efficiency or performance 
auditing is, however, arguably as much a departure from as 
a reinforcement of the 'Gladstonian' conception of financial 
control. For that reason further comment on the change and 
its consequences will be reserved for the next chapter.
In any case, regularity auditing continues to occupy 
'much the greater part' of the Audit Office's workload 
(Auditor-General, 1985a:9). Standard provisions for 
regularity auditing of statutory authorities are set out in 
the new Part XI of the Audit Act inserted in 1979. Division
2 of that Part relates to authorities ' required to keep 
accounts in accordance with commercial practice'; Division
3 relates to other authorities. The provisions of the 
respective Divisions are applied to statutory authorities 
either through a reference in an authority's enabling 
legislation or by regulation under the Audit Act (Auditor- 
General, 1986:83-4).
An important part of the regularity audit of statutory 
authorities, especially the trading authorities, is the audit 
of financial statements. This includes an evaluation of the 
accounting systems integral to many authorities' daily 
operations which generate the data summarized in the 
financial statements (Auditor-General, 1986:40). Two reforms 
introduced in 1983 have attempted to improve the value of 
statutory authorities' financial statements for
15. Audit Amendment Act 1979 (No.8)
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accountability purposes. Firstly, as a result of an 
amendment to the Acts Interpretation Act (by Statute Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (No.l) 39/1983) all statutory 
authorities became legally obliged to present to parliament 
their annual reports, including audited financial statements, 
within six months of the close of their financial year. The 
importance of timely reporting is self-evident, so the point 
need not be laboured here. However, more will be said in the 
next chapter about the reporting reforms in the context of 
parliament's developing view of the significance of statutory 
authority annual reports. The second reform consisted in the 
tabling by the Minister for Finance of 'Guidelines for the 
Form and Standard of Financial Statements of Commonwealth 
Undertakings' to be applied to some 80 statutory authorities 
and a number of departmental undertakings (Department of 
Finance, 1983). It should be noted that the parliament, 
through its Joint Committee of Public Accounts, played an 
active part in the development of these guidelines (see JCPA, 
1982 and 1983). The aim of the guidelines is to ensure the 
comparability of financial statements, adequate disclosure 
of financial performance and the application as appropriate 
of accounting standards promulgated by Australian 
professional accounting associations. As the enabling 
legislation of statutory authorities typically requires that 
financial statements be prepared in a form approved by the 
Minister for Finance, the latter has sufficient leverage to 
ensure that the Guidelines are acted upon.
According to the Senate Standing Committee on Finance
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and Government Relations (1982a:124) the Guidelines 
establish a higher standard of disclosure than required by 
either Companies Acts or Stock Exchange regulations for 
private sector companies. This achievement means that the 
financial reporting of many statutory authorities compares 
more than favourably with that of ministerial departments 
which utilize a less comprehensive cash accounting system and 
are subjected to only rudimentary guidelines for financial 
statements (note SSCFGO, 1982a:124)16. Some evidence is 
provided by a comparison of the Auditor-General's findings 
regarding the financial statements of statutory authorities 
and departmental commercial undertakings for the 1985-86 
financial year. Of 108 audit reports on the financial 
statements of statutory authorities prepared that year, 22 
were qualified on technical breaches of legislation and 24 
were qualified for substantial reasons, generally to do with 
unsatisfactory accounting practices. (In all 80 individual 
matters were raised.) By comparison all 11 financial 
statements of the departmental undertakings were qualified 
for substantial reasons (63 matters were raised) (Auditor- 
General, 1986:42, 45). This result reflected what the 
Auditor-General described as 'a general attitude of 
indifference' by departments to the preparation of the 
statements (Auditor-General, 1985b:19).
The Auditor-General (1985b:21) has recently declared 
himself generally satisfied with the current audit
16. See the criticism of and recommended amendments to 
these guidelines in JCPA (1986:9-11).
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arrangements for most statutory authorities. Audit 
quality, in turn, has direct consequences for the work of the 
Joint Committee of Public Accounts. There is a close working 
relationship between the Audit Office and the JCPA. This has 
its basis in the latter's enabling act which requires the 
Committee, inter alia, 'to examine all reports of the 
Auditor-General' and to report on any matters contained 
therein which it believes should receive the attention of the 
parliament (Public Accounts Committee Act 1951, S.8(l)). The 
Committee is permitted to use its discretion in selecting 
items from audit reports and normally consults with the Audit 
Office before making its choice. Further, the Audit Office 
supplies an officer to assist the committee at public 
inquiries (Auditor-General, 1986:45-6). JCPA reports fairly 
often address matters connected with statutory 
authorities17.
Reflecting the growth of parliamentary interest in the 
financial accountability of statutory authorities, the right 
of the JCPA to scrutinize these bodies has recently been 
clarified. JCPA access to authorities funded by means of 
parliamentary appropriation has never been a problem - it 
followed as a matter of course from the requirement for 
Committee scrutiny of the statements of 'Expenditure from the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund' and 'Expenditure from the Advance 
to the Minister for Finance'. But one of the others could 
be examined only if attention was drawn to it in the Auditor-
17. See the complete list of reports to October 1984 in 
JCPA (1985b).
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General's annual report (or supplements to the latter). The 
Public Accounts Committee Amendment Act 1979 (No.187) removed 
this impediment 18. The change is a good indication of the 
parliamentary attitude towards control of statutory 
authorities at this time, but its practical effect seems not 
to have been great. As was observed in the debate on this 
amendment, the Auditor-General had when necessary in the past 
employed the 'subterfuge' of mentioning an authority in a 
report so as to provide the Committee with the pretext it 
needed (House of Representatives, CPD, 15 November 
1979:3125).
Public Works Committee
We have now dealt with the most important mechanisms 
associated with parliament's traditional function of 
financial control. For the sake of completeness, however, 
it is worth drawing attention to the role of the Joint Public 
Works Committee. In addition to checking the costing of 
public works, this committee is required to examine, for each 
public work, 'the stated purposes of the work and its 
suitability for that purpose; the necessity for, or the 
advisability of, carrying out the work; [and] the most 
effective use that can be made, in the carrying out of the 
work, of the moneys to be expended...' (Pettifer, 1981:595). 
While the value of this committee is often questioned (for 
example Emy, 1978:485) and a parliamentary inquiry has even
18. The amendment added S.8(l)(aa) to the Public Accounts 
Committee Act 1951.
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suggested its abolition (JSCPCS, 1976), it is the only 
committee which allows members of the House of 
Representatives to scrutinise expenditure before that 
expenditure has been committed. Moreover, the committee has 
shown that it is not prepared merely to rubber stamp the 
capital works proposals referred to it; on at least one 
recent occasion the failure of a minister to explain 
adequately the rejection of a Committee report provoked a 
lengthy public dispute between the Committee and the 
government (see Uhr, 1981:34-5).
Until 1981 works undertaken by statutory authorities 
did not fall within the Committee's remit. But, as a result 
of the efforts of the Committee, in that year the government 
introduced amendments to the Public Works Committee Act to 
give it authority to scrutinise the works of statutory 
authorities and other governmental bodies, as well as 
overseas projects19. The coverage of statutory authorities 
is not complete. Specific exemptions are made for a number 
of bodies, including the National Capital Development 
Commission, tertiary education institutions in the Australian 
Capital Territory and the Parliament House Construction 
Authority. Further, the Act confers on the government the 
power to exclude other authorities by regulation. In his 
speech introducing the amendments the minister suggested that 
trading authorities which compete with the private sector 
would be candidates for exemption, and Trans Australian 
Airlines and Qantas were given as examples in the
19 See Public Works Committee Amendment Act 1981(No.20).
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accompanying notes (House of Representatives, CPD, 5 March 
1981:488-9; see also 746-51). In addition, only public 
works whose estimated cost exceeds $2 million ($6 million 
from July 1985) may be examined, and particular works may be 
declared urgent by resolution and permitted to proceed 
without being referred to the Committee (Pettifer, 1981:596). 
Despite these constraints, the Public Works Committee is an 
important mechanism of scrutiny of statutory authorities with 
large capital budgets. Examination in 1985 of a proposal by 
Telecom for a new State Head Office building in Sydney 
estimated to cost $45.5 million is an illustration of the 
substantial amounts of money regularly involved (see House 
of Representatives, CPD, 9 October 1985:1732)20. Moreover, 
from the point of view of the general argument of this 
chapter, the legislative changes made in 1981 are further 
evidence of parliament's efforts to extend to statutory 
authorities the full force of the control arrangements 
devised for ministerial administration.
Conclusion
This chapter has reinforced the argument of the preceding 
two. The main conclusion of Part II of this thesis is that 
the concept of parliamentary control of administration has 
greater relevance for the accountability of statutory
Note that Telecom, the Overseas Telecommunications 
Commission, Aussat and Australia Post have recently been removed 
from the ambit of the Public Works Committee (see Minister for 
Transport and Communications, 1988a:11).
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authorities than the conventional wisdom would lead us to 
believe. The familiar parliamentary mechanisms associated 
with the control of ministerial administration are by and 
large also available for the control of statutory 
authorities, and, moreover, are extensively used. The result 
achieved is not obviously inferior to that achieved for 
ministerial departments. While financial control is weaker 
for trading authorities, control through legislation is 
stronger for statutory authorities generally. Administrative 
oversight, the third element of parliamentary control, varies 
greatly from agency to agency, but seemingly not in a way 
which adversely affects the scrutiny of statutory authorities 
as a whole. Indeed, given the disproportionate parliamentary 
attention paid to agencies delivering services to the public, 
among which statutory authorities are well represented, 
oversight may even be weighted in favour of statutory 
authorities.
Nor is this situation simply a consequence of the 
various reforms of the late 1970s and the early 1980s. We 
have seen that the institutional arrangements for 
parliamentary interaction with Commonwealth statutory 
authorities have never incorporated a strong version of the 
'arm's length' principle. However, the present chapter 
demonstrates that parliamentary control of statutory 
authorities has certainly been strengthened in recent years. 
Improvements have been achieved, firstly, by extending more 
fully to statutory authorities pre-existing mechanisms of 
control and, secondly, through the development of
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parliament's capacity for both ad hoc inquiry and systematic 
financial scrutiny.
The main problem with the accountability of statutory 
authorities, then, is not that they are less amenable to 
parliamentary control than ministerial departments. Rather 
it is that too much emphasis has been placed on such control 
as the key to accountability. This is most obviously so 
because for statutory authorities, as for ministerial 
departments, parliamentary control, in any strong sense of 
the term, is an unrealistic objective. It has been noted in 
this chapter that parliamentary scrutiny is uneven and often 
superficial. Improvement is surely possible, but the 
interests of members of parliament and the nature of 
parliamentary politics would seem to impose clear limits on 
what can be achieved. That parliament must play a major role 
in arrangements for administrative accountability is not in 
dispute. But this does not necessitate control. Moreover, 
parliament may make its contribution within a scheme of 
accountability incorporating a variety of mechanisms 
additional to those we have examined here.
In the case of statutory authorities the unsuitability 
of some conventional mechanisms of parliamentary control 
constitutes an additional incentive to explore alternatives. 
In Part III of this thesis it will be argued both that 
alternative approaches to accountability are already present 
in Commonwealth government and that the development of such 
alternatives offers the best prospect for further improvement 
in the accountability of statutory authorities.
PART III
THE ACCOUNTABLE STATUTORY AUTHORITY: 
ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACCOUNTABILITY
CHAPTER 7
THE MANAGERIALIST PERSPECTIVE ON ACCOUNTABILITY
This chapter examines a currently influential conception of 
administrative accountability which, while quite compatible 
with the basic features of responsible government, departs 
significantly from the traditional Australian approach treated 
in Part II. I have termed this a managerialist conception in 
recognition of its close association with a dominant trend in 
administrative reform in Anglo-Saxon parliamentary democracies 
in the 1980s (for Australia see Emy and Hughes, 1988:337-68; 
Painter, 1988; Considine, 1988; Paterson, 1988; Davis, Weller 
and Lewis, 1989).
Little has been written about the history of 
'managerialist' ideas in public administration (but see 
Garrett, 1980:130-36; Gray, 1982), but this is not the place 
to attempt to rectify that deficiency. For present purposes 
it is sufficient to note that the major inquiries into 
national government administration in Britain, Canada and 
Australia in the period 1960-1980 - namely, Glassco (RCGO, 
1962), Fulton (CCS, 1968), Coombs (RCAGA, 1976) and Lambert 
(RCFMA, 1979) - all argued for changes to administrative 
arrangements which would achieve three purposes. These were, 
firstly, to improve management skills in the respective public
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services in response to a shift in the nature of governmental 
activity, especially since the Second World War, from 
regulation to service delivery1; secondly, to delegate 
authority for resource management down the administrative 
hierarchy so as to unify policy and resource allocation 
responsibilities; thirdly, to develop information systems and 
objective measures of performance which would enhance the 
capacity of top bureaucrats and the political executive to 
'steer' program development.
These inquiries, together with subsequent reform 
efforts, challenged two important assumptions, or habits of 
thought, about administrative accountability. One was the 
tendency, implicit in the approach discussed in Part II, to 
treat accountability and control - that is, political control 
of administration - as virtually synonymous. The desire of 
reformers simultaneously to devolve administrative 
responsibilities and to enhance 'strategic' direction, or 
steering capacity, seems to have led them to draw an 
increasingly clear distinction between the two concepts.
The other assumption was that there is normally a sharp 
trade-off between accountability and efficiency. This 
provided a classic rationale for the statutory authority, 
namely that it facilitated a reduction in political control 
over administration (and hence in accountability) in order 
that certain functions could be executed more efficiently. It 
is true that recent 'managerialist' reform initiatives have
1. But note that the Australian public sector has always 
been strongly oriented to the production of goods and services 
(Paterson, 1988:289).
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been motivated by, if anything, a greater awareness of the 
possible adverse effects of close control on administrative 
efficiency and effectiveness. But, by distinguishing clearly 
between control and accountability, reformers have been able 
to suggest that, within broad limits, accountability and 
efficiency are directly rather than inversely related, are 
complementary rather than rival values2. Indeed, they have 
gone further. Since the mid-1970s the central goal of 
administrative reform has very definitely become the 
improvement of program efficiency under increasing resource 
constraints, as size and rate of growth of government have 
become major political and economic issues (see Howard, 1986; 
Painter, 1987). In this environment the strengthening of 
accountability for the exercise of devolved managerial 
functions has tended to be seen as a primary means of raising 
bureaucratic efficiency (see for example Keating, 1988a).
Of the several inquiries referred to above, the 
Canadian Lambert Commission produced the strongest statement 
of the managerialist position in general, and of the 
managerialist approach to accountability in particular. It is 
relevant to draw attention to the report of this body because 
its spirit and language, indeed many of its detailed proposals 
for institutional reform, have been very much a part of 
administrative, and in particular statutory authority, reform 
in Australia in the 1980s. Lambert conceptualised government
2. Note for instance the subtitle of Davis, Weller and 
Lewis (1989): 'reconciling accountability and efficiency'.
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as an essentially managerial activity3. Accountability, in 
turn, was seen as an aspect of the governmental 'management 
system', or 'that quality of a system that obliges the 
participants to pay attention to their respective assigned and 
accepted responsibilities' (RCFMA, 1979:10; emphasis in 
original). We shall refer below to Lambert's deployment of 
the control-accountability distinction. But even greater 
emphasis was placed on the contribution of accountability to 
efficient management:
Accountability is the fundamental prerequisite for ... 
ensuring ... that power is directed towards the 
achievement of broadly accepted national goals with the 
greatest possible degree of efficiency, effectiveness, 
probity and prudence (p.21).
The Report went on to identify weaknesses in the management of
Canadian government departments and agencies as resulting most
importantly from inadequacies in accountability arrangements:
In the absence of a requirement to account adequately 
for the conduct of their affairs, departments and 
agencies have been under little compulsion to husband 
the resources available to them ... and to ensure that 
they were being employed with the greatest possible 
efficiency and effectiveness (p.26; see also p.42).
A managerialist approach to accountability has three
main features which distinguish it from the approach familiar
in Westminster-style systems of government through most of the
3. Note for instance the following statement: 'Management 
in the public sector has suffered traditionally from a narrow 
definition and indeed a narrow perception of what was really 
involved in it. This in turn led to abnormal stress being placed 
on the differences in the roles of policy adviser and manager. 
A good manager in the public sector should see his mandate as 
understanding policy objectives and priorities as established by 
the political process, working to help develop programs to 
implement these policies and priorities, and then seeking 
adequate resources to implement them effectively and with due 
regard to economy and efficiency' (p.26).
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twentieth century. These may be briefly outlined here, with 
a more detailed exposition being reserved for the body of the 
chapter.
The first feature is an emphasis on 'strategic 
direction' or 'strategic control' over and within 
administrative organizations, accompanied by broad delegations 
of authority. This contrasts with the close or detailed 
control and correction which long constituted the principle, 
if not always the practice, of modern public services. The 
standard administrative 'control' is the need to gain 
clearance for a proposal with a superior, with the possibility 
of amendment, before proceeding to implementation. As Dunsire 
(1981:177) has noted, a shift to strategic control implies 
'taking a longer or broader view of the control objective', 
relying less on 'the "bottleneck" one-by-one or project-by- 
project controls' and more on the setting of broad parameters 
and guidelines. In this process the superior loses some of 
his/her capacity for 'immediate and detailed error-correction' 
as the agency itself is ' induced to do its own day-to-day 
monitoring and correcting' within the specified limits 
(emphasis in original).
The second feature follows from this increase in agency 
self-monitoring and self-correction. From the managerialist 
perspective accountability rests heavily on enforced agency 
self-evaluation and reporting. Greater self-evaluation is 
partly a matter of necessity under conditions of strategic 
control and delegated authority: if one moves away from close 
external supervision the capacity for external evaluation is
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also reduced. But it is also the case that managerialism 
places a positive value on agency self-evaluation, which it 
sees as integral to the task of management (see for example 
Keating, 1988a:78). However, as Wildavsky (1972) has argued, 
there are limits to the ability of an organization to evaluate 
itself. Hence the cognate emphasis in managerialist reform 
initiatives on improving information flows to external or 
quasi-external evaluators (ministers, the Auditor-General, 
parliament) by means of stricter reporting requirements, 
external involvement in the selection of performance 
indicators and so on. The aim is in part to duplicate the 
task of evaluation and in part to ensure that agency self- 
evaluation satisfies certain objective criteria.
The third feature of the managerialist approach to 
accountability concerns the quality of responsiveness involved 
in the accountability relationship. In the past 
administrative accountability tended to mean responsiveness to 
political demands, or to the 'value expectations' of 
politicians (ministers and members of parliament). This is 
evident in the pattern of evaluation by politicians. 
Traditionally, as Linder (1978:191) has noted for the United 
States, program evaluation was typically undertaken only when 
programs or their administrators were failing seriously to 
meet the expectations of politicians. Gradually, however, 
program evaluation is being 'rationalised' in the Weberian 
sense. This means, firstly, that evaluation is increasingly 
regularised or systematised and governed by 'instrumental' or 
process values, rather than political values. Secondly, it
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means that the process is increasingly professionalised, 
whether the 'professional' evaluators are auditors authorised 
to undertake 'performance' audits, or members of parliament 
organized into specialist select committees, supported by 
smaller or larger numbers of professional research staff. The 
rationalisation of program evaluation has proceeded further 
elsewhere (especially in the United States - see Rosen, 1982; 
Dodd and Schott, 1979; Ripley and Franklin, 1980) and within 
Australia practice lags considerably behind the aspiration 
(see for example JCPA, 1989:221-47 and passim). But the 
development is nevertheless unmistakable. The implications 
for accountability too are clear. Simply stated, the 
traditional view is that an agency is accountable if it 
satisfies its political masters (and has demonstrably complied 
with its legal obligations and any additional public sector 
requirements); whereas, on the managerialist view, 
accountability requires the agency to meet certain objective 
tests, or to satisfy certain objective 'specialised 
performance values' (Linder, 1978:191). It is responsiveness 
to such values which characterises accountability from the 
managerialist viewpoint.
The three features of the managerialist conception of 
accountability outlined above constitute the organizing 
principle of this chapter. The basic tasks of the chapter are 
to substantiate the claim that we have identified a 
distinctively different approach to accountability and to show 
that the latter is an important influence in the contemporary 
design and redesign of accountability regimes for Commonwealth
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statutory authorities. The immediate purpose is to show the 
potential of the managerialist approach to alter the terms of 
debate about the accountability of statutory authorities. But 
it will ultimately be argued that, insofar as administrative 
accountability can be adequately conceptualised in 
managerialist terms, the statutory authority, far from being 
an impediment to accountability, is in fact a good basis upon 
which to build an accountable public administration.
I. STRATEGIC CONTROL
Linder (1978:182) has shrewdly observed that ' [t]he quest for 
accountability is a response to the biases associated with 
discretion' (my emphasis). One general means of attacking 
such biases is to reduce, or preferably eliminate, discretion. 
There are two main methods of achieving this: what we may 
term 'type 1* control, which involves the need for 
subordinates to receive clearance from superiors before 
proceeding; and 'type 2' control, the more 'hands-off' form, 
which involves the setting of policy and procedural guidelines 
by superiors within which subordinates must work. The other 
general approach to the problem of accountability is to tackle 
only the biases associated with the exercise of discretion 
rather than the discretion itself. There are a variety of 
institutional mechanisms which might be employed to this end, 
including appeals procedures; direct representation of 
outside interests in decision making; wider participation of 
'insiders' in the exercise of discretion, for instance through 
formalised objective setting and policy planning processes;
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and external reviews of performance or other means of 
requiring the public justification of the use to which 
discretion is put.
As understood here, strategic control draws upon both 
of the approaches outlined above. It emphasises objective 
setting and processes of periodic assessment by superiors to 
establish overall direction (that is, to limit discretion) and 
to combat biases in the use of discretion. But it seeks to 
minimise the use of direct, or operational, controls - 
especially type 1 controls. The formulation of strategies and 
policies to achieve objectives is broadly delegated to 
subordinates (who will usually have participated in the 
creation of the primary objectives) and the performance of the 
subordinates against agreed criteria is formally assessed and 
must be justified at set intervals.
In its application to public administration, and 
statutory authority administration in particular, strategic 
control is not confined to relations within the single 
administrative organization. What gives the concept its 
relevance to the general issue of public accountability is its 
application to relations between institutional actors - 
specifically between agency management, agency board, minister 
and parliament. These actors, in a context of strategic 
control, ideally constitute a clearly defined hierarchy of 
levels for the setting of objectives and policy guidelines 
(and for review): objectives are broadest and most firmly 
fixed at the parliamentary level (where they are incorporated 
in agency statutes), most detailed and flexible at the level
293
of agency senior management. (The agency itself may also be 
organized into a hierarchy of objective setting and reviewing 
responsibilities).
Strategic Control and Statutory Authorities
It should be apparent that the notion of strategic control as 
outlined here has particular relevance to statutory 
authorities. Indeed it is arguable that the design of 
Commonwealth statutory authorities has generally expressed 
this idea quite clearly. The defining feature of a statutory 
authority is the assignment of primary decision-making 
responsibility in an area of administration to an entity other 
than a minister. However, as we have shown, parliament and 
ministers are normally placed in a position of strategic 
control by means of several mechanisms. Firstly, the enabling 
statute provides a formal 'mandate' (though the term has not 
been used) for the authority, typically comprising a set of 
statutory 'functions' (sometimes also 'purposes' and 'policy 
guidelines') and the powers thought adequate to accomplish the 
set tasks. Secondly, the minister is typically given a power 
of direction (qualified or unqualified) over the authority, in 
order where necessary to lay down the government's objectives 
and policy guidelines for the authority within the more 
general statutory framework. The direction and guidance thus 
provided by parliament and minister was, moreover, 
historically well understood to be different from control. 
From the commencement of the modern era of statutory authority 
creation, with the establishment of railway commissions in
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late nineteenth-century Australia, there was seen to be a need 
to avoid excessive detailed controls so that responsibility 
could be firmly fixed on the statutory office holders. 
'Recoup' provisions, where used, and the frequent requirement 
for 'open' ministerial directions are further evidence of this 
desire. Finally, the usual statutory requirement for the 
authority to submit an annual report to the minister for 
tabling in parliament was envisaged not only as a functional 
substitute for close parliamentary supervision but also as 
providing an annual opportunity for a review of the 
performance of the agency. (Ministers are given additional 
opportunities for evaluation, for instance through their 
responsibility for appointments and their receipt of quarterly 
financial statements from trading authorities.)
While the basic administrative framework for statutory 
authorities thus conforms to the concept of strategic control, 
evidence presented in earlier chapters shows that practice has 
departed from that ideal in a number of ways. In the first 
place, parliament has never clearly defined its role in this 
area as involving primarily the rigorous definition of an 
authority mandate and periodic reviews of authority 
performance. As we have seen, statements of 'functions' in 
authority statutes are often both permissive and imprecise. 
Importantly, too, functions are not the same as objectives 
(though lists of statutory functions sometimes mix objectives, 
or purposes, with statements of tasks and permissible 
activities). Again, the evidence of members' attitudes, as 
revealed in debates on authority legislation, shows that they
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regard the statute as something less than the foundation of a 
system of strategic control. A key reason for this is the 
tendency, documented at length in Part II, for parliament to 
model its relations with statutory authorities on the standard 
Westminster model of ministerial administration and 
parliamentary control of administration through ministers. 
For the same reason, 'parliamentary control' of statutory 
authorities and irregular review, in response to crises, has 
generally prevailed over periodic review focused on 
parliamentary consideration of annual reports.
Ambiguity has also surrounded the proper role of the 
'responsible' minister with regard to the statutory authority. 
An accepted set of principles governing the use of the 
ministerial power of direction has never been established, 
with the consequence that the instrument has generally lacked 
legitimacy. While it is widely assumed that ministers often 
attempt to influence authorities' decision-making, use of 
formal directions for this purpose has traditionally been very 
rare. To be sure, there has been an understanding that the 
directive power should be used infrequently and mainly to lay 
down general policy, rather than to interfere in matters of 
administration. But such an understanding runs into the old 
difficulty of distinguishing policy matters from 
administration. Moreover, there is an important difference 
between the imposition as a last resort of a clear statement 
of government policy on a potentially errant authority, on the 
one hand, and the use of directions at more frequent intervals 
to 'flesh out' the statutory mandate, on the other. The
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latter understanding of the ministerial directive power has 
not in the past been evident in Australia. Ministerial 
control has not necessarily been any less as a result, but it 
has been less clearly of a strategic sort.
The purity of the strategic control model of minister- 
authority relationships has also been sullied in practice by 
the existence in the typical authority statute of a more or 
less extensive range of type 1 ministerial (and other) 
controls designed to limit discretion in matters of finance, 
resource allocation and general policy making. These have 
been introduced for macro-economic policy reasons, or to 
ensure conformity with other government policies, or to 
minimise the potential for adverse public responses to 
authority decisions (for example, pricing decisions).
Finally, mirroring the ambiguity surrounding the roles 
of parliament and the minister, the role and responsibilities 
of the authority board in its relations with agency 
management, on the one side, and the minister, on the other, 
has been another point in the system of accountability 
relationships at which the notion of strategic control has not 
been fully or clearly established. Ministerial, rather than 
board, appointment of the chief executive officer under many 
statutes has weakened the status of the board. The authority 
of the board over agency policy has also been weakened by 
ambiguity surrounding the obligations of departmental 
representatives typically appointed to boards. (Are they 
there to keep the minister informed? Or to bring ministerial 
influence to the heart of the board decision-making?) In some
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cases the lack of a clear focus of responsibility on the board 
has created a tendency for government to deal directly with 
the chief executive, with the board as a largely irrelevant 
onlooker4.
Adverse comments on these departures from the strategic 
control model, and recommendations designed to refashion the 
control regime to bring it closer to the model, have been the 
stock in trade of the small amount of critical commentary 
there has been on Commonwealth statutory authorities (see 
especially JCPA, 1954 and 1955; Wettenhall, 1976). The focus 
has, however, been mainly on the relationship between 
ministers and statutory boards, in accordance with the 
assumption that the main problem with statutory authorities 
was to work out the extent and nature of the necessary 
departure from full ministerial responsibility. The 
respective roles of parliament and the board with respect to 
agency management have received less attention. Moreover, 
while the idea that strategic control is a desirable principle 
to structure relationships involving statutory authorities has 
been strongly implied by proposals for reform over the years, 
there has been little attempt in this literature to work out 
a comprehensive, well articulated model of the desired 
relationships.
The Lambert Report
These deficiencies explain the wide appeal of the Lambert
4. My interviews indicated that this was much more the case 
with some authorities (for example Telecom) than others (for 
example the Australian Industry Development Corporation).
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Commission's analysis. Lambert's reading of the situation in 
Canada was similar to that sketched above for the Australian 
Commonwealth. Moreover, neither the ideas underlying 
Lambert's analysis nor his prescriptions would generally have 
struck Australian readers as particularly novel. But the 
comprehensiveness and clarity of the model developed in the 
Lambert report distinguishes that document from its 
counterparts in the Anglo-Saxon parliamentary democracies. 
Lambert's starting point was to identify four key elements in 
any accountability regime (RCFMA, 1979:274-5). These were: 
mandate: which 'defines what must ultimately be answered for
by the board', and consists in 'a rigorous definition of 
tasks, purposes and objectives assigned to an agency and a 
clear delegation of the powers and managerial authority 
necessary to accomplish them' (p.274);
direction: whose purpose is 'to define and interpret the
mandate' (p.334) and which 'requires a clear statement of the 
powers that parliament and the Government reserve to 
themselves... and of the conditions under which they can be 
used' (p.274);
control: the choice and application of instruments to 'affect
the delegation of powers to, and managerial authority of, the 
Crown agency' (p.274); and, finally, 
evaluation and reporting.
The next step in logical sequence was to identify 
specific instruments associated with each of these elements 
(see RCFMA, 1979:301-7). The report then showed how 
parliament, ministers, central agencies and statutory
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authorities, as the actors controlling or sharing the use of 
the various instruments, should relate to each of three types 
of agency, namely 'independent deciding and advisory bodies', 
'Crown corporations', and 'shared enterprises and quasi-public 
corporations'.
Lambert's objective for the wholly public agencies 
(that is, the first two types listed above) was to create as 
nearly as possible a framework of strategic control (the term 
itself was not used) over the differing forms of 
administrative discretion properly assigned to each agency 
type. This emphasis is particularly apparent in the desire to 
expand the complementary roles of mandate and evaluation in 
accountability regimes, and correspondingly to reduce the 
reliance on 'on going' controls as much as possible (see 
RCFMA, 1979:303-5). It is also apparent in the considerable 
effort devoted to differentiating and delimiting the roles of 
parliament, minister and board in order to maximize the 
freedom of the actors closest to the administrative task, 
while also improving the ultimate 'steering' capacity of the 
elected actors. For Lambert the relevant agent at each level 
of the hierarchy of strategic control has four key managerial 
responsibilities - objective setting and policy guidance; 
appointments; monitoring; and evaluation - which together 
create a capacity for strategic control. Lambert set out to 
show in some detail (in Chapters 18 and 19 of the Report) how 
these responsibilities could be arranged into a hierarchy so 
that each level could play a role appropriate to its political 
status and managerial capacity, without encroaching
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excessively upon, or obfuscating, the responsibilities of its 
counterparts elsewhere in the hierarchy.
Towards Strategic Control for Commonwealth Statutory 
Authorities
Reform of accountability regimes for Australian Commonwealth 
statutory authorities over recent years has been broadly 
along the lines laid down by the Lambert Commission. This is 
not to suggest that the latter body has been the only or the 
major influence; the Australian reforms are the end product 
of an Australian history of criticism, inquiry and report 
which has been outlined in Chapter 3. There have also been 
some notable departures from Lambert's prescriptions. For 
present purposes, however, the point is that the trend in the 
design of accountability regimes for Commonwealth authorities 
is towards a significantly stronger institutionalisation of 
the idea of strategic control already implicit, but often 
only weakly established, in existing arrangements. This can 
be demonstrated through an examination of four aspects of 
recent changes. These are:
i) a strengthening of the role of the authority statute as 
'mandate';
ii) greater emphasis on, and clarification of, the use of 
the ministerial power of direction;
iii) a reduction of 'on going' controls over authority 
boards, especially those engaged in trading activities; 
and
iv) a strengthening of the role of the authority board in
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the overall system of control and accountability.
These will now be considered in turn. Another change which 
has strengthened strategic control is the development of 
instruments for regular evaluation and review of statutory 
authority performance. This important matter will be dealt 
with at length in the next section.
The Statute
For Lambert (RCFMA, 1979:301-2) a fundamental role of the 
authority statute was to provide a clear and comprehensive 
statement of the 'tasks, purposes, objectives and powers' of 
the authority it establishes. In particular, it should make 
clear what the parliament, whose instrument the statute is, 
requires the authority to attempt to achieve. This was seen 
to be important as the first stage of the objective-setting 
process which not only directs the authority's activity but 
also assists the assessment of its performance.
From the managerialist perspective it is thus a 
weakness of the statutes of Commonwealth authorities that they 
have not traditionally attempted explicitly to define 
objectives. More or less meaningful statements of 
'functions', or tasks expected to be performed, were always 
present and were sometimes accompanied by statutory policy 
guidance of some kind. But only very rarely (as for example 
in the Australian Tourist Commission Act 1967) was the mention 
of a 'purpose' thought necessary.
Against this background, a development of significance 
over recent years is the growing use of 'objects' provisions
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in authority statutes. Virtually unknown until the early 
1980s, these provisions have appeared since 1983 in about one 
half of statutes creating or reconstituting Commonwealth 
authorities (see Table 7.1). In addition, where statements 
of objectives are not present statutory functions and policy 
guidelines often contribute, more so than previously, towards 
the same end by assisting to define the authority's mission, 
guiding the pursuit of long term goals, establishing or 
clarifying priorities, and the like.
Table 7.1 Use of Statutory Objectives and Policy 
Guidelines in Statutory Authority Enabling Legislation, 
1983-88
Year No. of No. with an No. of Remainder
Statutes Objectives Section Containing Policy 
Guidelines
1983 7 3 3
1984 5 3 -
1985 8 5 -
1986 7 3 3
1987 9 3 3
1988 5 2
41 19 9
Source: Acts of the Australian Parliament.
To a degree this change is a matter of symbols and 
terminology. One can question the value of necessarily broad 
statutory objectives for purposes of guidance or evaluation 
of performance. Also, it might be pointed out that 
statements of functions have in the past sometimes included 
de facto objectives, and that the contents of objects and 
functions provisions in recent statutes are not always easily 
differentiated. But it is important to recognize that what
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the statute symbolises is likely to be of practical 
significance. Whether the statute is seen as establishing an 
entity authorised by parliament to pursue a specific mission, 
or alternatively (as hitherto) as defining a field of 
administrative activity and perhaps setting a few ground rules 
for that activity, will surely influence attitudes about 
performance and evaluation.
Changes in the content of statutes suggest a shift 
towards the first of the above understandings - at least 
within the executive, which dominates the drafting of 
legislation. But a recent report on the Australian 
Broadcasting Tribunal by a House of Representatives committee 
provides a little evidence that the managerialist view of the 
constituting statute has growing support among members of 
parliament (see HRSCTCI, 1988). At the Tribunal's 
establishment in 1976 and 1977 members of parliament had shown 
an almost total lack of interest in the virtually unlimited 
discretionary powers conferred on the Tribunal to perform its 
licensing function. In marked contrast the 1988 report argued 
a sophisticated managerialist case for the inclusion of a 
specified set of objectives in the enabling legislation5 (see 
especially HRSCTCI, 1988:16-19).
5. This outcome cannot be attributed solely to an 
autonomous change in attitudes among members of parliament 
towards governance of statutory authorities. An Administrative 
Review Council report in 1981 (ARC, 1981), controversy over 
changes to the Broadcasting and Television Act in the same year, 
and submissions from the Department of Transport and 
Communications and the Tribunal itself to the Committee's inquiry 
requesting statutory policy objectives were obvious influences 
on the committee members.
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Ministerial Direction
The second notable development of recent years is the growth 
in legitimacy of the ministerial power of direction as an 
instrument of strategic control. This has occurred in line 
with an emphasis on the idea that a key managerial function of 
the minister is to interpret, or 'flesh out', the statutory 
mandate in certain non-extraordinary circumstances. At the 
same time, however, new instruments have been created to 
assist in the performance of that function, which means that 
any increase in the use of the directive power is likely to be 
less than might otherwise be expected.
In fact two distinct conceptions of the role of the 
power of direction appear to be present in Commonwealth 
statutes in the late 1980s. The first envisages relatively 
frequent use of the power, along the lines sketched in the 
report on the Broadcasting Tribunal referred to above. The 
report noted that the problem with statements of objectives in 
authority statutes is their inevitable generality. More 
detailed objectives and policy guidelines are necessary to 
guide decision making in the organization, especially where 
trade-offs between objectives are necessary or where 
alternative means of achieving objectives are available. 
Therefore, the report recommended that the Act be amended to 
enable the minister from time to time to impose upon the 
Tribunal a statement detailing the way in which its statutory 
objectives should be achieved6 (HRSCTCI, 1988:19-20).
6. This is arguably less novel than it may seem. It is 
worth noting that a requirement that the authority have regard 
to government policy is included in many authority statutes. It
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The second conception envisages use of the power only 
in exceptional circumstances. The statutes of trading 
authorities and primary produce marketing authorities have 
over recent years tended to embody this idea. In these cases 
Acts now commonly create an alternative instrument for regular 
ministerial input into the establishment of a policy framework 
for the authority - namely medium term corporate plans and, 
sometimes, annual operating plans as well. More will be said 
about these instruments later. But where they exist the use 
of the ministerial directive would seem to be restricted to 
those unusual circumstances where serious conflict with 
government policy is imminent, or where the authority feels a 
need for immediate clarification of some aspect of its 
mandate.
In order for the ministerial directive to realise its 
potential as an instrument of strategic control three 
conditions must be satisfied: the directive power must be a 
standard part of authority statutes, it must be viewed by 
ministers as a politically available instrument, and there 
must be both an understanding of the appropriate role of the 
power among relevant actors and some means of bringing this 
understanding to bear upon ministers tempted to abuse the 
power. These conditions are close to being achieved in the 
late 1980s.
With respect to the first condition, the statutory 
power of ministerial direction, always very common in
might be held that the procedure recommended for the Tribunal is 
merely a more formalised and elaborate version of this 
requirement.
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Commonwealth authority statutes, has become virtually 
universal in the 1980s. There is not now, nor has there been 
for a decade, any debate about the application of such a 
provision to a trading authority. But two recent examinations 
of its employment among what Lambert termed 'independent 
deciding and advisory bodies' may be referred to to illustrate 
current thinking in government and parliamentary circles about 
the breadth of its application.
One examination concerned the prominent advisory body, 
the Industries Assistance Commission (IAC). The IAC Act 1973 
had been amended in 1978 to permit the minister to inform the 
Commission (under S.22(2)) of any matters additional to the 
policy guidelines contained in the Act and (under S.22(3)) of 
any priorities among the guidelines to which it should have 
regard in the performance of its functions. In 1984 the 
report of a major review of the IAC was published (RIAC, 
1984). The inquiry had received conflicting submissions about 
the 1978 amendments; in response it supported the retention of 
S.22(2) but recommended the repeal of S.22(3). Bolstered by 
the new conventional wisdom, however, the minister was able, 
without political difficulty, to dismiss this recommendation 
as a violation of the 'principle' that the government should 
determine priorities among policy guidelines (Senate, CPD, 7 
June 1984:2786). This argument would not have been nearly so 
readily accepted a decade earlier.
The other examination formed part of a House of 
Representatives Expenditure Committee inquiry during 1984-86 
into the Australia Council and Commonwealth support of the
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arts in general. The inquiry received criticism of the 
informal arrangement for ministerial policy input which had 
grown up in the absence of a ministerial power of direction in 
the 1975 Act. This involved a written communication to the 
Council after the budget was presented in parliament, 
otherwise known to Council members and staff as 'the letter 
that comes with the cheque'. The Committee concluded that 
this was productive of uncertainty in the government-council 
relationship and recommended that the minister be empowered 
under the enabling Act to direct the Council, but not on 
individual grants (see HRSCE, 1986b:71-9).
Evidence that ministers are today more prepared than 
previously to countenance use of the directive power, the 
second condition, is provided by my survey of debates on 
authority legislation in the 1980s (referred to in Chapter 3). 
As always the powers conferred on ministers, and the likely 
effect of these on the functioning of authorities, were 
closely scrutinised in parliamentary debate. But ministers 
were more forthright than their 1970s predecessors in stating 
their need for considerable powers, both in order that 
authorities should operate in accordance with declarations of 
government policy and to ensure adequate accountability. 
Moreover, to an extent this was accepted by members of 
parliament; in comparison with the earlier set of debates 
examined the relationship between ministers and authorities 
was discussed with a greater appreciation of the case for 
(strategic) controls.
The third and final condition, the presence of adequate
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restraints to prevent abuse of the power, has been satisfied 
in part by the growing influence of the managerialist 
conception of the minister's role vis-a-vis quasi-independent 
authorities. But there are also formal restraints in the form 
of statutory requirements for openness in the use of the 
directive power. These have been strengthened in recent years 
and applied more uniformly. They include, at a minimum, 
prompt publicity of directions issued and the recording of 
directions in the authority's annual report. Such provisions 
are now virtually universal. Less commonly, but still fairly 
frequently, parliament is given an opportunity to supervise 
the issue of directions through a statutory requirement that 
they be laid before the parliament (for possible 
disallowance), sometimes within a specified time.
A further means of ensuring that the ministerial 
directive is used for the purpose of strategic rather than 
detailed control is for some form of explicit statutory 
constraint to be imposed on possible uses of the instrument. 
For instance, it is common in the case of granting authorities 
for the minister to be proscribed from issuing directions 
regarding particular recipients. But there is great variety 
among recent statutes in the extent and nature of the 
constraints on ministers. The range of options in use extends 
from no restriction (as in the Australian Institute of Sport 
Act 1986, No.103); to an obligation on the minister merely to 
satisfy himself on certain matters before issuing a direction 
(as in the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology
Organization Act 1987, No.3); to a requirement for
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consultation between minister and authority (as in the 
Australian Institute of Health Act 1987, No.41); to the 
limiting of directions to the laying down of general 
principles (as in the Anti-Dumping Authority Act 1988, No.72); 
to the specification of matters on which there can be no 
direction without a prior inquiry (as in the Federal Airports 
Corporation Act 1986, No.4); to a proscription on the issue 
of directions on particular cases (as in the Management and 
Investment Companies Act 1983, No.123); to a restriction of 
directions to specified matters only (as in the Aboriginal 
Land Grant (Jervis Bay Territory) Act 1986, No.164).
Corporate Plans
The appearance in recent authority statutes of a requirement 
for the board to prepare a formal 'corporate' or 'strategic' 
plan has provided an important new instrument for ministerial 
guidance. Before we examine the way in which ministerial 
input occurs, however, it is worth noting that the growth of 
statutory provisions for corporate planning is a good 
indication of the strength of the managerialist tide in 
Australian public administration. Corporate planning is the 
essence of contemporary managerialism (see for example 
Beringer, Chomiak and Russell, 1986). In managerialist 
thinking a corporate plan is 'the vehicle for defining and 
refining the corporation's mandate' (RCFMA, 1979:335); it 
'provides a collective and functional identity for the 
organization as a whole'; and it 'should be a dynamic 
framework for communicating corporate objectives and
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priorities' (Beringer et al., 1986:54). To perform this role 
the plan should include such components as a situation review, 
a statement of objectives, an account of strategies chosen to 
achieve the objectives, a set of policies for implementing 
strategies in specified circumstances, and in greater or 
lesser detail the proposed allocation of resources. The 
formal plan itself, however, should constitute only the end 
point of an extensive process of discussion and discursive 
formation of commitments, both within the organization and in 
association with major 'stakeholders' (see Beringer et al., 
1986:53-83).
A corporate planning provision has become a fairly 
common feature of authority statutes in the 1980s. Table 7.2 
lists the 22 examples discovered in statutes passed into law 
between 1983 and 1988.
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Table 7.2 Statutory Authority Legislation Establishing 
a Corporate Planning Requirement, 1983-88.
Year Legislation
1983 Australian Shipping Commission Amendment Act 
1983,No.127
Australian National Railways Commission 
Amendment Act 1983, No.140
1984 Australian Meat and Livestock Corporation 
Amendment Act 1984, No.57 
Canned Fruits Marketing Amendment Act 1984, 
No.148
1985 Meat and Livestock Research and Development 
Authority Act 1985, No.12 
Australian Sports Commission Act 1985, No.77 
National Parks and Wildlife Conservation 
Amendment Act 1985, No.94 
Rural Industries Research Act 1985, No.102 
Australian Trade Commission Act 1985, No.186
1986 Federal Airports Corporation Act 1986, No.4 Dairy Product Act 1986, No.54 
Australian Wine and Brandy Corporation Act 1986, No.60
Australian Institute of Sport Act 1986, No.103 
Science and Industry Research Legislation 
Amendment Act 1986, No.121
1987 Defence Housing Corporation Act 1987, No.101 
Australian Tourist Commission Act 1987, No.136 
Australian Meat and Livestock Industry
Legislation Amendment Act 1987, No.155 
Australian Horticultural Corporation Act 1987, 
No.164
Horticultural Research and Development 
Corporation Act 1987, No.166 
Commonwealth Banks Amendment Act 1987, No.182.
1988 Textiles, Clothing and Footwear Development 
Authority Act 1988, No.14 
Civil Aviation Authority Act 1988, No.63.
Source: Acts of the Australian Parliament
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The Lambert Commission prescribed corporate planning 
for Crown Corporations (that is, trading authorities)7 and 
Table 7.2 shows that it is also mainly associated with this 
category of authority in Australian Commonwealth government. 
Most, but not all, statutes establishing or reconstituting 
such authorities in the period covered by the table contained 
a requirement that a corporate plan be produced. But 
authorities outside the trading category were also subjected 
to the same requirement. These included not only authorities 
with major managerial responsibilities in some ways similar 
to trading authorities (for example the Australian Institute 
of Sport or the Commonwealth Science and Industry Research 
Organization) but also such diverse bodies as the Australian 
Sports Commission, National Parks and Wildlife Conservation 
Boards, Rural Industries Research Councils and the Textiles, 
Clothing and Footwear Development Authority. Thus the 
possibility suggests itself of a very extensive use of this 
device as a standard part of accountability regimes for 
statutory authorities generally.
The corporate planning provisions differ quite 
considerably in their degree of detail. Those employed in 
the Australian Shipping Commission Act and Australian 
National Railways Commission Act at the beginning of the 
period examined (1983) are very rudimentary, simply stating 
that the Commissions must develop objectives, strategies and 
policies and must review and revise these from time to time.
7. Lambert's criteria for a Crown Corporation (RCFMA 
1971979:439) establish the equivalence of these entities.
313
Others are a good deal more complex, requiring the production 
of two forms of plan (a three to five year corporate plan and 
an annual operational plan) and specifying both a longer list 
of contents for the plans and sophisticated arrangements for 
their approval and variation. Although there remains a good 
deal of variety among the particular provisions, those 
contained in later statutes tend to be more demanding. In 
this respect the remodelling of legislation for the primary 
produce marketing and research authorities, the results of 
which began to appear in 1984 (see Australian Meat and 
Livestock Corporation Amendment Act 1984), and the Australian 
Trade Commission Act of 1985 were early indications of the 
direction of later legislation.
Where they are employed in Commonwealth statutes, corporate 
planning provisions typically facilitate ministerial 
involvement by requiring the plan to receive the minister's 
approval and giving the minister some measure of power to vary 
the plan. As with the provisions generally, the formal 
arrangements for ministers to alter the plans vary 
considerably - from no such arrangements (as in the Australian 
Shipping Commission and Australian National Railways 
Commission Acts of 1983); to a simple provision for 
ministerial approval of plans (as with the Australian Sports 
Commission Act 1985); to a requirement for ministerial 
approval, together with the stipulation that the board shall 
vary the plan at the request of the minister (as with the 
Australian Trade Commission Act 1985); to ministerial approval
plus a ministerial power to request variations, but with the
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board retaining the right to revise as it 'considers 
appropriate' (as for the primary produce authorities). In 
some cases the use of the corporate plan as an instrument of 
control is further emphasized in the statute through a 
statement that the functions of the authority are not to be 
performed otherwise than in accordance with the approved 
corporate plan (see Australian Institute of Sport Act 1986, 
Australian Sports Commission Act 1985).
In Australia there has been little public debate over the 
subjection of corporate plans to ministerial approval. But 
the Lambert report (RCFMA, 1979:336) came out firmly against 
such a proposal by the Canadian government of the day. The 
Report agreed that the minister and his/her department needed 
to see a plan in order 'to ascertain whether the corporation's 
strategy is consistent with the policy interests of the 
Government and to ensure that there will be no surprises when 
capital and operating budgets come to the minister. . . '. But 
it argued that the plan should be forwarded for the minister's 
information only and not for approval. To subject the plan to 
ministerial approval, the Commission seems to have concluded, 
would be, firstly, to encroach upon the legitimate 
prerogatives of the board (to lay down policy for the 
organization) and, secondly, to duplicate and hence weaken the 
role of the ministerial directive.
Similar views have been put semi-publicly to the 
Australian Commonwealth government by authority boards8, but
8. Criticism of the proposal in the Policy Discussion Paper 
of 1986 (Department of Finance, 1986:21) that the corporate plans 
of 'government business enterprises' be submitted to ministers
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have evidently been rejected (as indeed they were by the 
Canadian government)* 9. This would seem to raise the 
possibility of quite detailed ministerial intervention, 
intervention which moreover would escape those arrangements 
for disclosure of ministerial directives intended to ensure 
that ministerial input promotes strategic rather than detailed 
control. However, it needs to be recalled that corporate 
plans, as instruments for direction-setting over several 
years, are inevitably broad-brush exercises and, as such, are 
not especially suitable instruments for detailed control. A 
better test, therefore, is the nature of the arrangements for 
ministerial consideration of the annual operational plans (or 
in some cases annual financial plans) which are required to be 
produced in a majority of cases along with the corporate plan.
Annual operational plans, for which the managing director 
rather than the board is generally made formally responsible, 
are intended to be quite detailed documents. They are 
typically required to include details of the strategies the 
board proposes to pursue, the programs the board proposes to 
carry out, and the resources the board proposes to allocate to 
each program during the financial year. Statutorily 
prescribed arrangements for ministerial oversight vary 
considerably. In almost all cases the plan must be approved
for approval was a feature of those authorities' written
responses to the Paper.
9. A requirement that each Crown Corporation 'annually 
submit a corporate plan to the appropriate Minister for the 
approval of the Governor in Council on the recommendation of the 
appropriate Minister' was included in the Canadian Financial 
Administration Act by S.129 of C.31, Statutes of Canada 1984.
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by the minister, but the scope this provides for ministerial 
intervention is typically limited by an additional stipulation 
that the minister may fail to approve or may request 
variations only on the grounds that the annual operational 
plan is inconsistent with the corporate plan. A stronger 
safeguard against excessively detailed interference is 
provided by the Commonwealth Science and Industry 
Organization's enabling statute, which confines the approval 
process for the annual operational plan to the CSIRO Board 
(see Science and Industry Research Legislation Amendment Act 
1986). In several cases where annual 'financial' plans are 
required ministers are given the power to vary financial 
targets and performance indicators10. But only in one or two 
cases could it be said that statutory provisions for 
ministerial oversight of the plans appear to give the minister 
a truly broad power to vary or request variation of detailed 
aspects of policy* 11.
Controls
A reduction of the burden of 'on-going' ministerial and other 
controls over authorities is the counterpart to efforts to
10. Examples are the Federal Airports Corporation Act 1987, 
the Defence Housing Authority Act 1987 and the Civil Aviation Act 
1988. It should be noted, however, that financial targets are 
subject to ministerial variation under all Commonwealth statutes 
which require their use.
11. The Commonwealth Banks Amendment Act 1987 seems to 
confer such a power, as does the Textile, Clothing and Footwear 
Development Authority Act 1988. But, with regard to the latter 
example, it needs to be kept in mind that budget dependent 
authorities are typically required in any case to forward annual 
estimates of expenditure for the minister's approval. This gives 
the minister considerable potential for detailed intervention.
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create new capacities for strategic control. On the 
government's own assessment a major problem with the 
administrative arrangements for trading authorities was that, 
while they were fettered with 'precise detailed operational 
controls', they tended to be provided with 'little in the way 
of strategic guidance or accountability' (Minister for 
Transport and Communications, 1988b:160). With appropriate 
instruments for 'strategic guidance' in place, so the now 
familiar managerialist argument runs, the bulk of 'operational 
controls' which are harmful to both efficiency and 
accountability may be relaxed or removed. The Hawke 
government's characterisation of its government business 
enterprise reforms is the essence of contemporary 
managerialist wisdom:
The emphasis will no longer rest on scrutiny and 
approvals of the processes of running an organization, 
but on the extent to which it is successful in meeting 
its goals. Constant oversight of individual 
transactions... does not ensure that an organization will 
be successful in meeting its goals, diverts resources 
from more productive activities, and obscures the 
accountability for the decisions that are involved 
(Minister for Transport and Communications 1988b:161; 
emphasis in original).
The focus of reform in this area has been the trading 
authorities. This is so because the primary issue has been 
the necessary extent of ministerial controls over authorities' 
resource management, the need for a measure of autonomy in 
which constitutes the raison d'etre of statutory trading 
authorities. Other sorts of statutory authority, by contrast, 
do not require so much freedom in resource allocation 
decisions, at least insofar as resource allocation is not used 
to compromise the objectivity and impartiality of their
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decision-making in other areas (the need for which provides 
their raison d'etre). Moves to reduce such controls may be 
understood in part as an extension to trading authorities of 
the managerial reforms under way in ministerial departments 
which are designed to delegate responsibilities for detailed 
resource allocation from central agencies to departmental 
managers (see Dawkins, 1984; Keating 1988a and 1988b). (They 
are also part of a drive to commercialise the authorities, to 
'level the playing field' as between public and private 
businesses, either as a substitute for, or prior to, 
privatisation). But reduction of external controls over 
resource management is of special significance to trading 
authorities precisely because it reinforces their essential 
raison d'etre.
The Telecommunications and Postal Services Acts of 1975 
are illustrative of the range of controls imposed on 
Commonwealth trading authorities by their constituting 
statutes. The most prominent control is that over prices. 
While the Commissions are empowered to fix and vary charges 
for their services, for basic services - such as standard 
telephone rentals, telephone calls and telegrams in the case 
of Telecom, and standard postal articles and registered 
publications in the case of Australia Post - ministerial 
approval of tariff charges is required. Ministerial approval 
is also required for the Commissions to enter into contracts 
exceeding $500,000 (raised in recent times to $2m) or to lease 
land for a period exceeding ten years. In addition, all 
borrowings are made subject to the Treasurer's approval, as
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are short term investments in other than bank fixed deposits 
or Australian government securities. The Treasurer 
(subsequently the Minister for Finance) is also made 
responsible for determining interest rates on advances from 
the Commonwealth (that is, the Commission's capital). The 
portfolio minister determines how surplus earnings shall be 
applied. With regard to staffing matters, the Commissions are 
required to comply with detailed statutory provisions which, 
inter alia, preserve Public Service terms and conditions of 
employment.
Moreover, the constituting statutes are far from the only 
source of controls over these and other trading authorities. 
Appendix 2 lists a wide range of additional controls applying 
to Australia Post. These are implemented by a variety of 
statutory and non-statutory instruments, and supervised by a 
dozen ministers.
The reform of controls regimes promised for all 
Commonwealth 'Government Business Enterprises' (GBEs) has so 
far been most conspicuous among authorities in the transport 
and communications sectors. Reform efforts in these 
authorities have been assisted by the amalgamation of the 
Transport and Communications departments in 1987 which brought 
eight of the most important GBEs under the one departmental 
umbrella. This gave greater prominence to the GBE reform 
agenda and, at the same time, made possible a more consistent 
approach to reform among the eight authorities.
The minister's policy statement on the reform of 
transport and communications GBEs (Minister for Transport and
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Communications, 1988a:8-11) distinguishes between two sets of 
controls: those ' strategic controls'12 which serve macro- 
economic purposes, or implement government policy regarding 
public sector employees, and 'day-to-day controls' which were 
part of the traditional approach to accountability. Different 
measures were prescribed for the two categories: the so 
called 'strategic controls' were to be 'relaxed', replaced 
with less intrusive controls based on 'guidelines', and 
selectively removed, whereas 'day-to-day controls' were by and 
large to be abolished as new mechanisms (namely, corporate 
plans and financial targets) for what I have termed strategic 
control were introduced. Table 7.3 sets out the most common 
controls and the action to be taken with regard to each.
12. Note that this usage of the term 'strategic control' 
differs from that which I have adopted in this chapter.
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Table 7.3 Reform of Controls over Transport and 
Communications Government Business Enterprises* 
Announced in 1988
Activity Current Control Reform
STRATEGIC CONTROLS






Extensive requirements for 
Department of Industrial 
Relations approval 
Remuneration Tribunal 
determination (except for 
AUSSAT)










Boards to be given 
responsibility, 






ject to governmt 
'guidelines'
DAY-TO-DAY CONTROLS
Contracts Minister's approval for
amounts above $6m.
Borrowings Treasurer's approval of
terms and conditions 

















tive Services conducts for 
Telecom, OTC & Aust.Post 
Telecom, OTC, AUSSAT and 
Australia Post are subject 
to Parliamentary Standing 
Committee on Public Works; 
Telecom required to use 
Department of Administrative 
Services Construction Group.
Abolition of 






a AUSSAT, Telecom, Overseas Telecommunications Commission 
(OTC), Australia Post, Australian National Line (ANL), 
Australian National Railways (AN), Qantas, Australian 
Airlines.
Source: Minister for Transport and Communications 1988a
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The Board
In conjunction with the reduction of ministerial controls just 
discussed, several other measures have been introduced to give 
the statutory boards of trading authorities a more important 
role. The general purpose is to create a clearer focus of 
devolved responsibility in order to strengthen the incentives 
upon which strategic control depends. Perhaps due in part to 
the influence of the Westminster identification of public 
accountability with ministerial administration, statutes have 
in the past held back from assigning boards full 
responsibility for the running of their undertakings. The 
focus of responsibility on authority boards has also been 
blurred by their immersion in the dominant public service 
culture, emphasizing security of tenure, central agency 
controls and the need to refer matters upwards for a political 
sounding. Finally, the fact that boards have a policy rather 
than an executive role has made it possible for them to be 
bypassed with relative ease. In at least some cases boards 
have been seen as a result to be 'off to one side' while 
senior management, departmental staff and ministers made all 
the main decisions13. Recent reforms are designed to give 
the 'policy board' a more central place in the system of 
linkages between parliament and the administration of the 
activity entrusted to the agency. As such, they have involved 
renewed efforts both to devolve responsibility from ministers 
(and departments) to boards and to bolster the board's
13. This observation was made by interviewees about the 
situation of the Telecom and Australia Post boards in the late 
1970s and early 1980s.
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authority over the agency's senior management.
Specific measures to devolve responsibility include 
all of those noted in the previous sub-section. In addition, 
the movement towards a statutory requirement for trading 
authorities to undertake corporate planning has meant 
assigning the board a more explicit responsibility for 
setting medium term and (sometimes) annual objectives and 
policies, financial targets, performance indicators and the 
like, and for negotiating such matters with the minister (see 
for example Australian Telecommunications Corporation Act 
1989). As for the relationship between the board and senior 
management, statutes are now more likely than previously to 
emphasize that the chief executive officer runs the agency 
under the guidance of the board, and to give practical force 
to this desire by granting the board, rather than the 
minister, sole or major responsibility for appointing (that 
is, hiring and firing) the chief executive and determining 
the terms and conditions of the appointment. The latter 
development is important since the power of appointment is 
regarded as a particularly effective control (RCFMA, 
1979:304). However, as Table 7.4 indicates, there is no 
strong trend towards uniformity in this matter. While the 
government has committed itself to make the chief executives 
of the eight major transport and communications authorities 
'squarely accountable to their boards for performance' 
(Minister for Transport and Communications, 1988a:7), a 
number of recent statutes place the power to appoint, and set 
the terms and conditions for, the chief executive completely
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in the hands of the minister (see for example Australian 
Trade Commission Act 1985).
Table 7.4 Principal Location of Authority to Appoint the 
Chief Executive Officer and to set the Terms and 
Conditions of this Appointment in Statutory 
Authority Legislation, 1983-88
Year Cases where Authority 
Placed with Board









a In all but one case this means either the minister or the 
Governor General. In one case provision was made for an 
elected executive.
Source: Acts of the Australian Parliament.
If boards are to be given, or encouraged to exercise, 
greater powers, they should be subject to appropriate 
sanctions for failure to discharge their responsibilities 
adequately. The transport and communications GBEs are also 
at the forefront of an effort to heighten responsibility by 
extending the grounds for removal of board members. For 
ordinary part-time members these have typically included 
misbehaviour, physical or mental incapacity, bankruptcy, 
failure to disclose interests, conflict of interest as a 
result of other paid employment, and failure to attend three 
consecutive board meetings. For transport and communications 
GBEs the grounds for removal will now also include ongoing 
under-performance (Minister for Transport and Communications,
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1988b:7).
II. EVALUATION AND REVIEW
Strategic direction-setting by a range of actors is one of the 
two main components of what I have termed strategic control; 
the other is evaluation. The development of arrangements for 
regular, performance-oriented evaluation is the essential 
complement of a movement from detailed to strategic direction.
Our primary purpose in this section is to show that there has 
been over recent years an increased emphasis on this sort of 
evaluation of Commonwealth statutory authorities. A secondary 
purpose is to elucidate further the managerialist model of 
accountability and to show what it might mean in the 
Australian context if it were fully institutionalised. To 
this end Figure 7.1 sets out the main forms of periodic 
evaluation and review of statutory authorities which have been 
promoted in Australia and in other parliamentary democracies 
(in particular, Canada under its amended Financial 
Administration Act) over recent years. The discussion will 
follow the categories identified there, enabling us both to 
appreciate what a serious emphasis on evaluation would imply 
in practical terms and to determine how far current 
arrangements fall short of this situation.
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Figure 7.1 Forms of Evaluation and Review Associated with 
a Managerialist Approach to Accountability
Type of Evaluation/Review Basis/Associated Instrument
ENFORCED INTERNAL EVALUATION
Ex ante Corporate and Annual Operational
Plans required by enabling statute
Effectiveness Annual reporting obligation
EXTERNAL EVALUATION
Parliamentary Annual report; statutory and self-
assigned objectives, strategiesand policies
Ministerial Annual report and other reports or
information requested pursuant to 
minister’s statutory right toinformation
Ministerial/governmental Statutory power of appointment 
evaluation of board members' performance as part of the 
reappointment process
Performance Audit (by Audit Act
Australian Audit Office)
Parliamentary (Public Performance Audit
Accounts Committee)
EXTERNAL REVIEW
Periodic review of mandate Statutory requirement
by government and parliament
Internal Evaluation
As was suggested at the beginning of this chapter, 
managerialism sees the evaluative process as beginning with 
agency self-evaluation. During the 1980s there have been 
considerable efforts to promote agency self-evaluation, or 
internal evaluation, in the Commonwealth public sector. For
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ministerial departments the vehicle has been the Department of 
Finance's Financial Management Improvement Program (Department 
of Finance and Public Service Board, 1984; Department of 
Finance, 1987). Since 1984 this program has attempted to 
upgrade evaluation within budget-dependent agencies, as part 
of a gradual reform of resource management processes 
generally. In the case of statutory authorities the change 
has been reflected in new obligations imposed upon authorities 
through amendments to their enabling statutes.
But internal evaluation only becomes relevant to 
accountability, as distinct from contributing to efficient and 
effective management within the agency, when it facilitates 
external evaluation. There are two reasons why this is more 
likely to occur with statutory authorities than with 
ministerial departments. Firstly, the statute can be used to 
spell out and enforce a clearer set of linkages between 
internal and external evaluation. Secondly, statutory 
authorities have, in the annual report presented to 
parliament, a well established mechanism for making internal 
evaluation relevant to external evaluation. In very recent 
times ministerial departments have also been required to 
present annual reports. But, as Wettenhall (1987:21) has 
argued, the meaning of the annual report is inevitably 
different for the ministerial department and the statutory 
authority. In general the problem with evaluation in 
ministerial departments is that the pervasiveness of 
ministerial responsibility is a major impediment to the 
creation of a process of agency evaluation which does not
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directly implicate the minister (or, in other words, which is 
separate from the normal arrangements for ministerial 
accountability). These circumstances must strictly limit the 
extent to which internal evaluation can flow through to the 
external evaluative process.
Internal evaluation may be divided into three main 
stages: ex ante evaluation - the assessment of alternative 
objectives, strategies and policies; process evaluation - 
associated with the task of implementing programs and keeping 
them 'on the right track'; and effectiveness evaluation - 
assessment of how well objectives are being met and whether 
established programs continue to be necessary (Department of 
Finance, 1988:67). The first and the third of these stages 
are the most relevant for the external evaluation of statutory 
authorities. Increasingly, enabling statutes require both the 
performance of such evaluations and that the results of the 
evaluations be formally presented to key external actors 
(ministers and parliament). Ex ante evaluation is implied by 
statutory requirements for corporate and annual operational 
plans; and, as we have seen, these plans are typically 
required to be brought before ministers for approval14. This 
must assist ministers in evaluating the execution by 
authorities of key responsibilities vital to successful 
performance overall. By establishing objectives and sometimes 
performance indicators, the plans also create the 
preconditions for effectiveness evaluation. Effectiveness
14. In at least one case, the Australian Institute of Sport 
Act 1986, there is a requirement that the corporate plan be laid 
before parliament.
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evaluation itself is implied (albeit, as we shall see, more 
or less strongly) by the annual reporting obligation. The 
tabling of the annual report by the minister, in turn, makes 
(some part of) the internal evaluation available to the 
parliament for the latter's evaluative purposes.
Enough has already been said about the corporate 
planning process in Commonwealth statutory authorities to 
suggest how it might be relevant to external evaluation. A 
little more will be said on the subject later in passing. 
It is time, however, to look more closely at the annual 
reporting process and its relationship to evaluation.
Annual Reports and Evaluation
Two basic conditions need to be satisfied for the annual 
report to provide a strong foundation for external evaluation 
and hence to contribute importantly to public accountability. 
Firstly, there must be an obligation for statutory 
authorities to submit a report and for that report to be 
tabled in parliament in timely fashion. And secondly, the 
authority must be obliged to include in its reports specified 
information of particular relevance to the evaluation of its 
performance. The latter condition is likely to be more 
adequately satisfied the more the authority views the annual 
report as an exercise in explaining and accounting for its 
performance. Thus conceived, the annual report would assist 
external evaluators by communicating, in summary form, 
pertinent aspects of the agency's own effectiveness 
evaluation. It can be shown that significant progress has
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been made in the 1980s towards fulfilling these conditions in 
Commonwealth government.
In an earlier chapter reference was made to action taken 
in this period to strengthen the obligation of statutory 
authorities to report to parliament. This reform was 
primarily due to pressure by the Senate Standing Committee on 
Finance and Government Operations (SSCFGO)15. The need for 
improvement in reporting was a central theme of that 
Committee's first six reports on Commonwealth statutory 
authorities (SSCFGO, 1979a, 1979b, 1980, 1980b, 1982a, 1982b). 
Two basic weaknesses in existing arrangements were 
highlighted. The first was a lack of uniformity in the 
reporting requirements such that only 67 out of the 194 bodies 
listed in the Committee's First Report had what was described 
as the 'standard' reporting requirement: that the body
'report to the Minister as soon as practicable after the end 
of the financial year, with the minister to table in the 
Parliament within 15 days of receipt'. Some 98 bodies and 
their ministers were subject to a variety of other, generally 
less stringent, requirements and 29 had no obligation 
whatsoever to report (SSCFGO, 1979a:73). The second complaint 
concerned the lateness of submission and tabling of many 
reports. In this respect the Committee's Third Report found 
that '[t]he current situation is so bad that we consider that 
major and comprehensive changes... are required' (SSCFGO, 
1980a:63 ) .
15. But this was not the only parliamentary influence (see 
JCP, 1979).
331
The Committee’s preferred vehicle for rectifying these 
and other deficiencies in current reporting practice was an 
Annual Reports Act, modelled on similar Canadian legislation. 
This recommendation has not been adopted, but a similar result 
has been achieved by changes to legislative drafting practice 
and by the 1983 amendments to the Acts Interpretation Act 
referred to in Chapter 5. These amendments imposed an 
obligation on all statutory bodies which did not have a 
specific period within which to furnish a report to the 
minister to do so within six months of the close of the 
reporting period. The minister is required to table the 
report in parliament within 15 sitting days. In the case of 
late reports a written explanation must be provided, after 
which an extension may be granted. But both the letter and 
the reasons for the extension must be tabled in parliament16.
The SSCFGO was also keen to see an improvement in the 
contents of annual reports. Its particular concern was 
inconsistencies in the form of financial statements. It 
argued that bodies carrying out similar activities should be 
required to adopt a common form for their accounts so that 
their performance could be compared, both with one another 
and, where appropriate, with private sector organisations 
(SSCFGO, 1979a:80). The Committee also paid a good deal of 
attention to the related issue of the appropriate accounting 
standard for statutory authorities. Its interest in this 
question seems to have been stimulated by delays in reporting
16. But note that complaints about persistent lateness in 
lodging reports continue to be voiced (see ACT Division RAIPA, 
1989:13).
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which resulted from the need for some authorities to operate 
under both cash accounting and accrual accounting standards 
(see SSCFGO, 1980a:72-3). It was thus led to consider the 
relative merits of the two approaches. Cash accounting, the 
approach traditionally utilized by ministerial departments, 
shows only the receipts and payments of an organization during 
the year; whereas accrual, or commercial, accounting also 
monitors the assets and liabilities of the organization so 
that a balance sheet and a profit and loss statement can be 
prepared. The Committee came to the view that where possible 
accrual accounting should be used because of its ability to 
disclose more fully the financial affairs of an authority, 
including any financial support an authority may receive from 
the government (SSCFGO, 1980a:74).
The nature of financial information communicated by 
annual reports was addressed by the 'Guidelines for the Form 
and Standard of Financial Statements of Commonwealth 
Undertakings' issued by the government in 1983 (Department of 
Finance, 1983). These are a fairly extensive and detailed set 
of instructions, plus a useful crib on the 'philosophy' of 
financial reporting. Under the Guidelines, the financial 
statements of all 'undertakings' (80 statutory authorities and 
a number of departmental operations) are required to be 
prepared on an accrual basis, 'except where it may be 
demonstrated to the Minister for Finance that financial 
statements prepared on a cash basis are not materially 
different in terms of information conveyed to readers'. 
Another set of 'guidelines', in this case for the 'Content,
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Preparation and Presentation of Annual Reports of Statutory
Authorities', were issued by the government in late 1982
(Guidelines, 1982) . Like the guidelines on financial
statements, these originated in a governmental working party 
established in the late 1970s. The document is brief, but 
sets out time limits for reporting and includes a list of 
matters upon which authorities would henceforth be required to 
supply information. The specified items include enabling 
legislation; responsible minister; powers, functions and 
objects; membership and staff; financial statements; 
activities and reports; operational problems; and 
subsidiaries. Issued at the same time were 'Guidelines for 
Departmental Annual Reports' (Guidelines, 1982). In support 
of the earlier claim that departmental annual reports have 
been viewed differently to those for statutory authorities and 
have less potential as an instrument of accountability, it may 
be noted that the guidelines for departments were less 
commanding and less detailed than their counterpart for 
statutory authorities. They were, however, replaced by a 
stronger set in 198617.
The measures described above have demonstrably improved 
the timeliness and the contents of annual reports. Financial 
reporting, in particular, is now generally of a high standard. 
Moreover, these developments have clearly assisted the process 
of external evaluation. However, the reforms discussed so far 
fall short of requiring authorities to improve their use of
17. The later Guidelines for the Preparation of 
Departmental Annual Reports are reproduced and commented upon in 
JCPA (1986).
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annual reports to explain and assess performance. It is to 
this aspect of annual reporting that we must now turn.
The primary purpose of an annual report has always been 
understood to be to provide an 'account* of the authority's 
performance. But there is sufficient ambiguity about this 
concept for it to be unclear whether a report should simply 
provide a 'public record' of an authority's actions or, 
additionally, fulfil definite 'explanatory' and 
'justificatory' functions (Parliament of Western Australia, 
1983:9). The difference between these attributes of a report 
has become increasingly noticeable to Australian observers as 
notions of objective-setting and performance measurement have 
taken root in the Australian public sector, sharpening the 
meaning of explanation and evaluation of performance. Along 
with a firmer distinction between the ideas of public record, 
on the one side, and explanation and evaluation, on the other, 
has come a recognition that Australian reports have emphasized 
the former function to the neglect of the latter functions. 
Certain efforts to rectify this situation have ensued.
For once the SSCFGO was not an important agent of change. 
Despite (or perhaps because of) its preoccupation with annual 
reporting processes, that committee paid very little attention 
to the possible either need to rethink the role of reports or 
to inculcate in authority management a better understanding of 
the purpose of the exercise. Other parliamentary committees 
have been similarly unprepared to address these matters in any 
depth (but note SSCSE, 1978:1-2). The Royal Australian 
Institute of Public Administration (RAIPA) has, however, made
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a significant contribution to raising the explanatory and 
evaluative quality of reports through its Awards Scheme for 
annual reports begun in 1983 . So too has the insertion of new 
reporting obligations in authority statutes.
The survey of recent authority legislation conducted for 
this chapter revealed ten instances between 1983 and 1988 
where authorities acquired an explicit statutory obligation to 
include an evaluation of their performance in their annual 
reports. Table 7.5 lists the relevant legislation. Statutory 
provisions requiring self-evaluation seem not to have been 
used before 1985, but they have appeared sufficiently 
frequently since to suggest that they may become widespread in 
the future. A notable feature of the cases listed in Table 
7.5 is the link they establish between the annual report and 
the corporate planning process. The authorities must settle 
short term objectives or (where applicable) financial targets 
and performance indicators year by year as part of their 
formal planning and, subsequently, report on performance 
against these yardsticks.
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Table 7.5 Legislation Requiring Statutory Authorities to 
Evaluate Own Performance, 1983-88
Year Legislation
1985 Meat and Livestock Research and Development 
Corporation Act (No.12)
Australian Trade Commission Act (No.186)
1986 Federal Airports Corporation Act (No.4)
Dairy Produce Act (No.54)
Industry Research and Development Act (No.89) 
Pig Industry Act (No.157)
1987 Defence Housing Authority Act (No.101)
Australian Tourist Commission Act (No.136) 
Australian Horticultural Corporation Act (No.164)
1988 Civil Aviation Act (No.63)
Source: Acts of the Australian Parliament.
Growing expectations for annual reports of greater 
explanatory and evaluative quality have begun to produce 
results. The annual reports of Commonwealth statutory 
authorities of the late 1980s have in general been much more 
performance-oriented than hitherto. Commenting on the 1987-88 
reports of the government business enterprise group of 
authorities, the RAIPA Annual Reports Awards Panel expressed 
satisfaction that '[i]ncreasing attention is being given to 
identification of objectives and the difficult area of 
reporting performance against those objectives' (ACT Division 
RAIPA, 1989:13).
A perusal of a cross-section of the 1987-88 annual 
reports of Commonwealth statutory authorities confirms that a
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good deal has been achieved in this area. Good performance 
reporting requires a number of things (not all of which are 
equally applicable to each case): a meaningful statement of 
objectives; a discussion of the year's activities related to 
those objectives; presentation of an adequate range of 
performance indicators closely related to the authority's 
objectives; as far as is possible, measurement of performance 
in terms of those indicators and in comparison with relevant 
targets; comparison of measures of performance over a 
sufficient period of time to enable trends to be detected and, 
where appropriate, comparison of performance with other public 
or private sector entities; and explanation of outcomes 
against objectives. Of 35 more or less randomly selected 
reports very few, if any, fully satisfied these requirements. 
But a great majority of the authorities concerned evidently 
conceive annual reporting at least partly in these terms18 
and a substantial minority of reports rated well against most 
of the above criteria. When allowances are made for the 
differential applicability of performance measurement, 
examples of good performance reporting can be found among 
budget-dependent, non-trading authorities and off-budget, 
trading authorities alike.
Nevertheless, there is clearly much room for 
improvement in the reporting of performance. A small 
proportion of authorities are clearly either ignorant of the 
principles of this sort of reporting or unconvinced of its
18. For instance, five year summaries of financial 
performance are now common, as are statements of short term and 
medium term objectives.
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relevance to their activities. Even among those authorities 
for which the exercise has the most obvious relevance, that is 
the government business enterprises, the Awards Panel has 
identified a number of cases where public relations 
considerations have predominated in the preparation of reports 
(see ACT Division RAIPA, 1989:13). But authorities seem 
increasingly to view the quality of their annual reports as an 
indicator of managerial competence19. With this incentive to 
better reporting, the good role models which are liberally 
sprinkled through the 1987-88 reports are likely to influence 
growing numbers of authorities.
Use of Annual Reports by Parliament
As a result of the developments we have traced above, annual 
reports of Commonwealth statutory authorities in the late 
1980s are of considerable value for external evaluation. Such 
evaluation may be undertaken informally or semi-formally by a 
range of public and private sector actors with a variety of 
degrees of influence over the bodies concerned. However, if 
annual reports are to play an important role in formal 
evaluation, it is essential that there be adequate means of 
utilising them once they are tabled in parliament.
The Commonwealth Parliament has traditionally shown 
little interest in annual reports, treating them simply as a 
part of the mass of documents vaguely intended to satisfy the 
informational needs of members of parliament. The Lambert
19. One piece of evidence is that references to awards won 
for previous annual reports are prominently displayed in the 
reports.
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Commission reported the existence of similarly unsatisfactory 
arrangements for the scrutiny of reports in the Canadian 
parliament:
In the vernacular of the House of Commons a report 
'lies on the table' and unfortunately this expression 
conveys quite literally what happens to such reports: 
they just lie there (RCFMA, 1979:353).
This description was fully applicable to the Australian House 
of Representatives through the 1980s. Moreover, in the House 
of Representatives the tabling of authority reports is not 
even an occasion for the raising of issues related to the 
performance of the authorities, as happens fairly often in the 
Senate.
From the late 1970s, in contrast, the Senate has 
attempted to institutionalise the consideration of annual 
reports. Under a sessional order first agreed to in March 
1978 annual reports are automatically referred (that is, 
without any Question being put) by the President of the Senate 
to the appropriate Legislative and General Purpose Committees. 
The order specifies that these Committees 'may, at their 
discretion, pursue or not pursue inquiries into reports so 
received'. As has been discussed, the SSCFGO made scrutiny of 
the annual reports of statutory authorities an important part 
of its activity. Several of the other committees have also 
reported on the annual reports referred to them. But the 
process is still evolving, with the Committees experimenting 
in an attempt to discover a satisfactory means of dealing with 
the documents. Until recently it was both usual and 
justifiable for the committees to focus on the standard of
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reporting as part of the campaign to improve the timeliness,
consistency and quality of reports. By the early 1980s,
however, enough progress had been made on this front for
committees to feel the need to devise strategies for dealing
with the contents of reports. The experience of the two
committees which have made the greatest commitment to using
annual reports as a basis for inquiry may be briefly reviewed
in order to illustrate the progress which has been made as
well as the pitfalls which have been encountered.
In its second report on annual reports the Senate
Standing Committee on Science and the Environment observed
that 'annual reports of departments and statutory authorities
offer a potentially vast field of inquiry for Legislative and
General Purpose Committees' and announced its intention to
explore some areas of the field by calling evidence from time
to time on some of the reports referred to it (SSCSE, 1978:1).
Several reports later the Chairman reflected on the change
which had taken place in the Committee's approach to its task:
In earlier years, a common approach by standing 
committees was to examine briefly all the annual 
reports referred to them... Limitations of time and 
staff impose severe constraints on the standing 
committees in attempting to use the review of annual 
reports as a means of overseeing the activities of the 
Executive. In the inquiry leading to its May 1982 
report, the Committee tried to circumvent these 
constraints by selecting particular aspects of two of 
the 45 annual reports referred to it for examination 
that year (Senate, CPD, 2 November 1983:2109).
The two inquiries conducted in accordance with this selective 
strategy revealed certain difficulties which led the Committee 
to adjust its practice again. The Chairman now felt that, in 
order to ensure the collection of a sufficiently wide range of
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evidence and to give proper consideration to matters raised, 
at least six months needed to be allotted to an inquiry. As 
a result, he considered it 'advisable' that issues chosen for 
investigation in the future should, in most cases, be of 
'relatively long term interest' (Senate, CPD, 2 November 
1983:2110).
In 1985 the same committee considered a submission from 
the Royal Australian Institute of Public Administration 
(RAIPA) and heard evidence from a representative of the 
Australian Capital Territory Division of that body on the 
question of the manner in which annual reports should be dealt 
with (see SSCSTE, 1985). While much of the advice received 
focused on the old issue of timeliness and the related matter 
of the Committee's work timetable, a selective approach to the 
review of reports was endorsed. Little was said or concluded, 
however, about the sort of subject that should be chosen. The 
Committee subsequently began an inquiry into National 
Information Policy, a topic which arose from its consideration 
of the 1983/84 Annual Report of the Australian Libraries and 
Information Council. It is understandable that the Committee 
should feel that its scarce resources of time and manpower are 
best utilised on inquiries into matters of enduring interest, 
somewhat removed from the immediate context of politics and 
administration. Indeed, the Legislative and General Purpose 
Committees were intended to perform precisely this role and by 
now have a history of substantial achievement in work of this 
kind (see Uhr, 1981:53-7; Aldons, 1985; Reid and Forrest,
1989:375-80, 396). Nevertheless, it is questionable whether
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such activity contributes greatly to the review of the recent 
performance of administrative agencies, which is surely the 
main purpose of scrutinising annual reports.
However, an attempt to take this objective seriously can 
cause problems in the relationship between parliament and 
statutory authorities, as the Senate Standing Committee on 
Education and the Arts has discovered. Like the Science, 
Technology and Environment Committee, this committee had by 
the mid-1980s passed from the stage of reporting on the 
timeliness and form of annual reports to that of considering 
substantive matters of policy and administration arising out 
of the documents. Its first exercise of this type was an 
inquiry based on the annual reports of four agencies involved 
in the production, the regulation and the framing of policy 
for children’s television (SSCEA, 1985a and 1986a). This was 
followed by reports on aspects of the operation of the 
Australian Capital Territory Schools Authority and the 
Australian National Gallery respectively (SSCEA, 1985b and 
1986b). But it was the Committee’s decision to conduct an 
inquiry into changes in the Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation's radio coverage of horse racing in Queensland, 
following its examination of the Corporation's 1983-84 and 
1984-85 annual reports, which revealed the sort of difficulty 
which committees may encounter in attempting to review the 
recent performance of particular statutory authorities.
The ABC objected to an inquiry which it saw as 'narrowly 
confined to a particular programming decision' and which, it 
argued, 'placed ABC programming under external authority and
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impaired its editorial functions'20. It drew a distinction 
between administration, for which it had an active 
responsibility to parliament, and programming powers, which 
were held as 'a trust on behalf of the people of Australia' 
and exercised 'by law and convention' free from governmental 
and parliamentary intervention. The Corporation stated that 
it was prepared to comment on the issues of principle and the 
general processes by which ABC programming decisions are made, 
but not on the decisions themselves. Accordingly, it refused 
to appear before the Committee to give evidence on the 
adequacy of its racing service in Queensland.
The Committee, for its part, asserted its 'right and 
duty' to examine decisions of a statutory authority which 
affect the services it provides to the public. It argued that 
in practice programming and administrative matters could not 
be as neatly separated as the corporation seemed to believe, 
because 'programming decisions will invariably have financial 
and administrative implications'. Against the Corporation's 
allegation of parliamentary interference in programming, the 
Committee insisted on a distinction of its own: between the 
explanation of past events and the direction of future 
actions. The Committee simply 'wished to know how and why a 
particular decision was made and to ascertain the effects of 
this decision on the people of Queensland'. Its inquiry would
The objections raised in the ABC's submission to the 
inquiry are reproduced at various points in the Committee's 
report (SSCEA, 1986). The submission was subsequently published 
as a monograph (ABC, 1986).
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not have infringed the 'ABC's responsibility to consider 
whether any further changes to its radio racing service in 
Queensland were necessary' (SSCEA, 1986c:59-63).
It is doubtful, however, whether the Committee's 
distinction is any more meaningful in practice than that 
advanced by the Corporation between programming and 
administration. Clearly an adverse finding by the Committee 
would exert pressure on the Corporation to alter its 
programming and in that sense might be held to constitute 
interference in program decision-making. On the other hand, 
the Committee's position is understandable. The injunction to 
take seriously the examination of annual reports leads 
naturally to a focus on the decisions which have affected a 
body's recent performance. The choice of subject in this case 
may have been unwise, as the scrutiny of particular recent 
programming decisions inevitably called up the spectre of a 
parliamentary committee seeking to assume editorial powers 
over the ABC. It might also be argued that the subject was 
not well chosen to facilitate an evaluation of important 
aspects of the Corporation's performance. But it is, in fact, 
precisely this sort of issue - a matter of policy having a 
wide and direct impact on members of the public - which 
committees are likely to feel the strongest temptation to 
pursue.
Thus parliament has made tentative efforts towards 
institutionalising consideration of statutory authority 
reports. Despite recent progress, however, the achievement is 
not impressive. Some improvement is possible as parliament
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continues to experiment and to learn from its experience. 
Nevertheless, the sort of performance evaluation which is 
likely to result from this process is likely to be less 
systematic, more particularistic, and more policy oriented - 
in a word, more political - than managerialists might hope. 
But this is not a legitimate cause for complaint; it is 
simply inevitable.
Ministerial Evaluation
Because of their prominence in recent efforts to improve 
statutory authority accountability, the first two forms of 
evaluation presented in Figure 7.1 have been discussed at 
considerable length. Most of the remaining instruments 
identified in Figure 7.1 may be dealt with more briefly either 
because they have been less prominent in recent reforms or 
because they are more familiar.
Figure 7.1 identifies two types of ministerial evaluation 
of statutory authority performance. The first is implicit in 
the process, discussed earlier in this chapter, of ministerial 
approval of corporate and annual operational plans which is 
mandatory for growing numbers of statutory authorities. 
Similarly, for budget-dependent authorities it is implicit in 
ministerial approval of estimates of expenditure submitted in 
advance of the earmarking of annual appropriations. In both 
cases more or less careful judgements about previous 
performance are made before future funding or future 
programmes of action are approved. In making their 
evaluations ministers may draw upon annual reports. But they
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may also acquire additional information as a result of either 
their statutory powers to call for additional reports or the 
statutory obligations imposed on authorities to keep ministers 
informed.
The second type of ministerial evaluation concerns 
judgements about the performance of individuals which are made 
by ministers and cabinet in deciding the appointment and 
(especially) reappointment of members of statutory boards and, 
in those cases where ministers have the power, chief executive 
officers as well. The Lambert Commission emphasized the 
potency of this form of evaluation and argued for its further 
development and institutionalisation in Canada (RCFMA, 
1979:322-3). But it is not clear how well developed is the 
corresponding process in Australian Commonwealth government.
Virtually nothing has been said in parliamentary reports 
or ministerial statements about the need to improve either of 
the forms of ministerial evaluation identified above. It is 
relevant to recall, however, that the 1988 reforms to the 
Transport and Communications GBEs include the addition of 
ongoing underperformance to the grounds for removal of board 
members. Taking this seriously would imply a strengthening of 
the machinery of formal evaluation of individual performance.
Performance Audit
The next item in Figure 7.1 is performance audit. As 
suggested in the previous chapter, the development of 
performance auditing by the Australian Audit Office since 1979
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is a significant departure from the traditional role of the 
Auditor-General within the Gladstonian circle of financial 
control. Indeed, that development fits squarely within the 
trend, under examination in the present section, towards a 
strengthening of mechanisms for elected representatives to 
evaluate administrative performance. A recent parliamentary 
report on the audit function has insisted, as have previous 
commentaries, that audit and evaluation are different 
activities (JCPA, 1989:156). This accepted, it remains the 
case that an important purpose of performance audit is to 
assist performance evaluation.
What then does performance audit entail, and how relevant 
is it to the evaluation of statutory authorities? The first 
point to make is that the Audit Act does not speak of 
performance audit but of 'efficiency audit' which (in Section 
2(4)) it defines as follows:
(a) an examination of the functions performed by, and 
the operations carried on by, the body or person for the 
purpose of forming an opinion concerning the extent to 
which those operations are being carried on in an 
economical and efficient manner; and
(b) an examination of the procedures that are followed 
by the body or person for reviewing operations carried on 
by the body or person, and an evaluation of the adequacy 
of those procedures to enable the body or person to 
assess the extent to which those operations are being 
carried on in an economical and efficient manner.
As noted in Chapter 5, these provisions have been interpreted
by the Auditor-General as including review of the
effectiveness of management and management techniques. As the
Department of Finance has recently observed, however, the
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limits of efficiency audits are ambiguous21. Both the 
Department of Finance and the Joint Committee of Public 
Accounts (JCPA) have suggested the need to draw a clearer 
distinction between the review of administrative 
effectiveness, which they claim is the Auditor's proper 
responsibility, and the review of policy effectiveness, which 
should normally be the executive's responsibility. The JCPA, 
in its major report on the Australian Audit Office, has argued 
that such a division of labour can be achieved by means of two 
rules (JCPA, 1989:154-7). Firstly, the Auditor-General should 
not comment directly on policy but may legitimately identify 
a policy (for example, staff ceilings) where this is a factor 
affecting efficiency. Secondly, the Auditor-General should 
not evaluate programs but should confine himself to reviewing 
the adequacy of agencies’ evaluation planning. On this 
argument, which largely refines and makes explicit the 
understandings informing current practice22, it seems that 
audit has a strictly limited (albeit significant) role to play 
in assisting the evaluation of administrative performance23.
21. The Department's views were presented in a submission 
to the Public Accounts Committee's inquiry into the Audit Office 
and are reported in JCPA (1989:155).
22. Note the Auditor-General's claim, as reported, that he 
'did not believe that he had the legislative right to examine 
government policy in any field, nor did he wish to' (JCPA, 
1989:155)
23. Compare the situation in the United States where the 
General Accounting Office is involved in the audit of 'program 
results'. According to 'Standards for Audit of Government 
Organizations, Programs, Activities and Functions' published by 
the GAO in 1972, the purpose of this activity is to determine 
'whether the desired results or benefits are being achieved, 
whether the objectives established by the legislature or other 
authorising body are met, and whether the agency has considered
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But the JCPA's position, as stated in its 1989 report, is
in fact more complex than this. Interestingly, from our point
of view, the report reaches quite different conclusions about
the limits of the audit function for statutory authorities and
ministerial departments respectively. The argument described
above was directed exclusively at the audit of ministerial
departments. In contrast the JCPA (1989:182) found as follows
for other forms of administrative agency:
Audits of SAs, SMAs, GBEs and government companies can 
examine policies of those organisations by reviewing, for 
example, whether these were achieved. Essentially the 
focus of efficiency audits is a matter for the Auditor- 
General's judgement. In the conduct of efficiency audits 
in these organisations, the Auditor-General should not 
feel constrained if efficiency audit reports comment on 
auditees' policies... [whereas] a commentary or analysis 
on government policies in ministerial departments will 
remain beyond the Auditor-General's charter.
These sharply differing findings for the two broad categories
of government agency were a product of the JCPA's assumption
that ministerial departments are 'primarily involved in
administering or implementing predetermined government policy'
whereas 'government business enterprises', if not other
statutory authorities, are 'independent, self-managing
businesses setting their own commercial and investment
policies within the framework of their legislative guidelines'
(JCPA, 1989:181; also JCPA, 1987:16). We know enough about
both ministerial departments and statutory authorities to
realize that this exaggerates the difference between them.
Nevertheless, the JCPA provides an authoritative statement of
alternatives which might yield desired results at a lower cost' 
(see the description of the General Accounting Office in RCAGA 
Appendix Volume Four, 1976:173-81).
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the view that performance evaluations of statutory authorities 
should be able to draw upon more comprehensive performance 
audits than their counterparts for ministerial departments. 
Indeed, on the JCPA's argument, there would be little if any 
distinction between audit and evaluation of statutory 
authority performance: audit would in fact be a major 
instrument of evaluation.
If this suggests that the potential relevance of 
efficiency audit may be greater for statutory authorities than 
for ministerial departments, its present relevance is somewhat 
less. (In neither case, however, could the role of efficiency 
audit be described as well developed.) This is because of the 
very small number of efficiency audits of statutory 
authorities which have been completed24. But another factor 
which may impair the potential of efficiency audit in the case 
of statutory authorities is the possible shift to private 
auditors. The primary produce marketing authorities and the 
transport and communications GBEs have recently been permitted 
choice of auditor. By early 1989, only one marketing 
authority and one GBE had appointed a private audit firm. But 
the Auditor-General and the JCPA have expressed concern that 
an increase in the number of efficiency audits of these
24. Only 7 (or 13.5 per cent) of the 52 efficiency audits 
conducted by the Commonwealth Auditor-General between 1979 and 
1988 were concerned with statutory authorities or government- 
owned companies. This compares with 23 for departments and 22 
for 'departmental outriders' (JCPA, 1989:136; see also p.138). 
Another form of comparison is in terms of length of 'audit cycle' 
- that is, years taken to complete audits of all programs with 
income or expenditure over say $10m. At the rate of progress 
achieved in the late 1980s audit cycle lengths were 54 years for 
statutory authorities, 48 years for ministerial departments and 
20 years for departmental outriders (JCPA, 1989:223).
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authorities would produce a flight to private auditors (who do 
not conduct unsolicited efficiency audits) (JCPA, 1989:166-7).
Efficiency audit is thus far from having realized its 
potential as an instrument of, or an instrument assisting, 
evaluation25. However, it has some prospect of doing so over 
the next decade. The JCPA (1989:221-31) has strongly 
recommended a major increase in funding for efficiency, or 
performance, audits. If that recommendation were to be 
implemented, audit could be expected to contribute greatly to 
the consolidation of the managerialist approach to 
administrative accountability. Moreover, the audit of 
statutory authorities might make an especially significant 
contribution to that end as, on the JCPA view, audit would be 
afforded greater scope in the case of statutory authorities.
However far audit develops towards an instrument of 
evaluation in its own right, it will remain also an important 
input into the evaluative activities of other, especially 
parliamentary, actors. We must therefore briefly trace the 
influence of efficiency auditing in this area. The JCPA has 
been the traditional recipient of audit reports and its role 
has, not surprisingly, expanded in recent years in line with 
the development of the audit function.
Following the adoption of efficiency auditing the Public 
Accounts Committee Amendment Act 1979 gave that Committee
25. Note that Australia compares poorly with New Zealand 
and Canada in terms of the proportion of audit resources devoted 
to efficiency audits. The figures for national government audit 
were 10 per cent and 42.8 per cent for New Zealand and Canada 
respectively in 1988-89, compared with 6 per cent for Australia 
in 1987-88 (JCPA, 1989:223-5)
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explicit authority to examine efficiency audit reports. A 
year or so later the parliament enhanced the Committee's 
freedom of access to these reports by abandoning its 
requirement for the reports to be formally referred to the 
Committee by parliamentary motion. In response the Committee 
has begun to move beyond its traditional concern with 'fraud, 
over-expenditure, non-observance of Treasury regulations and 
the absence of proper auditing procedures' (Emy, 1978:490) to 
embrace tentatively the notion of performance evaluation26.
The JCPA does not monopolise the parliamentary 
consideration of efficiency audit reports. The House of 
Representatives Expenditure Committee was also involved until 
its disappearance in 1988. For instance, in 1986, while the 
JCPA was engaged in inquiries resulting from efficiency audit 
reports on the Export Development Grants Board and the 
property operations of the Australian Wool Corporation 
(Auditor-General, 1986:46-7), the Expenditure Committee 
presented a report on the Overseas Telecommunications 
Commission's control over manpower and property, based on 
another efficiency audit (HRSCE, 1986c). The Senate Standing 
Committee on Finance and Government Operations (SSCFGO) has 
also examined matters raised in Auditor-General reports on 
reference from the Senate, or by its own decision under its 
standing reference to oversee the finances, administration and 
accountability of statutory authorities and other government-
26. In 1985 the Committee reported that, while its primary 
concern remained 'the cost effectiveness of policy rather than 
its objectives, it was 'becoming more interested in analyzing the 
process by which those objectives are determined' (JCPA, 
1985b:1).
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owned bodies. As part of its long-term program of monitoring 
the annual reports of statutory authorities, the SSCFGO 
frequently explored instances where the Auditor had qualified 
the financial statements of an authority. With the 
establishment of a system of select committees in the House 
of Representatives in 1987, the range of parliamentary 
committees making use of efficiency audit reports has 
expanded further (see JCPA, 1989:319).
Periodic, Comprehensive Review
The final instrument listed in Figure 7.1 is the periodic 
review of the mandate and overall performance of a statutory 
authority. The potential benefits of this instrument have 
not been seriously canvassed in the Commonwealth public 
sector, mainly, one suspects, because the notion of periodic 
review has tended to be treated as incidental to the idea of 
'sunset' legislation. For instance, the SSCFGO (1979a:87-92; 
1982a:49-57) gave serious consideration to the sunset concept 
that is, a periodic reauthorisation requirement for 
statutory authorities. But, having concluded that only very 
occasional use of the measure was desirable (1982a:54-5), the 
SSCFGO saw no need to examine separately the case for 
mandatory periodic reviews. (But it did state its preference 
for the use of annual reports to identify agencies for 
selective review.)
The Canadian Lambert Commission, in contrast, was 
careful to separate the two issues. Like the SSCFGO, it
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argued for a statutorily imposed ministerial review of mandate 
and operations of each body not less than once every ten 
years. Further, a report on each review should, it argued, be 
required to be tabled in parliament and be automatically 
referred to the appropriate standing committee. Such a review 
might or might not lead to the abolition of an agency. But 
its primary purpose, building on the regular assessments 
conducted by parliamentary committees, would be to determine 
whether the agency had fulfilled, or was making satisfactory 
progress towards fulfilling, its statutory objectives and, 
just as importantly, whether these objectives required 
modification in the light of a decade's experience (RCFMA, 
1979:325,353).
Despite the absence of strong support for either sunset 
clauses or periodic review in Australian Commonwealth 
government, the ideas have attained a degree of practical 
expression in that arena. But, in accordance with the 
tendency noted above for review to be viewed as subordinate to 
the sunset idea, such requirements for review as have been 
imposed are mostly implicit ones, consequent upon the 
existence of a statutory provision terminating the authority 
at a set date some years on27. In only one case (the 
Employment, Education and Training Act) is there an explicit 
statutory requirement for a formal review along the lines
27. The following Acts (to 1988) have imposed some form of 
obligation for review: Human Rights Commission Act 1981 (No.24); 
Steel Industry Authority Act 1983 (No.124); Automotive Industry 
Authority Act 1984 (No.106); Textiles, Clothing and Footwear 
Development Authority Act 1988 (No.14); Anti-Dumping Authority 
Act 1988 (No.72); Employment, Education and Training Act 1988 
(No.80).
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recommended by Lambert. Within five years of the enactment of 
the enabling legislation the minister is required to bring 
about an external review of the authorities created and to 
table the resulting report in the parliament within 15 days.
Periodic review, then, is currently a very minor part of 
the machinery of accountability for Commonwealth statutory 
authorities. But there are some signs that it may come to 
play a larger role. The instances of its use noted above are 
recent and are likely to inspire imitation. A related 
instrument whose wide use may be envisaged has also recently 
been discussed by the JCPA (1989:181-2). This is a five- 
yearly 'strategic audit' of trading authorities, an idea 
originally advocated in Australia by the New South Wales 
Commission of Audit (1988:94). The strategic audit would be 
essentially an efficiency audit, but one conducted, unlike 
current efficiency audits, at regular and reasonably short 
intervals. Also unlike many current efficiency audits, it 
would concentrate on the organization as a whole rather than 
a particular aspect, or aspects, of its operations.
III. A NEW CONCEPTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIVENESS 
The third feature of the managerialist approach to 
accountability identified at the outset has been an implicit 
theme in the previous sections of this chapter. We must now 
draw explicit attention to its presence and elaborate some of 
its more important manifestations.
It will be recalled that along with its complementary 
emphases on strategic direction and evaluation and review, the
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managerialist approach, as we have explained it, understands 
the accountability relationship as involving responsiveness to 
objective performance values rather than, as has been the 
tendency hitherto, responsiveness to the expectations of 
political representatives. There are in fact two aspects to 
this development which may be distinguished. Firstly, the
government-authority relationship is increasingly seen in 
quasi-contractual terms, whereby legislative and ministerial 
direction establish an objective 'mission' for the authority 
which the latter is thereafter responsible for achieving. (It 
is for this reason that it has become popular to identify the 
lack of a strong framework of legislative and ministerial 
directions as a serious defect in accountability regimes for 
statutory authorities - see for example PBRC, 1981:131.) This 
understanding of the relationship de-emphasises the need for 
the authority to interpret, and to stand continually ready to 
respond to, the wishes of politicians and focuses attention 
instead on fulfilment of the specified terms of the 
'contract'.
The second aspect is the growing significance of pre- 
established, objective, and often instrumental criteria 
against which the adequacy of an authority's discharge of its 
responsibilities is assessed. Such formalisation of
evaluation is manifested in the new emphasis on timely formal 
reporting of performance against pre-established objectives; 
in the effort to develop quantifiable performance indicators; 
and in the growing importance of audit within the evaluative 
process, audit being virtually synonymous with the application
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of 'objective rules and criteria' (Linder, 1978:191) to 
administrative performance.
A related development, insofar as it is also symptomatic 
of the prominence of process, or instrumental, values in the 
contemporary conception of accountability, is the movement 
towards stricter formal standards for decision-making 
processes. One manifestation, following the Committee of 
Inquiry on Public Duty and Private Interest (Bowen, 1979), is 
new statutory provisions to prevent conflict of interest in 
the decision-making of statutory boards. Another
manifestation, this time a product of the 'new administrative 
law' introduced in the late 1970s and early 1980s, is the 
requirement that many decisions taken by statutory authorities 
be open to scrutiny by the Ombudsman, to judicial review and 
to review on their merits by the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal (AAT). Also part of the administrative law reforms 
was the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act (1982), under which 
agencies must make available internal rules and guidelines 
used in making decisions affecting citizens. This
requirement, together with the fact that under the AAT Act 
1975 and the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 
1977 decision-makers must supply on request a written 
statement of the reasons for a reviewable decision, has 
created a strong incentive for agencies to enhance the 
regularity of their decision-making processes (Griffiths, 
1985:462). It should be noted, however, that the developments 
outlined in this paragraph are not unique to statutory 
authorities (though the administrative law reforms were
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applied to Commonwealth statutory authorities earlier than to 
the ministerial departments) and that trading authorities 
enjoy significant exemptions from the FOI Act28.
If accountability is increasingly understood in terms of 
responsiveness to specialized performance values, then the 
value upon which most emphasis has recently been placed is 
that of economic efficiency in the use of resources29. Among 
statutory authorities this value clearly has most relevance to 
trading authorities, or Government Business Enterprises (GBEs) 
- that is, those authorities whose performance is most readily 
and appropriately measured in economic terms. In what follows 
we shall concentrate on this category of bodies.
We noted above the trend towards a more formalised 
government-authority relationship. In the case of trading 
authorities this is particularly clear30. The model which 
has been increasingly promoted as the basis of government- 
authority interaction is that of shareholder to public 
company. Like any shareholder, so the argument goes, the 
government should be primarily interested in achieving an 
acceptable financial return on the funds it has invested in 
the particular enterprise. In addition to its role as 
shareholder, however, the government is acknowledged to have
28. See Schedule 2 of Freedom of Information Act 1982 
(No.3).
29. The reasons for this development were touched upon in 
Chapter 1.
30. The ideas outlined in this paragraph were very much 'in 
the air' of the Commonwealth public sector in the late 1980s. 
For instance, they pervaded the remarks of my interviewees in 
early 1989.
359
another legitimate role which will be more or less evident in 
different cases. This is to determine the nature and level of 
other than commercially justifiable activities it wishes the 
enterprise to undertake in pursuit of certain policy 
objectives. But, once identified, these activities should, it 
is held, be performed by the authority under a de facto 
contract with the government. In order that the authority 
should not take decisions on non-commercial grounds, it should 
be made clear that 'community service obligations' (CSOs) are 
met at the direction of the government and constitute grounds 
for some form of financial compensation from the government.
The attribution to the government of these two roles, and 
these alone, is intended to clarify the decision-making 
environment of authorities. In particular, proponents of this 
approach suggest that one of its virtues is to make 
unambiguously clear that the primary obligation of authorities 
is to use the resources at their disposal in an economically 
justifiable manner. Authorities should not, it is said, be 
required to make trade-offs between commercial and political 
objectives; that is the job of governments. Economically 
justifiable resource use is also the principal criterion 
against which, it is argued, the performance of authorities 
should be judged.
These ideas about the running of statutory trading 
authorities are not new to the Commonwealth public sector but 
they have been taken up with much greater enthusiasm in the 
1980s than ever before. Two major reports - that of the 
(Davidson) Committee of Inquiry into Telecommunications
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Services in Australia (CITSA, 1982) and that of the Senate 
Select Committee on Statutory Authority Financing (SSCSAF, 
1983) - were particularly influential in producing a
favourable political climate, though the main (proximate) 
sources of ideas have been Treasury, the Department of Finance 
and private financial management consultants. A formal 
commitment to reform by the government, however, came only in 
October 1987 with the Paper on Policy Guidelines for 
Commonwealth Statutory Authorities and Government Business 
Enterprises (Minister for Finance, 1987). The thrust of the 
changes recommended for GBEs by that paper was to combine a 
reduction in controls over enterprise operations (as discussed 
earlier) with a requirement that enterprises operate within 
the discipline imposed by a rate of return financial target. 
As a result of work done to realize this projected change, the 
Minister for Transport and Communications subsequently issued 
a more detailed policy statement outlining reforms concerning 
the eight enterprises associated with that portfolio (Minister 
for Transport and Communications, 1988a). As the latter 
include many of the most important Commonwealth GBEs, this 
development is important in its own right. But because of the 
prominence of the authorities involved it is possible that the 
reforms will also generate a significant flow on effect to 
authorities in other sectors.
Before examining more closely the changes underway in the 
authorities mentioned above, it will be useful to outline 
briefly certain salient features of the pre-existing 
situation. As part of its 1983 report the Senate Select
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Committee on Statutory Authority Financing analyzed the 
financial performance of nine major authorities and found that 
performance to be both variable and often unimpressive 
(SSCSAF, 1983:37-72; see also Carroll, 1986). But as 
significant as this finding was the difficulty the committee 
experienced in attempting to derive an economically meaningful 
and consistent set of rate of return figures, due to the 
diverse financial management and accounting techniques 
employed by the authorities (see SSCSAF, 1983:23-35). These 
problems had been highlighted the previous year by Shand. In 
his examination of eight Commonwealth authorities, Shand 
(1982) found marked and apparently arbitrary discrepancies in 
the nature of their capital bases, in the nature of dividend 
and other payments to the Commonwealth, in the liability for 
Commonwealth taxes and charges, in the form and level of 
financial targets, and in pricing policies. His particular 
concern was that these discrepancies made it difficult to 
compare the financial performance of authorities, both with 
one another and with private sector enterprises, in order to 
judge whether capital was being employed in its most 
productive uses.
The differing target rates of return and the poor 
financial performance of many authorities are partly explained 
by the fact that authorities are, for community reasons, often 
expected to deliver certain services which they either would 
not perform at all or would provide at a lower level if they 
were acting solely on commercial considerations. They have 
also been subjected to certain costs as a part of the public
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sector which they would not have experienced otherwise31. 
The problem here is that 'community service obligations' 
(CSOs) are very rarely specified clearly or explicitly 
required by legislation or regulation. In general their 
'implementation is broadly at the discretion of the management 
of the GBE' (BTCE, 1988:3). For these reasons, and because 
explicitly targeted financial assistance on the 'recoup' 
principle is rarely paid to Commonwealth authorities, there 
has been very little incentive for authorities to cost CSOs 
separately. As a result the impact of CSOs on rates of return 
was simply unknown with any degree of accuracy (see Shand, 
1982; BTCE, 1988).
For present purposes the main conclusion to be drawn from 
the above is that rate of return targets have traditionally 
played little or no role in accountability arrangements for 
Commonwealth GBEs. The financial targets which have been 
employed are, as Shand (1982:56) has shown, often so vague or 
so easily achievable that 'no effective target' has existed. 
Further, Shand (1982:58) has suggested that targets have been 
to an extent historically determined, their form and levels 
being in some cases 'merely an ex post rationalization for 
failure to achieve a [meaningful] financial target'.
A central feature of current GBE reforms, as noted above, 
is the shift to an economically meaningful rate of return 
financial target as the main disciplinary force in GBE 
decision-making. The idea of rate of return targets for
31. On the other hand, membership of the public sector also 
confers certain benefits on trading authorities (Shand, 1982:55).
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public enterprises is 'to ensure that, after allowing for any 
identified CSOs, resources are used at least as efficiently in 
the public sector as would be the case if they were subject to 
normal commercial judgements' (Department of Finance, 
1988b:3). This means that for each GBE the financial target 
should, in the words of the 1987 Policy Guidelines Paper, 'be 
designed to achieve a ... return sufficient to justify the 
long term retention of assets in the enterprise', rather than 
their application to some other public or private use 
(Department of Finance, 1987:22). Consequently, target rates 
of return are set to reflect rates achieved by comparable 
private sector enterprises or, in the absence of the latter, 
some other relevant private sector benchmark.
The rate of return target is the quintessential objective 
performance criterion for statutory trading authorities. Its 
projected adoption in accountability regimes for Commonwealth 
GBEs is thus clear evidence of the particular change under 
discussion in this section. As an economist in the Bureau of 
Transport and Communication Economics succinctly observed, in 
very much the same terms we have employed, whereas 
accountability for these authorities in the past meant 
'political control' it now means 'achieving a satisfactory 
return on resources employed' (Interview, February 1989).
This observation reinforces the impression that what we 
are discussing is something akin to a Kuhnian paradigm shift. 
The rate of return concept is not so much a means of making 
statutory authorities more accountable in some accepted sense 
as it is part of a different way of understanding
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accountability. Moreover, as with a Kuhnian paradigm shift, 
the new conceptual framework produces a new agenda for 
research and new difficulties as much as it produces new ways 
around old problems. In this case the research agenda has to 
do with the problems involved in operationalising the rate of 
return concept. This task is by no means straightforward, 
especially given the generally unsuitable accounting and 
financial management practices previously followed by 
Commonwealth authorities. While progress has been made 
towards applying the new approach, a target which is soundly 
based in economic terms had not been achieved for any 
authority by early 1989 (the time of writing). Indeed, the 
difficulties in operationalising rate of return targets 
(discussed below) are serious enough to dampen any residual 
feeling that the latter offer a readily available and 
obviously superior approach to accountability. On the other 
hand, the fact that considerable effort has been applied to 
overcoming the obstacles since the publication of the 
Department of Finance policy papers in 1986 and 1987 suggests 
a strong commitment to the new approach in the Commonwealth 
public sector.
We may briefly refer to the main tasks involved in 
deploying the rate of return concept in order to illustrate 
the magnitude of the undertaking as well as the difficulties 
which may prevent a fully successful outcome. The tasks have 
to do with asset valuation; identification and costing of 
CSOs; choice of the form of rate of return measure; and the 
setting of the target rate (see generally Bureau of Transport
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and Communications Economics, 1988).
The appropriate valuation of assets is important because 
'in broad terms the economic rate of return of an enterprise 
is determined by comparing the enterprise's economic income to 
a market valuation of the enterprise or its assets'32 
(Treasury, 1988:1). Typically, for Commonwealth authorities 
current asset values have not been known because the 
authorities have traditionally practised historical rather 
than current cost accounting (SSCSAF, 1983:27-8). Valuing 
assets on a purely historical basis, as the Department of 
Finance (1988b:3) has noted, 'inject[s] an element of 
arbitrariness into a rate of return comparison due to 
differences in longevity of assets and in the relative 
inflation rate of different assets'. The process of shifting 
to market valuations of assets is, however, underway. The 
Department of Finance (1988c:4) reported that 'in most cases 
Commonwealth GBEs are required to undertake a valuation of 
assets before finalising 1987-88 dividends or before any 
legislation necessary to implement the [1988] reforms comes 
into force; and in other cases, in the absence of special 
arrangements, revaluations should be reflected in the accounts 
for the year ended 30 June 1989' . The Department of Finance's 
draft guidelines for asset valuation in GBEs provide for 
comprehensive current valuations at least every five years or 
over a five year cycle (Department of Finance, 1988c:4). But 
determining the current cost of a large variety of the non-
32. The change in the market value of an enterprise or its 
assets is in turn central to the determination of economic income 
(Treasury, 1988:1).
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current assets held by public authorities, such as special 
purpose buildings or equipment of specialised design, is a 
difficult undertaking. Where there does not exist an 
effective market for the asset surrogate measures of its 
current cost must be devised. This is to some degree a 
creative and inexact exercise (see generally Department of 
Finance, 1988c).
The identification and costing of CSOs is obviously 
necessary if GBEs are required to meet rate of return targets 
set on a commercial basis, as the CSOs (and 'costs of public 
ownership' - CPOs) will affect performance as measured. Some 
of the problems involved in identifying CSOs which were 
touched on above will be overcome as CSOs are explicitly 
defined as a result of being brought within the corporate 
planning process. But costing CSOs and CPOs involves some 
considerable difficulties regarding the allocation and 
attribution of revenues and costs within the enterprise (see 
BTCE, 1988:3-8).
The choice of the form of the rate of return is a less 
difficult matter. Where possible it should reflect the point 
of comparison in the private sector. Normally the appropriate 
measure would be the rate of return on some definition of the 
enterprise's total assets, but in some circumstances a case 
can be made for some other measure such as rate of return on 
turnover, or on equity as distinct from total capital (see 
Department of Finance, 1988b:5).
The setting of the target rate of return, the final task, 
seems particularly fraught with difficulties (see Department
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of Finance 1988b:6-9). One problem is the determination of an 
appropriate allowance for risk, since rates of return should 
vary with the riskiness of the enterprise. This is not a 
concern where there are private sector counterparts, but such 
benchmarks are often lacking for public enterprises. Use of 
the average private sector return is the ultimate fallback 
position, but given the considerable variation in private 
sector returns both over time and between enterprises this 
seems a rather arbitrary approach. In addition to the 
problems caused by differential riskiness, the Department of 
Finance (1988b:9-14) has identified a range of circumstances 
which may justify modification of target rates, often one 
suspects necessarily in accordance with 'seat of the pants' 
judgements. These include situations where unexpected 
technological change, movements in factor prices or poor past 
investments have left GBEs with capital stock inappropriate to 
current trading conditions; where enterprises have inherited 
non-optimal levels of manning or work practices; where 
enterprises are capital or labour intensive; and where the 
general business climate or the economic circumstances of the 
industry in which the enterprise is operating are unusual.
To reiterate, the above discussion is not intended to 
suggest that the rate of return concept is fatally flawed. On 
the contrary, even if it can only be operationalised in a 
rough and ready fashion, the rate of return target may serve 
its purpose. Rather, the point of indicating the difficulties 
of operationalisation was to emphasize that the shift to 
required rates of return is not to be explained as the
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discovery of a better way of achieving what has always been 
sought by way of accountability for trading authorities, but 
is better understood as part of a new way of conceiving 
accountability itself .
Conclusion
This chapter has accomplished several tasks. Firstly, it has 
differentiated what we have termed a 'managerialist' 
conception of accountability from the conception of 
accountability as parliamentary control, discussed in the 
previous chapter. Secondly, it has shown that while important 
aspects of the managerialist conception have long been 
implicit in basic institutional arrangements for statutory 
authority accountability, these have been only weak influences 
on practice. Thirdly, it has demonstrated that during the 
1980s major steps have been taken towards institutionalising 
the managerialist conception in accountability regimes for 
Commonwealth statutory authorities.
When accountability is conceived in managerialist terms, 
the supposed impediments to public accountability posed by the 
statutory authority form disappear. Indeed, viewed in this 
light, the statutory authority offers certain advantages 
compared with the ministerial department. Among the most 
important of these is, as we have suggested, that the 
institutional 'distance' established between minister and 
agency facilitates strategic rather than 'simple', or 
detailed, control. Such distance is also (as the Public 
Accounts Committee seems to have recognized) an essential
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prerequisite for developed arrangements for formal public 
evaluation and review.
The evidence about recent administrative change 
presented in this chapter shows that accountability for 
statutory authorities is increasingly being understood, 
implicitly or explicitly, in managerialist terms. It is no 
longer adequate to make judgements about administrative 
accountability by reference to the traditional 'parliamentary 
control' paradigm alone. Moreover, this is not merely a 
matter of changed perceptions. As has been shown, consid­
erable practical efforts have been made over recent years to 
ensure that statutory authorities contribute, along the lines 
we have discussed, to an accountable public administration.
CHAPTER 8
ACCOUNTABILITY AS CONSTITUENCY RELATIONS
This chapter examines a further alternative to the traditional 
conception of accountability as parliamentary control. The 
ideas it examines have had less influence on recent changes, 
or 'reforms', in accountability relationships than those 
discussed in the previous chapter, and for that reason can be 
dealt with more briefly. The point of the chapter is thus not 
so much, as in Chapter 7, to argue for a major contribution of 
new thinking to the practice of accountability in statutory 
authorities, as to draw attention to phenomena, in some cases 
of long standing, whose existence is often unnoticed or whose 
significance for public accountability has been 
underestimated.
Accountability arrangements following from this 'third 
perspective' may take many varied forms and are consequently 
more difficult to generalise about than was the case with the 
institutional expressions of the 'second perspective'. 
Indeed, their importance can be properly demonstrated only 
through in-depth studies of particular organizations. There 
are, however, few suitable existing studies to draw upon, and 
this deficiency cannot be rectified in a generalised study of 
the present kind. All that can be done here - and all that
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needs to be done given the aims of the thesis - is to make a 
case for the 'third perspective' as a valid and distinctive 
way of conceptualising accountability; to outline and provide 
examples of the various ways in which the ideas are manifested 
in Commonwealth statutory authorities; and to discuss the 
extent to which what is discovered should cause us to reassess 
conventional judgements about the accountability of 
Commonwealth statutory authorities. In addition, it will be 
argued that, as with the approach to accountability considered 
in Chapter 7, that dealt with here is especially compatible 
with the statutory authority device.
Accountability as Constituency Relations
What shall be referred to here as a 'constituency relations' 
approach to accountability is similar to what has been 
described in recent British and Australian literature as 
'mutual accountability'. The latter term was a product of an 
Anglo-American research project on accountability conducted 
between 1967 and 1973 (see Smith and Hague, 1971; Smith, 1974; 
Hague, Mackenzie and Barker, 1975; Barker, 1982a). This 
project focused on organizations, mainly quangos and quagos, 
which were sites for the interpenetration of public and 
private activity. The researchers became convinced of the 
importance for accountability of the web, or 'network', of 
relations of dependence and influence in which these bodies 
were typically enmeshed. Such relations were, they felt, at 
least as essential to the meaning of accountability as the 
legal (that is, statutory) situation which normally only
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addressed relationships between authorities and ministers. 
Pursuing this empirical approach, the British participants in 
the project concluded that 'the relationships subsumed in the 
actual practice of accountability include ... "answerability", 
"fiscal control", "peer-group judgement", patterns of 
"reference group" or "reputational" authority, "clientele 
relations" and "participation" - a fairly mixed bag, pointing 
towards a broad, interactive or "network" model of the 
process' (Barker, 1982b:16). Thus alongside 'upward' 
accountability to ministers and parliament, the British 
authors argued for the recognition of 'downward' 
accountability to clienteles and 'horizontal' accountability 
to peers and other reference groups. The balance struck in 
particular cases between these several forms of accountability 
should, it was argued, be determined by the nature of the 
activity performed by the organization. For instance,
'[w]here a governmental body (whether advisory or executive) 
is acting as the expert and unbiased judge of subjective 
matters (grants to arts or historic buildings) it should enjoy 
minimum upward accountability in making its decisions but 
accept maximum outward or downward answerability by joining in 
public discussion of its field and work... ' (Barker, 1982a:18; 
see also Keeling, 1976). We shall reserve until later the 
question of what precisely 'accountability' may mean when used 
in these ways.
This work has been summarised for Australian readers 
by Wettenhall (1983:33-8; note also 1986:130), who has 
suggested its applicability to Australian statutory
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authorities (see also Thynne and Goldring, 1987:226). 
Wettenhall noted a few likely analogues to the cases explored 
in the British literature: the Human Rights Commission and 
Trans Australia Airlines (as these bodies were then named) 
were offered as examples of bodies for which downward 
answerability could be expected to be important, while primary 
produce marketing authorities, the Australia Council, the 
Heritage Commission, the National Standards Commission, 
professional registration boards, courts and appellate 
tribunals were seen as likely to employ a mixture of 
horizontal and downward accountability (1983:36-7).
The Australian literature does not go much beyond this 
point. There has been little effort to scrutinise the 
underlying conception of accountability or to examine, however 
superficially, the mechanisms through which it is manifested 
in Australian bodies. Nor has there been an attempt to 
assess the significance for judgements about accountability of 
recognizing horizontal and downward relationships of the 
above-mentioned types, except for Wettenhall's suggestion 
(1983:38-9) that 'the need for a "mutual accountability" 
system' justifies the independence from ministerial control 
apparently signified, though not always realized, by statutory 
authorities.
One basic issue may be raised at this point. If 
downward and horizontal forms of accountability are to be 
accorded anything like equality of status with upward 
accountability, it would seem that statutory office-holders 
must be sufficiently independent that the interests and
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opinions of peers, clients and so on can be as fully 
incorporated into decision-making as office-holders choose. 
This might be held to raise some difficulties.
The questions of the authority of officials to 
exercise responsibility independently of political superiors 
and of the desirability of their doing so have long been 
debated in the international public administration literature. 
(The Finer, 1941-Friedrich, 1935; 1940 exchange is the most
cited example; but see also Long, 1952; Appleby, 1965; and 
Saltzstein, 1985). In general, American writers have over the 
years been more prepared to countenance, and even promote, the 
independent responsibility of officials than have their 
counterparts in parliamentary systems of government. It has 
been argued, for instance, that the United States Constitution 
establishes not the supremacy of the legislature but the 
equality of the three branches of government, each of which 
exercise powers delegated by the sovereign people. On this 
view 'all officers, elected and unelected, are representatives 
of the people even though their constitutional duties may 
differ' (Rohr, 1983; cited in Saltzstein, 1985:290). In 
contrast British and Australian thinking has been very much in 
tune with the position championed by Finer (1941:336) in his 
exchange with Friedrich:
. . . the servants of the public are not to decide 
their own course; they are to be responsible to the 
elected representatives of the public, and these are 
to determine the course of action of the public 
servants to the most minute degree that is 
technically feasible... This kind of responsibility 
is what democracy means.
Such unwillingness to allow that unelected
375
administrators may possess an independent responsibility to
the public has influenced thinking about statutory
authorities. As we saw in Chapter 2, some Australian
commentators have argued that statutory office holders
exercising administrative (as distinct from judicial)
functions possess only a strictly circumscribed discretion
vis-a-vis ministers - defined only uncertainly by enabling
statutes, but rigidly delimited by statements of government
policy and ministerial directions. In constitutional terms,
they have argued, the statutory authority may well be no
different in status to the ministerial department:
whatever organization is used must be consistent with 
the principles of responsible government'; '... it 
is at least arguable that any provision which seeks 
to oust the answerability to the minister for the 
activities of the authority offends against the 
Constitution... (Goldring, 1980:367, 370).
Since Wettenhall has associated himself with this 
position (Goldring and Wettenhall, 1980), his support for the 
relevance of 'mutual accountability' to statutory authorities 
seems a little incongruous. Presumably his view is that the 
wider recognition of alternative channels of accountability 
may persuade ministers, despite their pre-eminent position in 
the system of public accountability, to exercise greater 
forbearance in their dealings with statutory authorities. The 
latter is a cause which Wettenhall has championed throughout 
his writings. Such forbearance would give authorities freedom 
to be responsive to clients and other relevant actors. 
However, as argued in Chapter 2, the Goldring-Wettenhall 
reading of the constitutional standing of statutory
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authorities is a dubious one. It is more likely that 
parliament has complete freedom to confer independent 
decision-making authority upon statutory bodies and to specify 
whatever arrangements for the public accountability of the 
latter it judges appropriate. If this is correct, the real 
issue is what is desirable in arrangements for the 
accountability of statutory authorities, not what is 
constitutionally allowable.
As well as drawing upon the British literature 
discussed above, our 'constituency relations' perspective owes 
something to an interesting conceptualisation of 
accountability by American authors Romzek and Dubnick (1987). 
Romzek and Dubnick also see accountability as inherent in a 
range of agency relationships. Their main contribution, 
however, is their characterisation of the accountability 
relationship. Accountability, they claim, has traditionally 
been closely associated with answerability, which implies 
'limited, direct and mostly formalistic responses to demands'. 
They argue that this is too narrow an understanding of what is 
involved in public accountability and that accountability is 
better understood in terms of the various 'means by which 
public agencies and their workers manage the diverse 
expectations generated within and outside the organization' 
(1987:228).
The Romzek and Dubnick position I take to be related 
to Linder's view (1978:182), presented in Chapter 7, that 
accountability is sought as a response to the biases 
associated with discretion. The possession of discretion by
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administrators gives rise to expectations and suspicions in a 
diverse range of groups, which in turn creates a need for the 
exercise of discretion to be justified or legitimised. Romzek 
and Dubnick (1987:228-9) identify four generic means of 
achieving this result. Alternatively, six main types of 
institutional mechanism would seem to be available for the 
task. These are:
firstly, ministerial controls of various kinds (including 
strategic as well as detailed controls);
secondly, arrangements for appealing against decisions, or 
review mechanisms;
thirdly, arrangements for outside participation in decision­
making ;
fourthly, arrangements whereby decision-making is placed in 
the hands of acknowledged experts, on the assumption that 
decisions will be governed by the norms as well as the 
expertise of a profession;
fifthly, arrangements for answerability, or the rendering of 
formal accounts, statements of reasons for decisions and the 
like;
and sixthly, arrangements for external evaluation of decision­
making .
The managerialist approach to accountability considered in the 
previous chapter relies heavily on the first and last of these 
mechanisms. The 'constituency relations' approach, by 
contrast, is distinguished by the use it makes of the other 
four mechanisms.
We may now draw together the threads of the discussion
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in order to define our third perspective on the accountability 
of statutory authorities. A constituency relations 
perspective interprets accountability as satisfaction of the 
diverse expectations generated by the organization. It 
follows that the third perspective is distinguished from the 
perspectives examined so far in terms of the number and nature 
of the actors with whom relationships are formed, as well as 
in terms of the means by which the exercise of discretion by 
the authority is legitimized. The actors to whose 
expectations the authority responds include all of those who 
can make a successful claim to have a legitimate interest in 
the authority's decisions. These will vary from case to case 
but will often include professional peers, clients, employee 
bodies and bodies with which the organization has commercial 
relationships, as well as ministers, parliament and other 
public sector 'watchdog' agencies (such as the Auditor 
General, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the Prices 
Surveillance Authority). However, the distinctive feature of 
the third perspective, as far as the range of actors is 
concerned, is the use it makes of 'downward' and 'horizontal' 
relationships rather than 'upward' ones. The characteristic 
means by which these relationships are sustained and the 
exercise of authority legitimized are those listed above; they 
will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.
There are two other noteworthy characteristics of this 
understanding of accountability. The first is that it 
expresses what might be termed a 'statutory authority centred' 
perspective on accountability. Traditionally, accountability
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has been approached from the point of view of ministers or 
parliament: the task has been seen as one of making unelected 
officials ('them') responsible to elected officials and thence 
to members of parliament ('us'). Indeed, even an observer as 
sympathetic to the statutory office-holders' point of view as 
Wettenhall has implied that the notion of accountability is 
inseparably associated with a ministerial or parliamentary 
perspective:
Emphasizing the accountability problem does, however, 
tend towards a "top-down" view - looking in on the 
SAs, as it were, to see whether they are behaving 
themselves ... (1983:43 )
Whereas the approaches to accountability considered in 
previous chapters have embodied such a 'top-down' view, our 
third perspective denies the necessity of this connection. It 
seems more in conformity with the vantage point of the 
statutory office-holders and senior staff, who will typically 
be as keenly aware of demands for responsiveness stemming from 
the agency's interactions with clients, consumers, 
professional peers, commercial rivals, public interest groups, 
employees and their associations, semi-independent public 
sector inquisitorial bodies and so on, as they will be aware 
of the need to respond to pressures from 'above' generated by 
politicians. That some agencies at least implicitly 
understand accountability in terms of responsiveness to a 
range of interested actors is evidenced by the emphasis they 
have placed on 'stakeholder management' or effective 
communication with 'key audiences' (see for example SFIT, 
1988; Telecom, 1988a).
The second characteristic follows from the first.
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Because it adopts the vantage point of the statutory 
authorities, the third perspective treats accountability not 
as something to be extracted from the administrative agency by 
some 'responsible' entity but as something for which the 
agency itself has the primary public responsibility. In other 
words, the agency is seen to some extent as a political entity 
in its own right, with a direct responsibility to various 
'publics' or 'constituencies'. It is to capture this most 
distinctive feature of the third perspective that I have 
chosen to call it 'accountability as constituency relations'. 
Figure 8.1 compares this aspect of the third perspective with 
the corresponding aspects of the perspectives on 
accountability examined in Part II and Chapter 7.
























a The figure was suggested by Romzek and Dubnick (1987:230). 
Manifestations in Commonwealth Statutory Authorities
Aside from the public sector actors which have dominated the 
discussion to this point in the thesis, we can identify 
several main sorts of 'constituency' whose expectations vis-a-
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vis particular statutory authorities may, depending on the 
activity in which the body is involved, be especially 
important to the public justification of statutory 
authorities' decision-making powers. These are professional 
peers, consumers (that is, paying customers), clients and, 
finally, individuals or groups with public interest concerns. 
In this section we shall describe a number of specific 
mechanisms through which the expectations of each of these 
generic groups is managed or satisfied. Observations will 
also be made on the adequacy with which particular mechanisms 
perform this task. One mechanism is relevant to most of the 
above types of constituency. This is the authority board, 
typically composed largely of part-time, limited tenure 
appointees. Because of its prominence and its relevance to 
the several constituency types, the board is considered 
separately.
Before proceeding to the tasks outlined above, we 
should perhaps take a moment to consider why statutory 
authorities might be expected to have a special affinity for 
'horizontal' and 'downward' accountability relationships. 
Agencies other than statutory authorities will of course also 
feel the need to address a range of different audiences. In 
general, the number and strength of the demands on agencies 
will depend on the nature of their task environments. But the 
way agencies view and respond to such demands will be affected 
by those actors (parliament and ministers) able to determine 
what their formal accountability will consist in. These 
actors will affect the way authorities prioritise and satisfy
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demands for responsiveness, both by the level of their own 
demands and by the arrangements for interaction with other 
actors that they impose on authorities. If in accordance with 
their basic raison d 1etre statutory authorities are generally 
characterised by a lower volume and intensity of demands from 
ministers and parliament than ministerial departments, they 
should have greater freedom to develop strong relationships 
with other actors. The strength of these relationships may be 
enhanced where enabling statutes counterbalance a reduction in 
intended responsiveness to ministers with formal obligations 
to respond to other actors. The result would be a greater 
propensity for statutory authorities, compared with 
ministerial departments, to view their external environment as 
placing upon them a variety of more or less equally strong 
demands.
Clients and public interest groups
Downward accountability to clients or interested sections of 
the public may be purely a result of strategic considerations 
on the part of the authority, or it may be engineered or 
reinforced by institutional arrangements. British writing has 
paid most attention to the former situation, in particular to 
bodies with overtly promotional objectives (for example, the 
Commission for Racial Equality, the Equal Opportunities 
Commission, and the National Consumer Council) whose downward 
links are based largely on a strategic need to cultivate 
community groups with a close interest in their work (see 
Barker, 1982b:19-20). In Australia, too, a number of such
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bodies have been created in the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, 
the ex-Director of one such body, the now defunct Australian 
Institute of Multicultural Affairs, has acknowledged the 
importance to a promotional body's effectiveness, and 
ultimately to its survival, of developing a supportive social 
base or constituency (Sheldrake, 1987). However, our interest 
is principally in the second category of cases because 
institutional links offer a greater guarantee of 
responsiveness to interested groups, and hence establish a 
stronger form of accountability.
Several sorts of institutionalised downward linkages 
can be found in Commonwealth statutory authorities. The best 
known and most common sort is that produced by giving 
particular groups or associations the legal right to nominate 
or elect members of a statutory body's governing board. As 
noted above, the role of the board is reserved for separate 
discussion below. Occasionally, however, processes for 
filling boards are supplemented by other arrangements for 
representation. Perhaps the most notable case is the proposed 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) which 
embodies a two-tiered representative structure comprising the 
Commission and a system of Regional Councils replacing the 
existing Regional Offices of the Department of Aboriginal 
Affairs. The Regional Councils are to be elected by 
Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders resident in each region 
and will, in turn, elect 17 of the 20 commissioners, in 
addition to their other tasks of determining regional 
priorities, developing and implementing regional plans, and
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generally representing the interests of the region (Hand, 
1987; Tate, 1989; Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission Bill 1989). ATSIC is thus explicitly designed to 
combine upward accountability through the minister (who, inter 
alia, must approve budgetary estimates and a corporate plan, 
and may issue financial directives) with downward 
accountability to clients.
Commonwealth primary produce marketing authorities 
(SMAs) utilize a different mechanism. For many years the 
procedure for determining board membership constituted the 
main formal means of achieving downward responsiveness and 
legitimising the authorities to their client base. However, 
the White Paper Reform of Commonwealth Primary Industry 
Marketing Authorities (Department of Primary Industry, 1986) 
announced a new approach to achieving these ends. The Paper 
affirmed the government's commitment to 'dual accountability' 
for the authorities: accountability to parliament, 'which 
provides the statutory powers', and accountability to the 
industries, 'on whose behalf they act and which provide SMAs 
funds' (Department of Primary Industry, 1986:5). The latter 
objective would henceforth be achieved by requiring each 
authority to hold an annual general meting of growers or, 
alternatively, to report to a suitably representative industry 
organization.
The annual general meeting mechanism had by 1988 been 
included in legislation for the Australian Meat and Livestock 
Corporation and the Australian Wine and Brandy Corporation. 
In these cases the authority is required 'to establish a
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register of bona fide industry members and to provide those
members with its annual report and an invitation to attend the
AGM' (Department of Primary Industry, 1986:5). Through the
annual general meeting industry members are able to
consider the annual report of the SMA; receive an 
address by the Chairperson on the performance of the 
SMA in the past year and on the outlook and intended 
performance in the coming year; question the 
Chairperson and Board on any aspect of the SMA's 
activities, including financing; and debate and vote 
on specific motions including levy determination and 
confidence in the Chairperson or the Board as a whole 
(P•5 ) .
The minister is required to terminate the appointments of 
board members in whom motions of no confidence are passed.
The alternative arrangements for accountability to 
rural industries - which have been adopted for the Australian 
Wheat Board, the Australian Wool Corporation and the 
Australian Horticultural Corporation - establish a similar set 
of procedures, except that they apply to the executives of 
grower associations rather than growers and they do not make 
provision for votes of no confidence. Rural Industry Research 
Councils have also been required to account to relevant 
industry organizations in this fashion (Department of Primary 
Industry, 1986:5-6; Australian Horticultural Corporation Act 
19137, No.164; Rural Industries Research Act 1985, No.102).
A third mechanism of downward accountability, this 
time to interested or affected groups rather than clients, is 
the public hearing. Advisory authorities make regular use of 
public hearings, and some regulatory bodies (for example the 
National Companies and Securities Commission) can choose to 
employ them. But it is unusual for Commonwealth bodies with
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executive powers to use the procedure on a regular basis in 
the exercise of their powers. This contrasts with the United 
States of America where a requirement for a public hearing in 
advance of specified categories or decisions is a standard 
feature of regulatory processes (see for example Rosen, 1982; 
Gormley, 1986). Among Commonwealth bodies the Australian 
Broadcasting Tribunal (ABT) comes closest to the American 
model, that is to the use of the public hearing as a major 
channel of accountability1. A brief look at that body is 
worthwhile for what it can tell us about the conditions in 
which public hearings are effective for this purpose.
Throughout most of the post-war period powers to 
grant, renew, suspend and revoke broadcasting licences; to 
approve transactions affecting the control or ownership of 
licences; and to determine the general standards and 
conditions with which broadcasters must comply were exercised 
by the minister, acting on the advice of the Australian 
Broadcasting Control Board. The system of accountability was 
based on the premise that the minister, assisted by the 
Control Board and answerable to the parliament, adequately 
represented the public and that, consequently, there was no 
need for direct public involvement (ARC, 1981:3). The 
legislation of 1976 and 1977 which established the ABT 
rejected that premise. In placing the powers listed above in
1. There is, however, room for argument about the 
importance of the public hearing mechanism for the accountability 
of the ABT. At a RAIPA (ACT Division) Monthly Meeting, on 30 
March 1988, the Chairman of the ABT, Ms D. O'Connor, argued that 
public accountability was better served by the publication of 
reasons for decisions and the 'pyramid of review' constituted by 
the system of administrative law.
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the hands of the ABT, the legislation constrained that body to 
make its decisions regarding the renewal of licences through 
a process designed to enable extensive participation by the 
public and by the industry being regulated. The newly formed 
Tribunal announced that ' [t]he philosophy of direct public 
accountability is the basis of our approach to the regulation 
of broadcasting' (ABT, 1977; cited in ARC, 1981:4). The 
mechanism through which this was to be achieved was the 
'inquiry procedure' which gave members of the public and 
persons affected the right to make submissions and participate 
in public hearings held prior to ABT decisions. Also
important for accountability was the requirement for the ABT 
to prepare and publicise a report of every inquiry, containing 
its findings and its reasons for any decision or
recommendation.
Obligations to hold a public hearing and to report,
however, do not guarantee effective public participation or an
appropriate level of satisfaction of public expectations. A
number of deficiencies in the ABT's procedures for public
participation were highlighted by the Administrative Review
Council (ARC, 1981). Two of the ARC's criticisms are
particularly worthy of note here. The ARC found that a basic
weakness was that too much had been expected of the hearing
alone as a vehicle for public participation:
The Tribunal's inquiries are at present conducted on 
the basis that a hearing will be the sole occasion 
for allowing participation, receiving evidence and 
deciding issues. The problems caused by expecting so 
many things to be achieved in a brief time gave rise 
to most of the criticisms received by the Council. 
The Council has proposed a more staged procedure, in 
which hearings would be held only where they were
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clearly necessary, and would always be thoroughly 
prepared in advance (1981:22).
The ARC was also critical of the lack of adequate procedural 
rules to protect rights of participation and to ensure natural 
justice to all parties. A particular issue was 'standing' to 
appear at hearings. This involved practices based on the 
Tribunal's reading of that part of the Broadcasting and 
Television Act which confined the right to appear before the 
Tribunal to individuals 'having an interest in the 
proceedings.' The ARC (1981:23-6) found those practices to be 
essentially arbitrary and restrictive of the rights of 
interest groups to participate. Liberal rules on standing to 
make submissions and to give oral evidence at hearings are 
vital for genuine public participation, as are prior publicity 
of a hearing, a clear description of its purpose, and its 
conduct at a convenient location and time. But even these may 
not prove sufficient to prevent regulatory 'capture' - that 
is, accountability principally to the actors who are subject 
to regulation. In the United States during the 1970s concern 
about the narrowness of participation led to the funding of 
groups lacking the resources to participate, as well as to the 
passage of 'sunshine' laws to proscribe ex parte 
communications between members of regulatory agencies and 
interested members of the public and to open the processes of 
the agencies to public scrutiny (Rosen, 1982:74). The ARC 
(1981:36) canvassed the issue of funding interest groups but 
made no findings or recommendations.
While the ARC thus exposed some major weaknesses in 
the ABT's arrangements for direct public accountability, it
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also recognized that these weaknesses were due as much as 
anything to a lack of familiarity in the Commonwealth public 
sector with the particular form of public inquiry. The latter 
instrument was acknowledged to be a valid means of engineering 
'downward' accountability. Subsequent changes to the ABT's 
enabling legislation began the reform of procedures along the 
lines recommended by the ARC (see Broadcasting and Television 
Amendment Act 1985, No.66).
We may conclude that Commonwealth statutory 
authorities exhibit at least three main sorts of 
institutionalised linkages to client and public interest 
groups, through which these groups may seek to satisfy their 
expectations. In terms of the six types of mechanism 
identified above, the specific linkages discussed here would 
seem to be examples of participation (the third category) and 
answerability (the fifth category).
Peers
The Carnegie-sponsored, Anglo-American research project of the 
late 1960s and early 1970s referred to above has probably done 
most to raise awareness of the importance of 'reputational' or 
'reference group' communities to accountability (see Barker, 
1982b:16-22). Those involved were particularly impressed by 
the evidence they uncovered regarding the influence of 
professional peer groups - as, for instance, the finding that 
'engineers in the BBC research department saw themselves as 
accountable to scientists within the ITA [the rival 
organization] who formed part of their 'community', though
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there was manifestly no formal requirement to do so' 
(Mackenzie and Hood, 1975:44).
Why should peer groups be regarded as important to 
public accountability? It is not difficult to see why the 
other sorts of group discussed in this chapter should have 
been chosen: clients, public interest groups and customers are 
all obvious surrogates for 'the public' in certain 
circumstances. But peer groups surely lack this intimate 
connection with the public interest. This accepted, the 
reason for their importance is related to the frequent use of 
statutory authorities to place decision-making power in the 
hands of 'experts'. Under these circumstances, peer reference 
is an important (though not necessarily a sufficient) 
safeguard against bias (other than that of a professional 
nature).
What of the mechanisms through which peer influence 
is brought to bear on statutory authorities? Responsiveness 
to professional peer groups is produced by the internalisation 
of professional attitudes and values, resulting in self- 
policing, combined with habits of subjective reference. But 
it may be reinforced by institutionalised patterns of 
interaction such as cross-representation on committees. In 
general, then, peer influence draws upon the third (that is, 
participation) and the fourth (that is, use of experts) of the 
mechanisms for legitimising the exercise of discretion 
identified earlier.
An example of institutionalised interactions with 
peers is provided by Mitchell's study of the British Medical
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Research Council (MRC). Mitchell (1975) found that the MRC 
was embedded in a web of interaction, involving competition as 
well as co-operation, with a range of public and private 
bodies belonging to 'a series of overlapping arenas'. The 
latter included a departmental arena (the Department of Health 
and Social Security), a university arena (the Universities 
Grants Committee (UGC) as well as individual universities), a 
research council arena (the four other councils) and a medical 
research funding arena (private charities and foundations). 
Among the forms of linkage involving the MRC in a network of 
relationships between the various bodies were mutual 
dependencies in the training of researchers, high rates of 
staff interchange, physical interdependence of research 
establishments, liaison to maintain consistency in terms of 
employment and salaries (all of which brought the MRC into 
continuous contact with the universities); joint research 
ventures (with the DHSS); negotiation in the primary division 
of funds available for research (involving the five councils); 
the 'dual-support' granting system (involving the MRC and the 
UGC); and cross-representation on funding advisory committees 
(with the DHSS and private organizations) (1975:229-37).
Commonwealth statutory authorities offer many examples 
of institutionalised or semi-institutionalised interactions 
with professional peer groups. Perhaps the most obvious are 
granting authorities such as the Australia Council and the 
Industry Research and Development Board. In these cases the 
main form of linkage is that provided by the direct 
representation of relevant groups in the decision-making
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structure. Rotation of these part-time office-holders at 
relatively short intervals preserves the immediacy of peer 
group influence. In recognition of the 'horizontal' 
accountability relationship on which it is based, this 
decision-making structure is commonly referred to as 'peer 
review'.
In both the Australian Council and the Industry 
Research and Development Board relevant professionals or 
practitioners are represented at all levels of multi-layered 
structures. Ideally, this enables peer influence to be 
brought to bear on all important decisions, from matters of 
general policy to the awarding of individual grants. The nine 
member Industry Research and Development Board at 30 June 1988 
consisted of a senior hospital administrator, a technology 
consultant, a deputy general manager of the Australian 
Industry Development Corporation, two senior managers from 
metals industry companies, a senior academic geneticist, the 
principal of an engineering consultancy, a solicitor and a 
First Assistant Secretary from the Department of Industry, 
Technology and Commerce (IRDB, 1989). But the Board does much 
of its work through eight specialist committees each chaired 
by a board member and containing on average three to five 
other part-time members drawn from professions or businesses 
relevant to the particular concern of the committee. The 
Biotechnology Committee, for example, comprised at 30 June 
1988 an academic geneticist (chairman), a technology 
consultant, a CSIRO researcher, a management consultant, a 
senior academic biochemist and a senior medical school
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academic (IRDB, 1989). The Australia Council has a three- 
level decision-making structure. Beneath the Council are a 
set of specialist art-form Boards (seven to ten members) which 
like the Council must contain a majority (excluding 
chairpersons and government representatives) of 'persons who 
practice the arts or are otherwise associated with the arts' 
(Australia Council Act 1975, sections 9, 22). The Boards have 
been the key decision-making arenas, enjoying a high degree of 
autonomy in developing policy and administering grants for 
their respective art-forms (HRSCE, 1986:65). But in selecting 
grant recipients the Boards have, in turn, made widespread use 
of assessment panels or committees (of three to four members 
with a Board member in the chair) comprising specialists drawn 
from particular sub-branches of the arts (HRSCE, 1986:83; 
Interview: Bourke, 1989).
As noted above, responsiveness to peer group standards 
and opinions requires fairly frequent rotation of decision­
makers. Thus in the case of the Australia Council membership 
of the Committees turns over annually, that of the Boards 
every two to three years and that of the Council every three- 
four years. Efforts are also made to ensure that members are 
representative of relevant artistic communities; or, in other 
words, that review is performed by genuine peers. To this end 
Australia Council Boards are required to advertise regularly 
for, and maintain lists of, potential members. The field is 
also invited to submit lists of suitable individuals 
(Interview: Bourke, 1989).
Away from grant-giving bodies, the Commonwealth
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Science and Industry Research Organization (CSIRO) offers an 
example of a more complex set of linkages with its peer group, 
the science and technology community. The mechanisms for 
interaction include representation on the Organization's 
governing board, advisory mechanisms throughout the 
Organization, co-location of CSIRO research units with other 
research organizations, joint funding of collaborative 
research, joint appointments of staff, and participation in 
the use of national research facilities (see ASTEC, 1985:30- 
32). The CSIRO is of additional interest because it also has 
important 'downward' links with industrial end-users of 
research, especially through contracts with the eleven or so 
Rural Industry Research Funds and with research associations, 
such as the Australian Mineral Industry Research Association 
(ASTEC, 1985:32-3). In an attempt to improve the contribution 
of the CSIRO to 'usable' research, the government has recently 
sought to strengthen both horizontal and downward interactions 
(Jones, 1986). The report on which recent changes to the 
CSIRO have been based identified three main sets of actors 
with which it saw a need for the Organization to interact - 
the industrial end-users of research, members of the 
scientific and technological community, and Commonwealth and 
state governments. By increasing direct links with the first 
group and forging closer working relationships with the second 
group, the CSIRO would, the report argued, improve both its 
performance and its public accountability (ASTEC, 1985:24).
Horizontal accountability relationships, like their 
downward counterparts, are clearly not of equal relevance to
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all statutory authorities. Barker (1982b:19) has suggested 
that the Carnegie work may have exaggerated their general 
importance. The reason horizontal accountability achieved 
such prominence in these studies, in Barker's view, was that 
the Carnegie project was stimulated by the major shift to 
contracting out of United States government research and 
development to universities in the 1960s. This gave the 
project a bias towards an activity and organizations in which 
formal peer group control plays an important role.
The Australian examples referred to above bear out the 
relevance of peer influence to research activities. But they 
also indicate that the distribution of government grants in 
any specialised field is an activity which encourages 
receptivity to the judgements of fellow professionals. It is 
likely that peer group interactions are also important to 
other categories of statutory authority. For instance, one 
would expect to find important professional influence flows 
between major quasi-judicial or regulatory bodies, on the one 
side, and the legal profession and courts, on the other. 
Managers and professional employees of trading authorities are 
also likely to see their counterparts in private business as 
important reference points and arbiters of sound business or 
professional practice.
Not only is horizontal accountability thus relevant 
to a range of Commonwealth statutory authorities, there is 
also every likelihood that it is more important to statutory 
authorities than to ministerial departments. Dunleavy (1982) 
has argued this case for British trading authorities, and
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several of his supporting arguments seem equally relevant to 
the Australian situation. In general, many of the activities 
performed by statutory authorities are technical or highly 
specialized in nature. A primary reason for establishing 
statutory authorities to conduct these tasks is to give 
individuals with relevant specialised knowledge key roles in 
decision-making. This can be achieved either by placing such 
individuals in the top structures of organizations or by 
devolving decision-making within organizations. Moreover, 
habits of subjective reference to peers and peer norms will be 
reinforced among individuals who are part-time members of 
statutory boards as they will typically continue to be 
actively involved in their professions outside the public 
sector.
Customers
A particular form of downward accountability for that category 
of statutory authorities which market goods and services to 
the public, the trading authorities, is accountability to 
customers. There is a range of mechanisms, of varying degrees 
of effectiveness, through which Commonwealth trading 
authorities seek to manage customer expectations or through 
which customers may pressure authorities to pay attention to 
their interests and demands. As we shall see, they tend to be 
instances of either the second type (that is, arrangements for 
appeal or review) or the fifth type (that is, answerability) 
of our generic mechanisms for legitimising the independent 
decision-making powers of statutory bodies. The specific
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mechanisms to be dealt with here may for convenience be 
divided into two main types: those which exist primarily to 
deal with individual grievances and those concerned with 
policy and general performance2. We shall consider each type 
in turn.
Each authority has its own internal arrangements for
dealing with individual complaints. By themselves, however,
these cannot provide sufficient public reassurance. As the
Commonwealth Ombudsman has argued,
the public will not be satisfied by rejection of a 
claim by an internal review officer or body. Members 
of the public do not distinguish between deciding 
officers and internal reviewing officers or bodies 
(Commonwealth Ombudsman and Defence Force Ombudsman, 
1988:26).
It is for this reason that the machinery of administrative 
law, in particular the Ombudsman, is of great importance in 
the handling of customer grievances.
The Ombudsman Act 197 6 gave the Commonwealth Ombudsman 
jurisdiction over both departments of state (excluding the 
parliamentary departments) and 'prescribed authorities', 
including all Commonwealth statutory authorities. In June 
1977, regulations placed 17 statutory bodies, including three 
trading authorities (the Australian National Airlines 
Commission, the Australian Shipping Commission, and the 
Commonwealth Banking Corporation), outside the scope of the 
Ombudsman's inquiries (Commonwealth Ombudsman, 1978:24). But
2. These are not watertight categories. Bodies responsible 
for dealing with complaints may be best placed to advance 
forceful criticisms of policy and performance. Conversely, 
machinery to monitor performance is, as Prosser (1986:176) has 
argued, 'a prerequisite for adequate complaints handling'.
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for other trading authorities the Ombudsman provides a major, 
often the only, avenue of external review for dissatisfied 
customers. Take the case of Telecom. That authority 
generates a huge volume of customer complaints each year; in 
1987-88, for instance, just under 2,600 complaints received by 
the Ombudsman, or 21.1 percent of those within jurisdiction, 
concerned Telecom (Commonwealth Ombudsman and Defence Force 
Ombudsman, 1988:8-10). In the absence of the Ombudsman most 
of those complainants, having presumably exhausted the 
possibilities afforded by internal complaints mechanisms, 
would have no further avenue available through which to seek 
redress. This is so because Telecom's customers are in many 
circumstances prohibited by law from taking legal action 
against Telecom, even if they have suffered financial loss due 
to its action or inaction.
The Ombudsman has considerable capacity to pursue 
grievances. An investigation may be initiated on the basis of 
either oral or written complaints, or on the Ombudsman's own 
motion. The Ombudsman may find an administrative action to 
have been defective for a number of reasons, including that 
the action appears to be contrary to law; is unreasonable, 
unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory; is based 
either wholly or partly on a mistake of law or fact; or is 
otherwise, in all the circumstances, wrong (Section 15, 
Ombudsman Act 1976). In pursuing his/her investigations the 
Ombudsman has the power to require the production of documents 
and other relevant materials. Where a defect is discovered 
various remedies may be sought - ranging from an apology, to
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a statement of reasons, to reversal of the adverse decision, 
to compensation. The Ombudsman may go beyond the securing of 
a remedy for the particular grievance to recommend a future 
course of action such as a change in procedures. In these 
cases he/she must submit a report of the findings and 
recommendations to the agency and the minister. If 
dissatisfied with the response the Ombudsman may, as a final 
recourse, submit special reports to the Prime Minister and the 
Parliament (Section 15, Ombudsman Act 1976; Commonwealth 
Ombudsman, 1978:31-2).
The Ombudsman has recently reported difficulties in 
getting prompt attention paid to his reports and in adequately 
publicising the office, its role and achievements 
(Commonwealth Ombudsman and Defence Force Ombudsman, 1987:1- 
2). Nevertheless the large number of complaints received each 
year (22,370 in total in 1987/88) demonstrates substantial 
public awareness of the complaints mechanism, as the 
reasonably high level of successful outcomes testifies to its 
effectiveness (see Commonwealth Ombudsman and Defence Force 
Ombudsman, 1988:11-12). It certainly compares favourably with 
the primary mechanism used to handle complaints about British 
nationalised industries, the consumer councils. The 
performance of these bodies in this role has been widely 
criticised as weak: 'their existence has been little-known 
and their effectiveness limited; they have deferred too much 
to the industries and have not used agreed settlements as 
precedents for future agreements' (Prosser, 1986:190; see 
generally pp.190-92).
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We turn now to the second set of instruments, those 
which enable customers' expectations to be made known and 
•satisfied in the areas of general performance and policy. As 
regards performance, an essential prerequisite to the 
satisfaction of expectations is reliable knowledge about the 
standards of performance being achieved. Over recent years, 
in Australia and elsewhere, considerable emphasis has been 
placed on the development of 'performance indicators' to 
provide such knowledge. Even where trading authorities are 
required to meet rate of return financial targets (as 
discussed in the previous chapter) performance indicators have 
an important role to play, due to the fact that authorities 
may raise prices to meet targets where they have monopoly 
power or may sacrifice quality of service for 'bottom-line' 
performance.
As Prosser (1986:177) has observed for Britain, the 
term performance indicator has been used to refer to several 
distinct things: performance aims negotiated between the 
government and the enterprise, such as the new price control 
arrangements for Telecom outlined below; management 
performance indicators, covering such matters as productivity 
trends and manning levels, for use in management information 
systems; and, finally, indicators of adequacy of service to 
customers. Prosser also noted the tendency, prevalent in 
Australia as well, to confuse performance 'indicators' with 
performance 'targets'. Ideally, there should be targets set 
to represent desirable performance against which actual 
performance is subsequently reported, so that customers or
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their representatives can identify strengths and weaknesses on 
the basis of agreed standards.
Keeping these distinctions in mind, we may briefly 
survey the use of performance indicators by six Commonwealth 
trading authorities with among the highest volumes of 
commercial dealings with the general public. The authorities 
are Telecom, Australia Post, Australian Airlines, the Health 
Insurance Commission, the Commonwealth Bank, and the 
Australian National Railways Commission. The standard of 
performance measurement as displayed in recent annual reports 
varied greatly among these bodies. For Telecom and Australia 
Post it was generally very good: in each case a variety of
indicators were employed, including a number of indicators of 
service standards, and both targets and measures of actual 
performance were presented. Telecom also provided eight 
measures of customer satisfaction. The Health Insurance 
Commission compared favourably with Telecom and Australia Post 
in some respects but not in others. It utilized a similarly 
extensive range of indicators. In addition, it presented 
informative comparisons of its efficiency and financial 
viability with those of the private industry. However, 
although the financial and managerial performance data showed 
trends over a ten year period, no performance targets were 
provided. The Railways Commission's performance reporting 
also blended strengths and weaknesses. A large number of 
performance indicators (20 or more) were displayed, but only 
three concerned customer service. Moreover, the information 
was presented only on the basis of comparisons with previous
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years, with no accompanying targets. Finally, the 
Commonwealth Bank and Australian Airlines showed little 
commitment to performance measurement, particularly in the 
area of service quality. Again no performance targets were 
presented.
Performance indicators give customers and consumer 
associations a certain capacity to monitor performance. But 
satisfaction of customer expectations arguably requires, in 
addition, a capacity to make authorities justify their 
performance. Several public sector bodies play this role to 
a greater or lesser extent vis-a-vis Commonwealth trading 
authorities.
One has already been encountered in another guise. 
This is the Ombudsman, who not only seeks remedies for 
individual grievances but is also intended to improve the 
general standard of administration. Such an outcome may 
result where the investigation of a complaint uncovers an 
institutionalised deficiency which is then pursued in its own 
right by the Ombudsman. Alternatively, the Ombudsman may 
launch an own-motion investigation into some aspect of 
administration in which his/her own monitoring has revealed a 
difficulty. The latter course is more likely the more 
familiar the Ombudsman is with a particular authority as a 
result of the burden of case work it generates. For instance, 
Telecom, the leading source of complaints to the Ombudsman, 
produced such an investigation in 1987-88 by its decision to 
remove the pip tones from time charged community telephone 
calls (Commonwealth Ombudsman and Defence Force Ombudsman,
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1988:16-17).
The Prices Surveillance Authority is another body which 
has had a role in monitoring important trading authorities and 
pressuring them to justify their pricing policies3. Prices 
for standard or basic services delivered by Telecom, the 
Overseas Telecommunications Commission and Australia Post were 
(prior to new arrangements being introduced for the first two 
authorities in 1989) subject to ministerial approval following 
Prices Surveillance Authority consideration. While its 
scrutiny is triggered by and focused upon proposals to 
increase prices, the Authority's public hearings have provided 
an opportunity for individuals and consumer associations to 
publicise their discontent with various aspects of these 
enterprises' operations (for example, the absence of consumer 
representatives on boards). Moreover, its reports have 
criticised particular features of an enterprise's performance, 
such as poor industrial relations in the postal service, which 
have led to otherwise unnecessary price increases (note 
Wettenhall, 1986:107-8).
The other notable performance scrutinising body is AUSTEL, 
a new regulatory authority established in 1989 (see Minister 
for Transport and Communications, 1988a:122-56; 
Telecommunications Act 1989, No.53). It has jurisdiction over 
Telecom, Aussat and the Overseas Telecommunications Commission 
in the areas of technical regulation, protection of the 
carriers' monopoly, protection of competitors from unfair
It was established by the Prices Surveillance Authority 
Act 1983 (No.145).
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competition by the carriers, promotion of efficiency, and 
protection of consumers against misuse of the carriers' 
monopoly powers. It is the last of these functions which is 
of relevance in the present context. AUSTEL's general
authority to protect consumer interests is combined with 
specific roles in price control, consumer complaints and 
customer service standards (Minister for Transport and 
Communications, 1988a:145-51). In the area of consumer 
complaints a division of labour has been worked out with the 
Ombudsman, whereby the latter will continue to deal with 
individual grievances while AUSTEL will be responsible for 
pursuing complaints which raise 'wider regulatory policy 
considerations' (1988a:152)4 . With regard to customer service 
standards, AUSTEL's role will be to advise the government on 
the setting of performance targets for the three enterprises 
following consultation with the service providers and user 
groups. According to the Minister, in carrying out its 
consumer protection functions AUSTEL will be required to 
establish 'consultative arrangements' with 'representative 
consumer groups and other relevant interest groups'(1988a:145).
It remains to draw attention to several recent innovations 
designed to require trading authorities throughout their 
operations to pay greater attention to customer 
interests and preferences. The desirability of public 
organizations 'getting closer' to consumers has become a
4. Note the Ombudsman's reservations about this outcome and 
his displeasure with decision-making processes in the Department 
of Transport and Communications (Commonwealth Ombudsman and 
Defence Force Ombudsman, 1988:27-8).
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catch-cry in Australia and elsewhere in the 1980s. Addressing 
developments in Britain, Hambleton (1988) has identified a
simultaneous trend of the same sort in private sector
management. But he also argues that the threat of
privatisation and deregulation are crucial factors behind the 
recent popularity of 'consumerism' in government. These 
factors have been at work in Australia too. Their effects are 
nowhere more evident than in recent changes within Australia's 
largest public enterprise, Telecom.
Three notable developments have occurred almost 
simultaneously in Telecom. The first is its reorganization 
into three divisions, reflecting its main customer groups - 
corporate customers, metropolitan customers and country 
customers (see Telecom 1988b). Accompanying the new structure 
has been a major effort to change the organizational culture, 
so that through devolution of managerial responsibility, 
decentralisation and differentiation of service the enterprise 
can become truly 'customer driven' (see Ward, 1988). The 
second development is the establishment of an ongoing large- 
scale survey of consumer satisfaction with Telecom's main 
services. The survey, known as 'Telecats', is conducted by a 
private market research company in order to establish its 
independence in the minds of customers. Telecats is intended 
as both a performance measure, enabling districts to measure 
their performance against national targets and regional 
results, and a management tool, helping to identify reasons 
and remedies for customer dissatisfaction (Remark, 1987; 
Telecom Business Communications, 1988). Thirdly, an interim
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Telecom Consumer Consultative Council has been formed, the 
first of its kind associated with a Commonwealth trading 
authority. It comprises Telecom representatives and 
representatives of seven major consumer and other interest 
groups (Telecom, 1988c, 1988d). For Telecom's managing 
director the Council appeared as a way 'to build a bridge of 
understanding' between telecom and its customers; whereas the 
Director of the Australian Federation of Consumer 
Organizations, the Deputy Chairman of the interim Council, 
envisaged the permanent body as a 'legitimate forum' where 
consumers' views on issues could be 'put before Telecom at the 
most senior level' (Telecom, 1988c)5.
A considerable amount has thus been achieved over 
recent years in institutionalising responsiveness to the 
interests and expectations of the customers of Commonwealth 
trading authorities. Moreover, several of the very recent 
innovations we have discussed will undoubtedly attract 
widespread interest, and pressure may well develop to extend 
them to other authorities. In general, the achievement seems 
quite notable when one takes into account the virtual neglect 
of this whole area by the 'reform' movement of the 1970s and 
1980s.
This having been said, however, it cannot be concluded 
that mechanisms of accountability to the trading authorities' 
customers are particularly strong. To begin with, the 
mechanisms discussed above are far from having effective
5. The objectives and terms of reference of the Council are 
set out in Attachment A to Telecom (1988e).
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application to all trading authorities. Further, certain 
mechanisms found to be of value elsewhere are either absent or 
poorly developed among Commonwealth authorities. For 
instance, unlike some of their state counterparts, 
Commonwealth trading authorities are not required to have 
consumer representatives on their boards. Similarly, codes 
of practice setting out standards to be observed in dealing 
with customers on various matters, such as have been adopted 
for several of the nationalised industries in Britain (see 
Prosser, 1986:183-8), have no Commonwealth counterparts. 
Perhaps most notably, in comparison with the British situation 
there are no consumer councils which authorities are obliged 
to consult.
The new Telecom Consumer Consultative Council, noted 
above, appears to lack the necessary institutional autonomy. 
It is a Telecom creation rather than a body with its own 
statutory basis; it is chaired by a Telecom representative; 
its agenda is determined by Telecom; and it is presumably 
funded by Telecom (Telecom, 1988e). This compares with the 
more independent consumer councils attached to British 
nationalised industries. In Britain the statutory 
requirements for consultation with the consumer councils are 
'fragmented and inconsistent' and the record of consultation 
is 'highly varied', but the consumer councils have had some 
notable successes in promoting consumer causes (see Prosser, 
1986:157-8; see generally 157-68).
The absence of strong arrangements for consumer 
consultation, in turn, weakens the potential of other
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mechanisms to contribute to genuine responsiveness to 
consumers. Thus while the use of published indicators of 
performance has improved, in line with a more general emphasis 
on this instrument in Australian public administration, such 
indicators make no institutionalised contribution to 
satisfying consumer expectations. This is because performance 
indicators and performance targets are generally set solely by 
the authorities themselves and failure to meet targets has no 
automatic consequences. (In this respect, the role of AUSTEL 
in the setting of performance targets, noted above, is a 
significant departure from past practice). By contrast, 
Redwood and Hatch (1982) have shown how performance targets 
could be employed to strengthen the position of consumers. 
Targets would be set by the enterprises in consultation with 
consumer councils and the reasons for choosing particular 
targets would be published. Annual reports would describe 
actual performance against the targets and explanations would 
be provided for underperformance. Performance would also be 
monitored by the consumer councils and the auditors. Failure 
to meet targets would engender publicity and some form of 
special investigation.
The Board
We may now consider perhaps the most prominent and widespread 
mechanism through which the responsiveness of statutory 
authorities to key constituencies is facilitated, namely the 
placement on authority boards of representatives of particular 
groups. A glance at the annual reports of Commonwealth
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statutory authorities confirms that statutory boards are 
vehicles for the participation in public sector decision­
making of a very large number of individuals, from a great 
variety of niches in Australian society. But how adequate is 
this mechanism as a means of managing or satisfying the 
expectations of relevant groups? How effective is it, in 
other words, as an instrument of accountability?
The question is a difficult one to answer with any 
certainty. Indeed, the potential of the part-time policy 
board to act as an instrument of 'downward' or 'horizontal' 
accountability has been differently assessed in two recent 
Commonwealth documents. A favourable evaluation of this 
potential underpinned the recommendation of the Australian 
Science and Technology Commission report Future Directions for 
CSIRO (ASTEC, 1985) that the top structure of the Science and 
Industry Research Organization, one of the very few executive 
boards in existence among Commonwealth authorities, be 
replaced by a policy board. ASTEC argued that '... the Board 
should be perceived as a key element in the Organization's 
overall accountability to the broader community, bringing 
external views into the Organization and representing the 
Organization's views to that community' (1985:49-50). On the 
other hand, the White Paper Reform of Commonwealth Primary 
Industry Statutory Marketing Authorities (Department of 
Primary Industry,1986) argued against industry representation 
on boards as a means for authorities to account to their 
industries:
The Government's view is that it does not allow
sufficient accountability because as Board members,
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industry representatives have corporate 
responsibilities and commitments to Board policies 
through their involvement in the policy formulation 
process. They are not well placed to question Board 
policies after those policies have been agreed upon 
and implemented (1986:6).
The two positions were, however, not as far apart as 
they may seem. The White Paper did not deny that industry 
representation on boards had operated as an instrument of 
accountability, only that it had certain deficiencies which 
made other arrangements more 'suitable' for the purpose. For 
its part, ASTEC did not envisage the individual accountability 
of board members to the groups from which they were chosen, as 
it insisted that board members 'should not sit in a 
representative capacity' (1985:47).
It seems clear, however, that if the board is to 
operate as a strong mechanism of accountability then board 
members must, formally or informally, play representative 
roles. They are more likely to do so where there is a 
statutory requirement for representatives of particular fields 
of endeavour, associations or industry organizations to be 
appointed. The latter bodies will, in these circumstances, be 
in a better position than otherwise to exact responsiveness 
from boards. They will be in an even stronger position where 
statutes give the industry or association the right to 
nominate or elect its representatives. Both of these sorts of 
arrangement can be found among Commonwealth authorities.
Among the best known examples of the stronger 
requirement are the primary produce marketing authorities, the 
first batch of which were created in the period between the 
world wars. In these cases it was typically provided that
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growers and those involved in the processing and marketing of 
particular products should elect representatives to the board 
established to control the marketing of their product. Higher 
education authorities are also well known examples. The 
Australian National University Act 1946 (No.22), like the 
university Acts of the states, specified the composition of 
the University's governing Council in some detail. It 
required that, of the maximum of 30 Council members, five to 
nine must be elected by Convocation, two must be appointed or 
elected (as determined by the University Statutes) to 
represent students, three must be elected or appointed by the 
professorial and teaching staff, and four must be drawn from 
and elected by members of the Commonwealth Parliament (two 
from each House). We have also noted that the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Commission is to be largely composed of 
members elected by representative Regional Councils themselves 
elected by Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders. Various 
other statutes contain weaker versions of this sort of 
provision. For instance, the Economic Policy Advisory Council 
Act 1983 (No.26) specified that a majority of members be 
appointed after 'consultation' between the minister and 
various organizations representative of particular interest 
groups. Similarly, the Institute of Health Act 1987 (No.41) 
made provision for nominees of two health associations to be 
included in the 12 member Institute. In all of these cases 
accountability to non-governmental groups or associations is, 
to a greater or lesser degree, part of the design of the 
statutory authority.
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Formal arrangements for fully or partially 
representative boards are, however, relatively rare among 
Commonwealth authorities. More common is a requirement that 
the individuals selected have particular sorts of expertise or 
experience. For example, the Australia Council Act 1975 
(No.11), the Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act 1983 
(No.6), the Management and Investment Companies Act 1983 
(No.123), and the Defence Housing Authority Act 1987 (No.101) 
stipulate that an individual should not be appointed unless he 
'appears to the Governor-General' to be qualified by virtue of 
expertise or experience in specified relevant fields of 
activity. Often, however, the fields specified are so 
numerous or so broad as to place little constraint on the 
appointing authority. This sort of provision seemingly owes 
far more to the perceived need of ministers to protect 
themselves from allegations of patronage than to anything 
else. And even this minor constraint on the choice of board 
members is absent in the majority of authority statutes.
Furthermore, the representative board has been under 
attack to some extent over recent years, most notably in the 
statutory authority reform White Papers of 1986 and 1987. The 
White Paper on primary produce marketing authorities 
foreshadowed the end of representative boards for these 
authorities, although the statutory selection committees which 
were henceforth to nominate board members would be filled on 
a representative basis (Department of Primary Industry, 
1986:16-21). The subsequent 'Policy Guidelines' Paper on 
statutory authorities and government business enterprises took
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the trouble to emphasize that, unless statutes provide 
otherwise, the duty of members of statutory boards is to 
contribute their expertise for the good of the authority 
rather than to represent the views of the group or profession 
from which they are drawn (Minister for Finance, 1987:11).
It is tempting to conclude that, except in the few 
cases where Commonwealth statutory boards are formally 
representative of outside interests, the board is not an 
important mechanism of either 'horizontal' or 'downward' 
accountability. But this is not necessarily so. Even in 
cases where ministers have complete freedom of choice they (or 
their advisers) would surely often need to consult interest 
groups and professional associations in search of suitable 
appointees. One suspects that in many cases the result is 
that appointees are the de facto nominees of such bodies. 
Conversely, it seems natural that board members will often 
feel that they are expected, as far as possible, to represent 
the point of view of the group, association or profession from 
which they are drawn (and to which they may, as suggested 
above, owe their appointment). Moreover, it is likely that 
appointments will often reflect the desire of the minister to 
legitimise the agency and its programs in the eyes of 
particular social groups. Therefore, while formal efforts to 
produce accountability to clients, peers and so on may be 
relatively few, such relationships may well commonly grow out 
of the use of selection processes to manage the expectations 
of relevant groups. Of course, this is a speculative 
conclusion. And even if it is soundly based speculation, the
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lack of formal arrangements to cement the links would tend to 
keep any relationships of accountability relatively weak.
Implications for Judgements about Statutory Authority 
Accountability
The aim of the foregoing has been to reveal the existence of 
a hitherto underemphasized dimension of statutory authority 
accountability. On the evidence presented it is not possible 
to estimate with any precision the current contribution to 
public accountability of the phenomena we have discussed. But 
that contribution is clearly significant - both in terms of 
the number of authorities affected and in terms of the degree 
of institutionalisation of the relevant relationships. Thus, 
it has been shown that 'accountability', as the term is 
defined in this chapter, is importantly multi-faceted, or 
multi-directional, for a substantial number of statutory 
authorities. We have also demonstrated the considerable 
extent to which horizontal and downwards relationships are 
strengthened by formal mechanisms. By contrast, the previous 
writing on this subject (discussed earlier in the chapter) has 
tended to concentrate on informal linkages, which generally 
signify weaker (because less reliable) forms of 
accountability. Further, it has been argued that
accountability as constituency relations, in its developed 
forms, is closely associated with statutory authorities. That 
is, the relevant phenomena are more likely to exist, and to be 
more strongly established, among statutory authorities than 
among ministerial departments, making this type of
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accountability a compensation for any comparative weakness in
the system of ministerial control over the former bodies.
It seems to be the case, too, that downward and
horizontal accountability relationships have become more
important among Commonwealth authorities over recent years.
There is no evidence of a conscious movement aimed at
institutionalising a constituency relations conception of
accountability. Nevertheless, many of the examples mentioned
in the previous section, especially those involving notable
innovations, originated in the 1970s and 1980s.
Further evidence of a growth in the popularity of the
general approach is that during the 1980s it found favour with
a small number of academic commentators. Wettenhall's
contribution has already been noted. Ward's (1985) use of the
idea, applied to the particular case of universities, is also
of interest, not least because it seems to bear out that what
is important as far as public accountability is concerned is
highly dependent on the vantage point of the observer. Ward,
as the Vice Chancellor of Sydney University, argued that
government policy towards universities in the 1980s rested on
an excessively narrow conception of accountability, reflecting
a specifically governmental point of view and defined in terms
of ministerial control. From the seat of the chief executive
of a university, matters could be viewed differently:
. . . the most important aspect of accountability is 
not to be found in the formal obligations attached to 
grants of money or in the statutory responsibilities 
of reports to legislatures. Rather, it is to be 
found in the relationships between universities and 
the communities that nourish them and in some cases 
founded them... If university relationships with 
communities were in a strong state of mutual
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understanding... there would then certainly be no 
political gain in demanding that universities should 
demonstrate repeatedly that their finances are 
intact, that their courses and research are 
"relevant" to some government's concepts of the 
national interest, that their efficiency is so high 
that not a dollar is ever wasted (1985:75).
But the maintenance of this aspect of accountability over time
was, Ward implied, ultimately the responsibility of the
universities. Governments could not be expected, without
prompting, to share this outlook. Indeed, he argued, it was
precisely because universities had underplayed the importance
of downward relationships with local communities that
governments, 'driven by long term trends and by immediate
political and financial pressures' (p.75), were enabled to
impose their preferred uni-dimensional view of accountability.
So accountability as constituency relations is, if not
'on the march', then at least 'up and about'. And there is
reason to think that it may become even more important in the
future. To be sure, pressures to restrain governmental growth
and to increase efficiency will undoubtedly produce further
pressures, such as Ward has objected to, to equate
accountability with hierarchical control. But, as Barker
(1982:21) has suggested, 'Big Government', while probably here
to stay, is now sufficiently distrusted that its future
acceptability in the eyes of the governed may depend on its
adoption of 'an open and participatory disposition'. On the
evidence of this chapter, we can agree with Barker's
iconoclastic assessment that statutory authorities can promote
this style 'very considerably'.
Before concluding our case for the relevance of a
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constituency relations perspective on accountability, we must 
consider a possible objection to the whole argument. This is 
the possibility that what we have identified as a form of 
accountability is not genuine accountability at all, or else 
is an inferior species of accountability. Three distinct 
criticisms along these lines might be advanced. The first is 
that the 'statutory authority centred' perspective which the 
constituency relations approach incorporates is an 
inappropriate one. The argument here is that accountability, 
as either a process or an accomplishment, should be defined or 
controlled by the public or its representatives, not by non- 
elected officials (whether statutory officers or otherwise). 
Only then, it might be contended, does public accountability 
assume the central role we wish it to play in ensuring 
democratic government. The second criticism focuses on what 
may be regarded as a mis-specification of the entity to which 
statutory office-holders must be held accountable. The 
objection here is that the constituency relations approach 
satisfied itself with accountability to groups with particular 
interests, whereas the traditional Westminster approach 
institutionalises accountability to representatives of the 
public at large. In other words, while responsiveness to 
groups may be, up to a point, a desirable aspect of public 
administration, it does not constitute accountability. A 
third criticism might be that the constituency relations 
approach rests on an 'explanatory and co-operative' 
understanding of accountability (see Marshall, 1978 and 
1984:119-21), which is much weaker than the traditional
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conception which links answerability to control. The 
assumption is that it needs to settle for this weaker form of 
accountability because the groups and individuals to whom, on 
the constituency relations approach, officials respond do not 
have any executive authority (such as ministers possess) to 
issue instructions, nor are they able to invoke sanctions when 
performance proves unsatisfactory. We shall deal with each of 
these criticisms in turn.
The first criticism may be quickly dismissed. It is 
true that the constituency relations approach has been 
identified with the statutory office-holder's vantage point. 
But, in determining whether or to what extent statutory 
authorities are accountable, the emphasis in this approach is 
not on how the statutory authority perceives its level of 
responsiveness, but on the ability of the statutory authority 
to satisfy the exogenously determined expectations of the 
relevant constituencies.
The second criticism cannot be so easily brushed 
aside. It arises from two fundamental problems in the 
political theory of democracy. One is how to operationalise 
'the public interest' or 'the will of the people'. The other 
concerns what should be required of individuals acting in a 
representative capacity (as the constituency relations 
approach tends to view statutory office-holders). Should they 
be required to respond to expressed demands and tangible 
pressures? Or should they act in accordance with a more 
detached view of the public interest? A large literature 
addresses these problems (see in particular Pitkin, 1967;
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Pennock, 1979; Saltzstein, 1985) and solutions are likely to 
remain strongly contested into the foreseeable future.
The constituency relations approach stakes out a 
particular position in these debates. It assumes that 
accountability is a matter of responsiveness to desires or 
expressed demands, rather than to some official's view of what 
the public interest requires. It also assumes that the 
constituencies of peers, clients, public interest groups and 
customers to which statutory authorities respond are able to 
give adequate practical expression to key components of 'the 
public interest'. At the same time, the approach does not 
suggest that accountability to such constituencies should ever 
be regarded as the whole of a public accountability regime. 
The approach is an inherently pluralistic one: it holds that 
accountability necessarily involves a variety of relationships 
including those with actors, such as ministers and 
parliament, who can claim to stand for a more inclusive view 
of the public interest. An adequate regime of public 
accountability for statutory authorities is, on this view, a 
matter of striking an appropriate balance between different 
channels of accountability connecting administrators and a 
variety of interested actors. The problem of public 
accountability for each statutory authority is thus most 
appropriately seen as a particular exercise in institutional 
design.
The third criticism invites two sorts of response. 
One is that explanatory accountability has, in effect, long 
been the norm in parliamentary democracies, and that the
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notion of a stronger form of accountability within such 
systems is for the most part a myth. To be sure, ministers 
are in a position to sanction and instruct officials, and to 
dismiss or fail to reappoint statutory office-holders. But 
this is not sufficient to ensure a system of public 
accountability. In parliamentary government the linchpin of 
accountability is the relationship between parliament and 
ministers: ministerial control ensures public accountability 
only in conjunction with its necessary complement, 
parliamentary control of ministers. It is a commonplace of 
studies of contemporary parliaments that parliament cannot 
usually control ministers in any strong sense. The result is 
that ministerial responsibility functions today much more as 
a mechanism for exacting explanations than for controlling or 
sanctioning ministers or official6.
The other response is that it is by no means clear 
that the alternative mechanisms we have discussed in this 
chapter cannot provide sanctions or other forms of influence 
sufficient in most cases to ensure explanations or remedial 
actions which are at least as satisfactory as those produced 
by ministerial responsibility. Ministers and parliament have 
an important role in accountability regimes for statutory 
authorities because they have the greatest potential to punish 
lapses of responsibility or authoritatively to redirect the 
work of an agency. But this power is deployable only in 
extreme circumstances or at substantial intervals. A range of
6. These matters are discussed more extensively in Chapter 
9. For a recent overview of the large literature on this topic 
see Emy and Hughes (1988:294-331).
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more subtle influences, of precisely the kind that we have 
considered, will also be necessary to ensure the satisfaction 
of the variety of legitimate expectations which a multiplicity 
of interested 'audiences' or 'constituencies' will typically 
have of semi-independent governmental bodies. And it is the 
satisfaction of such expectations which, on the argument of 
this chapter, should be regarded as a primary test of 
accountability.
CHAPTER 9
ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY IN CONTEXT
This final chapter places the issue of statutory authority 
accountability in the context of general trends in 
Commonwealth public administration. As suggested in Part I, 
statutory authorities can only be fully understood when seen 
as part of a wider system of public administration. Their 
very existence is a consequence of perceived limitations in 
ministerial administration. Further, the ministerial 
department has traditionally been adopted as the reference 
point for judgements about the strengths and weaknesses of 
statutory authority administration. In particular, it is in 
(explicit or implicit) comparison with ministerial 
administration that statutory authorities have been held to 
lack accountability. It is thus of considerable interest that 
the 1970s and 1980s have witnessed a major reassessment of the 
quality of public accountability furnished by ministerial 
administration, leading to pressure for institutional change. 
I shall characterise and explain this development before 
discussing its significance for statutory authorities.
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The Shift from a Monistic to a Pluralistic Conception of 
Accountability
Recent critical discussion of public accountability has been 
based most importantly on a desire to confront the perceived 
de facto independence of the officialdom in contemporary 
government. In effect, the traditional problem of statutory 
authority accountability - how to reconcile independence with 
accountability - has been recognized as a key problem in 
modern government generally. The most authoritative and 
influential Australian analysis of the problem is that of the 
Royal Commission on Australian Government administration which 
reported in 1976 (RCAGA, 1976).1 We shall consequently pay 
close attention to the findings and recommendations of that 
body and its researchers.
The Royal Commission's main finding was that the
1. Up to the early 1980s there would have been room for 
dispute over a description of the Coombs Commission as either 
authoritative or influential. Initially the government and 
senior public servants appeared keen to dispute its authority. 
Prime Minister Fraser enunciated a largely conventional 
understanding of 'responsibility in government' in 1978 (Fraser, 
1978). And over the following year, as Hawker (1980:178) noted, 
no less than three senior public servants felt compelled to 
restate 'what once did not need to be stated' , offering a defence 
of the public service 'in familiar terms of instrumentality and 
a certain isolation from the political level of control'. 
Moreover, while some action was taken in the late 1970s in 
accordance with the Coombs reform agenda, the fate of the Coombs 
report under the Fraser Coalition government was in general 'a 
textbook case of the non-implementation of administrative reform' 
(Wilenski, 1986: 267). However, through the cumulative effect 
of further inquiries (both executive and parliamentary), several 
politically embarrassing demonstrations of administrative 
weaknesses and the pressure of tighter fiscal constraints, the 
Coalition parties were won over to key elements of the Coombs 
reform proposals. Under the Hawke Labor governments (1983- ) 
the Coombs report has been a primary source of initiatives for 
administrative reform, most of which have received bipartisan 
support.
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'Westminster model' no longer provided an adequate framework 
for public accountability:
... in a system which combines the anonymity of 
officials with an inability of ministers effectively to 
accept responsibility, effective and economical 
administration can fall between the stools of the 
theory of ministerial responsibility and of the 
practice of management by anonymous official (RCAGA, 
1976:12).
On the basis of this diagnosis, the Commissioners took their 
task to be the development of a new system in which a more 
limited, or 'realistic', notion of ministerial responsibility 
would be supplemented by means of holding officials directly 
accountable for the powers which they inevitably exercise 
independently of ministers (RCAGA, 1976: 12). This was a bold 
departure from the Australian orthodoxy. But, considered in 
an international context, it merely followed the trend of 
comparable inquiries in Britain (CCS, 1968) and Canada (RCGO, 
1962).
The wisdom of overseas experience was distilled for the 
Commission and applied to the Australian situation in the 
consultant's report of Professor H.V. Emy (1976).2 In Emy's 
view the Westminster model was not only descriptively 
inaccurate in contemporary circumstances, but it had become an 
obstacle to efficiency, effectiveness and accountability in 
government. Three aspects of existing arrangements in
Emy's report was seen to have exerted a 'profound 
influence' on the Commission (Reid, 1976: 323). Further, it was 
described by Reid (1976:322), himself one of Australia's foremost 
analysts of responsible government, as 'the most penetrating 
examination of the notion of ministerial responsibility yet 
published in Australia'. Emy's report is discussed here because 
it contains a clearer, more fully argued and more forceful 
statement of the Commission's dominant theme than can be found 
in the Coombs report.
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particular needed to be overturned.3 Firstly, in place of the 
policy-administration dichotomy, which supported an 
artificially rigid distinction between the role of the 
minister and that of the public servant, one should posit a 
continuum of activity to which both politicians and officials 
contribute. Thus the roles of the two sets of actors should 
not be determined by any supposedly inherent differences in 
the nature of their tasks, but should be actively defined. It 
should be made clear that the minister is responsible for the 
overall, or strategic, control of the department and efforts 
should be made to make such control a reality. But, at the 
same time, senior officials should be made clearly responsible 
for operational matters. Central to Emy's scheme of reform 
was the need to deny ministerial responsibility the 'holistic' 
significance it has in the Westminster model. Individual 
ministerial responsibility should, he thought, apply only to 
the instructions ministers give to public servants (1976:45- 
6 ).
Secondly, Emy argued that, in place of the idea that 
responsibility can be concentrated in the person of the 
minister, the reality of diffused responsibility should be 
recognized and dealt with through the deliberate delegation of 
authority within departments and the strengthening of 
management control systems. Once it was accepted that 
officials necessarily exercise executive power and play
3. The following summary pulls together matters dealt with 
at various points in Emy's paper. The three points are, however, 
clearly expressed in Emy's own account of his general proposal 
for reform (1976: 45-9).
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important policy roles, mechanisms could be developed to hold 
them accountable. For Emy the controlled devolution of 
responsibility and accountability was also desirable on the 
ground that it would create an organizational environment 
conducive to better administrative performance. Recognizing 
a degree of independence in the exercise of power by public 
servants would entail the development of a 'constitutional 
persona' for the latter, but this process was already underway 
and could in any case be dealt with more effectively through 
codes of conduct for public servants than through a 
reassertion of the old notions of neutrality and anonymity 
(1976: 61-63).
Finally, a system of 'positive controls' should, in 
Emy's view, be substituted for the current regime of 'negative 
controls' (1976: 46). Negative controls, a consequence of 
ministerial responsibility, emphasized close supervision, rule 
following and the values of reliability and predictability. 
The proposed positive controls, in contrast, would emphasize 
personal responsibility and goal seeking and would be imposed 
through performance review. This final proposed change was 
closely related to the second. If officials were to be 
recognized not as inert instruments of the minister's will but 
as exercising significant initiative, they should be subjected 
to stimuli which encourage goal attainment rather than simply 
conformity to rules and directions.
Emy's analysis was broadly accepted by the Commission. 
In keeping with its tacit acknowledgement of the need for a 
pluralistic approach to accountability in modern government,
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the Coombs report sought in essence to combine three 
accountability principles. These were what we may describe as 
a responsible government' principle, an 'accountable 
management' principle and a 'downward responsiveness' 
principle.4 We shall briefly examine each of these.
The first principle is the Westminster notion that the 
minister must control his department so that he can answer for 
it in public. The Commission remained firmly wedded to this 
idea. Its proposals were designed both to strengthen 
ministerial control directly and to make it more credible by 
clarifying its content. The minister's role within the 
department, as the Commission saw it, was to give general 
direction and several of its recommendations sought to enhance 
capacity in this area (RCAGA, 1976: 63-67). On the other 
iand, the Commission observed that 'the more usual need' was 
to relieve ministers of managerial pressures so that they can 
apply themselves to their other roles and so that departments 
are 'not continually hampered by being unable to proceed for 
vant of authority (p.66). To rectify this situation and, 
equally importantly, to improve accountability, the Commission 
vanted the formal responsibilities of the departmental head to 
oe clarified and increased. Specifically, it was recommended 
chat departmental heads be appointed as Accounting Officers 
ind that they be held responsible to ministers and cabinet for 
departmental efficiency (p.97, p.44).
4. This characterisation of the Coombs report has 
sinilarities with Spann's analysis of the 'Coombs doctrine' of 
adninistration into three 'themes' : 'the politics-administration 
cor.tinuum', 'accountable management' and 'flexible 
responsiveness' (Spann, 1977).
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Accountable management, the second of the components in 
the Commission's revised system of accountability, has been 
defined as 'the development of the maximum of independent 
command at the lowest possible level and the development of an 
objective yardstick to measure performance in these commands'
(Drucker, 1960; cited in Garrett, 1980: 130) . Such a
management system imposes a number of organizational
requirements: the organization must be divided into
'accountable units ' which can function as largely self-
contained budgetary entities; there must be a 'performance 
appraisal procedure for setting and reviewing objectives'; 
means must be developed to sustain a good supply of competent 
middle managers; and 'a comprehensive system of planning and 
control information' is needed to coordinate the units, to 
relate objectives to the overall goals of the organization and 
to enable middle managers to be held accountable (Garrett, 
1980: 130-31). These prerequisites are sometimes difficult to 
satisfy, especially in government, but the incentive for the 
effort is the attractiveness of the promised result: 'a 
rapidly-reacting, adaptable, cost- and results-conscious... 
[organization] with a minimum of bureaucratic rules and 
regulations and an active and self-reliant management style' 
(p.131).
The influence of this model of management pervades the 
RCAGA report. In particular, it was an essential element in 
the argument that departments should have greater control over 
financial and manpower resources, with the key central 
agencies, Treasury and the Public Service Board, exercising
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only global controls (pp.44-5). A necessary counterpart to 
greater departmental freedom in these areas is a strengthening 
of the procedures for review. The Commission addressed this 
matter by advocating periodic efficiency audits conducted by 
the Auditor-General (pp.375-9), effectiveness reviews by the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (pp.384-5), and the 
monitoring of general standards and guidelines on departmental 
establishments by the Board (pp.388-400).
The third component of the Coombs' accountability 
system I have termed 'downward responsiveness'. In the 
context of relations between the bureaucracy and the public, 
responsiveness has several dimensions: a spirit of 
helpfulness on the part of officials; procedures which 
facilitate prompt service and provide flexibility to allow the 
particular circumstances of clients to be taken into account; 
and the ability of interested individuals and groups to 
influence the policy of the organization. The Commission 
identified various causes of a lack of responsiveness on each 
of these dimensions and framed recommendations to overcome a 
variety of impediments. Recommendations included training 
programs, development of guidelines and codes of behaviour, a 
change in the social composition of the bureaucracy, revision 
of excessively restrictive rules and regulations and 
encouragement of greater outside participation in the policy 
process (pp.128-146).5
The decade following the appearance of the Coombs
5. See Self (1978: 317-19) for a more detailed and complete 
summary of the proposals.
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report witnessed an unprecedented stream of administrative 
reform (Wilenski, 1986). Reform has encompassed initiatives 
related to each of the three accountability principles 
outlined above, though it has not always followed the Coombs 
agenda. Thus the main administrative reforms with which the 
Fraser government was associated were largely outside the 
concerns of the Coombs Commission, although they can be seen 
as a response to that body's emphasis on both the need for 
responsibility to be placed directly upon public servants and 
the need to strengthen the 'downward responsiveness' of 
government administration. These reforms involved the 
creation in a series of steps between 1975 and 1982 of a body 
of 'new administrative law',6 a program of change which even 
before its completion was described by the Law Reform 
Commission of Canada as 'an awesome leap' towards a new legal 
structure for public administration (Katz, 1980; cited by 
Griffiths, 1985:445).
Administrative reform under the 'responsible minister' 
and 'accountable management' heads has been mostly the work of 
the Hawke Labor government, though to some extent that 
government has been able to build on a process of change 
within the public service extending well back into the 1970s.7
6. The specific legislative measures were the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, the Ombudsman Act 1976, 
the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 and the 
Freedom of Information Act 1982. For discussions of the 
operation and impact of these changes, see Jinks (1982), 
Griffiths (1985), Thynne and Goldring (1987), and Canberra 
Bulletin of Public Administration (1989).
7. For the Hawke Government's reforms, see Kouzmin et al. 
(1984), Nethercote et al. (1986) and Wettenhall and Nethercote 
(1988) .
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Reforms designed to strengthen ministerial control of 
departments were a feature of the Public Service Reform Act 
1984 and accompanying legislation. One set of changes sought 
to bolster the authority of the minister over the departmental 
head. Other changes addressed the capacity of the minister to 
give direction. From 1973 the personal staffs of ministers 
had gradually been increased and upgraded to augment the 
political input into the work of departments (Wilenski, 
1986:272). In 1984 the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act gave 
ministers the ability to engage a 'limited number' of 
individuals 'for work on nominated projects or reviews 
directly for a Minister, or on duties agreed between the 
Minister and the secretary to the department and under the 
secretary's supervision and direction' (Dawkins, 1984).
Reforms associated with the accountable management 
principle are less confined to a few pieces of legislation and 
extend over a longer period of time. A prominent component of 
these reforms is the devolution to departments of greater 
responsibility for the disposition of human and financial 
resources. The 1984 public service reform package was an 
important step in this process. The Senior Executive Service 
it introduced in the place of the Second Division gave 
departmental heads much greater freedom in the appointment, 
promotion and redeployment of senior staff. It also 
transferred the authority to create, abolish and classify 
positions and determine duties from the Public Service Board 
to departmental heads. A second wave of public service reform 
in 1986 included measures increasing the ability of
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departmental heads to retire and discipline staff, giving 
managers broader criteria on which to determine positions, and 
streamlining (in some cases abolishing) appeals processes 
(Hawke, 1986). Then in 1987 the whittling away of the 
responsibilities of the Public Service Board culminated in its 
abolition and the devolution to departments of its remaining 
powers over the operational aspects of personnel matters 
(Hawke, 1987).* 8
As for financial resources, moves to enhance the 
decision-making powers of departments began in the late 1970s 
but gathered force under the Hawke government. Administrative 
'votes' were amalgamated in the 1984-85 Appropriation Act, 
reducing the number of separate appropriations for each 
department from as many as 21 to two (Howard, 1986: 55). 
Further, as part of his 1986 reforms, the Prime Minister 
announced that departments (and budget-dependent agencies) 
would be permitted within limits to carry over unused 
administrative funds from one year to the next and to exercise 
more freedom in the movement of funds between their salaries 
and administrative expenses votes (Hawke, 1986: 1450).9
The counterpart of greater resource management powers
. The waning of the Board was to some extent offset from
the point of view of line departments by the growing power of the
Department of Finance. Under the 1984 changes, the Department
of Finance gained control over departmental staffing levels and,
with the abolition of the Board, it took over responsibility for
the public service classification system.
9. It is likely, however, that these changes mask the 
extent of continuing Department of Finance constraints on 
decision-making given the government's overwhelming concern in 
recent years with the achievement of savings and reductions in 
public expenditure (Howard, 1986).
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for departments, within an evolving system of accountable 
management, is the development of mechanisms to hold 
departmental managers responsible for the exercise of those 
powers. The first important step in this direction following 
the Coombs Commission was the amendment of the Audit Act in 
1979 to clarify and enhance the financial responsibility of 
departmental heads and to authorise the Auditor-General to 
undertake efficiency audits (see Audit Amendment Act 1979, 
No.8). The Hawke government's contribution has been to 
accelerate the hitherto tentative progress towards program 
budgeting10 and, relatedly, to stimulate development of the 
managerial capabilities and information systems necessary for 
accountable management within departments.* 11 Central to 
these reforms is the identification of the 'program' - that 
is, 'a set of resources and actions directed towards one or 
more common goals and under the direction of one manager or 
management team' (Department of Finance and Public Service 
Board 1981; cited by Howard, 1986: 53) - as the main focus of 
both management systems and public accountability. In 
addition to the organization of administrative activity into 
a 'hierarchical structure of programs', the government's 
budgetary and 'financial management improvement' reform 
aspirations encompass several other elements of accountable 
management: the specification of program objectives, the
10. See Howard (1986: 43-4) for an account of developments 
in the 1970s.
11. The progress of these efforts can be traced in a
series of official documents: Dawkins (1984), Department of
Finance and Public Service Board (1984), Department of Finance 
(1987) and Department of Finance (1988a).
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development of indicators to enable performance to be 
measured, the regular review of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of programs as part of the budgetary cycle, the 
presentation of the budget in program format, and the 
delegation of responsibility within departments (Howard, 1986: 
52, 56-7).
The administrative reforms of the 1970s and 1980s have 
been portrayed in newspaper and academic commentary as highly 
consequential for the shape of Australian government. 
Reference has been made to the emergence of 'a hybrid 
structure which incorporates Westminster features with those 
of the U.S. - a peculiarly Australian form of government' 
(AFR, 1987). Similarly, for Wilenski (1986:273, 275), 
Australia has been moving towards ' its own model of 
responsible administration' comprised of 'British, American 
and European approaches'.
It is the argument of this section that the trend of 
administrative reform may be understood as a shift from a 
monistic to a pluralistic conception of accountability, 
encompassing a partial differentiation of administrative 
accountability and ministerial responsibility. Administrative 
accountability in Westminster-style government has 
traditionally emphasized a single, fixed chain of 
relationships connecting officials to ministers, ministers to 
members of parliament and members of parliament to the public. 
In response to perceived weaknesses in this constitutional 
mechanism in contemporary circumstances, recent reforms have 
attempted to remove some of the strain by developing
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alternative means of ensuring that government bureaucracy 
serves public purposes. These involve direct relationships 
with both parliament and public to supplement the 'mediated' 
public accountability provided for by the Westminster 
model.12
The search for a broader framework for administrative 
accountability is in keeping with growing interest over recent 
years in the creation of a variety of new checks on executive 
power. This theme may be detected in a range of otherwise 
disparate developments such as the rediscovery and celebration 
of the 'consensual' as opposed to the 'ma joritarian' 
components of Australian democracy (Sharman, 1989); the 
interest in a bill of rights (Galligan, 1987); and the 
growing role of various forms of public participation, 
including interest group participation in the policy process 
(Marsh, 1983) and the involvement of 'outsiders' in committees 
set up to review government activity (Prasser 1985; 1986; 
1988).
Consequences for Ministerial Administration
If the Coombs Commission argued an influential case f o r  
tendencies toward bureaucratic independence in contemporary 
government to be dealt with through the development of 
pluralistic accountability arrangements, it also
12. The emergence of a pluralistic model of accountability 
raises the possibility of conflicting pressures on 
administrators. This has important consequences for democratic 
theory and practice which cannot be pursued here. See Saltzstein 
(1985) for a good outline of the issues from an American 
perspective.
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unintentionally demonstrated the difficulty of accommodating 
the desired change within the framework of the ministerial 
department. An important part of the problem is that, by 
promoting the direct public accountability of officials, the 
two additional principles which Coombs regarded as essential 
for adequate administrative accountability in contemporary 
government threaten to erode ministerial responsibility, the 
keystone of the ministerial department.
Early commentary on the Coombs report was sceptical 
about the apparent belief of the Commissioners that they had 
successfully married the three principles. In Spann's view 
(1977:86) the very aspiration was 'Utopian'. Similarly, 
Parker (1978b:348-9) suggested that basic inconsistencies 
could be perceived merely by juxtaposing the Report's main 
propositions:
... first, that at one end of the administrative scale 
machinery should be developed to enhance ministerial 
control and broaden ministerial responsibility; 
second, that through the middle of the scale the old 
vertical lines of hierarchical control should be 
weakened in favour of rank-and-file participation in 
decisions, task-force-type operational teams, more 
informal procedures and more delegation of authority; 
third, that officials at all levels should be held 
directly accountable for administration through 
processes of incentives, penalties, efficiency audits 
and appeal tribunals monitored not by ministers but by 
parliamentary committees; and fourth, that officials 
in the operational front line should abjure their vows 
of silence, anonymity and obedience and become somehow 
directly accountable not to parliament but to the 
public.
It is possible, however, that such complex arrangements will 
necessarily result from an attempt to take accountability 
seriously in contemporary circumstances. Insofar as the 
Commission had convinced itself that its three principles
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could be perfectly harmonized the criticism levelled at them 
by Spann and Parker was justified. But the more modest claim 
that each of the principles is important and that a balance 
must be struck between them, through explicit trade-offs where 
they are clearly contradictory, is much less vulnerable.
The Coombs Commission appears, nevertheless, to have 
been deficient in two respects in its treatment of the 
relationship between the accountability principles. Firstly, 
it did not squarely confront the need to limit the responsible 
minister principle in order to accommodate its new principles. 
And, secondly, those trade-offs which it did make were 
consistently in favour of the traditional principle. In other 
words, the Commission failed to follow through with its 
analysis. To illustrate this point we may examine those parts 
of the Coombs report dealing with each of the new principles .
The first of the above deficiencies is strongly 
manifested Coombs' treatment of accountable management. There 
is, for instance, little effort to address the likelihood that 
continued support for a strong notion of ministerial control 
would have the effect of shoring up the concentration of 
authority at the top of departments, thereby impeding the 
devolution of responsibility within departments essential to 
accountable management. The Commission's proposal to 
strengthen the personal accountability of departmental heads 
arguably also encourages this outcome.13
13. Nethercote (1977:114) claims that this is what happened 
in Canada in the mid-1960s following the implementation of the 
Glassco Commission's recommendations to 'let the managers 
manage'. In Britain, the Accounting Officer arrangement which 
the Coombs Commission recommended for Australia has been
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The issue of possible trade-offs is avoided in another 
way by vagueness about the status of the accountability the 
Commission wished to produce through its accountable 
management reforms. Parts of the Report (for example, section 
3.4.6) read as though the Commission, like the Fulton 
Committee, envisaged the establishment of 'an "internal" 
system of managerial accountability in departments' which 
would not affect 'the "external" or public accountability of 
Accounting Officers and Ministers' (Garrett, 1980:134). But 
the Report has also been interpreted as advocating a radical 
extension of the public accountability of officials (at least 
down to the level of middle level managers) to parliamentary 
committees (Parker, 1978b:348-9).14 Such public
answerability may indeed be necessary, as the Expenditure 
Committee of the British Parliament has suggested (Expenditure 
Committee, 1977; cited by Garrett, 1980:137), if accountable 
management is to operate effectively. But if so a number of 
questions about the arrangements required to operate the 
resulting, more complex system of public accountability need 
to be answered.15
On the key question of the implications for ministerial 
responsibility, Emy's report accepted the need for major
identified as a major restraint on delegation within departments 
(Garrett, 1980:133).
14. See the passage from Parker (1978b) quoted above.
15. For instance, what sanctions can be applied by the 
parliament to enforce the accountability of officials? If 
officials are to be drawn into the political arena should they 
be permitted, or granted, some means of defending themselves 
publicly? If so, what should this be? (Reid, 1976:324; Parker, 
1978b:358).
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change if accountable management were to be taken seriously. 
It stated that 'accountable management pulls in the opposite 
way to ministerial responsibility' (Emy, 1976:50), that '[t]he 
managerial concept has a holistic significance of its own' 
(p.48), and that 'ministerial responsibility must fit within 
the new system, and not vice versa' (p.58). By comparison the 
Coombs Commission, desiring as strongly to breathe new life 
into ministerial responsibility as to establish a meaningful 
system of accountability for officials, was generally not 
prepared to face a choice between the two. But when forced to 
choose the Commission tended to defer to tradition, as in its 
acceptance on classical Westminster grounds of restrictions on 
public servants' freedom of comment before parliamentary 
committees (RCAGA, 1976:116-7 ).16
We turn now to the Commission's treatment of the other 
new principle, downward responsiveness. The Report suggests 
three main ways in which the Westminster model had inhibited 
bureaucratic responsiveness. Firstly, it had produced a 
concentration of decision-making authority at the top of 
departments and a preoccupation at the lower levels, among 
those having most contact with the public, with the avoidance 
of error (RCAGA, 1976:149-50). This was productive of 
inflexibility in dealings with clients. Secondly, work 
associated with the delivery of services to the public had 
been undervalued because policy development and provision of
16. The notions supported were that public servants should 
mot express opinions on the merits of 'a ministerial or 
grovernment decision' or policy or divulge advice tendered to 
ministers (1976:116).
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advice to ministers had been viewed as the main functions of 
the ministerial department (1976:21). Thirdly, the 
Westminster model encouraged officials to regard members of 
parliament and ministers as the sole agents responsible for 
transmitting citizen demands into administration (p.20, 
p .126).
As diagnosed, then, these are structural problems, to 
be dealt with presumably by restricting the responsible 
minister principle. In framing its recommendations, however, 
the Commission played down the relationship between 
Westminster principles and the offending attitudes and 
practices. It tended instead to suggest that the latter could 
be addressed independently of the former, through new 
administrative arrangements or through the psychological 
reorientation of officials (see, for example, pp.126-7). So 
once more the Commission failed to confront the apparent need 
to trade-off accountability principles.
Whether in order to avoid the need to make such trade­
offs, or for other reasons, the Commission also forsook a 
potentially major means of improving bureaucratic 
responsiveness to the public by focusing almost exclusively on 
internal administrative reform and neglecting the possibility 
of empowering the public through rights to information and 
rights of appeal against administrative decisions.17 This 
bias is exemplified in the discussion of public access to 
information where administrative guidelines are tentatively
17. Some administrative law reforms are supported (pp.134- 
5) but the discussion of the whole subject occupied less than 
three pages in the 412 page report.
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supported in preference to freedom of information legislation 
(p.350).
What of the reforms enacted in the period since the 
Coombs report? Have these exhibited the same reluctance to 
interfere with traditional principles? The answer is a mixed 
one. Recent reforms show different degrees of deference to 
ministerial responsibility. The new administrative law has 
decidedly radical elements. Probably the most striking is the 
ability of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to substitute 
its own decision for the original administrative decision, 
even if the former conflicts with departmental policy. While 
the Tribunal has attempted to work out an accommodation with 
ministerial responsibility (Sharpe, 1986; Bayne, 1988), the 
very existence of the power has been criticized by a 
prestigious British body on the ground that it 'substitute[s] 
for ministerial answerability in Parliament an unaccountable 
policy-making tribunal' (The Justice-All Souls Committee, 
1981; cited by Griffiths, 1985:451). It is also relevant to 
note that the British Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration was established in a way which showed greater 
sensitivity to the traditional role and status of the member 
of parliament than does the office of Ombudsman in Australia 
(Griffiths, 1985:455).
On the other hand, the central role of ministerial 
responsibility has been directly bolstered by those reforms 
designed to strengthen the capacity for ministerial control. 
In addition, the accountable management reforms have reflected 
Coombs' conservatism, with the result that the potential for
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a new channel of accountability between departmental officials 
and parliament which might diminish the dominance of 
ministerial responsibility is presently very underdeveloped. 
Moreover, the 'Government Guidelines for Official Witnesses 
Before Parliamentary Committees and Related Matters' 
(Guidelines, 1984) seem well designed to ensure that this 
remains so. These Guidelines severely restrict the 
answerability of public servants for the exercise of their 
responsibilities on familiar grounds: 'consistent with the 
traditional understanding of ministerial responsibility, the 
public advocacy and defence of government policies and 
administration has traditionally been, and should remain, the 
preserve of ministers, not officials' (1984:309).
Thus administrative accountability within Commonwealth 
departments of state no longer rests exclusively on 
ministerial responsibility. But, as with the Coombs report, 
the development of a pluralistic system of accountability has 
been compromised by efforts to shore up traditional 
arrangements. If the Coombs Commission's analysis (as 
distinct from its recommendations) is accepted, it must be 
concluded that public accountability remains compromised by 
the great weight which continues to be placed on ministerial 
responsibility.
The Statutory Authority as a Model for Administrative Reform? 
We have focused above on the potential for certain new 
accountability mechanisms to conflict with ministerial 
administration as traditionally understood. But it is
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important to recognize that the basic issue is the alleged 
need for ministerial administration to accommodate a degree of 
overt bureaucratic independence. At bottom, it is this 
requirement rather than the particular mechanisms employed to 
secure the accountability of the quasi-autonomous officials 
which is the source of difficulty.
Emy and the Coombs Commission, the former more 
insistently than the latter, both felt that the reality of 
significant independence in the exercise of power by public 
servants should be met with the development of a 
'constitutional persona' for the latter. What I want to 
highlight here is that, in attempting to accommodate this 
development, Emy and Coombs argued in effect for the 
importation into the structure of the ministerial department 
of elements of statutory authority administration.
At the most basic level, this tendency is manifested in 
a desire to separate the responsibility of the minister from 
the responsibilities of departmental officials. Emy (1976:28, 
45-46) saw several benefits resulting from such a change. 
Firstly, the responsibility of the minister could be made more 
'realistic' by being limited to the use made of the minister's 
power to issue directions. Secondly, the de facto exercise of 
power independently of the minister could be formally 
acknowledged and separate arrangements could be made to ensure 
its accountability. Finally, the overwhelmingly 'political' 
orientation of departments, their subordination to the 
dictates of the immediate partisan struggle, might be reduced, 
thereby facilitating more and better research and planning and
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more attention to delivery of services to the public as 
opposed to the work of advising the minister.
A separation of responsibilities as between minister 
and agency, with the ultimate dominance of the former 
guaranteed by a power to direct the latter, are primary 
features of the statutory authority.18 Moreover, the 
benefits just listed could be, and often have been, given as 
justifications for the creation of statutory authorities.
The parallel between the new arrangements advocated for 
ministerial departments and arrangements traditionally 
associated with statutory authorities continued at a more 
detailed level. It was particularly marked in the suggested 
reforms of the office of departmental head, which was not only 
to be given a statutory basis and independent statutory 
responsibilities but was also to be filled in a manner and on 
a tenure something like that of statutory boards (RCAGA, 
1976:95-103). Other similarities included the recommendations 
that departments submit annual reports to ministers for 
tabling in parliament (pp.75-6) and that collegial 
arrangements for decision-making be experimented with at the 
top of departments (p.71).
As has been noted, the similarities with the statutory 
authority model are more apparent in Emy's paper than in the 
Coombs report. In spite of its desire to fix responsibilities 
more firmly, the Coombs Commission was determined to preserve 
the administrative flexibility and the pragmatic character of
18. Emy (1976:45) argued that political control should be 
explicitly defined as the 'power to direct' rather than 
imanagement by the minister of all aspects of the policy process.
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the relationship between ministers and officials which it saw 
as among the leading advantages of the ministerial department. 
Further, the Commission was loath to endorse any arrangement 
which might have the effect of isolating the minister from the 
management of the department. Indeed, it sought the active 
involvement of the minister in the improved management control 
and performance evaluation system which it had identified as 
a major goal. Consequently, the idea that departments might, 
like statutory bodies, be granted responsibility for the 
conduct of their affairs subject only to ministerial 
directions (and a limited number of other controls) was 
explicitly rejected in the Report (RCAGA, 1976:43).
Coombs’ position on the role of the minister hints at 
an important contradiction in the Report. The latter's 
central theme was accountability (Spann, 1977:79); yet it was 
equally insistent on the value of administrative flexibility. 
The problem is that flexibility, or fluidity, and 
accountability are not mutually consistent objectives. 
Accountability requires, as the Commission recognized, the 
formalising of structures through a clear specification of 
responsibilities. The more clearly defined, differentiated 
and firmly fixed the responsibilities the better so far as 
accountability is concerned. But the traditional ministerial 
department, especially at its highest levels, fuses rather 
than separates roles (the departmental head is both chief 
policy adviser and departmental chief executive) and leaves 
great freedom for the minister and senior officials to fashion 
a division of labour to suit circumstances and personalities.
446
In its attempt to retain such an administrative structure 
while seeking to strengthen ministerial accountability and to 
have officials held directly accountable, the Coombs 
Commission expressed a desire to have its cake and eat it. In 
Self's words, '[a]s long as Australia practices a highly 
fluid, flexible and pragmatic system of administration, so 
long will rules of accountability prove elusive or illusory' 
(Self, 1978:328).
As we saw in Chapter 3, subsequent work on 
administrative reform in Australian Commonwealth government 
has also evaluated very positively the flexibility of the 
ministerial department. For instance, the Senate Standing 
Committee on Finance and Government Operations, in its 
influential Fifth Report on statutory authorities, argued that 
the ministerial department's 'flexibility' gave it a 'basic 
advantage' over the statutory authority: 'when governmental 
functions being performed by departments change . . . the 
consequent structural alterations are relatively simple: the 
Administrative Orders can be changed and staff can be 
transferred' (SSCFGO, 1982:22-3).
Given the Senate committee's preoccupation with the 
issue of accountability, its failure to note any consequences 
for accountability of such flexibility suggests that it saw 
none. But this is far from the case. The costs of the 
frequent administrative change which results from the fact 
that the ministerial department is wholly an expression of the 
will of the executive have been emphasized elsewhere. Coombs 
drew attention to the costs in 'money and manpower' and the
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damage to public service morale of excessive administrative 
change (RCAGA, 1976:387). More recently, the (Reid) Review of 
Commonwealth Administration observed that between 1972 and 
1982 41 departments were abolished, 40 created and 24 retitled 
(RCA, 1983; cited by Nethercote, 1986:4). Its report included 
an extensive list of the associated costs and adverse 
administrative consequences (RCA, 1983:191-2). Reviewing the 
instability created by the record of departmental reshuffling 
just noted, the Chairman of the Review was moved to 'ponder 
how anything was achieved in a consistent way with any 
prospect of coherent planning or sensible results' (Reid, 
1984; cited by Nethercote, 1986:5).
From our perspective, the main point is that 
governments are scarcely required to account for such 
machinery of government changes. It is hardly surprising that 
critics have called for machinery of government legislation or 
an affirmative resolution by parliament prior to 
administrative reorganizations. In a remarkable departure 
from the normal tenor of comparisons between ministerial 
departments and statutory authorities, one critic has argued 
that:
Proper accountability may even require that departments 
be constituted individually by legislation. These 
requirements apply in the case of statutory agencies; 
the departmental system should now likewise be brought 
within the pale of parliamentary scrutiny and sanction. 
(Abel 1982; cited by Nethercote, 1986:6).
In short, then, efforts to take administrative 
accountability seriously in the circumstances of contemporary 
government have led to various pressures, so far fairly
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successfully resisted, for the traditional arrangements of 
ministerial administration to be restricted or replaced by 
arrangements closer to those associated with statutory 
authorities.
The Rise and Fall and Rise of the 'Swedish Model*
As well as suggesting in effect a remodelling of the 
ministerial department along lines closer to those of the 
statutory authority, reformers aiming to improve 
administrative accountability have also argued for a reduction 
in the role of the ministerial department in government and a 
corresponding increase in the role played by non-ministerial 
or quasi-autonomous agencies. The ultimate reference point 
for advocates of this approach, such as the British Fulton 
Committee and Emy (1976), has been the Swedish model of public 
administration. The latter involves a fairly rigid division 
of functions between institutions: small ministries take 
responsibility for policy formulation and strategic control 
while the bulk of administration, including policy 
implementation and delivery of services to the public, is 
entrusted to statutory authorities (Elder, 1970).
Emy (1976:50) believed the application of this model to 
Australia would yield two interrelated benefits. It would 
help to narrow and define more clearly 'the ambit of political 
management' with beneficial consequences for ministerial 
accountability. At the same time, it would clearly identify 
those officials who were to be covered by the conventions of 
anonymity and confidentiality, enabling a strong system of
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accountable management to be imposed on the remainder. Emy 
suggested that full statutory separation may not be necessary 
to reap these advantages.
An echo of Emy's prescriptions can be detected in
Coombs' support for the 'bureau' framework for research bodies
(RCAGA, 1976:79-80). But in general the Coombs Commission
refused to countenance the Swedish model. The grounds for its
opposition are unclear, but several factors were probably at
work. Firstly, there was the perception, registered in
Wettenhall's report for the Commission, that the 'hiving off'
recommended for Britain by the Fulton Committee was not
proving 'as easy or successful' as its advocates had hoped.19
Wettenhall (1976:332) warned that
... we should be wary of establishing new statutory 
authorities just because an activity is self-contained, 
lacks policy content, etc. etc. We have no easy 
solutions to the problems of accountability that this 
course produces, and no guarantee that the work will be 
better done than is a department.
Secondly, as Self (1978:323) noted, departmental permanent 
heads would most likely have been opposed for the self- 
interested reason that large-scale hiving-off would have 
weakened their authority in the system of public 
administration.20 Thirdly, there was the Commission's
19. This view was advanced by the Civil Service Department 
iin Britain (Garrett, 1980:69). But according to Garrett, 'the 
Ifailure to persevere with hiving off was ... probably due more 
tto a change in political attitudes than to any intrinsic 
difficulty in constructing them [hived off organizations]... The 
ttide of parliamentary opinion had swung away from the emphasis 
on managerial efficiency, which hiving off was supposed to bring, 
and towards an emphasis on surveillance and scrutiny' (1980:70).
20. Self (1978:332, endnote 15) for further discussion of 
tthis point.
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unwillingness to consider a reduction in the flexibility it 
valued in ministerial administration. This was part of the 
Commissioners' deep attachment to the Westminster model 
despite their criticisms of it (Self, 1978:322).
The Coombs position on the Swedish model was and is the 
unchallenged mainstream Australian position. The same was 
true of the other Anglo-Saxon parliamentary democracies over 
many years. In very recent times, however, the Swedish model 
has received renewed support in New Zealand and Britain. In 
the New Zealand case the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, 
affecting 60,000 public servants or around 25 per cent of the 
central government workforce, was a major example of the 
systematic employment of the statutory authority as part of a 
strategy to improve the efficiency and accountability of the 
public sector (Boston, 1987:424).21 Commentators have 
suggested that this may be the beginning of an extensive 
remodelling of New Zealand public administration along Swedish 
lines (Roberts, 1987; Boston, 1987) In this scenario a core 
of 10 to 12 smallish 'ministries' (replacing some 30 
departments) would have responsibility for 'gathering 
information, supplying policy advice to ministers, drafting 
legislation and regulations and preparing budgetary 
proposals'; while new administrative agencies, each 'run by 
a separate independent board of directors' but 'subject to the 
overall direction of the government', would be established to 
implement policy (Boston, 1987:426).
21. More precisely the new entities are statutory limited 
liability companies established under the State-owned Enterprises 
Act and incorporated under the Companies Act 1955.
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In Britain the need for a new administrative framework 
for public administration, with a greater role for semi- 
autonomous agencies, was advocated once more in the Efficiency 
Unit report Improving Management in Government: the Next Steps 
(1988). The recommended change reflected the view that 
substantial improvements in resource management and a greater 
emphasis on service delivery required greater status and 
autonomy for civil service managers than could be gained 
within the existing system. The impediments targeted by the 
Report were nothing less than the unified civil service, which 
constrains flexibility in pay and conditions, and ministerial 
administration, which fuses policy advisory and managerial 
roles and confers greater status on policy work than on 
management. Subsequent governmental action has been viewed as 
a much watered down version of the Report's scheme for 
devolving power.22 But in responding to the Report, the 
Prime Minister committed the government to a 'continuing 
programme* for establishing agencies and suggested 
considerable potential for the initiative to develop beyond 
its initial modest form (House of Commons Weekly Hansard 1988, 
cited by Fry, Flynn, Gray, Jenkins and Rutherford, 1988:433).
22. Some 12 blocks of work, involving about 70,000 civil 
servants, were identified as candidates for 'executive agency* 
status. For a list of the entities concerned see Fry et al. 
((1988:433). The government stepped back from the more radical 
possibilities presented by the Efficiency Unit report. Thus the 
Prime Minister stated that agencies would in most cases be set 
up within the Civil Service and subject to full ministerial 
responsibility, but under the day-to-day control of a chief 
executive and with greater flexibility on pay (The Times, 1988a 
and 1988b). The Times newspaper described the changes as an 
"anti-climax' and 'small beer' but also suggested the possibility 
that the experiment might lead to bigger things. (The Times, 
11988c)
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Fry has suggested that the existing arrangements - with the 
government on one hand fully endorsing ministerial 
responsibility and on the other hand promoting autonomy for 
civil service managers - are unstable and may well give way to 
'an Anglicized form of a Swedish style structure' (Fry et al., 
1988:436-7).
There has so far been almost no acknowledgement of the 
possible relevance of these developments to Australia. But 
various recent initiatives suggest that similar pressures are 
at work in the Australian public sector. At the Commonwealth 
level an important example is the 'hiving off' of functions 
from the Department of Transport to the Federal Airports 
Corporation created in 1986 and the Civil Aviation Authority 
created in 198823. Another is the 'corporatisation' of 
public enterprise within the Department of Defence (Beazley, 
1989). More generally, Australia shares with Britain and New 
Zealand the growing attraction to a 'corporate management' 
approach to public administration (Davis et al., 1989) which 
has been an important influence on developments in the latter 
countries.
Australian academic commentary has barely begun to 
digest these trends. Wettenhall (1988) is a partial 
exception. Exemplifying his own earlier contention that ideas 
in public administration follow a pendulum swing (1968b:352- 
3), Wettenhall (1988) has articulated a reversal of his
23. Federal Airports Corporation Act No.4 1986; Civil 
Aviation Authority Act No.63 1989. The Department of Transport 
was absorbed into the Department of Transport and Communications 
din 1987.
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previous position that statutory authority status should be 
reserved for 'exceptional cases' (1976:342). His suggestion, 
offered entirely without argument, that 'it may now be time to 
resurrect the Swedish model of administrative structure' 
(1988:196) would nevertheless strike many Australian readers 
as curious after a decade and a half of almost unrelieved 
vilification of the statutory authority and a much longer 
administrative history which made the Westminster arrangements 
for ministerial administration the model of accountable public 
administration. But, on the argument of this thesis, he is 
undoubtedly correct to call for a re-examination of settled 
attitudes towards the structure of public administration in 
Australia.
Conclusion
Those making judgements about the accountability of statutory 
authorities have traditionally employed the ministerial 
department as an explicit or implicit bench-mark. But while 
commentators on statutory authorities often continue to adopt 
the ministerial department as the model of the accountable 
administrative agency, wider ranging studies of administrative 
accountability - notably, for the Australian Commonwealth 
government, the Coombs report - have called the relevance of 
that model into question. Moreover, in attempting to devise 
institutional arrangements which answer the challenges to 
administrative accountability posed by the circumstances of 
contemporary Westminster-style government, reformers have more 
or less consciously turned to the statutory authority and have
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sought both to inject elements of the statutory authority form 
into the ministerial department and to argue for a larger role 
for the statutory authority in public administration. In this 
broader context, then, the statutory authority has come to 
rival the ministerial department as a model of accountable 
administration, with advocates of the Swedish system arguing 
for an administrative structure which treats both agency types 
as normal or standard instruments to be used in tandem to 
maximize the 'accountability potential' of government. The 
value of the statutory authority as far as accountability is 
concerned is that it permits the firm assignment of 
independent responsibilities to non-ministerial actors and 
thereby opens the way for the full development of alternative 
forms of accountability whose presence alongside ministerial 
responsibility have been seen as essential to an adequate 
contemporary system of accountability. We have seen in 
Chapters 7 and 8 that Commonwealth statutory authorities have 
proved to be apt vehicles for forms of accountability similar 
to the accountable management and downward responsiveness 
principles discussed in the present chapter.
CONCLUSION
This thesis has both critical and constructive purposes. Its 
critical purpose has been to show that the dominance of a 
particular conception of accountability has distorted 
understanding of administrative accountability in Commonwealth 
statutory authorities. The idea of 'parliamentary control' - 
which is a shorthand way of describing the distinctive 
Westminster 'syndrome' (Parker, 1978b) of ministerial control 
of administration and ministerial responsibility to parliament 
- developed alongside the idea of ministerial administration 
and the ministerial department. But there has been a strong 
tendency to sever parliamentary control from its institutional 
moorings in the ministerial department and to make it 
synonymous with administrative accountability. Once this step 
has been taken the notion of an accountable statutory 
authority becomes highly problematic - but for reasons which 
have nothing to do with matters of substance. The thesis has 
explored a number of diverse consequences of the hegemony of 
'parliamentary control':
despite a good deal of opinion to the contrary, 
accountability arrangements and levels of accountability 
(that is, parliamentary control) for statutory
authorities are not markedly different to those for 
ministerial departments (the argument of Part II); 
past efforts to devise or implement forms of account-
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ability specifically designed for statutory authorities 
have been very restricted exercises (Chapter 2); 
the recent statutory authority reform movement has by and 
large perpetuated the limited thinking of the past 
(Chapter 3);
the interests of the executive rather than those of the 
parliament (or the public) have been served by a narrow 
(Westminster) interpretation of the ways in which 
parliament may 'control' statutory authorities (Chapter 
3).
The thesis has also argued that the need to rethink the issues 
of accountability surrounding statutory authorities has gained 
urgency from the fact (demonstrated in Chapter 9) that 
'parliamentary control' has over recent years begun to lose 
its hegemonic position in Australian public administration.
The constructive purpose of the thesis has been to 
develop an adequate understanding of the public accountability 
of Commonwealth statutory authorities. An important part of 
this task was to establish an appropriate conceptual 
framework. This involved, firstly, drawing upon the ideas of 
Linder (1978) and Romzek and Dubnick (1987) to define the root 
idea of accountability as the satisfaction of diverse 
expectations and concerns about the exercise of administrative 
discretion. Secondly, two additional conceptions of, or 
'perspectives' on, administrative accountability were 
introduced - a 'managerialist' conception and a 'constituency 
relations' conception. Thus, as others have identified 
multiple conceptions of liberty (see Berlin, 1969), democracy
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(see Schumpeter, 1942; Dahl, 1956; Lijphart, 1984), social 
justice (Miller, 1976) and so on, I have argued that three 
main conceptions of accountability may be usefully 
distinguished for a discussion of Commonwealth statutory 
authorities in the 1980s. The differences between the three 
conceptions of accountability may be described (as in Figure 
8.1) in abbreviated fashion as follows: the traditional 
notion of parliamentary control rests on essentially 
bureaucratic relationships of close supervision or control of 
the administrative agency; the managerialist conception rests 
on quasi-contractual relations, emphasizing strategic control 
and periodic evaluation; and the constituency relations 
conception rests on an essentially political set of 
relationships, emphasizing the responsiveness through various 
mechanisms of the agency to a range of interested 
constituencies. It was argued in Part III that, in the light 
of the appropriately sophisticated understanding of public 
accountability permitted by this conceptual framework, 
Commonwealth statutory authorities appear more accountable 
than is commonly supposed. Moreover, the statutory authority 
can be seen to have certain advantages over the ministerial 
department as the basic building block of an accountable 
public administration.
The way in which each of the above conceptions of 
accountability relates individually to the statutory 
authorities of Australian Commonwealth government has been 
extensively illustrated in Chapters 4 to 8 of the thesis. But
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something needs to be said about the relationship which is 
envisaged between the three conceptions.
The main point is that the latter are not intended to be 
seen as mutually exclusive ways of viewing accountability. 
Nor has the thesis sought to argue that any one conception is 
intrinsically superior to the others. All have a role to play 
in contemporary public administration, and indeed all three 
may be utilized in tandem to engineer a desired level and form 
of public accountability for particular statutory authorities. 
But all will not be equally relevant to each agency: 
depending on the task of the agency and the associated 
institutional arrangements, different combinations of the 
three conceptions - and of the mechanisms through which each 
is realized - will be appropriate. This is true for 
ministerial departments and statutory authorities alike. But 
it is important to note that ministerial departments, as a 
class, are far more constrained in the variety of 
accountability regimes they may adopt: parliamentary control 
via ministerial responsibility must, almost by definition, 
remain the dominant form of accountability for the ministerial 
department.
The position on the design of accountability regimes 
advocated in this thesis is thus in sympathy with the view of 
Romzek and Dubnick (1987) that accountability should be 
treated in effect as an aspect of organizational design and 
that accountability regimes ought to be tailored to the nature 
and mission of the particular administrative organization.
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It might be thought that the emergence over recent years 
of a pluralistic set of accountability arrangements in 
Commonwealth government (as described in Chapter 9) would have 
encouraged intellectual acceptance of the approach just 
outlined. In fact, however, thinking about accountability 
continues to exhibit a definite monistic tendency. This is 
illustrated by current enthusiasm for a managerialist, or 
corporate management, approach to improving effectiveness, 
efficiency and accountability of administrative operations 
across the board. It seems obvious that reforms which may 
make great sense in, for instance, Telecom's task environment 
(such as development of more objective measures of 
performance, establishment of clearer objectives and medium 
term corporate strategies) may be of much less relevance, if 
not a complete absurdity, in the task environment of key parts 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade or the Treasury. 
But the Commonwealth's Financial Management Improvement 
Program, in its design if not in its implementation, seems to 
have made little concession to this ostensibly self-evident 
point (see Department of Finance, 1984, 1987, 1988). The
overzealous promotion of this fashionable approach has 
provided an easy target for academic critics (see Peachment, 
1986; Yeatman 1986, 1987; Painter 1988; Considine 1988). It 
may be expected as well to produce more protests - like John 
Ward's on behalf of universities noted in Chapter 8 - from 
senior administrators who are aware, as those at the centre of 
government captivated by the latest cure-all are not, that
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their accountability properly resides in a number of 
relationships and a variety of mechanisms for satisfying 
expectations or justifying the exercise of discretion.
Debate over the accountability of statutory authorities 
may be viewed, finally, as an aspect of a wider debate over 
the relative merits of competing models of democracy. On one 
view, democracy is essentially about majority rule. In a 
majoritarian model of democracy (see Lijphart, 1984), 
accountability is closely related to the responsibility of the 
'elected government' with its 'mandate'. Because governments 
must be able to carry out their responsibilities (that is, 
possess power) in order to be held responsible, the 
majoritarian conception of democracy requires power to be 
concentrated in the hands of the elected representatives of 
the majority. As Lijphart (1984) has shown, this approach is 
closely associated with the 'Westminster model'. But it has 
also been widely promoted in the literature on public 
administration in other liberal-democratic countries. For 
instance, Dwight Waldo is said to have recently characterised 
'orthodox' American public administration as assuming that 
'democracy is realistically achievable only if power is 
concentrated so that it can be held accountable . . . Otherwise, 
responsibility bleeds into the social surround' (Waldo, 1980, 
cited by White, 1989:525). From this point of view, statutory 
authorities are suspect because they diffuse administrative 
authority and weaken the responsibility of 'elected 
ministers', thereby weakening democracy itself.
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But if statutory authorities are challengeable on this 
ground so are other familiar institutions. Thoroughgoing 
majoritarian democrats are not hesitant to make the 
connection:
Like looking to the courts and to upper houses to limit 
the powers of elected governments, statutory authorities 
are a masochistic perversion of the sovereignty of the 
people which after all is the only ultimate source of 
power (Day, 1982:4)1.
On this view, then, statutory authorities have something in 
common with federalism, bicameralism, entrenched 
constitutions, judicial review, bills of rights and electoral 
systems which facilitate representation of minorities: they 
disperse power, create opportunities for the will of the 
majority (party) to be frustrated and weaken the 
responsibility of the elected executive for governmental 
activity at large.
But in an alternative, 'consensus' model of democracy 
(Lijphart, 1984), such limits on the powers of elected 
governments are valued where they institutionalise wide 
participation in decision-making among affected groups and 
individuals and necessitate broad agreement on the policies 
which should be pursued. The irony of the majoritarian model 
of democracy is that it implies that autocratic administration 
is a precondition for democratic government. A consensus 
model of democracy, on the other hand, permits administration
My attention was drawn to this statement by Wettenhall 
(.1983:37). As Wettenhall notes, the context was a discussion of 
uirban planning in the Australian Capital Territory.
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to contribute directly to the liberal-democratic ends of the 
political system (see generally Ostrom, 1974). Statutory 
authorities have a role to play in such a system of 
government. They allow administrative tasks to be located in 
a wide variety of purpose-built administrative agencies with 
a wide range of purpose-related means of responding to the 
concerns and expectations of many relevant constituencies 
regarding the use of administrative discretion.
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